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
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
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




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THE

PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

EDITED BY

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THE
PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

THE PRAGMATIST ACCOUNT OF TRUTH AND ITS
MISUNDERSTANDERS.

THE account of truth given by me in the *Journal of Philosophy* for March 14 of this year (Vol. IV, p. 141) and printed later in my volume entitled *Pragmatism*, continues to meet with such persistent misunderstanding that I am tempted to make a final brief reply. My ideas may well deserve refutation, but they can get none till they are conceived of in their proper shape. The fantastic character of the current misconceptions shows how unfamiliar is the concrete point of view which pragmatism assumes. Persons who are familiar with a conception move about so easily in it that they understand each other at a hint, and can converse without anxiously attending to their P's and Q's. I have to admit, in view of the results, that we have assumed too ready an intelligence, and consequently in many places used a language too slipshod. We should never have spoken elliptically. The critics have boggled at every word they could boggle at, and refused to take the spirit rather than the letter of our discourse. This seems to show a genuine unfamiliarity in the whole point of view. It also shows, I think, that the second stage of opposition, which has already begun to express itself in the stock phrase that 'what is new is not true, and what is true not new,' in pragmatism, is insincere. If we said nothing in any degree new, why was our meaning so desperately hard to catch? The blame cannot be laid wholly upon our obscurity of speech, for in other subjects we have attained to making ourselves understood. But recriminations are tasteless; and, as far as I personally am concerned, I am sure that some of the misconception I complain

of is due to my doctrine of truth being surrounded in that volume of popular lectures by a lot of other opinions not necessarily implicated with it, so that a reader may very naturally have grown confused. For this I am to blame, — likewise for omitting certain explicit cautions, which the pages that follow will now in part supply.

First misunderstanding: Pragmatism is only a reëditing of positivism.

This seems the commonest mistake. Scepticism, positivism, and agnosticism agree with ordinary dogmatic rationalism in presupposing that everybody knows what the word 'truth' means, without further explanation. But they then either suggest or declare that real truth, absolute truth, is inaccessible to us, and that we must fain put up with relative or phenomenal truth as its next best substitute. By scepticism this is treated as an unsatisfactory state of affairs, while positivism and agnosticism are cheerful about it, call real truth sour grapes, and consider phenomenal truth quite sufficient for all our 'practical' purposes.

In point of fact, nothing could be farther from all this than what pragmatism has to say of truth. Its thesis is an altogether previous one. It leaves off where these other theories begin, having contented itself with the word truth's *definition*. "No matter whether any mind extant in the universe possess truth or not," it asks, "what does the notion of truth signify *ideally*?" "What kind of things would true judgments be in case they existed?" The answer which pragmatism offers is intended to cover the most complete truth that can be conceived of, 'absolute' truth, if you like, as well as truth of the most relative and imperfect description. This question of what truth would be like if it did exist, belongs obviously to a purely speculative field of inquiry. It is not a theory about any sort of reality, or about what kind of knowledge is actually possible; it abstracts from facts altogether.

As Kant's question about synthetic judgments had escaped previous philosophers, so the pragmatist question is not only so subtle as to have escaped attention hitherto, but even so subtle, it would seem, that when openly broached now, dogmatists and

sceptics alike fail to apprehend it, and deem the pragmatist to be treating of something wholly different. He insists, they say (I quote an actual critic), "that the greater problems are insoluble by human intelligence, that our need of knowing truly is artificial and illusory, and that our reason, incapable of reaching the foundations of reality, must turn itself exclusively towards *action*." There could not be a worse misapprehension.

Second misunderstanding: Pragmatism is primarily an appeal to action.

The name pragmatism, with its suggestions of action, has been an unfortunate choice, I have to admit, and has played into the hands of this mistake. But no word could protect the doctrine from critics so blind to the nature of the inquiry that, when Dr. Schiller speaks of ideas 'working' well, the only thing they think of is their immediate workings in the physical environment, their enabling us to make money, or gain some similar 'practical' advantage. Ideas do work thus, of course, immediately or remotely; but they work indefinitely inside of the mental world also. Not crediting us with this rudimentary insight, our critics treat our view as offering itself exclusively to engineers, doctors, financiers, and men of action generally, who need some sort of a rough and ready *Weltanschauung*, but have no time or wit to study genuine philosophy. It is usually described as a characteristically American movement, a sort of bobtailed scheme of thought, excellently fitted for the man on the street, who naturally hates theory and wants cash returns immediately.

It is quite true that, when the refined theoretic question that pragmatism begins with is once answered, secondary corollaries of a practical sort follow. Investigation shows that, in the function called truth, previous realities are not the only independent variables. To a certain extent our ideas, being realities, are also independent variables, and, just as they follow other reality and fit it, so, in a measure, does other reality follow and fit them. When they add themselves to being, they partly redetermine the existent, so that reality as a whole appears incompletely definable unless ideas also are kept account of. This pragmatist doctrine, exhibiting our ideas as complementary elements of reality, throws

open (since our ideas are instigators of our action) a wide window upon human action, as well as a wide license to originality in thought. But few things could be sillier than to ignore the prior epistemological edifice in which the window is built, or to talk as if pragmatism began and ended at the window. This, nevertheless, is what our critics do almost without exception. They ignore our primary step and its motive, and make the relation to action, which is our secondary achievement, primary.

Third misunderstanding: Pragmatists cut themselves off from the right to believe in ejective realities.

They do so, according to the critics, by making the truth of our beliefs consist in their verifiability, and their verifiability in the way in which they do work for us. Professor Stout, in his otherwise admirable and helpful review of Schiller in *Mind* for last October, considers that this ought to lead Schiller (could he sincerely realize the effects of his own doctrine) to the absurd consequence of being unable to believe genuinely in another man's headache, even were the headache there. He can only 'postulate' it for the sake of the working value of the postulate to himself. The postulate guides certain of his acts and leads to advantageous consequences; but the moment he understands fully that the postulate is true only in this sense, it ceases (or should cease) to be true for him that the other man really *has* a headache. All that makes the postulate most precious then evaporates: his interest in his fellow-man "becomes a veiled form of self-interest, and his world grows cold, dull, and heartless."

Such an objection makes a curious muddle of the pragmatist's universe of discourse. Within that universe the pragmatist finds someone with a headache or other feeling, and someone else who postulates that feeling. Asking on what condition the postulate is 'true,' the pragmatist replies that, for the postulator at any rate, it is true just in proportion as to believe in it works in him the fuller sum of satisfactions. What is it that is satisfactory here? Surely to *believe* in the postulated object, namely, in the really existing feeling of the other man. But how, even though the postulator were himself the most hardened pragmatist, could it ever be satisfactory to him *not* to believe in that

feeling, so long as, in Professor Stout's words, disbelief "made the world seem to him cold, dull, and heartless"? Disbelief would seem, on pragmatist principles, quite out of the question under such conditions. And since the supposed belief, true for the subject assumed in the pragmatist's universe of discourse, is also true for the pragmatist who for his epistemologizing purposes has assumed that entire universe, why is it not true in that universe absolutely? The headache believed in is a reality there, and no extant mind disbelieves it! Have our opponents any better brand of truth in this real universe of ours that they can show us?¹

So much for the third misunderstanding, which is but one specification of the following still wider one.

Fourth misunderstanding: No pragmatist can be a realist in his epistemology.

This is supposed to follow from his statement that the truth of our beliefs consists in general in their giving satisfaction. Of course satisfaction *per se* is a subjective condition; so the conclusion is drawn that truth falls wholly inside of the subject, who then may manufacture it at his pleasure. True beliefs become thus wayward affections, severed from all responsibility to other parts of experience.

¹ I see here a chance to forestall a criticism which someone may make on Lecture III of my *Pragmatism*, where, on pp. 96-100, I said that 'God' and 'Matter' might be regarded as synonymous terms, so long as no differing future consequences were deducible from the two conceptions. The passage was transcribed from my address at the California Philosophical Union, reprinted in the *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 673. I had no sooner given the address than I perceived a flaw in that part of it; but I have left the passage unaltered ever since, because the flaw did not spoil its illustrative value. The flaw was evident when, as a case analogous to that of a godless universe, I thought of what I called an 'automatic sweetheart,' meaning a soulless body which should be absolutely indistinguishable from a spiritually animated maiden, laughing, talking, blushing, nursing us, and performing all feminine offices as tactfully and sweetly as if a soul were in her. Would any one regard her as a full equivalent? Certainly not, and why? Because, framed as we are, our egoism craves above all things inward sympathy and recognition, love and admiration. The outward treatment is valued mainly as an expression, as a manifestation. Pragmatically, then, the idea of the automatic sweetheart would not *work*, and in point of fact no one treats it as a serious hypothesis. The godless universe would be exactly similar. Even if matter could do every outward thing that God does, the idea of it would not work as satisfactorily, because the chief call for a God on modern men's part is for a being who will inwardly recognize them and judge them sympathetically. Matter disappoints this craving of our ego, so God remains for most men the truer hypothesis, and remains so for definite pragmatic reasons.

It is difficult to excuse such a parody of the pragmatist's opinion, ignoring as it does every element but one of his universe of discourse. The terms of which that universe consists positively forbid any non-realistic interpretation of the function of knowledge defined there. The pragmatizing epistemologist posits there a reality and a mind with ideas. What, now, he asks, can make those ideas true of that reality? Ordinary epistemology contents itself with the vague statement that the ideas must 'correspond' or 'agree'; the pragmatist insists on being more concrete, and asks what such 'agreement' may mean in detail. He finds first that the ideas must point to or lead towards *that* reality and no other, and then that the pointings and leadings must yield satisfaction as their result. So far the pragmatist is hardly less abstract than the ordinary slouchy epistemologist; but as he defines himself farther, he grows more concrete. The entire quarrel of the intellectualist with him is over his concreteness, intellectualism contending that the vaguer and more abstract account is here the more profound.¹ The concrete pointing and leading are conceived by the pragmatist to be the work of other portions of the same universe to which the reality and the mind belong, intermediary verifying bits of experience with which the mind at one end, and the reality at the other, are joined. The 'satisfaction,' in turn, is no abstract satisfaction *überhaupt*, felt by an unspecified being, but is assumed to consist of such satisfactions (in the plural) as concretely existing men do find in their beliefs. As we humans are constituted in point of fact, we find that to believe in other men's minds, in independent physical realities, in past events, in eternal logical relations, is satisfactory. We find hope satisfactory. We often find it satisfactory to cease to doubt. Above all we find *consistency* satisfactory, consistency between the present idea and the entire rest of our mental equipment, including the whole order of our sensations, and that of our intuitions of likeness and difference, and our whole stock of previously acquired truths.

The pragmatist, being himself a man, and imagining in general no contrary lines of truer belief than ours about the 'reality'

¹Cf. Russell in the *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. IV, pp. 292-293, and Pratt, *ibid.*, p. 322.

which he has laid at the base of his epistemological discussion, is willing to treat our satisfactions as possibly really true guides to it, not as guides true solely for *us*. It would seem here to be the duty of his critics to show with some explicitness why, being our subjective feelings, these satisfactions can *not* yield objective truth. The ideas which they accompany 'correspond' to the assumed reality, 'agree' with it, and 'fit' it in perfectly definite and assignable ways, through the sequent trains of thought and action which form their verification, so merely to insist on using these words abstractly instead of concretely is no way of driving the pragmatist from the field, — his more concrete account virtually includes his critic's. If our critics have any definite idea of a truth more objectively grounded than the kind we propose, why do they not show it more articulately? As they stand, they remind one of Hegel's man who wanted 'fruit,' but rejected cherries, peas, and grapes, because they were not fruit in the abstract. We offer them the full quart pot, and they cry for the empty quart-capacity.

But here I think I hear some critic retort as follows: "If satisfactions are all that is needed to make truth, how about the notorious fact that errors are so often satisfactory? And how about the equally notorious fact that certain true beliefs may cause the bitterest dissatisfaction? Isn't it clear that not the satisfaction which it gives, but the relation of the belief *to the reality* is all that makes it true? Suppose there were no such reality, and that the satisfactions yet remained: would they not then effectively work falsehood? Can they consequently be treated distinctively as the truth-builders? It is the *inherent relation to reality* of a belief that gives us that specific *truth-satisfaction*, compared with which all other satisfactions are the hollowest humbug. The satisfaction of *knowing truly* is thus the only one which the pragmatist ought to have considered. As a psychological sentiment, the anti-pragmatist gladly concedes it to him, but then only as a concomitant of truth, not as a constituent. What *constitutes* truth is not the sentiment, but the purely logical or objective function of rightly cognizing the reality, and the pragmatist's failure to reduce this function to lower values is patent."

Such anti-pragmatism as this seems to me a tissue of confusion.

To begin with, when the pragmatist says 'indispensable,' it confounds this with 'sufficient.' The pragmatist calls satisfactions indispensable for truth-building, but expressly calls them insufficient unless reality be also incidentally led to. If the reality he assumed were cancelled from his universe of discourse, he would straightway give the name of falsehoods to the beliefs remaining, in spite of all their satisfactoriness. For him, as for his critic, there can be no truth if there is nothing to be true about. Ideas are so much flat psychological surface unless some mirrored matter gives them cognitive lustre. This is why the pragmatist is forced to posit his 'reality' *ab initio*, and why, throughout his whole discussion, he remains an epistemological realist.

The anti-pragmatist is guilty of the further confusion of imagining that, in undertaking to give him an account of what truth formally means, we are assuming at the same time to provide a warrant for it, trying to define the occasions when he can be sure of materially possessing it. Our making it hinge on a reality so 'independent' that when it comes, truth comes, and when it goes, truth goes with it, disappoints this *naïve* expectation, so he deems our description unsatisfactory. I suspect that under this confusion lies the still deeper one of not discriminating sufficiently between the two notions, truth and reality. Realities are not *true*, they *are*; and beliefs are true *of* them. But I suspect that in the anti-pragmatist mind the two notions sometimes swap their attributes. The reality itself, I fear, is treated as if 'true,' and conversely. Whoso tells us of the one, it is then supposed, must also be telling us of the other; and a true idea must in a manner *be*, or at least *yield* without extraneous aid, the reality it cognitively is possessed of.

To this absolute-idealistic demand pragmatism simply opposes its *non possumus*. If there is to be truth, it says, both realities and beliefs about them must conspire to make it; but whether there ever is such a thing, or how anyone can be sure that his own beliefs possess it, it never pretends to determine. That truth-satisfaction *par excellence* which may tinge a belief unsatisfactory in other ways, it easily explains as the feeling of consistency with the stock of previous truths, or supposed truths, of which

one's whole past experience may have left one in possession.¹

But are not all pragmatists sure that their own belief is right? their enemies will ask at this point; and this leads me to the

Fourth misunderstanding: What pragmatists say is inconsistent with their saying so.

A correspondent puts this objection as follows: "When you say to your audience, 'pragmatism is the truth concerning truth,' the first truth is different from the second. About the first you and they are not to be at odds; you are not giving them liberty to take or leave it according as it works satisfactorily or not for their private uses. Yet the second truth, which ought to describe and include the first, affirms this liberty. Thus the *intent* of your utterance seems to contradict the *content* of it."

General scepticism has always received this same classic refutation. "You have to dogmatize," the rationalists say to the sceptics, "whenever you express the sceptical position; so your lives keep contradicting your thesis." One would suppose that the impotence of so hoary an argument to abate in the slightest degree the amount of general scepticism in the world might have led some rationalists themselves to doubt whether these instantaneous logical refutations are such fatal ways, after all, of killing off live mental attitudes. General scepticism is the live mental attitude of refusing to conclude. It is a permanent torpor of the will, renewing itself in detail towards each successive thesis that offers, and you can no more kill it off by logic than you can kill off obstinacy or practical joking. This is why it is so irritating. Your consistent sceptic never puts his scepticism into a formal proposition,—he simply chooses it as a habit. He provokingly hangs back when he might so easily join us in saying yes, but he is not illogical or stupid,—on the contrary, he often impresses us by his intellectual superiority. This is the *real* scepticism that rationalists have to meet, and their logic does not even touch it.

No more can logic kill the pragmatist's behavior: his act of utterance, so far from contradicting, accurately exemplifies the

¹ I need hardly remind the reader that both sense-percepts and percepts of ideal relation (comparisons, etc.) should be classed among the realities. The bulk of our mental 'stock' consists of truths concerning them.

matter which he utters. What is the matter which he utters? In part, it is this, that truth, concretely considered, is an attribute of our beliefs, and that these are attitudes that follow satisfactions. The ideas around which the satisfactions cluster are primarily only hypotheses that challenge or summon a belief to come and take its stand upon them. The pragmatist's idea of truth is just such a challenge. He finds it ultra-satisfactory to accept it, and takes his own stand accordingly. But, being gregarious as they are, men seek to spread their beliefs, to awaken imitation, to infect others. Why should not *you* also find the same belief satisfactory? thinks the pragmatist, and forthwith endeavors to convert you. You and he will then believe similarly; you will hold up your subject-end of a truth, which will be a truth objective and irreversible if the reality holds up the object-end by being itself present simultaneously. What there is of self-contradiction in all this I confess I cannot discover. The pragmatist's conduct in his own case seems to me on the contrary admirably to illustrate his universal formula; and of all epistemologists, he is perhaps the only one who is irreproachably self-consistent.

Fifth misunderstanding: Pragmatism explains not what truth is, but only how it is arrived at.

In point of fact it tells us both, tells us what it is incidentally to telling us how it is arrived at,—for what *is* arrived at except just what the truth is? If I tell you how to get to the railroad station, don't I implicitly introduce you to the *what*, to the being and nature of that edifice? It is quite true that the abstract *word* 'how' hasn't the same meaning as the abstract *word* 'what,' but in this universe of concrete facts you cannot keep hows and whats asunder. The reasons why I find it satisfactory to believe that any idea is true, my manner of arriving at that belief, may be among the very reasons why the idea *is* true in reality. If not, I summon the anti-pragmatist to explain the impossibility articulately.

His trouble seems to me mainly to arise from his fixed inability to understand how a concrete statement can possibly mean as much, or be as valuable, as an abstract one. I said above that the

main quarrel between us and our critics was that of concreteness *versus* abstractness. This is the place to develop that point farther.

In the present question, the links of experience sequent upon an idea, which mediate between it and a reality, form and, for the pragmatist, indeed, *are*, the *concrete* relation of truth that may obtain between the idea and that reality. They, he says, are all that we mean when we speak of the idea 'pointing' to the reality, 'fitting' it, 'corresponding' with it, or 'agreeing' with it,—they or other similar mediating trains of verification. Such mediating events *make* the idea 'true.' The idea itself, if it exists at all, is also a concrete event: so pragmatism insists that truth in the singular is only a collective name for truths in the plural, these consisting always of series of definite events; and that what intellectualism calls the truth, the *inherent* truth, of any one such series is only the abstract name for its truthfulness in act, for the fact that the ideas there do lead to the supposed reality in a way that we consider satisfactory.

The pragmatist himself has no objection to abstractions. Elliptically, and 'for short,' he relies on them as much as anyone, finding upon innumerable occasions that their comparative emptiness makes of them useful substitutes for the overfulness of the facts he meets with. But he never ascribes to them a higher grade of reality. The full reality of a truth for him is always some process of verification, in which the abstract property of connecting ideas with objects truly is workingly embodied. Meanwhile it is endlessly serviceable to be able to talk of properties abstractly and apart from their working, to find them the same in innumerable cases, to take them 'out of time,' and to treat of their relations to other similar abstractions. We thus form whole universes of Platonic ideas *ante rem*, universes *in posse*, though none of them exists effectively except *in rebus*. Countless relations obtain there which nobody experiences as obtaining,—as, in the eternal universe of musical relations, for example, the notes of Aennchen von Tharau were a lovely melody long ere mortal ears ever heard them. Even so the music of the future sleeps now, to be awakened hereafter. Or, if we take the world of geometrical relations, the thousandth decimal of π sleeps there,

though no one may ever try to compute it. Or, if we take the universe of 'fitting,' countless coats 'fit' backs and countless boots 'fit' feet on which they are not practically *fitted*; countless stones 'fit' gaps in walls into which no one seeks to fit them actually. In the same way countless opinions 'fit' realities, and countless truths are valid, though no thinker ever thinks them.

For the anti-pragmatist these prior timeless relations are the presupposition of the concrete ones, and possess the profounder dignity and value. The actual workings of our ideas in verification-processes are as naught in comparison with the 'obtainings' of this discarnate truth within them.

For the pragmatist, on the contrary, all discarnate truth is static, impotent, and relatively spectral, full truth being the truth that energizes and does battle. Can any one suppose that the sleeping quality of truth would ever have been abstracted or have received a name, if truths had remained forever in that storage-vault of essential timeless 'agreements' and had never been embodied in any panting struggle of men's live ideas for verification? Surely no more than the abstract property of 'fitting' would have received a name, if in our world there had been no backs, or feet, or gaps in walls, to be actually fitted. *Existential* truth is incidental to the actual competition of opinions. *Essential* truth, the truth of the intellectualists, the truth with no one thinking it, is like the coat that fits though no one has ever tried it on, like the music that no ear has listened to. It is less real, not more real, than the verified article; and to attribute a superior degree of glory to it seems little more than a piece of perverse abstraction-worship. As well might a pencil insist that the outline is the essential thing in all pictorial representation, and chide the paint-brush and the camera for omitting it, forgetting that *their* pictures not only contain the whole outline, but a hundred other things in addition. Pragmatist truth contains the whole of intellectualist truth and a hundred other things in addition. Intellectualist truth is then only pragmatist truth *in posse*. That on innumerable occasions men do substitute truth *in posse*, or verifiability, for verification, or truth in act, is a fact to which no one attributes more importance than the pragmatist: he emphasizes

the practical utility of such a habit. But he does not on that account consider truth *in posse*, — truth not alive enough even to have been questioned or contradicted, — to be the metaphysically prior thing, to which truths in act are tributary and subsidiary. When intellectualists do this, pragmatism charges them with inverting the real relation. Truth *in posse* means only truths in act; and he insists that these latter take precedence in the order of logic as well as in that of being.

Sixth misunderstanding: Pragmatism ignores the theoretic interest.

This would seem to be an absolutely wanton slander, were not a certain excuse to be found in the linguistic affinities of the word 'pragmatism,' and in certain offhand habits of speech of ours which assumed too great a generosity on our reader's part. When we spoke of the meaning of ideas consisting in their 'practical' consequences, or of the 'practical' differences which our beliefs make to us; when we said that the truth of a belief consists in its 'working' value, etc.; our language evidently was too careless, for by 'practical' we were almost unanimously held to mean *opposed* to theoretical or genuinely cognitive, and the consequence was punctually drawn that a truth in our eyes could have no relation to any independent reality, or to any other truth, or to anything whatever but the acts which we might ground on it or the satisfactions they might bring. The mere existence of the idea, all by itself, if only its results were satisfactory, would give full truth to it, it was charged, in our absurd pragmatist epistemology. The solemn attribution of this rubbish to us was also encouraged by two other circumstances. First, ideas *are* practically useful in the narrow sense, false ideas sometimes, but most often ideas which we can verify by the sum total of all their leadings, and the reality of whose objects may thus be considered established beyond doubt. That these ideas should be true in advance of and apart from their utility, that, in other words, their objects should be really there, is the very condition of their having that kind of utility, — the objects they connect us with are so important that the ideas themselves grow important. This manner of their practical working was the first thing that made truths good

in the eyes of primitive men ; and, buried among all the other good workings by which true beliefs are characterized, this kind of subsequential utility remains.

The second misleading circumstance was the emphasis laid by Schiller and Dewey on the fact that, unless a truth be relevant to the mind's momentary predicament, unless it be germane to the 'practical' situation, — meaning by this the quite particular perplexity, — it is no good to urge it. It doesn't meet our interests any better than a falsehood would under the same circumstances. But why our interests might not be theoretical here as well as narrowly practical, I wish that our critics would explain. They simply assume that no pragmatist *can* admit a genuinely theoretic interest. Having used the phrase 'cash-value' of an idea, I am implored by one correspondent to alter it, "for everyone thinks you mean only pecuniary profit and loss." Having said that the true is 'the expedient in our thinking,' I am rebuked in this wise by another learned correspondent : "The word expedient has no other meaning than that of self-interest. The pursuit of this has ended by landing a number of officers of national banks in penitentiaries. A philosophy that leads to such results must be unsound."

But the word 'practical' is so habitually loosely used that more indulgence might have been expected. When one says that a sick man has now practically recovered, or that an enterprise has practically failed, one usually means just the opposite of practically in the literal sense. One means that, although untrue in strict practice, what one says is true in theory, true virtually, *certain to be true*. Again, by the practical one often means the distinctively concrete, the individual, particular, and effective, as opposed to the abstract, general, and inert. To speak for myself, whenever I have emphasized the practical nature of truth, this is mainly what has been in my mind. 'Pragmata' are things in their plurality ; and in that early California address, when I described pragmatism as holding that "the meaning of any proposition can always be brought down to some particular consequence in our future practical experience, whether passive or active," I expressly added these qualifying words : "the point lying rather in the fact that the experience must be particular than

in the fact that it must be active," — by 'active' meaning here 'practical' in the narrow literal sense.¹ But particular consequences can perfectly well be of a theoretic nature. Every remote fact which we infer from an idea is a particular theoretic consequence which our mind practically works towards. The loss of every old opinion of ours which we see that we shall have to give up if a new opinion be true, is a particular theoretic as well as a particular practical consequence. After man's interest in breathing freely, the greatest of all his interests (because it never fluctuates or remits, as most of his physical interests do) is his interest in *consistency*, in feeling that what he now thinks goes with what he thinks on other occasions. We tirelessly compare truth with truth for this sole purpose. Is the present candidate for belief perhaps contradicted by principle number one? Is it compatible with fact number two? and so forth. The particular operations here are the purely logical ones of analysis, deduction, comparison, etc.; and although general terms may be used *ad libitum*, the satisfactory *practical working* of the candidate-idea consists in the consciousness yielded by each successive theoretic consequence in particular. It is therefore simply silly to repeat that pragmatism takes no account of purely theoretic interests. All it insists on is that verity in act means *verifications*, and that these are always particulars. Even in exclusively theoretic matters, vagueness and generality serve to verify nothing.

Seventh misunderstanding: Pragmatism is shut up to solipsism.

I have already said something about this misconception under the third and fourth heads, above, but a little more may be helpful. The objection is apt to clothe itself in words like these: "You make truth to consist in every value except the cognitive value proper; you always leave your knower at many removes

¹ The ambiguity of the word 'practical' comes out well in these words of a recent would-be reporter of our views: "Pragmatism is an Anglo-Saxon reaction against the intellectualism and rationalism of the Latin mind . . . Man, each individual man is the measure of things. He is able to conceive none but relative truths, that is to say, illusions. What these illusions are worth is revealed to him, not by general theory, but by individual practice. Pragmatism, which consists in experiencing these illusions of the mind and obeying them by acting them out, is a *philosophy without words*, a philosophy of *gestures and of acts*, which abandons what is general and holds only to what is *particular*." (Bourdeau, in *Journal des Débats*, October 29, 1907.)

(or, at the uttermost, at one remove) from his real object; the best you do is to let his ideas carry him towards it; it remains forever outside of him," etc.

I think that the leaven working here is the rooted intellectualist persuasion that, to know a reality, an idea must in some inscrutable fashion possess or be it.¹ For pragmatism this kind of coalescence is inessential. As a rule our cognitions are only processes of mind off their balance and in motion towards real termini; and the reality of the termini, believed in by the states of mind in question, can be *guaranteed* only by some wider knower.² But if there is no reason extant in the universe why they should be doubted, the beliefs are true in the only sense in which anything can be true anyhow: they are practically and concretely true, namely. True in the mystical mongrel sense of an *Identitätsphilosophie* they need not be; nor is there any intelligible reason why they ever need be true otherwise than verifiably and practically. It is reality's part to possess its own existence; it is thought's part to get into 'touch' with it by innumerable paths of verification.

I fear that the 'humanistic' developments of pragmatism may cause a certain difficulty here. We get at one truth only through the rest of truth; and the reality, everlastingly postulated as that which all our truth must keep in touch with, may never be given to us save in the form of truth other than that which we are now testing. But since Dr. Schiller has shown that all our truths, even

¹ Sensations may, indeed, possess their objects or coalesce with them, as common sense supposes that they do; and intuited differences between concepts may coalesce with the 'eternal' objective differences; but to simplify our discussion here we can afford to abstract from these very special cases of knowing.

² The transcendental idealist thinks that, in some inexplicable way, the finite states of mind are identical with the transfinite all-knower which he finds himself obliged to postulate in order to supply a *fundamentum* for the relation of knowing, as he apprehends it. Pragmatists can leave the question of identity open; but they cannot do without the wider knower any more than they can do without the reality, if they want to *prove* a case of knowing. They themselves play the part of the absolute knower for the universe of discourse which serves them as material for epistemologizing. They warrant the reality there, and the subject's true knowledge, there, of it. But whether what they themselves say about that whole universe is objectively true, *i. e.*, whether the pragmatic theory of truth is true *really*, they cannot warrant, — they can only believe it. To their hearers they can only *propose* it, as I propose it to my readers, as something to be verified *ambulando*, or by the way in which its consequences may confirm it.

the most elemental, are affected with a human coefficient, reality *per se* thus may appear only as a sort of limit ; it may be held to shrivel to the mere *place* for an object, and what is known held to be only matter of our psyche that we fill the place with.

It must be confessed that pragmatism, worked in this humanistic way, is compatible with solipsism. It joins friendly hands with the agnostic part of Kantism, with contemporary agnosticism, and with idealism generally. But worked thus, it is a metaphysical theory about the matter of reality, and flies far beyond pragmatism's own modest analysis of the nature of the knowing function, which analysis may just as harmoniously be combined with less humanistic accounts of reality. One of pragmatism's merits is that it is so purely epistemological. It must assume realities ; but it prejudices nothing as to their constitution, and the most diverse metaphysics can use it as their foundation. It certainly has no special affinity with solipsism.

As I look back over what I have written, much of it gives me a queer impression, as if the obvious were set forth so condescendingly that readers might well laugh at my pomposity. It may be, however, that concreteness as radical as ours is not so obvious. The whole originality of pragmatism, the whole point in it, is its use of the concrete way of seeing. It begins with concreteness, and returns and ends with it. Dr. Schiller, with his two 'practical' aspects of truth, (1) relevancy to situation, and (2) subsequential utility, is only filling the cup of concreteness to the brim for us. Once seize that cup, and you cannot misunderstand pragmatism. It seems as if the power of imagining the world concretely *might* have been common enough to let our readers apprehend us better, as if they might have read between our lines, and, in spite of all our infelicities of expression, guessed a little more correctly what our thought was. But alas ! this was not on fate's program, so we can only think, with the German ditty :

" Es wär' zu schön gewesen,
Es hat nicht können sein."

WILLIAM JAMES.

THE GROUND OF THE TIME-ILLUSION.

IDEALISTS, from Plato to the present day, have been in almost complete agreement as to the illusory nature of time. For the most part, however, they have deemed it sufficient to have uttered the condemnation and to have turned to the exclusive consideration of the eternal. But unless we are to adopt an Oriental meaning of illusion as sheer nothingness, and, in terms of it, to suppose time to be completely false, we must regard time as in some degree expressive of reality. A most effective service, then, that philosophy would seem able to render the cause of the eternal would be to find to what degree the temporal is expressive of the real, and how that degree may be made more adequate.

The object of the present paper is to take a step in this direction by tracing the time-illusion to its subjective source. Curiously enough, time, for our ordinary thought, is a veritable Topsy: it has no accountable origin; it just 'grewed.' In other words, it is a form of illusion that we accept as 'given.' Although with respect to most acts and events we search within ourselves for the causes, we regard time as having no connection with our inner selves. It is a distorting medium, like a prismatic glass, through which we look confusedly for the true features of the real; how the glass came to be, we do not know.

For idealism, this acceptance of time as a given datum, inexplicable, external to ourselves, cannot, of course, be final. Time, for such a metaphysic, is a form or mode of conscious life. As, however, it is a form which involves error, it cannot, as to its source, be referred to perfect consciousness. Its peculiar defect, therefore, must be due to imperfect conscious life. It is incumbent, then, upon idealistic philosophy to ask what there is in the imperfect operations of human consciousness that may be regarded as cause of the time-illusion.

The thesis which the present paper will attempt to prove is, that the time-illusion is the expression of the imperfect character of human interest, the imperfection residing in the fact that human interest is of multiple degrees of intensity. That time

has thus its subjective source in imperfect interest will be all that the present paper will be concerned to establish. The paper will, however, in the end, offer a suggestion as to the manner in which the time-distortion, being primarily subjective, may be increasingly corrected, and the human consciousness brought nearer to an adequate expression of the real.

I.

Our first problem is to find the characteristic imperfection of the time-consciousness. In the whole discussion which follows, we shall treat time, not in abstraction from particular experiences (conceptual time), but, concretely, as a particular experience (perceptual time). Regarded in this way, the time-consciousness is imperfect, mainly, in so far as it is *perspective*. Although the term 'perspective' has, in ordinary usage, a spatial meaning, it is nevertheless perfectly applicable to time. In a spatial sense, a perspective experience is one in which *the point of view is determinant of the perceptual values*. For example, spatial things nearer the point from which the vision proceeds bulk larger than those more distant. When, to be sure, we reflect upon such an immediate spatial perception, we make a revaluation: knowing from experience that distance from the point of vision produces the illusion of lessened size, we discount the perceptual effect and estimate the actual size to be other than the immediate experience reports. In other words, our 'immediate' experience is perspective; our 'mediate reflection' corrects the illusion of perspective. The same error of immediacy and correction of the error by mediation are found in our time-consciousness. Temporally, the point of immediate 'vision' is each one's present. It is because, for example, this present moment in which I am writing is my present, that it bulks largest in my interest; it primarily and above all has for me the feeling of reality. My feeling of past and future decreases in intensity as these recede from my present. My present moment may, indeed, be barren and uninteresting; nevertheless I feel it uniquely and supremely. The feeling is one which belongs to no other moment of my life; it is the feeling of a perfectly immediate and undeniable value. I may, indeed, judge

other moments to have contained more of real value; but those moments do not possess the unique *quale* that 'my present' possesses, a *quale* comparable most nearly to the quite unshareable intimacy which I feel in 'my spatial here.' In fact, the 'my now' and the 'my here' are the standing-points from which, spatially and temporally, we see all else in perspective.

Nor is *my* present in any wise equivalent to *your* present. We may both be sitting in the same room and be aware that our presents are 'at the same time'; nevertheless, my present has an unshareable intimacy for me that yours can, for me, never have. I may, in a degree, lose myself in you, but it is always myself that remains, even in you; and the temporal present is still my present.

Thus the temporal consciousness looks out from its own vantage-point, and, with its immediate time-vision, measures values by nearness and remoteness from that point. Hence, as in spatial perception, *the point of view is determinant of the immediate or perceptual values.* But again, just as in spatial perspective we correct the perceptual values by reflection, so too we make correction of our time-consciousness. When I note how my immediate present has a value for me that no other temporal moment, either of myself or of others, can have, I remark how my time-consciousness is assigning a peculiar highest value, not on the basis of any high value of the content, but solely because that content is *immediately present to me.* I note how the 'me' thus accorded supreme value is but the veriest trifle of a me, a vanishing point between a past and a future. I note, too, that in insisting upon my present as against that of all others, my time-consciousness is valuing me as an isolated identity, apart from and exclusive of all other selves, and therefore wholly misvaluing the real me. I conclude, therefore, that the unique supremacy of interest that I have in my immediate present is a false supremacy, because based upon false values; and so I proceed reflectively to correct the error by regarding my real self as not a vanishing present and not an isolated identity, but as effectually living through and even above all time and in all selves. Hence while, in the immediacy of

my time consciousness, I take the present and only *my* present for my standpoint, reflectively, I look with impartial eye upon all time and all existence. And yet, much as I may reflectively make the correction, I never cease, in the immediacy of my experience, to be conscious of myself in a very present and isolated way, and with an interest that uniquely and disproportionately centers in my particular self as exclusive of others. In other words, while mediate reflection corrects the distortion of perspective, it never actually removes the immediate distortion : so, spatially, I see the railroad tracks run together ; I reflect, then, that they are, in fact, parallel ; and yet my reflection does not alter the fact that I still see them run together. Both temporally and spatially, in short, perception, in its immediacy, is perspective.

It is just this centering in the *immediate* interest of the *immediate* self that constitutes the essential falsification of the time-consciousness. The falsification lies in the fact that, from the point of view of temporal immediacy, the importance which we feel to attach to the present depends almost entirely upon the fact that it is *our* immediate present ; it does not depend primarily upon the content or real value of the present. If we could transcend such distorting time-consciousness, it would mean, in this view, that we should no longer experience values on the basis of their immediate presence to ourselves, but on the basis of the actual values themselves.

Thus far, we have treated the illusion of perspective as attaching only to space and time. But when we regard human consciousness more widely, we note that all the immediate attitudes of the human person are perspective ; so that we are led, finally, to conclude that the perspective quality is the typical error of imperfect consciousness.

The act of attention, for example, is perspective. That which lies in the focus of my attention has a peculiar value for me that all that lies more remote does not (in the immediacy of my attention-act) have. As I sit in my room at work, a British minister is addressing Parliament, a Russian general is quelling a mob, thousands of Chinese are dying of starvation, an astronomer is

discovering a comet ; nay, some thousand and more years ago, Brutus stabbed Caesar ; a thousand years and more hence, a great revolution will occur : all these, if they were *my* focus of attention, would be of far greater intensity of interest than my present moment of quiet work. Nevertheless, in the immediacy of my consciousness, *my* focus is *my* most real, and all else has relative unreality. Again, it is the point of view rather than the content that is here determinant of the values. And again, as in spatial and temporal perception, reflection mediates the immediacy. By changing the focus of attention variously, we widen the outlook ; we become less ' provincial ' ; we try to take all time and all existence for our province. Yet, vary it much as we may, we never can quite escape the distortion of particular focusing. The multiplication of focal points cannot alter the fact that each focus is still, in its immediacy, perspective. So again, although reflection may to an extent correct, it cannot actually remove, the perspective illusion of our acts of attention.

But the ' chief and captain ' of our perspective illusions is the illusion of egoism. It is a typical fact of our human life that each person's interest centers uniquely in himself. Much as I may have been schooled in altruistic or other-regarding motives, it nevertheless remains that the fact that I am I is of an interest to me out of all proportion to the fact that you are you. I may judge your life to be of unspeakably greater value than mine ; I may find in you such riches of life that I hold myself as nothing in your presence. Nevertheless, there is in my existence a feeling of reality such as your existence does not have for me. This feeling of reality is *my unshareable interest in myself*. There is, indeed, a unique experience in which this on-sided feeling of one's self is partly overcome. In the love of another person, there is a kind of identification of the lover with the beloved, so much so that the interests of the beloved are the interests of the lover. And yet, even here, it is a question whether there does not always remain in the lover's consciousness of himself an immediacy of selfhood, and therefore, in a subtle way, an intensity of value, with which the beloved can never be invested. As we emphasize this immediacy of interest, we tend, more and more, to be egoists.

When, however, we reflect, we note the falsity of a view which makes each life a center of unshareable interest, and we aim to realize in ourselves the 'life in others.' All our best human effort is in the direction of an escape from the bondage of our over-emphasized, immediate selves. And yet, try as we may, there remains always for us an intensity of interest in ourselves that cannot, in its immediacy, really be shared with any other. Again, our reflective life corrects to a degree the illusion of egoism ; it cannot, however, actually remove the illusion.

It should need no further argument, then, to show that the illusion of perspective is the typical human imperfection. It should be clear, too, that the time-illusion is not a something apart, inexplicable in purely human terms, but that it is of the very nature of this 'error of vision' which is typically human. If we can discover, now, the subjective source of this error, we shall be able to know, to a degree at least, wherein the time-illusion has its cause within our imperfect selves.

It remains, then, to ask what constitutes the subjective side of the error of perspective. The objective side we have already noted in the fact that the immediate values given by perspective do not correspond to the mediated values. The subjective error, we may say, lies in the fact that every perspective consciousness involves different degrees of interest. My local point of view, my temporal present, my focus of attention, my consciousness of my own existence, are the points of a peculiar intensity of interest not shared by any other points of my consciousness. It is true, of course, that in all consciousness there is of necessity a distinction between immediacy and mediateness of interest : if I am I, and you are you, I can never really be conscious of you as you are of yourself. Immediacy and mediateness, in short, are necessary complements in all conscious life ; and hence there can exist no error in the mere fact that the interest that I have in myself is different in kind from that which I have in you. The error arises, however, when difference in kind is translated into difference of intensity, when, in brief, my interest in myself is made so to preponderate and to claim a unique intensity that all mediate interests are given false values. This is the typical error of

human time-interest. It translates immediacy of interest into greatest intensity of interest; and so it treats the mediate, which rightly is complementary, as inferior in value.

II.

Difference of intensity of interest, then, is undeniably a subjective condition of the time-illusion. Up to this point, however, we have made no attempt to differentiate time-consciousness with respect to the manner in which it, in its special way, exhibits difference of interest-intensity. We have noted an illusion, namely, perspective-immediacy, common to several modes of our consciousness. It remains now to ask in what unique manner time-consciousness exhibits difference of interest-intensity.

In the first place, time, unlike space, attention, etc., has the quality of 'passing.' Its passing, too, is of different rates. By what means, now, do we measure the particular rates of passing? On the one hand, the passage of time is measured extra-subjectively by the reference of the temporal 'flow' to uniformly recurrent spatial movements. If one swing of the pendulum measured the elapsed moment, my ground for declaring that the present moment is of equal length lies in my noting the fact that it occupies precisely one recurrent swing of the same pendulum. Obviously, however, such extra-subjective measurement of time into equal segments is not a complete or adequate measurement of time. It treats time in a purely external manner as a something resolvable into terms wholly quantitative. It takes no account of the fact that the time-flow has a qualitative nature which varies from person to person and within the consciousness of each person. It aims simply to conventionalize time, to treat only that in it which is universal and public. It follows, then, that the more adequate measurement must treat time, not as an abstraction, but as a personal, qualitative experience. Taken thus, time is no even flow that can be ticked off into equal segments. One hour, by the clock, passes 'like lightning,' while another drags its weary length with untold slowness. If, now, we watch these variations of rate, we note that they are inseparably bound up with the variations of our interest. When I am

intensely interested, time passes with quite unwonted speed; when I am thoroughly bored, it creeps along on leaden feet; in my ordinary state of interest, it flows at a rate which becomes for me the normal rate of time-speed. Thus in the last resort, degree of interest is the subjective measure of time rates.

We pass now to a less obvious consideration. Time, we have said, is a rate; but being such, it involves a somewhat against which it may be measured. Thus, in like manner, a spatial movement must be measured against spatial points of relative permanence. It follows, then, that whenever there is the experience of a duration, or time-flow, there must likewise be the experience of that against which the duration is measured. What is this standard of reference? We are inclined at first to answer 'the timeless'; but while the timeless is undoubtedly the standard of *definition* of time, it cannot be the standard of *rate-measurement*. A rate is a ratio, and a ratio must consist of terms that are the same in kind. Hence a duration must be measured against a duration. In other words, just as a spatial movement is measured, not against the spaceless, but against the permanent in space, so a time-flow is measured, not against that which is *not* time, but against the permanent *in* time.

By the permanent in time, however, we cannot mean the absolutely permanent, but only that which is as permanent as a position within time permits. In other words, temporal permanence is a permanence of time-rate. The temporal permanent, in other words, is the time-rate which is the most continuous possible. It should follow, then, in strict theory, that all our duration-rates, faster and slower, are measured, in the last resort, against the rate which is the most continuous possible. As a statement of our experience, however, this conclusion should be slightly modified: the duration which actually serves us as standard is not necessarily the most continuous possible, but the most continuous within our experience. Such most continuous time-rate is, then, the normal standard of time-measurement. Thus, to sum up, every duration is a rate, more or less changing, measured against a rate that changes least.

All this, however, is introductory to our main point, which can

now be briefly stated. If it is true that the experience of a duration is *ipso facto* the experience of at least two durations of different rates, and if, as we have already shown, difference of duration-rate is, in all our experience, dependent upon difference of intensity of interest, it follows that every experience of a duration involves differences of intensity of interest.

An obvious inference, then, is that where there are no such differences of interest there is no time-flow. Whether, however, this inference be justified or not, it nevertheless remains true that our time-consciousness, because it is a 'rate of passing,' involves the peculiar subjective imperfection of different intensities of interest.¹

In two respects, then, we have found time-consciousness to involve defect: first, in so far as it exhibits perspective immediacy; second, in so far as it is durational. In both cases the subjective side of the objective illusion is seen to lie in 'unevenness' of interest. It would seem to follow, then, that, if the time-illusion is to be escaped or even corrected, it must be in so far as the subjective defect is correspondingly lessened or removed.

III.

To express, however, the full force of our conclusion, and to make clear the manner in which the time-illusion is to be corrected, it will be necessary to note, briefly, the extent to which difference of intensity of interest involves defect of consciousness. Degree of interest, we may say, is simply the sign of the extent to which one places oneself at the service of the experience. If, for example, I am very much interested in the development of a certain argument, I bring all the powers of my person to bear; I suffer no distractions; I forget that I am a physical being requiring food and rest; I force my whole nature into the service of the present situation. And I do so in order that no jot or tittle of real significance may escape me. When, on the other hand, I am indifferent to an argument, I allow its details to pass by without making any great effort to understand them; I attend only through a peep-hole of my person. The real power that I have, I hold

¹That the presence of different intensities of interest is a defect will be shown below.

in reserve, as not worth spending upon the present argument. Thus the difference of intensity of interest is simply the measure of what fullness of my person I am willing to yield to the situation in question.

We may note, now, how this difference of interest affects the worth of our judgments. When I attend to any content with an indifferent interest, I am regarding it only with partial powers ; hence I may or may not be doing justice to the content in question. Since I make no real effort to comprehend the content, I cannot know whether I am doing justice to it or not. My lack of interest may arise out of the fact that the subject is not interesting to me, or, again, out of the fact that it is not interesting in itself. When, now, as in the first case, I refuse to exercise my powers of attention simply because I, in my private subjectivity, have no interest in the matter, it is clear that whatever judgments I make respecting it are made upon inadequate knowledge. When, on the other hand, I declare that the matter in itself has no interest, it is a question how I may know this unless I have placed all my intelligent power at its service. So long as my interest remains at low ebb, I have no means of saying whether a matter is objectively of significance or not. In order, then, that I may do justice, I must, in every case, intensify my interest to the highest degree possible. Or, to anticipate an obvious objection, where the value of a thing is slight, it does not follow that my interest in it may rightly be slight ; for the slight value may only be justly estimated where my interest has become as full as possible ; that is, only where the complete power of my person has been placed at its service.

It should be clear, then, that only in so far as a self is present with perfect fullness of interest in each detail of its consciousness are its judgments perfect judgments. In other words, the perfect self must be its total self in every phase of itself ; it must, to use the paradoxical phrases, be a whole in every part and every part the whole. The peculiar defect of human life is that the human self is always a divided self ; its *total* self is never in evidence, while even its divisions are not distributed with impartial favor. I feel, for example, that most of my conscious self is

in this present moment and in this local 'here'; and I give only vague shreds of myself to other moments and other regions. Obviously, then, if I am to escape this imperfection, the line of my advance must be to rescue myself from this fragmentary dividedness, and to realize, more and more nearly, my whole self in every phase of my experience. But this, as we may now see, may be accomplished only as I eliminate from my life different intensities of interest. This does not mean, of course, that I eliminate different values, but simply that, in my attempt to judge values, I give always to my judgment the whole power of my person.

Such wholeness in every part, indeed, is what we must mean by a perfect person; and it should be clear now why we must regard such a person as timeless. His timelessness is not an inexplicable metaphysical quality; it is simply the expression of the perfection of his spiritual nature. His interest is, in every respect, *entire*; he lives his total self in every detail of his conscious life. In this sense, he is 'perfect love'; that is, he gives always of his whole self; he retains no private 'core' of himself, no sacred 'ego' for his own special and unshareable love. Or, to return to the phrasing of the argument, he suffers neither the illusion of perspective immediacy nor the illusion of duration. Thus he is timeless, because, in spirit, he is *whole*.

The corollary with respect to human striving should now be clear. If difference of intensity of interest is in truth a defect, the aim of life, obviously, must be to correct the defect by making interest entire. The human spirit must heal its mechanical divisions, transcend its special loves and special interests, and be its whole self in every part of itself, a spirit one and undivided. Granted, then, that time is but the expression of such differences of intensity of interest, the remedying of the subjective evil will be the effective means for the removal of the time-illusion. Thus time is to be escaped, not by an external act of removal, but by an inner growth into wholeness of life.¹

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This paper would be sadly misleading, of course, if it left the impression that, by a mere conscious act of will to remove differences of interest, the time-illusion could

be directly escaped. This would be true if difference of interest were wholly the result of our conscious and voluntary acts. Undoubtedly, in large measure, it is such; and, in so far, it needs but rightly directed effort to overcome unevenness of interest. But there are also large regions of our life in which the interest-quality is as yet beyond our direct control. For example, I am not and cannot be as immediately interested in the movements of the sun and the stars as I am in the course of my own thoughts and emotions. The explanation lies in the two-fold fact, first, that I do not know the sun and stars as intimately as I know myself; and second, that I cannot control them as I can control myself. It matters little what I think or do about them; my little knowledge and my little effort are unable to affect their existence in the slightest way. Hence my interest in them is distant and unvarying. Indeed, it is just because of this normally distant and unvarying interest that I can use them as standards of spatial movement and of time-rate. If my interest in the sun were as intense and varying as my interest in my loves and hates, I should have to seek elsewhere for my standard rate. Thus, lack of knowledge and lack of control are productive of a low degree of interest. Obviously, then, the intensifying of such interest is not possible by a mere act of will, but only by increase of knowledge and of control. Again, there are great regions of our life where we lack, not control, since control does not properly belong to us here, but understanding. The whole world of my fellow-men outside of my small circle, the world of beings below and above them, are only distantly of interest to me, because I really do not know them. I cannot, therefore, place my *whole* self at their service unless I know them as deeply as is possible. To sum the whole matter up, then, if the time-illusion is the result of a divided self, of different intensities of interest, it can be corrected only as we achieve the *utmost possible intimacy* with our world. Such utmost intimacy, being ultimately the life of each in all, is the intimacy of perfect love. Thus, in the last resort, the escape from the time-illusion is by the inward path of a perfect love.

MATTER IN ANCIENT AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY

EVERY age has its special disabilities in the use of that thought we call philosophical, which should mean thought which is both abstract and exact. The Greeks, we easily recognize to-day, were continually hampered by their want of linguistic knowledge, by that total inexperience in philology which made them liable to confound words with things and to create entities out of names. It is far harder for us to detect the disabilities under which we labor, though these are in fact no less than have impeded thought in any past age. Briefly stated, they are the outcome of our incapacity, — a mere incapacity in general for all who are accustomed to naturalistic modes of thought ; for more abstract thinkers an extreme difficulty, — in distinguishing between the logical 'first,' the *a priori* in reason, and the *a priori* in time. Such incapacity or extreme difficulty is an inevitable result of our familiarity with scientific cause and effect, — for that is but sequence in time, — and of the preoccupation of our minds by the idea of evolution.

It is the purpose of the present essay to try to correct or even momentarily to reverse that attitude of mind in respect, chiefly, of one special notion in philosophy, the notion of 'matter.' We shall, I hope, see, or see some reason to believe, that our present ingrained and almost ineradicable notion of matter is a side product of this special predisposition in us to set the *a priori* of time before the *a priori* of reason. For the moment, the first thing for us to realize is how deeply ingrained in us is our idea of matter, as of some brute primordial substance anterior to all that has come into existence 'out of it,' as we say. Logical caution may indeed substitute for this notion the formula 'permanent possibility of sensation' ; an idealistic philosophy may teach us in the end that matter as we conceived of it has no existence. Neither of these afterthoughts would reverse the instinctive response of our minds to the word 'matter,' the instinctive image, so to call it, which the word 'matter' would evoke, of that brute primordial

existence. Nor again would our thought be sensibly affected by the mere notional recognition that in its etymological origin 'matter' was not that, — that it was in fact 'material' (as we say 'building-material'), derived from the scholastic *materia*, which, again, is the translation of the Aristotelean ὕλη. We know 'notionally' that the significance of ὕλη, first 'wood,' then 'material' in the more practical sense, was by Aristotle extended to include the 'material' of all things. When used in that sense, we translate ὕλη 'matter,' and it becomes next to impossible for us, with our ingrained notions, to follow the discussion in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* of the relation of 'form' to 'matter,' and of both to 'being' or 'substance,' without the modern idea of matter at every moment usurping the chief place in our thoughts. Merely to argue against this idea 'notionally' would be of no avail. Merely to say that 'matter' is not the true equivalent of ὕλη, nor 'form' nor 'species' of εἶδος, — all this would bring us only to an acceptance of the fact that the complete thought of a Greek philosopher, the complete thought of Aristotle, say, was unattainable by us.

But by the following demonstration I believe we may arrive at the state of mind requisite for appreciating the mental attitude of an Aristotle (his more especially) *vis-à-vis* with notions that we translate by 'form' and 'matter'; that we may attain, if but for a moment, something of the ingrained and instinctive habit which would mould his concept as much as ours is moulded by our habits of mind. And if it be said that plenty of passages may be cited from the *Metaphysics* not consistent with the view of 'form' and 'matter' we shall thus attain to, I acknowledge that also; for no one affects to find in the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle (nor for that matter in the *Dialectic* of Plato) a complete and ordered cosmological conception.

My object is not, in fact, to establish the Aristotelian doctrine of the εἶδος any more than the Platonic doctrine of the 'idea' (ἰδέα),¹ but only to show that, before we can achieve so much as a glimpse of either, we must cast off the primal disability which springs from our confusion between the logical and the temporal

¹ Aristotle does not, in fact, make a distinct demarcation, in his uses of εἶδος and ἰδέα, between his own doctrines and those of Plato, though he is forever combatting the latter. This is one among the thousand sources of confusion in the *Metaphysics*.

'first.' Only by this preliminary can we so much as begin to understand either Plato or Aristotle when they deal with 'matter' and 'form' or 'idea.'

A man is out in the fields of a morning in spring. About him is a manifold of sights and sounds. A budding hedge here upon his left, and a little way down it an elm tree draped by a thin veil of green; a copse of beeches, dark still in the mass, upon his right hand; a grass meadow, beginning to put on its spring brightness, dotted with daisies and dandelions, rises before him to meet the opal sky; sheep are bleating upon one side, calling their lambs; and from the ploughed field upon the other a lark has just risen, and ascends by jerks, now just above the hedge, then ten yards higher, till in a no-time he has got into the sky; the cawing of rooks, the crowing of cocks are in the air, and the rumbling of a wain upon an invisible road; now and again the gentle sound of the wind moves over the grass. These things are the reality of the world round about our pedestrian; and, except to a philosophy that would persuade us we are such stuff as dreams are made of, in which case there is no reality anywhere, nothing could be more real than this 'manifold.' If, however, we only went on from one such reality, from one such manifold, to another, I know not how we might distinguish ourselves from the scene about us; our world would be a succession of experiences, a succession of such complexities, and it would be no more. But we have not alone the succession of 'manifolds' or 'complexes.' We have the memory of those which have gone by; and we know ourselves in that we know both and know them different.

This is a statement not of a theory but of a fact; but of a fact which, though sometimes formally recognized, is almost always intrinsically disregarded even by the more metaphysical, the less 'naturalistic' philosophy of our day; by the more naturalistic it lies almost outside of recognition. And yet the knowledge here described is the true logical antecedent to all other knowledge. Its priority has naught to do with the processes in time through which the manifold has been reached, nothing to do with the ideas which a child may have of the world, nor with the capacities for knowledge which that child may have gained from inheritance.

Enquiry into any of these matters is only possible on the assumption that we are reasonable beings, or (if you choose to put it otherwise) on the assumption of the validity of that process we call reason. The assumption of the reasoning or logical faculty is prior to all other assumptions whatsoever, and is only not formally made because it is always implicit. It follows, then, that the logical 'first' must be taken for granted before we discuss any 'first' in time. It is, indeed, unfortunate to have to devote so much as a paragraph to this matter in a philosophical essay. But the opposite idea, that there is something more reasonable than reason because it is in time anterior to reason, this also is nowadays implicit in all philosophy of the scientific or naturalistic school (Mill, Bain, Comte, Spencer), not less implicit in three fourths of all that is written on psychology, and has of late (in 'pragmatism,' as it seems to me) invaded the inner courts of philosophy.

We have at present used the word 'manifold' (Kant's word) or 'complex' to express the logical first of experience, and we have spoken of it as brought back by the 'memory.' But it belongs to the thesis of this paper that neither word is a correct one. The very fact that our complex is the beginning of experience disallows (in strict logic) the use of the word 'complex.' It is, if the logical first, the essential reality, — essential reality of experience, that is to say; whereas the words 'complex' and 'manifold' imply that some earlier experiences have been added together to make this one.

To put it in another way, each so-called 'complex' is not really made up by adding an elm to the ground, a lark to the sky, and so on, till the scene be complete. The scene is there: we never knew the elm growing on no ground, nor the lark flying in no air. We do not get the manifold by composition; we get the elements of it by analysis and abstraction.]

This is a matter of capital importance to all our theory of knowledge. Not to accept it is to remain chained forever to the confusion between the reasonable and the temporal *a priori*, the dominant error of our age. And I do not think that the same theory is adequately presented to the reason by such a phrase as 'we know all things in relation.' So time will not be lost if we

spend some little pains in enforcing the matter. It is a point not insisted on by Kant ; and it is diametrically opposed to the tenets of the older English philosophical school, the school of Locke and his followers, who amused themselves by discussing how we had constructed our ideas of solidity, of matter, nay, even of space ; whether by touch and the muscular movements of the hand chiefly, or by the eye chiefly, and so on. Yet it is evident upon reflection that the parts of each manifold have no real existence as such. No man ever saw a lark *in abstracto* singing in no sky, an elm growing from no special ground. So with all the elements of our scene. One can imagine an Olympian capable of simply but rightly knowing such 'manifolds' one by one, penetrating by direct knowledge (we may call it 'intuition' for the nonce, till, that is, we have time to see that such knowledge is not intuitive) into the nature of the lark that was singing, the elm that was growing, the wind that was whispering over the grass ; and yet knowing them all in their relations as they really were, in manifold after manifold. One can imagine this, because our limitation to the so-called elements of the scene (which for us are so) is essentially a matter of language, not a primary logical necessity.

For, — and hereby we best realize the fundamental simplicity of our complex, — each so-called element of the scene before our pedestrian, the lark, the elm, the hedge, each sheep, each lamb, this too is a manifold, this too is a *donné* of some mental power which I have not yet sought to specify. This too can be analyzed by thought into its elements, as the trunk, the branches, the twigs, the leaves of the elm ; and these last again into their chemical constituents, the chlorophyl, the nitrogen, or what not. Yet no one is ready to maintain that the elm was composed of these elements ; that the trunk, the branches, the twigs, the leaves must be first in knowledge before the elm could be known. Nor can anyone pretend that a man might not thoroughly know his horse and yet never have analyzed that horse into barrel, shoulders, pasterns, withers, and so forth.¹

¹The color of the horse, bay, brown, or gray, would come under the head of the 'accidental' in Aristotelian philosophy, in the same way that a man being 'white' or 'cultivated' (*μορφικός*) does. But, of course, if every horse were of the same color, that

This manifold, or, as I would rather call it, this simplex-complex, is the true beginning of knowledge, the logical first of all experience, and, as such, the essential 'substance.' The elm (to choose one simplex-complex) is known to us as an elm and not as a collection of twigs, branches, leaves, and so forth, still less as embodied nitrogen, chlorophyl, and whatever else its chemical constituents may be. It is only because we have fallen out with pure reason, — through habits of mind generated by physical science, — that we feel any difficulty in admitting this; that our minds in spite of ourselves, like bent springs, rebound even from demonstration, back to the idea of a brute primordial 'matter' which is 'anterior' to the elm of our experience, and which, as we try to determine its nature, dissolves beneath our grasp, first into molecules, next into ions or mere centers of force, of motion robbed of 'matter.' There would, I maintain (and the essential reason for this will appear presently), be no difficulty for a Greek in realizing that the simplex-complex of the elm was the total elm, the real elm, or, in other words, the being or substance (*οὐσία*) of the elm. But this simplex-complex is also the form (*εἶδος*) of the elm. And this identification of form and substance is the essential doctrine of Aristotle: the doctrine that the form of each individual object (which scholastic philosophy has confused for us by its Latin translation 'species') is its essence, substance, *οὐσία*, — or what you will.¹ Meantime the 'matter' or

color, too, would be a part of the idea or *εἶδος* of the horse. This seems an inconsistency, but is not so, as we see if we fix our minds on the notion (so elusive to our thought) of the priority and essentiality of the simplex-complex. It is true enough, however, that Aristotle's grasp on this 'substance' is also infirm; but from a different cause. He cannot clearly distinguish between a 'thing' and its 'definition.' (Cf. *Metaphysics*, Z, 6, end.) It will be understood that the demonstration I have given is meant to help us to assimilate a Greek's (or Aristotle's) 'habit of thought' in regard to matter, not to justify his metaphysic. I take this opportunity of noting that what we have called the *a priori* of time very often corresponds to the *κίνησις* of Aristotle (cf. E, 1, where, with that change, the relation of science to metaphysics [first philosophy] is expressed almost in terms of the logical and the temporal *a priori*.) Time is with Aristotle a mode of motion (Λ, 6, beg.).

¹ Cf. Arist., *Metaphysics*, Z, 15, beg. I do not pretend that Aristotle is consistent in his presentation either of the 'substance,' of the 'form,' or of 'matter.' Sometimes the *οὐσία* is spoken of as identical with the *εἶδος* (cf. Z, 7: *εἶδος δὲ λέγω τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἐκάστου καὶ τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν*; and later: *λέγω δὲ οὐσίαν ἀνευ ὑλης τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι*), sometimes as proceeding from the union of form and matter (*τὸ ἐκ τούτων*, Z, 10,

'material' of that simplex-complex becomes analogous to a quality or 'accident,' inherent in the thing itself, which can by analysis be abstracted. So much parenthetically. Let us now return to consider this 'being,' this simplex-complex in itself.

Knowledge of the simplex-complex, as distinguished from mere perception of it, — knowledge of the whole scene or of some lesser simplex-complex, as the elm, — implies comparison of various simplex-complexes. We commonly say that those which are not present are brought back by the 'memory.' It is a part of my contention that the word is inaccurate. Memory alone could never do more than give us again the individual experiences which, as we commonly express it, go to make up each simplex-complex, — the whispering sound of the wind in the scene we imagined, the song of the lark, the colors which come before our eyes. That which reproduces the simplex-complex as such can only be rightly called 'imagination,' a word which in this use of it very exactly corresponds to its etymological significance; and with philosophical terms that merit is not so common. So that imagination, instead of being an out-of-the-way and (by the vulgar reckoning) mostly useless faculty, and one peculiar to a special type of individual, is the logical accompaniment of all knowledge, of all possible comparison between complex and complex, lacking which 'things' would cease to exist for us, and our world would fall into a chaos of mere sensations. Yet is this embryonic imagination (so universal a faculty in man that it is employed without specific recognition) *ejusdem generis* with the imagination of the poet, the painter, the composer, etc.

We can, it was said, conceive an Olympian capable of simply yet rightly knowing even the greater manifolds one by one. But even we have in certain fields of experience examples of what such Olympian knowledge might be. Take for illustration the attitude of the impressionist painter towards his landscape. Whistler, in his *Gentle Art*, complains of that class of persons

[1035]). And that last notion is clearly illogical. In fact, in interpreting Aristotle, we have to make allowance for three different objects of his discourse and three different states of mind in the speaker. Sometimes (and most in Z and H) he is directly concerned to discover what is substance and being; again, he is merely combatting the Platonic theories; lastly (in Δ) he is concerned with spiritual notions practically the same as Plato's.

whose only interest is to know whether that object at the water-side is a boat or not ; this matter settled, they are satisfied. What the boat really *looked like* to them at the moment given, or any moment, they know not and do not care to know. The conventional landscape-painter allows for this curiosity in his public ; he paints his objects considered as objects (elements), not the simplex-manifold as it really is. And the Pre-Raphaelites, misled unconsciously by science and the deceits of language and a false standard of 'veracity,' considered the lesser manifolds as if they too were constructed of elements, and thought, for example, that by painting a multiplicity of twigs and leaves they were painting a tree.¹

The impressionist painter of the more pronounced type moves on from simplex-manifold to simplex-manifold in the same scene, as the hours, almost as the minutes, go by. To Claude Monet the same scene is not the same scene at twelve o'clock and at three. I am not arguing in favor of this view of art as against others, but using it as an illustration, as a possible view. For, indeed, it is no small wonder that, in these days of knowledge by analysis and abstraction, impressionist art should have arisen to remind the world that after all each manifold is really a unity.

I have selected one form of plastic art for illustration, because the achievements of the plastic arts are obvious and easily understood. It is true, however, that every branch of art deals with 'manifolds'; 'things in their relations' is not in strictness the phrase we should use, because 'things' are more or less arbitrary abstractions made by language ; and language, taken generally, answers to the needs of the common-sense or scientific side of the intellect rather than the imaginative and artistic side. Artistic knowledge, then, — I prefer this term to the more usual one, 'æsthetic'² knowledge, — is distinguished from scien-

¹ Cf. Arist., *Metaphysics*, Z, 10. This chapter is very illuminating and quite germane to our subject, if only we allow for the constant source of confusion of thought with the ancients of which we spoke at the outset.

²The modern use of the word 'æsthetic' must to anyone acquainted with Greek philosophy seem barbarous and unnatural. *Αἰσθησις* is for Greek philosophy almost the same as 'perception' for Kantian philosophy. *Αἰσθητικός* corresponds very nearly to our words 'perceptual' and 'materialistic.'

tific knowledge in being knowledge of manifolds as such, the other being knowledge of more or less arbitrary abstractions from the manifolds.

For now suppose our man in the fields had been hurrying to keep an appointment in a neighboring town, unconscious whether he were treading on grass or the highroad. Then the manifold would shrink for him to the likeness of a mathematical line, the shortest distance between two points. Or let him be measuring the surface of the ground, and indifferent, therefore, whether it be grass or barren heath or sand ; then the manifold will become a geometrical surface for him, as nearly as may be. Or let him be a poor man mushroom-gathering ; and let the scene shrink for him to the number of white knobs he counts as he puts them in his wallet. Now the scene has become arithmetical, a succession of unities. Out of such utilities as these, Science has had its rise. Scientific knowledge proceeds by analysis and abstraction. Out of the scene it takes the tree, out of the tree it abstracts the constituent parts, out of the constituent parts it abstracts the chemical elements. But none of the constituent parts has real existence ; not the tree *in abstracto*, nor a leaf *in abstracto*, nor nitrogen *in abstracto*. You may, indeed, be shown nitrogen by itself in a flask, as you may be shown a stuffed lark in a museum. But neither the one nor the other is, properly speaking, a reality ; each is an abstract idea, made after a certain fashion visible or sensible. In such instances as these, however, we are still dealing with a kind of reality. Very soon, in scientific knowledge, we get quite away from the sphere of reality, as in the case of numbers, of arithmetic. For to arithmetic not only are seven nuts the same as seven apples, but the same as the seven planets themselves. And this instance must be kept in mind to recall to us how far, in scientific or notional knowledge, we may leave the realm of reality behind.

Nothing is more true than that science is organized common-sense. What is not true is that common-sense gives 'knowledge' in the philosophical signification of that word. For common-sense, like science, looks upon things,—simplex-complexes of every kind,—not as they *are*, but in some aspect: *sub specie util-*

itatis, in the case of common sense ; in the case of what we now recognize as science, under the head of a particular kind of reasoning, of which more later. The utilitarian point of view of common sense would, I believe, be very interestingly illustrated by the history of common nouns, if anyone chose to investigate the matter. For it would be seen in how many cases the etymology of a noun or name shows that the thing designated had been first named altogether from its uses. I will take but one example, our word 'tree' or the Greek *δρῦς*. The former is from the same root as 'tear,' and the latter from its analogue *δέρω*, 'to flay,' probably because the barks of trees were much used by primitive man for coverings, and perhaps for clothing. But we are not to suppose that, when our remote forefathers were flaying an animal, they thought they were stripping a tree, or *vice versa*. What, then, stood in the way of the confusion? Imagination, which brought back the simplex-complex of the tree, or the animal, to contrast with the immediate experience ; though common sense did not, for its purposes, make distinction between the stripped tree and the stripped animal. And evidently the faculty which brought back the whole was precisely the same faculty as that which is used in the plastic arts, though in a simpler guise. It is, indeed, essentially the artistic or, one may say, creative faculty.

We are now in a position to understand why a view of 'form,' the manifold, and of 'matter,' the material part of these realities of knowledge, quite different from ours, was natural to the Greeks, however hard for us. It was because science (physical science), which with them was but in the embryo, with us is full-grown ; while art, which with us is a sort of *hors d'œuvre* in life, with them was the essential of life. Aristotle was by nature a man of science (what is commonly distinguished as an 'exact thinker') far more than an artist. And yet one cannot read any part of Aristotle, even the *Physics*, without seeing how naturally illustrations from art, *e. g.*, from statuary, spring to his lips. When, in the *Metaphysics*, he is laying down his doctrine of form and substance, he makes his case much more difficult to our minds by the use of examples taken from art. One example of the 'form'

and its 'material' is that of the statue and the bronze whereof the statue is made ; another, of a ring of bronze and the bronze in the ring. Now it is, I hold, true, that the statue or the ring is logically anterior to the bronze in the statue or in the ring ; but here the contrast between the *a priori* in reason and the *a priori* in time is brought before us too sharply for modern comprehension. It is far easier to see that the elm, as we know it, is the 'substance' of the elm, and not the materials into which we may subsequently analyze it, than that the completed statue is the substance of the statue, not the bronze of which the statue is made.¹

By the train of reasoning which we have adopted we may see, I think, at least that Aristotle's general idea of form and matter is a possible view. We may, I think, by the same means come to see that his polemic against his master and against the theory of 'ideas' is somewhat different from what it appears to us ; that Plato's 'ideas' are, in fact, much more matter of experience than they seem to our criticism. We think of the Platonic doctrine of ideas as merely a theory of another world, where all is perfect which is imperfect here ; in a word, we think of it altogether as a moral or mystical doctrine, but one which has no foundation in ordinary experience. The doctrine of 'ideas' is essentially a theory of what I have called Olympian knowledge of the simplex-complexes of experience. When we realize that the substance of knowledge is the thing we know, that there is no substance so substantial as the thing itself, the gift of our senses joined to imagination or artistic faculty, it is not unreasonable to suppose a higher or Olympian faculty for which each of the (for us) individuals (individual things) would be as it were but aspects of some higher order of things, known (artistically and really) to a higher order of intelligence. These would be the genera of our species ; they would be the ideal elm, or ideal tree, and in sum all that constitutes Plato's world of ideas.

Aristotle would have nothing to do with such. Is there (he would ask, and does in other words) both an ideal elm and an ideal

¹ But without doubt the most illuminating analogy which Aristotle chooses is that of the word and the letters which compose it. To us it seems more like an image than an example. Aristotle himself uses it in a hesitating way. But it does really very well express the essential truth, that combinations of matter are *our* work.

tree? And this actual elm of our knowledge, — of which ideal is it the aspect for us? Is there an ideal Socrates and also an ideal man? And from which is the Socrates we know derived? Such is the question which Aristotle asks a hundred times, in a hundred different ways.

It may be doubted if Aristotle's criticisms are always fair. But that matter does not concern the subject of this essay. Before we could establish the claim of either philosopher, before we could show that either Aristotle's or Plato's view of matter, and of the simplex-complex or 'form,' was in itself a just one, and juster than ours, we should need to enter upon another and difficult chain of argument, to attack a quite new problem. We should have to establish, if possible, that in the arts, as in the sciences, reason is used; for there can be no true knowledge without reason. And if artistic knowledge were, as it is commonly called, 'intuitive,' it could not be the subject-matter of philosophy. Secondly, we should have to establish that artistic reasoning, reasoning where the imagination is used and recognized while used, is on the whole juster than scientific reasoning, because it deals with realities; science, with 'notions' only. This line of argument would require us to begin with a distinction, which hitherto hardly any thinkers have made, between reason and demonstration. I believe that all this might be done, that all these propositions might be established; that it might be shown that the essential characteristic of scientific reason is not that it is a better kind of reason than any other, — for as there is no alternative between true and false,¹ so there is but one kind of reason, — but that it is a more demonstrable kind than any other; and that the reference is transferred from the intrinsic truth of its conclusions to the number of people who can be convinced of such truth, — obviously an irrelevant issue. But such a train of argument would occupy far too much space to be undertaken here.

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¹The principle of the excluded middle, so often forgotten in the 'suggestive' writing of our day.

WHAT IS THE FUNCTION OF A GENERAL THEORY OF VALUE?¹

I.

THERE has scarcely been a time in the history of thought when the problem of 'value' has so occupied the centre of attention as at present. Fundamental changes in the actual values of mankind, giving rise to what has been well called 'our anxious morality,' with its characteristic talk of creating and conserving values, has brought with it what may, without exaggeration, be described as a gradual shifting of the philosophical centre of gravity from the problem of knowledge to the problem of values. The problem of knowledge has itself become, in some quarters wholly, in others partially, a problem of value.

The historical causes of this, until recently silent, change of attitude are, in a general way, clear enough. The change from intellectualism to voluntarism, the rigorous discipline of the human soul through the almost universal application of the concepts of evolution and the struggle for existence, with their ideas of selective and survival values, — these are explanations which immediately suggest themselves; and yet they are but general and superficial characterizations of a still more fundamental crisis of the social will, a crisis which has its roots deep in the necessities of things, and which we are as yet scarcely able to understand.

Whatever the causes, the effects of the change are everywhere in evidence. This gradual change in actual values has found a mouthpiece, if somewhat rhetorical and rhapsodical, in Nietzsche's cry of "transvaluation of all values." But this cry has been echoed by other hearts and minds, and that which began as a

¹ This paper is an attempt, — in response to several requests, kindly seconded by the editors of this journal, — to state the results, and the probable bearing upon larger questions, of the technical investigations in the theory of value. In view of the extent of the problem, the writer may perhaps be pardoned the necessary reference to other more detailed studies, which may serve to supplement the present sketchy treatment of the subject.

species of poetry has passed into sober prose. Of chief importance is the transition from the accumulation of knowledge to its evaluation. To say nothing of the growing attempt to evaluate the results of physical science in the interests of a more comprehensive natural philosophy, — a movement which may or may not have some connection with Nietzsche's arraignment of science in its present form, — we may find sufficient evidences of this change of heart in the social and moral sciences, where the problem of value lies closer to the surface. "While formerly," we are told, "it was almost wholly the external structure of the social life, and the economic values which it produces, that received attention, now it is the meaning of this life for the human soul, its spiritual origin and spiritual effects, which finds expression."¹ In short it is the problem of evaluation.

Corresponding to this change in practical attitude has appeared the more *theoretical* consciousness of, as it were, a new side of reality. We have been scarcely aware, so we are told, that our entire life, on its conscious side, is one continuous series of feelings of value and evaluations, of explicit judgments and implicit assumptions of value; and that it is only by reason of this very fact, *that they are valued*, that the mechanically determined elements of reality in any sense have meaning for us. Far from being a mere fact among other facts, that which we mean by our evaluation of objects is something independent of this world, and so little merely a part of it that it is rather the whole world seen from a special point of view. Over against a world of facts is set a world of values.

But if this growing consciousness of the problem of value has indeed reached a point where we are conscious of a world of values, where the terms ethical, æsthetic, and even truth values, are in every mouth, and where the thought of a special 'theory of value' is no longer novel, with it has also come the realization that philosophy, and the philosophical disciplines which are traditionally concerned with values, are, in their present form, not

¹ This quotation is taken from the 'Prospekt' of *Die Gesellschaft*, a collection of social-psychological monographs in which the various institutions of society are studied from the point of view of their values for the individual. Some of the titles are Religion, Speech, Custom, Commerce, The State, Politics, War, The Strike, etc.

quite in a position to take possession of the new world. It is true that for some time metaphysics has seemed to many to be but a theory of value ; but the traditional problems as well as the traditional methods of that discipline are still such as to make the question of values subordinate to the question of 'being.' Nor are the special sciences which deal with facts of value able, as special disciplines, to cope with the changes, in both form and content of discussion, which this new setting of the problem has brought about. An harmonious division of labor between economics, ethics, and æsthetics has produced a completed product which, for various and sufficient reasons, does not meet the need. It is rather precisely because of this division of labor, unwisely conceived, that the results are unsatisfactory. More and more the conviction gains ground that a general theory of value, which shall comprehend in a systematic and scientific way all spheres of human values, is an absolute necessity.

It has been said that the most fruitful metaphysical thought of the present is to be found in the special sciences. While perhaps not quite true, such a statement has this element of truth, that it is within the special sciences that the most significant questions of philosophy first make their appearance. Similarly, the necessity of solving certain special questions of value within the sciences of economics, ethics, and æsthetics, has developed concepts the significance of which extends far beyond these limits, and which therefore afford the material for more general and systematic reflections.

Of first importance is the 'theory of value' which Economics has developed for its special purposes. Narrow as this purpose is (for it is not so long ago that an economist, F. von Wieser, was of the opinion that he had fulfilled his intention of "treating exhaustively the entire sphere of worth phenomena without an exception," although his investigations did not once go beyond the region of economic goods), nevertheless, the very limitation of its activities to a narrow range of problems has led to an intensive analysis of certain facts and laws of valuation which should have long since furnished an example to ethics, and which must now furnish both the stimulus and the discipline for any one who seeks

to comprehend the larger field. But this limitation of interest has obscured wider relations, knowledge of which would have been fruitful for the special work of the economist himself, and, in some cases, has led to fallacies of both observation and inference, which a more philosophical treatment of facts would have corrected. These limitations are, however, being overcome. The exigencies of translating economic into sociological conceptions, of correlating economic with larger social values, have brought about a notable change. Indeed, much of the movement in the direction of a more general theory comes from economics itself. Gradually the opposition to theory in this sphere is giving way, and at the same time the feeling increases that economic values are but a special class of human worths, and that they can be understood only in their relations, especially in their relation to ethical values.¹

Ethics, likewise, has its contributions to make to a general theory of value. Chief among these is its appreciative analyses and descriptions of qualitatively different attitudes and dispositions, and its elaboration of a doctrine of norms of obligation and virtue in which the appreciative distinctions of the race have been fixed. To this must be added the development of hypotheses as to the nature of the ultimate good, which, while they have not led to any final solution, have nevertheless served to develop and organize the normative point of view. But it is precisely because of this preoccupation with ultimate norms and abstractions that ethics is in no position to meet the advances of economics. For ethics, as it is commonly understood, still remains too much in the traditions of the Greeks, and, instead of seeking a psychologically founded theory of value, contents itself with a theory of abstract goods, consisting in an external and often arbitrary classification and evaluation of objects of desire, without any vital sense of the great problems involved in the processes and laws of desire themselves.

Especially harmful, moreover, has been the Kantian distinction between the 'empirical' and the 'intelligible' will, and the nar-

¹ Compare in this connection Hadley's article on "Economic Science" and the present writer's article on "Worth" in the *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*.

rowing effect of the concept of abstract imperatives. Although no longer present in its original form, it still exercises influence through the unfortunate antithesis of facts and values, of genesis and validity. For where such distinctions are made ultimate, where the laws of the empirical will are conceived to be irrelevant, or even hostile, to the will that values, there a science of values is impossible.

Where, on the other hand, ethics has broken loose from these bonds, the new-found freedom has given rise to such a multitude of irreconcilable principles that it is immediately apparent that the certainty of method, which makes possible internal unity of principles and harmonious external relations with other sciences, is still lacking. It has even been seriously doubted whether ethics can maintain its place as a special science, — whether it is not doomed to break up, on the one hand, into a part of psychology, the task of which shall be to analyse the individual feelings, judgments, and acts of will, the content of which has the moral predicate, and, on the other hand, into a part of sociology, which shall portray the forms and content of the common life which stand in relations to the ethical obligation of the individual. Its double character will, it is thought, ultimately prove its undoing.¹

Doubtful though such predictions may rightly be held to be, — for the boundaries of sciences are determined by other motives than those of mere logic, and there are practical reasons which will plead strongly for the integrity of ethics as a separate discipline, — still there can be no doubt that the inconsequent character of the science, in its present state, unfits it for leadership in the attempt to conceive valuation in its more general aspects. Like economics it has, to be sure, recently been looking beyond its narrowly conceived province, and seeking points of contact with its neighbors, — the breaking up of its solidarity is, in one sense, but an outward sign of an inward grace, — but this is in itself not sufficient to make of ethics the science of values *par excellence*.

Nor is such a science to be developed by a merely external fusion of elements from both of the preceding sciences, with perhaps the addition of a few judicious reflections upon æs-

¹ Simmel, *Einleitung in die Moratwissenschaft*, Vol. I, Preface.

thetic and religious values. To meet the obvious necessities of the situation there is required, rather, a systematic treatment of human values in their mutual relations, together with the psychology of feeling and will upon which such a theory must rest. What is needed is a point of view and method which go beyond the special motives of economics and ethics, and find common ground in a conception and purpose which unites them both. Thus, while economics has been thought to be a descriptive and explanatory science, and has contented itself with description of the empirical laws of valuation for the purposes of control, it has really been shot through with assumptions of a normative character, and has been fruitful in disclosing actual standards of value which ethics has often failed to estimate at their proper worth. On the other hand, ethics, although claiming to be a normative science, has found it necessary to investigate the phenomenology of feeling and will, without, however, as I shall seek to show later, succeeding in making these investigations sufficiently fruitful for its more ultimate purposes. The desideratum, therefore, seems to be to find a method which shall unite in some more fruitful way the descriptive and the normative points of view, a method which shall know how to interpret the norms of the so-called 'intelligible' will in terms of the laws of the 'empirical' will.

II.

I have stated thus broadly, and at some length, what I conceive to be the problem of a general theory of value, in order that we may have a point of view from which to estimate properly the significance of the special methods of investigation which have recently developed in this field. The range of the problem might, indeed, be conceived even more broadly. From one point of view at least, as has already been intimated, *truths* are values, both instrumental and intrinsic. The processes of acquirement, of enjoyment, and utilization of truth are processes of valuation, related in certain definite ways to the values of economics, ethics, and æsthetics, and to ignore these relations means an emasculation of the full meaning of the truth. While *in the making*, truth has certain instrumental values which are part of its meaning.

When made, believed, and enjoyed, it acquires certain complementary values which are either part or the whole of its meaning *as truth*. Thus it is perhaps not too much to claim that our conception of knowledge will gain much from the investigations of a general theory of value. Be that as it may, we shall, for the immediate purposes of this discussion, confine our attention to the problem as already defined.

When, moreover, the problem is thus stated, with it is also determined for us the logic of our procedure in estimating the methods employed in its solution. For, upon closer inspection, the problem is seen really to be two-fold: the descriptive or psychological and the normative or 'axiological,' as I have elsewhere described it.¹ The function of valuation has two aspects. On the one hand, we *feel* the value of the objects; on the other hand, we evaluate these objects, and ultimately the experiences of value themselves. The first aspect is that of process, the conditions and laws of which are to be determined; the second aspect is that of *function* and *meaning*, the norms of which are to be developed. Between these two aspects there is evidently a close relation. We cannot feel the value of an object without judging or assuming it to have some sort of reality, nor can we pass a normative judgment without at the same time assuming or postulating its conformity with the laws of feeling and will. Out of this double aspect of the problem arise all the special questions which a theory of value has to solve, and growth of insight into the nature of the relations between these two problems is the test of the value of the solutions.

¹This seems to be a case where the creation of a new term is not only admissible, but highly desirable; for the problem is in a sense a new one, brought about through the change in point of view already described. The problem is not merely the formulation of norms, but the determination of the validity of *the claim to objectivity* implied in every normative judgment. If our problem were the determination of the validity of objects and processes of knowledge alone, it would be best described as epistemological; but the term epistemology is too narrow to include the problem of the evaluation of values, and we may therefore make use of a special term to define the problem as it here presents itself. On the analogy of the term epistemology, we have constructed the term 'axiology,' and may hereafter speak of the relation of the axiological to the psychological point of view. Baldwin has accepted this use of the term 'axiological,' and, in the second volume of his *Genetic Logic*, distinguishes in a suggestive way between logical and axiological truth.

III.

Let us, then, first consider the contributions which recent psychological analysis has made to our knowledge of the phenomenology of judgments of value and their objects. The main results of this analysis are, I think it may be said, twofold: (1) The discovery of certain new facts which have led to a reformation of our conception of the *nature* and *conditions* of the worth-judgment, and consequently to a reconstruction of our conception of the *laws* of worth-judgment, or, more generally, of valuation; (2) as a result of these changes, it has been possible to bring about the coördination of the different types of worth-attitude and of objects of value, demanded by a general theory of value, and thus to explain in terms of empirical laws spheres of valuation into which such explanation (*von unten*) has not yet penetrated.

The first of these results may best be understood by contrasting the present concept of the value-judgment with preceding views. In the past there have been two main views, corresponding to the opposition between the empirical and rationalistic theories already described. The empirical theory, in its old form, held that every value judgment is determined by some feeling or desire, — feeling being viewed as the effect or feeling-tone of sensation, perception, or idea, according to the theory of feeling held, and desire being viewed as the effect of feeling. Conversely, it was held that all feeling and desire, positive or negative, is *ipso facto* valuation. All values were accordingly reduced to two types, immediate or intrinsic sensation-feelings, and mediated or instrumental utility-values, associated with the primary and immediate. In contrast to this was the dualistic theory (whether rationalistic or voluntaristic in form of expression), which excepted certain ideal values of ethics and æsthetics from this type of determination. As old as Plato, but more recently expressed in the Kantian antithesis of the empirical and the intelligible will, it holds, in whatever form it may appear, that these ideal values are constituted by acts of reason or will, for which, while they may, perhaps, have their empirical, psychological aspect, this empirical aspect is, nevertheless, irrelevant. They are not temporally conditioned, but timeless, values.

The results of recent psychological analysis have made impossible this dualism, and have, moreover, brought about such a reconstruction of the empirical theory as to make possible the inclusion of the *ideal* values within the region of empirical analysis and explanation. In the first place, they have had the negative result of showing that the feeling of value is not the *effect* of cognitive content as such, and is not coextensive with feeling or desire. It is always reality-feeling, and presupposes some cognitive act of presumption, judgment, or assumption. Passive feelings, satisfactions of desire, are in themselves not feelings of value. They can at most create the dispositional conditions which, when actualized through cognitive acts, give rise to feelings of value. This leads to an important extension in our concept of types of worth-attitudes and objects. We have feelings of intrinsic value wherever we have reality-feeling, whether the presupposition of that feeling be presumption, judgment, or assumption. We have feelings of instrumental value whenever an object is connected by relational judgments with these feelings of reality. Objects of value are both perceptual and ideal, objects immediately perceived or judged to exist, and objects which are ideal constructions, related to the immediate feeling of reality through relational judgments and assumptions. Moreover, it is possible to show a genetic relation between these presuppositions, and to classify the different attitudes and objects of valuation in terms of their genesis. This is the first step in the correlation of the different values, intrinsic and instrumental, economic, ethical, and æsthetic, required as a basis of a general theory of value.¹

As a result of this more adequate analysis of the empirical conditions of the value-judgment, there is opened up the possibility of discovering the empirical laws of all types of valuation. This extension of the concept of empirical law into all regions of

¹ A résumé of the results of these investigations will be found in the article on "Worth," already referred to, and in a later article, "Recent Tendencies in the Psychological Theory of Values," in the *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. IV, No. 4. In recent articles in the *Psychological Review*, Vol. XIV, Nos. 1 and 2, "Definition and Analysis of the Consciousness of Value," I have shown the bearings of these studies more fully, and have developed a genetic theory and classification of worth-attitudes, primary and derived.

values, the necessary condition of any general theory of value, is made possible by the reconstruction of the concept of empirical law itself, consequent upon the more adequate analysis of the value-judgment.

By the laws of valuation, in the larger sense of the term, may be understood any uniformity in the manner in which value-judgments are modified, either qualitatively or quantitatively, and in the light of which the relative values of objects may be determined. Taking the concept of law in this broader sense, it is obvious that there would necessarily be a dualistic conception of the nature of these laws, corresponding to the different conceptions of the nature of the value-judgment already considered. Thus the principle of universalization expressed in the Kantian maxim, according to which the capacity of an ideal object (as embodied in an act or disposition presupposed by the act) for extension and continuation is made the measure of its moral value, is considered to be the 'intelligible law' of the objective or normative value of the act, as distinguished from its subjective and empirical value, determined by the empirical laws of feeling and desire.

In the narrower sense, however, as for instance in the usage of economics already referred to, laws of valuation are empirical laws of mutation of the value of an object based upon fundamental laws of feeling and desire, and from which it is believed that a measure of value can be inferred. Such are the law of 'Diminishing Value' for intrinsic values and of 'Marginal Utility' for instrumental values, together with the law of 'Complementary Values,' which is conceived to modify the working of both the preceding laws. These empirical laws are based upon more ultimate psychological laws of feeling and will, such as the law of dulling of sensitivity with repetition and the law of satiety with overstimulation; and the psychological laws according to which both dulling of sensitivity and satiety can be modified by certain combinations and rearrangements of the objects of desire and feeling. These are the so-called 'laws of subjective value,' because they describe the laws effective in determining the value-judgments of the individual. But they lead to the development

of certain 'laws of objective value,' the exchange value or price of an object, as determined by supply and demand, these forces being determined by the laws of subjective value.

Now the result of psychological analysis has been so to reconstruct and reinterpret these empirical laws as to make them applicable to all types of objects and feelings of value, and thus to relate normative judgments to actual feelings of value. And it accomplishes this, first of all, by denying the psychological assumptions upon which the old formulation of the empirical laws rested. When Kant insisted upon the non-empirical character of the moral judgment and sense of obligation, and upon the nature of the æsthetic as desireless intuition, it was generally assumed, it must be remembered, — and Kant shared the assumption, — that there are only two types of feelings of value, immediate sensuous pleasure and the feeling of utility, indirectly and instrumentally connected with this immediacy, and that to these the laws of dulling of sensitivity and satiety apply universally. If this assumption of Bentham and his followers be granted, there is ground for the exception of certain ideal values, which are neither sense-feelings nor utility-feelings, but rather intrinsic values which, for the individual at least, may be absolute. But this assumption is by no means necessary. The denial of the view that feeling of value is coextensive with feeling and desire follows from the recognition that feelings of value are characterized by certain cognitive presuppositions. But it follows with equal necessity that an application of these laws to value-feelings in general is not possible until we have investigated the effect of the factors of quantity (repetition and amount) upon feelings of reality, judgment and assumption-feelings, and upon the dispositions which condition them. When thus viewed, our entire conception of the laws of valuation is changed. They become laws of *our interest* in objects, and the problem then becomes this: the determination of the laws according to which objects acquire, lose, or retain, interest or affective-volitional *meaning*.

It is at this point that the results of psychological analysis are, to my mind, most interesting and significant, just as it has been at this point that the psychology of feeling has previously been

most inadequate. Into the details of this analysis and its results it is impossible to enter here. Ehrenfels,¹ for instance, holds that such an analysis makes it possible to universalize the laws of 'Diminishing Value' and 'Marginal Utility' into a law of 'Grenzfrommen' (translatable, perhaps, as 'Marginal Appreciation') which is applicable to all objects of value. With this conclusion, however, I do not agree. It is of course certain that in the case of all those objects the value of which is conditioned by direct stimulation, dulling of sensitivity and satiety follow. It is also true that in all cases of instrumental conceptual constructions,—where the value is a utility-value, the function of instrumental judgments, and is conditioned by successive judgments of reapplicability,—the law of marginal utility holds. But it is not clear that this is the law of all ideal constructions. It is precisely here, on what may be called the *psychology of idealization and of ideals*, that analysis is most inadequate. Without going into detail, which the limits of the present discussion will not admit, I can only state dogmatically,—what I believe psychological analysis will not only justify, but also make conceivable,—that in the processes of relative and instrumental valuation of objects certain ideal objects are constructed, the assumption of existence of which gives rise to intrinsic ethical and æsthetic values, which are not subject to these laws of relative value. At first complementary values, they become intrinsic ideals and 'practical absolutes,' in the sense that they constitute the permanent assumptions upon which all other judgments of value rest. In the case of the miser, the judgments of reapplicability of his money may pass over into *an assumption of indefinite applicability*. It thus acquires absolute intrinsic value. An ethical disposition, the value of which is first of all instrumental and relative, may become intrinsic and absolute, and the assumption of its absolute existence may give rise to personal values, æsthetic and ethical, which are practical absolutes. What may be the psychological explanation of these facts, it is not our purpose here to inquire. I believe, however, that even these phenomena may be explained in terms of empirical laws of feeling and will when these laws are properly formulated and interpreted.

¹ *System der Wert-Theorie*, Bk. I, ch. vii, § 25; Bk. II, ch. iii, § 18.

The *subjective* personal meaning or value of an object is, however, quite a different thing from its *objective*, in the sense of *social*, value. The relation of these two values of the same object is one of the most important of the axiological problems, and one of the first conditions of its solution is to discover the conditions and laws which determine objective value. Objective values are in some sense conditioned by subjective values. Can we deduce the laws of objective from the laws of subjective value?

For economics the essential condition of objective value is exchange. Exchange objectifies subjective value through the interpolation of intermediate processes of judgment between the object and immediate enjoyment, the objective or exchange value being that which the individual must take into account in processes of subjective valuation. But, upon closer inspection, exchange is seen to be but a special case of social interaction and participation. Objective values have a wider range than economic values. Dispositions, ideas, ideals, arising first in individuals, acquire an objective reference and meaning through the fact that they are imitated, acknowledged, and shared. The fact that an ideal is or is not shared, that a disposition in an individual finds acceptance or opposition, modifies the individual's feeling of value in certain definite ways, and ultimately differentiates its objective reference and meaning from its subjective value. How is this objective value determined?

Economics has deduced the laws of objective exchange value from the laws of subjective value, conceiving the value in exchange to be the function of forces of supply and demand created by the operation of the laws of subjective value. The question then arises, whether similar laws cannot be developed for non-economic, moral, social values. This I think is not only entirely within the range of possibility, but is also in part accomplished. More than this, I think it is possible in this way to explain the variations of social moral values, as reflected in feelings of obligation and in judgments of praise and blame. Ehrenfels argues for the extension of the principle of 'Marginal Utility' to the social, moral value of dispositions, and with his conclusions I am in entire accord, although not wholly with the psychological

analysis upon which the inference rests. In my own view of the matter, the facts are briefly as follows. What we call objective social and moral values are *participation-values*, either immediate and intrinsic or instrumental. Dispositions and acts acquire this value according as they are immediately or indirectly related to the participation of the individual in the ends of society. From the laws of *Einfühlung*, of sympathetic participation of the individual, which are but special forms of the fundamental laws of feeling and will, the laws of social sympathy may be developed. Into the line of argument which underlies this view we cannot here enter. It will be sufficient to state the general conclusion that the degree of intensity of social sympathy is conditioned by the degree of its extension, and in such a manner as to lead to the inference that the social or moral value of a disposition is subject to a law of limiting value, which I have ventured to describe as the 'Law of Marginal Participation-Value.'

Such a conclusion evidently has an important bearing upon our conception of *normal* moral values. Underlying the normative law of 'universalization,' whatever its form, whether utilitarian or idealistic, whether in the Kantian form or in Fichte's modification ("act so that the maxim of thy conduct may become for thee an *eternal* law"), is the assumption that the objective moral value is identical with the subjective and personal, and that moral values escape the laws inherent in the temporal character of values. But the difficulties in such a conception are not to be hidden. As soon as the logical concepts of universality and eternal law are taken out of the region of subjective and personal ideals, and are applied to empirical conduct, they necessarily develop problems of probability, and even possibility. In this case the values are no longer intrinsic, but instrumental. Universalization of a given disposition, or even indefinite increase of the supply, must involve such a modification of the demand as in turn to modify the actual social and objective value of the disposition. To act as though the maxim of one's act were an eternal law, is to act as though frequency of repetition would have no effect upon its value, an assumption which experience does not allow us to make with respect to the objective values of any object. What-

ever absolute ideal value such an assumption may have for the worth-experience of the individual, it cannot be taken as a norm or measure of actual social values. Logical quantity has been translated into empirical terms, and in the empirical realm of actual values the demand for increase is conditioned precisely by lack of the desired disposition.

IV.

Advance in the direction of the understanding of the derivation of values, both individual and social, such as the general theory of value requires, and such as the new studies are in a fair way to furnish, should mean additional power to explain the more complex and developed phenomena of the value-judgment. Every advance in intensive analysis and comprehensive correlation should bring with it greater power of explanation. Here, of course, is to be found the test of the fruitfulness of the new studies. There are numerous points where this test may be applied, but for purposes of illustration it will suffice to take a single problem from the sphere of ethical values.

The region of ethical values, using the term 'ethical' in its widest extent, is characterized by the unique judgments of obligation and their correlated judgments of praise and blame. These are the feelings of ideal value which are conceived to reflect absolute norms. Or else, when the non-empirical point of view is abandoned,¹ the result has been at first a scepticism, such as Simmel gave expression to in his earlier studies, when he denied that our powers of analysis can penetrate to the *causes* of the difference between an obligation, intense but of narrow range, and one more extensive but correspondingly weak, and of the choice between the two.

Now there can be no doubt that our feelings of obligation and of praise and blame *do* vary in certain ways which, although the facts are clear enough, are difficult to explain. Thus our feelings of obligation toward any given act, and our attitudes

¹ In this case, ethics is broken up into "a part of psychology, the task of which shall be to analyze the individual feelings, judgments, and acts of will, the content of which has the moral predicate, and, on the other hand, into a part of sociology which shall portray the forms and content of the common life which stand in relations to the ethical obligation of the individual."

of approval or disapproval of the act and its presupposed disposition, are by no means unequivocal and consistent. Though in every case apparently immediate and intrinsic, they nevertheless vary in different individuals, and at different times in the same individual. These variations may extend all the way from complete *qualitative* difference (as when personal obligations come into direct conflict with social obligations, or when I approve an act as the expression of a total personality, although, from the impersonal and social point of view, I disapprove it) to merely *quantitative* differences of intensity of obligation and approval or disapproval (as when the quality of the act is always the same, but the intensity of the demand varies). Apparently, different standards are presupposed. One fundamental difference has become so clear as to give rise to the term 'double standard.' Meinong has distinguished between a larger region of ethical and quasi-ethical values and a narrower region of moral values, regions which we may further characterize as representing the personal and the impersonal points of view.

The complexity of these phenomena of ethical judgment cannot be denied, and the failure of the older methods of ethics, with their explanation *von oben*, seems equally certain. But a sceptical conclusion in the premises seems premature. The introduction of quantitative analysis in this sphere, first attempted by Meinong,¹ and made possible by his more intensive psychological analysis, has led to the formulation of certain empirical laws governing the variation of the intensity or emphasis of judgments of obligation, and of approval and disapproval, with variation in the quantity of the object, to the fixation of certain *norms* and *thresholds* of valuation, and of the limits within which the value-judgment moves. This method can, I think, be extended to include the analysis of the personal or quasi-ethical, the moral, and the legal judgments.

Into the details of such quantitative analysis we cannot go, but sufficient has been said to indicate that it is the first step in explanation. The variation in these apparently intrinsic ethical

¹ *Psychologisch-Ethische Untersuchungen zur Werth-Theorie*, Part II, chapters ii and iii.

values arises from the fact that the norms and thresholds represent demands or assumptions which are differently derived. They are the assumptions or expectations which have survived the process of selection, in value-movements, individual and social. In the case of the difference between the personal and the impersonal attitude, it can be shown, I think, that the impersonal moral obligation represents the instrumental *participation-value* of a disposition, while the personal obligation represents the *intrinsic ideal value* of the object for the person, the value which the object (the disposition), when assumed to exist, to be realized, has for the individual as such. How these different norms are derived, is a problem for genetic worth-analysis; but, when thus derived, they suffice to explain the variations in explicit value-judgments.

V.

A few words in conclusion as to the bearing of these psychological studies upon what is, after all, the most important problem of a general theory of value, that which has been described as the 'axiological' problem. The close relation is, in a general way, immediately apparent. We not only *feel the value* of an object, but we also reflectively *evaluate* the feeling, by raising the question of the validity of its presuppositions. Every feeling of value is a reality-feeling. Every object valued is, *ipso facto*, presumed, judged, or assumed to exist, even in the case of ideal values. Clearly another point of view than the phenomenological, psychological, is here involved,—a point of view which requires not only to be clearly defined, but also to be properly related to the psychological.

The chief problem for axiology, as for epistemology, is bound up with the distinction between subjective and objective, a distinction made use of in dealing with judgments of value as well as judgments of knowledge. We recognize values as in some way independent of individual acknowledgment, for between the subject and the object there are relations of feeling and will, felt as demands and obligations, just as inviolable as those of the sense-impressions imposed upon us from without. Between the subjectively desired and the objectively desirable in ethics, between

subjective utility and sacrifice and objective value and price in economic reckoning, between the subjectively effective and the objectively beautiful in art, — in all these cases there is a difference for feeling so patent that in naïve and unreflective experience the feelings with such objectivity of reference are spoken of as predicates of the objects themselves.

For reflection, however, there is a difference between the meaning of this distinction in the sphere of values and that which it has in the sphere of truth, and it is at this point that the specific character of the axiological problem appears. In the theory of knowledge the dispute still rages (and is especially fierce at the present time) as to whether there is an objectivity which transcends all subjective process, whether qualities inhere in the thing apart from experience. For the theory of value, the problem is simplified. All values are in one sense subjective; all are founded in some process. But we recognize that our concept of subjectivity must make room for a kind of objectivity, that the feelings or desires determined in one process may exercise a control over feelings and desires determined by other processes, and that this control gives them a form of objectivity.¹

When we seek a name for this kind of objectivity, we find one at hand in the concept of the *norm* and of normative judgments. The practical significance of an objective value is that it forms the norm for subjective feelings of value, that it determines subjective feeling in some way. The unique character of this relation appears upon closer examination. The acknowledgment of the normal exchange-value, the price of an object, is the condition of its further utilization by the individual; the acknowledgment of permanently desirable dispositions is the condition of the realization of certain subjective ethical values; the acknowledgment of objective beauty is the condition of permanent æsthetic satisfactions. Still more apparent is the relation in the case of the extreme objectifications of religion. Ideals of a supernatural character are the product, phenomenologically speaking, of individual and racial appreciative constructions; but the assumption or postulation of their existence is the presupposition of the realization of

¹ Cf. in this connection Simmel's *Philosophie des Geldes*, chapter i.

certain subjective feelings of value, such as reverence and inner peace. In general, the norm is an assumption or postulate of existence, representing the permanent aspects of desire, underlying changeable feelings and judgments. Its function is the control of appreciation, of the subjective worth-judgment.

When this unique character of normative objectivity is recognized, the problem of axiology begins to define itself. In the first place, there is clearly a distinction, at least relative, between *normative* and *factual* objectivity. The question whether an object, the assumption of the reality of which constitutes a control of subjective appreciation, has an existence apart from processes of valuation, individual and social, is for the axiological standpoint a meaningless question. It is also apparent that, in the last analysis, the question of the reality of a value apart from individuals is equally meaningless. Objective values, in the social sense, can be actualized only in individuals. Until thus actualized, they are, at most, merely permanent possibilities of value. We may then go further, and say that there is also a relative distinction between normative objectivity and factual, in the sense of actual, social values. While related, they are by no means identical. Such factual objectivity is always normative in so far as the demand in which the value of the object is founded must enter as a conscious presupposition of actualization of values in the individual. Normal 'exchange' and normal 'moral' values alike have both factual and normative objectivity; but this does not exhaust the field of normative objectivity. There are personal ideals, the normative character of which does not depend upon the belief in their present existence, or even ultimate realization in society. They are assumptions, postulates, the primary significance of which consists in the fact that they are the necessary presuppositions of subjective value in the individual. Developed though they may have been in social interaction, and retaining, as they undoubtedly do, a secondary instrumental value for society, for social participation, they are, nevertheless, *now* primarily significant as conditions of the continuity of the individual and personal value series. In contrast to the preceding *instrumental* norms, they are *intrinsic* norms, which undoubtedly

have metaphysical reality, in that they have meaning, but not necessarily factual existence. Normative objectivity of both types consists, therefore, in the acknowledgment of a presupposition of subjective value, and is ultimately founded in subjective process.

Now the distinction between subjective and objective values being what it has been shown to be, it is clear that the question of the validity of any such distinction is bound up wholly with the question whether the objectivity postulated *fulfills its function as the necessary presupposition of the continuity of valuation, in its two aspects of acquirement and conservation of value.* Other questions may, indeed, be raised, as, for instance, whether the reality which an object of value thus has is equivalent to existence apart from subjective process; but they are, as we have seen, not axiological. We cannot answer the question of the validity, and therefore ultimately the truth or falsity, of the cognitive presuppositions of a feeling of value without reference to this criterion.¹

When, however, the problem of axiology is stated in this way, it is also immediately apparent that a certain definite relation to psychological facts is involved. For immediate experience, this normative objectivity appears in an immediate appreciation of value, which has, as its cognitive presuppositions, certain assumptions or postulates; but for reflection these very assumptions show themselves to be the product of a selective genetic differentiation of our desires (through arrest, effort, and consequent re-adaptations and reconstructions), in which some of our desires have developed into permanent and objective demands. Out of the general level of immediate feeling has emerged a development which has its conclusion in a new kind of objectivity, reality. It is clear that all values, whether subjective or objective, being founded in some process, the ultimate question as to their validity is whether they are well founded or not. It is also clear that whether they are well founded or not depends upon

¹ We might without hesitation say that the criterion of normative objectivity is 'pragmatic,' if we could, without doing violence to the accepted use of the term, include intrinsic as well as instrumental norms. This is, however, doubtful, for the pragmatist seems bent upon the elimination of the 'absolute,' whether personal and practical, or impersonal and theoretical.

their conformity to certain ultimate laws. Every assertion of a value implies at the same time an assertion of its conformity to the laws of feeling and will. The same laws which determine the genesis and survival of objects of value must at the same time determine their normative objectivity.

We cannot, then, avoid the conclusion, that the bearing of the present studies of the processes and laws of valuation upon the axiological problem is direct and immediate, and that they must involve ultimately a reconstruction of such normative laws as are found to be in contradiction with the fundamental capacities of feeling and will. The situation may be stated in still another way. Whatever may be the abstract formulations for the normative sciences of the norms of validity, they cannot be anything else than the development in other terms, and for other purposes, of what, from another point of view, we call psychological laws. We may well believe that psychological description is not all there is to a theory of value, but it certainly is not irrelevant to the normative problem. It is at least necessary that the assumptions, postulates, embodied in these norms, shall be psychologically possible, that "they shall be in harmony with the general laws of the conscious life and only special and detailed developments of what lies in these laws."¹

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¹Quoted from Höfding's discussion of the relation of logical laws to psychology, in *The Problems of Philosophy*, p. 76.

DISCUSSIONS.

DETERMINISM AND INDETERMINISM IN MOTIVES : A REPLY.

Mr. G. W. Cunningham's discussion¹ of my article on "Determinism and Indeterminism in Motives"² presents some interesting general phases of criticism, as well as some important technicalities. He begins by saying frankly that one's conclusions depend considerably upon one's point of departure, and he indicates his own position, namely, a widely held metaphysical theory which lays great stress upon the methodological character of science, and holds in particular that absolute determinism is an implication of this methodology. His purpose is to show that the "existential standpoint" which he attributes to me leads to difficulties from which his own outlook offers the only means of escape.

The first of the difficulties is "an absolute separation of the will from the motive" and "a conception of the two as only externally related." Such abstractions, he observes, not only have obviously no real existence, but also, if taken seriously, make philosophy impossible, since they have no determinate relation to experience. Now this alleged difficulty exists largely in the imagination of my critic. That motives really antedate decision, and are thereby causes of it, is in my judgment a trustworthy and final report of experience. This measure of 'externality' cannot be removed without contradicting the facts or giving them some transcendental, 'timeless' interpretation. But that this way of stating the facts implies that the motive wholly lacks volitional character, or that the motive is entirely past before decision occurs, or that the volitional decision has no inherent motive character, or is superimposed upon the motives from the outside, — all this is as foreign to my own presuppositions as to those of Mr. Cunningham. Indeed, I tried to make this clear by saying: "It is unfortunate that some indeterminist writers designate the will as a supplementary and deciding factor. This gives the impression that the will works externally upon the motives," etc.³ The terms which I use in description of the process are necessarily 'abstractions,' and the plane of that description is in a sense

¹ THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, Vol. XVI, pp. 616 ff.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 298 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 304.

'existential'; but the alleged separation and hypostasization, with their attendant absurdities, to which Mr. Cunningham refers, are interpretative contributions of his own. There is a genuinely metaphysical view that just such descriptive abstractions, with their involved time-relations, tell the truth about reality; and, in particular, that the psychological concepts of the will and its motives are to be discussed on the existential plane without prejudice from any other methodology. The first difficulty, therefore, which Mr. Cunningham finds in my account, is partly a misinterpretation, and partly an inconsistency with an epistemological view which by no means enjoys universal acceptance.

The second alleged difficulty is purely epistemological. Mr. Cunningham says: "If . . . causality means general intelligibility of phenomena, the question concerning its absoluteness becomes . . . one, a negative answer to which renders knowledge itself impossible."¹ And again: "Kant long ago and with unmistakable clearness taught us that in the realm of experience causality is supreme and chance an absurdity." . . . "An undetermined event is an epistemological impossibility."² But the premise here is just what many question. Causality does not mean general intelligibility; and however vital its function in intelligence may be, it is perfect dogmatism to declare that the time sequence of motives and decision becomes unintelligible unless we assume absolute determinism. In taking such a position, Mr. Cunningham is clearly prejudiced by the thought that, if chance is real, it is absolute. Indeed, he says explicitly: "If there is a realm of chance, it is *ipso facto* absolute, since otherwise it would be a realm of law."³ On the logic of this, I will not comment further than to say again that it is no more sound in reference to law and chance than to likeness and difference. What I wish to point out is that this notion of 'realms' of law and chance, and of indeterminism as a theory of exceptions to law, is entirely a perversion of my statements. I said explicitly that chance is not an exception to law, but a partial aspect of every (partially lawful) event.⁴ Accordingly, this second difficulty which Mr. Cunningham finds in my statements seems, like the first one, to consist largely in his misinterpretation of them, and partly in their disagreement, not with the facts, but with a certain theory about the facts.

Mr. Cunningham concludes by offering an exposition of "the more concrete teleological point of view." The central thought of this is:

¹ P. 619.

² P. 620.

³ P. 619.

⁴ Pp. 308, 309

“Psychology has to do with only one aspect of the mental life, the time order aspect; meaning and purpose, although they are indisputably important aspects of the mind, are intentionally left entirely out of account.”¹ Now against this I would say that such a divorce between purpose and the time order of mental facts seems to many students of the matter entirely fictitious. A number of realists, pragmatists, and other hardened heretics and sinners raise a volume of protest which cannot be disregarded, as Mr. Cunningham seems to disregard it in his concluding paragraph, when he says: “At the present stage of our scientific and philosophical development, one may even be somewhat dogmatic in asserting that . . . the only rational solution of the problem of human volition lies in the direction of the teleological categories . . . freedom *in* necessity.” Now, while this disagreement is not at all a refutation of the methodology to which Mr. Cunningham adheres, it is most unquestionably a final reason for not making this methodology a basis of criticism. In the foregoing remarks, I have not tried to establish my conception of indeterminism, — that was the effort of my article, — or to demonstrate that my critic’s methodology is unsound, but only to show that criticism based upon a partizan metaphysical theory is disqualified from the start. Such criticism contains misrepresentations due to hasty oversight, and is ever harking back to the assumed authority of its own foundation. What it demolishes is almost invariably some more or less grotesque caricature of its object. And I personally have a shrewd suspicion that the very assumption of such a critical standpoint is a psychical event in the time order, which is in reality partly determined and partly a matter of chance. That this explanation does not thereby render it irrational or unethical is probably another point of disagreement.

In view of these considerations, it appears clear that, if controversies about experience are susceptible of being settled, then this possibility rests upon the common experience of both parties. Perhaps philosophical controversies cannot be settled, just for this reason; but there is obviously no other hope. Such a common basis of discussion, if any exists, is found on the plane of daily experience, which is at the same time existential, functional, and teleological. Given facts and such extensions only as have common acceptance are the indispensable requirement of debate.

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¹P. 622.

DETERMINISM AND INDETERMINISM IN MOTIVES:
A REJOINDER.

The points in the above reply to which I wish to refer are the assertions: (1) that I have, in my criticism, misinterpreted the statements which I attempted to criticise; and (2) that my misinterpretation is based upon a preconceived theory which happens not to harmonize with the criticised standpoint.

In defence of my "interpretative contributions" to Dr. Ewer's position concerning the separation of will and motive, I can only say that I attempted to criticise what seemed to me the logical implications of his article. Of course, I was aware that there were passages which did not agree with the general drift of the discussion, and such passages I tried not to overlook. I noted the passage which Dr. Ewer quotes above, to the effect that the will does not work externally upon the motives; and, in my criticism, I was careful to refer to this tendency on Dr. Ewer's part to bring will and motive together. But such isolated passages I could not reconcile with the author's nervous anxiety concerning the absolute contingency of the will, which anxiety was clearly evident throughout the entire discussion. The inconsistency may be stated definitely: If, as Dr. Ewer expressly declares, the will is decision, and if, as he says above, "motives really antedate decision and are thereby causes of it," then I confess myself incapable of seeing how will can possibly be uncaused; and yet the burden of Dr. Ewer's contention seems to be that the will *is* uncaused, decision *is* undetermined. My 'contribution,' therefore, simply amounted to confining my attention to the predominant tendency of the argument, since I knew the author did not wish to contradict himself. And so I reasoned thus: If will is not caused, if within limits, however circumscribed, it is 'particular and free,' then it must be independent of motives, and therefore only externally, if at all, related to them. Whether such reasoning is valid and justifiable, and whether such a will is more than a hypostasized abstraction, I leave others to judge.

My 'contribution' to Dr. Ewer's second difficulty is of the same import. If chance is epistemologically valid, then one ought to know its significance. Is it subject to law, and is the decision which is made possible by it a knowable decision? If so, why call the concept 'chance' and the decision 'undetermined decision'? If not, why is not the concept an ontologized nonentity, and the decision, which is not a decision, a contradiction in terms? If causality in its broadest signification does not mean intelligibility of phenomena, what does it mean? Again, the reader must decide whether I am guilty of pervert-

ing Dr. Ewer's statements, or whether Dr. Ewer himself could not study more carefully and define more sharply the meaning of his own terminology.

As to my having been led into all this error and misinterpretation by a "partisan metaphysical theory," little need be said. My criticism did not profess to be a theory, nor did I think that it was, any more than any serious experiment must be, biassed by preconception. It was merely an attempt to establish a standpoint adequate to certain phenomena, and I had fondly hoped that the attempt was made in the light of those phenomena. Perhaps I did not succeed in clinging to experience as did my author, but my failure was not due to lack of earnest effort. Whether I succeeded or failed does not affect the fact that criticism of a standpoint in both science and philosophy is possible and necessary, especially in the more concrete and intricate problems; and, fortunately, such a criticism does not presuppose, as Dr. Ewer seems to think, neglect of the data of experience.

In conclusion, I must say a word about the answer which Dr. Ewer makes to a statement of mine concerning the teleological point of view. After quoting my assertion that, according to this view, the science of psychology abstracts from the purposive aspect of the mental life and observes it simply on its factual side, he adds: "Now against this I would say that such a divorce between purpose and the time order of mental facts seems to many students of the matter entirely fictitious." If by this is meant that such a divorce postulated as the *whole truth* about the mental life is fictitious, none would agree to the assertion more readily than would the teleologist. If, on the other hand, it is meant that such a divorce (if one may call it so) is not the *truth of psychology*, in the sense that psychology presupposes this degree of abstractness, the teleologist does not agree with the position. He turns a deaf ear to the volume of protest raised by "realists, pragmatists, and other hardened heretics and sinners," and simply points to the facts.

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REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

Thought and Things. A Study of the Development and Meaning of Thought or *Genetic Logic*. By JAMES MARK BALDWIN. Vol. I, *Functional Logic or Genetic Theory of Knowledge*. London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York, The Macmillan Co., 1906. — pp. xiv, 273.

The complete work announced under the general title, 'Thought and Things,' is to comprise three volumes. The first volume now before us has the title 'Functional Logic,' while the second and third are to deal respectively with the 'Genetic Theory of Thought' (the discursive processes of judgment and reasoning) and 'Real Logic' ('carrying the treatment into the hyper-logical functions, Æsthetic, Rational, etc., and drawing conclusions for 'Real Logic' and Philosophy'). The three volumes will in general correspond to the author's three-fold division of the processes of knowledge into the pre-logical, logical, and hyper-logical. For Professor Baldwin holds not only that cognition begins prior to judgment and thought, but also that thinking cannot resolve its own dualism, and that the highest stage in the development of knowledge is hyperlogical, — a contemplative or æsthetic form of immediacy (p. x). These general divisions and this general conclusion have already been stated by Professor Baldwin in works published during the last few years. This volume gives us, then, first, an introduction to the whole work (pp. 3-34), defining the standpoint of genetic logic and discussing its canons and divisions, and, secondly, a treatment of the prelogical modes of cognition in their progression towards the form of logical experience.

At the end of the volume the author says that the characteristic features of all the determinations so far as reached, as contrasted with those of other writers, may be summed up in the two statements here quoted. "First, we have found quite untenable the position that there is any sort of discontinuity or dualism as between prelogical function, as merely elaborating matter for thought, and thought as a self-regulating activity coming to utilize such matter *ab extra*. On the contrary, cognition is a continuous function, which undergoes constant renewal in those progressive differentiations seen in the movements of control. Second, the positive dualism is one within the operation of this developing function, the dualism of meanings which arises from a distribution of the essential factors of all cognitive proc-

esses. There is no genetic discontinuity in the movement, no transverse break; there is a series of genetic contrast-effects due to the divergence in the strands of matter and function traced lengthwise" (pp. 272-273).

It seems to me, however, that this concluding statement of the book, taken by itself, scarcely serves to contrast the author's views with those of other writers. All modern writers of the idealistic school, from Hegel down, might accept these sentences as a general description of their own results. But in the preface and in the introductory chapter we find passages which are intended to state more definitely the author's aim, as well as what seems to him lacking in the earlier accounts of the development of knowledge. "There is need," he says, "of a careful and detailed working out of the development of cognition: an inductive, psychological, genetic research into the actual movements of the function of knowledge" (p. viii). Again, in criticising 'Meta-physical Logic,' he writes: "It is difficult, for example, for the logician who assumes teleological organization as an ultimate character of reality to allow that the purposive organization of the individual's thinking has its natural genesis and method in psycho-physical and social selective processes" (p. 8). And to this a footnote adds, "that is, processes of the type of Darwinian natural selection." "The psychologist," the same page tells us, "therefore, naturally puts in a claim for some treatment of thinking which describes it before it interprets it, which really determines its place in the growth of knowledge, instead of allowing it to determine the place of everything else." We have to ask about thinking, then, all the great questions that science is able to ask of its objects; not only the question *What?* but also the larger series of questions included under the *How?* and the *Why?* of the truly genetic sciences (p. 9).

Professor Baldwin's brief discussion of the "Canons of Genetic Logic" (pp. 22 ff.) is also significant as indicating his general point of view and principles of procedure in following the development of knowledge. The application of the 'Canon of Continuity' — "all psychic process is continuous" — is perhaps sufficiently illustrated by the passage already quoted from the author's final summary. Of the others we may mention here the 'Canon of Progression' (with its Fallacy of Composition) and the 'Canon of Actuality' (with the Fallacy of the Implicit). The former states that "all psychic process is genetic and may be expressed in the formula *A* becomes *B* whether or not it is ever true that *B* becomes *A*." The Fallacy of Composition "consists in treating a psychic event as compounded or made up

of or caused by other psychic events." The Canon of Actuality is that "no psychic event is present unless it be actual." The Fallacy of the Implicit or Potential "consists in treating something as implicit or potentially present when it is not actual; so the fallacy of finding implicit logical processes in the prelogical modes or a 'potential' self in the impersonal modes."

It is evident from these statements that Professor Baldwin maintains that a genetic account of knowledge must avoid alike 'leveling down' and 'leveling up.' If it is to do justice to a developmental series, it must abandon the attempt to explain the later by the earlier in terms of the mechanical category of cause and effect. On the other hand, if it is to furnish a real explanation, it must take the earlier modes of the conscious life as they are actually given, and not read into them meanings belonging to some more fully developed stages of knowledge. There can be no doubt, I think, of the value of the methodological principles here laid down. Philosophy and psychology have suffered both from the 'leveling down' and the 'leveling up' method of treating the facts with which they are called upon to deal. It is possible, however, to grant this, and even to recognize Professor Baldwin's attempt to avoid these rival fallacies as a genuine contribution, without following him altogether in his criticisms of other theories, or failing to raise the question whether he has rightly interpreted his own canons and consistently observed his own rules. This question, however, may be postponed until we have given some account of the main results of the book.

Following the introductory chapters, there are two main divisions of the volume. Part II, entitled "The Prelogical Modes," has two chapters which discuss the first form of cognitive consciousness and the development of sense and memory objects. Part III, "The Quasi-logical Modes," has seven chapters, with the following titles: Chap. V, "The Second Determination of Image Objects: The Inner-Outer Dualism"; Chap. VI, "The First Determination of Semblant Objects: Play or Make-Believe Objects"; Chap. VII, "On Meaning"; Chap. VIII, "The Development of Meaning: The Individual Mode"; Chap. IX, "Negative Meaning"; Chap. X, "The Substantive Progression: The Mind-Body Dualism"; Chap. XI, "The Subject-Object Dualism: Experience a Psychic Mode."

It is interesting to note that the term 'experience' is not used of the prelogical forms of cognition, but is reserved for that later stage when the subject-object dualism has been developed. This we may also speak of as the 'subject-mode,' "seeing that the inner or objec-

tive retreats into the citadel of conscious agency and control over against the entire world of thought or experience" (p. 250). Cognition, however, in its earliest sensational form is not yet experience, but exists as a simple awareness of an object. It is neither subjective nor objective, but may be described as projective consciousness (p. 44). Negatively, we may say that such a consciousness seems to lack dualism. "It is innocent of the distinction between what is in consciousness and what is external to it (the dualism of inner and outer), of the distinction of the subject that thinks and the things it thinks about (the dualism of the 'subject and object'), of the distinction between one thinker and another (the dualism of the self and other self — 'Ego and Alter')" (p. 46). And positively, this primitive awareness involves the recognition of an object, meaning by object anything to which the mind can be attentively directed. "It is just this way of doing — this singling out of an element from among the contents of consciousness and holding it up as having a sort of self-integrity and unit-quality for our personal ends — that is the function of cognition" (p. 41). Moreover, "there is in such a consciousness an awareness of the ways in which such an experience is progressively grouped" (p. 47).

On first reading these sections, one is inclined to say that it is a question of terminology only whether we apply the term 'judgment' to these early stages of cognition. For Professor Baldwin tells us that the transition from the prelogical to the logical "is in its nature but the development of a continuous function." Moreover, in his recognition that the primitive cognition involves attention, the singling out of something as an object or content, he seems to go as far as do those who find 'judgment' in the primitive experience. For in maintaining that cognition implies the subject-object relation, no one, I suppose, holds that this distinction is explicitly present, any more than Professor Baldwin holds that the subject is explicitly aware of itself in attending. Professor Baldwin would also admit, I think, that every object of cognition is a meaning. He speaks indeed of "simple apprehension and memory in their naïve and spontaneous exercise" as "bare of meanings" (p. 132), but this seems to be only a limiting case that is never realized. "Even at the lowest stage, there is, no doubt, in each case a somewhat that interests, or a somewhat that is recognized — some thin veiling of apperceptive process which enables the datum to conceal its absolute bareness and lack of meaning" (p. 137). But if so, the datum is so far read in a context, interpreted, or idealized; and this is all, I think, that anyone would imply by calling the process a judgment.

There is probably, however, more than a mere question of terminology involved here. For the issue seems to be whether the 'contexts' which even primitive cognition involves are cases of mere practical togetherness, fusions of sensational and kinæsthetic elements, or to some extent already organized by intelligence. To accept the latter alternative by no means does away with the necessity of showing *how* intelligence organizes, what are the concrete processes and means through which it achieves its results. But feeling and the results of movement must be taken up by thought before they can become organized as knowledge.

The main theme of the book is the development of the various 'dualisms of control' in the process of cognition. "By 'control' is meant in general the checking, limiting, regulation of the constructive process" (p. 57). Even in the early projective consciousness there is some recognition of two great factors, "the mass of moving disposition, representing the psychic drift and context, on the one hand, and the projective content-item, the datum of sense on the other hand" (p. 58). The one is autonomic in the negative sense of being undisturbed and facile. The other is obstructive, limiting, heteronomic in character. "Now it is by the development of these coefficients, considered as marks of great masses of contents, that we will find subsequent dualisms arising. . . . It is a segregation of the . . . heteronomic that yields *the physical world, the first form of the external that is reached*. It comes as resistance sensations through one sense, as visual sensations through another. . . . It dominates or controls the construction of the object of sense; it is a limiting, or 'nomic' presence, and in it the reference to what is extra-psychic takes place" (p. 59).

It is from this antithesis that the subsequent dualisms of knowledge develop, and it is in following the transformations which these opposing movements undergo that the author treats successively of the image mode (including memory and fancy), the semblant or play mode, the substantive mode, and the reflective mode. In the free imaging or fancy, the dualism takes on the form of 'inner and outer,' the play modes give rise to distinctions of self and not-self, which is further developed in the substantive mode into the dualism of mind and body. In the reflective mode emerges for the first time the subject-object dualism, the world of experience and logical ideas.

This progression of cognitive modes is worked out with great thoroughness of detail and with a comprehensive grasp of the guiding principles. It is the story at once of the parallel development of the knowing mind and of the objects of its knowledge, of 'thoughts and things';

and even though one does not entirely agree with Professor Baldwin's working assumptions, one cannot fail to recognize both the importance of the problem with which he is dealing and the real value of his results. Great emphasis is laid on the function of the semblant or play mode of consciousness in the development of knowledge, a factor which has not elsewhere received treatment. At first this mode gives rise to an enlargement of the inner control so as to include the outer within itself. This effacement of the dualism is but temporary, however, and issues in the erection of an experimental object within that mode which again brings the 'inner' under its control. It thus contributes in an important way to the development of both the inner and the outer life. The whole account of the mutual opposition and interplay of the opposing factors in the development of knowledge is most instructive. "The external control of sense is loosened in the joint control of memory; the lack of control in fancy establishes the inwardness of content as material for manipulation; the freedom of play leads to its reduction to order for subjective purposes; in thought it is again submitted to the joint control of external and internal factors" (pp. 261, 262). The final chapter tells how the opposing controls of mind and body are finally realized as subject and object of experience. When this stage is reached, "Knowledges are no longer simple presences nor are mistakes simple embarrassments; cognitions called truths and with them cognitions called errors now arise. . . . The facts of the world are truths only when mediated through the organization of experiences as ideas; and the appreciations of the self are only fulfilments when mediated through a context converted into facts" (p. 266).

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion, however, that the subject-object relation has been reached because it was the one continuous function whose development furnished both the motive and the moving principle for the whole progression. Only by reading back the end of the development into the earlier modes is it possible to select what is significant for description, or to see its meaning and function in the whole process. This is shown, it seems to me, by the author's frequent anticipations of what is to come later, as well as by his supplementation of the psychic standpoint by an account in the more reflective psychological terms. It is hardly possible to understand the memory, or the play consciousness, or the substantive modes of cognition, without assuming the organization of experience through ideas—that knowledge is something more than simple presence and error more than embarrassment.

The relation of his own view to Pragmatism is a subject to which

Professor Baldwin refers several times in the course of his work. He has somewhere spoken of his own view as recognizing the pragmatic origin of knowledge, but as denying that truth is merely instrumental in its ultimate end and criterion. The former part of the statement cannot, I think, be taken in the usual sense of the term 'pragmatic.' For one of the essential features of Professor Baldwin's account is his emphasis on the insufficiency of the inner control of interest and purpose and the necessity of a control of ideas through facts. This insistence on a real or objective moment in cognition which gives it a character of its own is, of course, directly opposite to pragmatism. Unfortunately, the sharp contrasting of the two factors, and the failure to mediate them through judgment, sometimes make the statement seem like the assertion of a most primitive realism. Another conclusion of great importance which is reached in the course of genetic treatment is that the merely instrumental is never a true universal, but functions only as a generalized schema (p. 216 ff.). Thought as reflective, that is, thought fully aware of itself in its mode of universality, finds its interest fulfilled by ideas and is theoretical. The author has used these arguments also in two articles published in the *Psychological Review* ("The Limits of Pragmatism," January, 1904, and "On Truth," July, 1907), the latter article being subsequent to the publication of the volume before us and containing replies to the criticisms of Professors Dewey and Moore.

The limits of a review have not allowed me to refer directly to the three chapters dealing with 'Meaning,' which discuss a number of topics of fundamental importance, notably the function of the schematism as a prelogical mode of cognition, and the significance of negative meanings in the development of knowledge. There are also a number of fundamental philosophical questions suggested by Professor Baldwin's treatment, questions regarding the nature of thought and the ultimate synthesis of experience, which cannot be discussed in this place. Such a discussion, however, may well be postponed until after the publication of the later volumes of this work. The remark, however, may not be inappropriate here, that if reflection is the only form and function of thought, then not only is thought powerless to heal its dualisms, but it is incompetent to furnish any criterion of certainty or to set up any ends of its own. Moreover, the ultimate principle of unity, whenever or wherever found in experience, can be nothing else than the nature of the knowing mind, and this is involved in the earlier as well as the later stages of cognition. If the dualisms of cognition are to be overcome, this must be effected through the development of the principle of unity which is from the first immanent in knowledge.

Notwithstanding these difficulties regarding ultimate questions, one must acknowledge heartily the importance of Professor Baldwin's contribution in a comparatively new field. The form of the book is at first somewhat repelling. It presents on first reading a multitude of divisions and distinctions in a terminology that is largely unfamiliar, but these difficulties largely disappear on further acquaintance. It still appears to me, indeed, that some of the author's distinctions are not of vital importance, and that he has an undue fondness for his own terminology. But the comparatively new field which he is exploring, together with the value of his results, would excuse more serious defects than these. And after all one might pass the same criticism on Kant's *Kritik* or on Hegel's *Logic*.

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The Persistent Problems of Philosophy: An Introduction to Metaphysics through the Study of Modern Systems. By MARY WHITON CALKINS. New York, The Macmillan Company; London, Macmillan and Co., 1907. — pp. xxii, 575.

The book before us is described in the Preface as an attempt "to combine" what seem to the author "the essential features of a systematic Introduction to Metaphysics with those of a History of Modern Philosophy." It is intended for the use, not only of beginners in philosophy, but also of more advanced students.

The introductory chapter seeks to define the nature of philosophy and to distinguish its various types. "Philosophy is the attempt to discover by reasoning the utterly irreducible nature of anything; and philosophy, in its most adequate form, seeks the ultimate nature of all-that-there-is" (pp. 5 f.). From the point of view of this definition, various types of philosophical systems are distinguished. The ultimate nature of reality may be considered from a quantitative and from a qualitative point of view. Quantitatively speaking, systems of philosophy are numerically monistic and numerically pluralistic. But the terms 'monism' and 'pluralism' may also be applied qualitatively, according as we regard the universe (whether it be one or many beings) to be "all of a kind" or to have a plural nature. Thus we get the distinction between qualitatively monistic and qualitatively pluralistic systems. Again, qualitatively monistic systems may be either idealistic or non-idealistic. And, finally, idealistic systems may be phenomenistic, those which "regard consciousness as mere succession of ideas," and spiritualistic or personalistic, those which mean by 'consciousness' a conscious self or selves (pp. 9 f.).

On the basis of this classification, Professor Calkins proceeds to discuss the representative modern philosophers from Descartes to Hegel. Save for a brief reference in the chapter on Berkeley, Locke's system is omitted, on the ground that it is essentially that of Descartes (p. 111). The numerical pluralists are taken up first. Among them, Descartes stands as the chief representative of qualitative pluralism. The qualitative monists of the group are: (1) Hobbes, whose monism is non-idealistic; and (2) Leibniz, Berkeley, and Hume, whose monism is idealistic. Of these latter, Leibniz and Berkeley are, further, personalists, while Hume is a phenomenalist. With Hume the discussion of numerical pluralism ends. Then follows a chapter on Kant, whom the author is unable to fit into her classification, because his system, "as internally inconsistent," fails "to represent any one type of philosophy" (p. 10, note). After Kant, the numerical monists are considered. The philosopher who combines qualitative pluralism with quantitative monism is Spinoza. The qualitative monists in the group, namely, Schopenhauer and Hegel, are not only idealists, but spiritualists as well. Fichte and Schelling, whose systems, like that of Kant, are characterized as "internally inconsistent," are discussed after Spinoza on the ground that, while they are not consistent, they nevertheless represent in a general way the advance toward monistic spiritualism. The concluding chapter of the book discusses contemporary systems, both idealistic and non-idealistic. The Appendix, embracing somewhat more than one hundred pages, contains biographies and bibliographies of writers discussed or referred to in the body of the work, critical notes, and expositions of parts of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and of Spinoza's *Ethics*.

The only important departure from the chronological order which the mode of treatment followed in the body of the work involves, is in the case of Spinoza. Aside from the greater convenience of discussing his system in connection with the other forms of numerical monism, the author would urge, I infer, that Spinoza may properly be considered between Kant and Fichte because his philosophy had little influence upon the history of thought until the latter part of the eighteenth century. In the interests of young students, however, it would have been well to point out, in the earlier part of the book, that Spinoza is taken out of the chronological order. His chronological position is, of course, indicated when we come to the discussion of his system (p. 278); but until this point the student is left to think that numerical monism had no representative in the seventeenth century.

The discussion of the various modern systems which constitutes the

main part of the book is naturally limited by the plan of the work. The author does not attempt to give a complete account of these systems, but considers each chiefly from the point of view of the questions which she has proposed as the basis of her classification. In this connection it might, perhaps, be urged that the title of the book is a little unfortunate, since it leads us to expect the discussion of some problems which are not taken up. But there can be no question that, in giving us this vigorous and detailed treatment of a few specific questions, Professor Calkins has rendered a higher service than she could have done by taking up a larger number of problems and studying them less exhaustively. Besides this, it should be noted that the Appendix supplies some deficiencies, and that in some other cases most of the important doctrines of the philosopher under consideration are at least touched upon in connection with the investigation of those problems which have been chosen as fundamental.

Professor Calkins's discussions of the philosophers whom she has selected for study are of great value. In each case, we have a careful exposition of the doctrine under consideration, followed or accompanied by a detailed and searching criticism. The expositions are, almost without exception, admirable for clearness and system. Even when one dissents, as one sometimes must, from the author's interpretation, one cannot fail to recognize the coherent thought and the power of clear expression which give to her exposition its unusual directness and lucidity. The criticisms, which form a considerable part of each chapter, are detailed, systematic, and penetrating, and are put with much clearness. As the author indicates in her Preface, they are made from the point of view of her own metaphysical theory, the doctrine that ultimate reality is an Absolute Self. But this is inevitable, and not, in my judgment, undesirable. An objection that may perhaps more properly be raised to some of Professor Calkins's criticisms is that her own love of system and clearness occasionally leads her into an error of emphasis, the error of demanding of a philosopher that he give us reasoned arguments for all his insights. Spinoza "never proves" that the All is One; Fichte "assumes, and does not argue, that the all-including One is activity" (p. 321, note); and even Hegel "nowhere explicitly outlines the argument" for his "doctrine that ultimate reality is an Individual," an oversight which Professor Calkins characterizes as "the greatest and the most inexplicable defect of Hegel's 'Logic'" (p. 380). I do not mean, of course, to imply that we have no right to demand argument of philosophy. I mean simply that there is here, perhaps, a little too much of the

balancing of arguments and not quite enough of the reproducing of the spirit of a system. But while, in a general way, this criticism may be made, I would not lay too much stress upon it. In a work which professed to be a history of philosophy, the defect, even in the slight degree in which it exists in this book, would be more serious. But Professor Calkins's main purpose is to determine what conceptions of ultimate reality the various philosophers have, and how far they have succeeded in establishing the validity of these conceptions. Hence the estimation of set arguments is a necessary part of her task, whereas she is not so much concerned to determine the value of each system as a whole.

A detailed discussion of all the chapters in this interesting book would require more space than we have at our command; but some of the salient points may be considered. The chapter on Leibniz gives, on the whole, an admirable exposition of a system which it is by no means easy to present to students in a way that will win their sympathy and intelligent appreciation. The argument for Leibniz's general idealistic position is put with great clearness. The weak point in the exposition as a whole seems to me to be the treatment of the doctrine of preëstablished harmony. The relation between the pre-established harmony that prevails throughout the universe of monads and the special case of the harmony of mind and body is nowhere explained, and the passage from the one to the other (p. 89) is somewhat confusing, the more so as the explanation of what Leibniz means by an animal body first appears several pages later.

The detailed exposition of Berkeley is excellent. The only point that I am disposed to criticise is the treatment of Berkeley's doctrine of the self, which will be touched upon later. The chapter on Hume gives an interpretation from which many will dissent. In the first place, it is bearing rather hard upon a thinker of Hume's tendencies to try to fit him into a scheme of constructive metaphysics. Professor Calkins admits that Hume is "skeptical" rather than "constructive philosopher," and that his "teaching is, above all, negative"; but she maintains that, through his critical objections to accepted theories, he "really formulated a new doctrine" (p. 150). To a certain extent this may be granted; but when one reads, *e. g.*, that "Hume teaches that reality is through and through immaterial," and that "he believes the universe to consist of a great complex of ever shifting sensations and images" (p. 149), one is hardly able to give full assent. Professor Calkins's discussion of Hume's doctrine of causality is one of the important features of the chapter. In the so-called

'causal connection of events,' she distinguishes two kinds of necessity: (1) the necessary "connection between cause and effect regarded merely as events in time," which is "formulated in the proposition, 'Every past has a present and has a future,'" and (2) the strictly causal necessity, "expressed in the proposition, 'Every recurring event . . . is uniformly followed by the same event'" (p. 155). In none of Hume's three arguments against causality does he succeed in disproving the necessity of the temporal connection. But Professor Calkins maintains that he does disprove the necessity of the strictly causal connection, by his argument that experience can tell us only what *has* happened, not what *will* happen. In the first place, "exactly the same event never recurs"; and, in the second place, "to-day's event, though precisely similar to yesterday's, cannot be known to have an event precisely similar to yesterday's as its consequent. . . . It is, to be sure, contrary to observation and subversive of science to suppose a cause repeated without repetition of the effect, but such a supposition is not logically impossible" (p. 162). I am not quite able to understand Professor Calkins's point of view here. If the denial of causal necessity is really subversive of science, philosophy can hardly afford to ignore that fact. But perhaps the author does not mean quite what she seems here to imply; for, in her later discussion of Kant's doctrine of causality, she seems to teach that science is possible without the supposition of causal necessity.

The chapter on Kant is at the same time one of the most valuable and interesting in the book and one of those most open to criticism. The interpretation is certainly one-sided; notably, the epistemological significance of Kant's work is too lightly touched upon, and, one suspects, too lightly valued. But the interpretation is suggestive and bears the marks of acute and independent thinking. In regard to causality, Professor Calkins believes that Kant succeeds in showing, in opposition to Hume, the necessity of the temporal connection of events, but that he fails to prove that the causal or uniform connection of events is absolutely necessary. Kant argues that we could not "know the world as a connected whole of regularly recurring phenomena, if the causal uniformity were not absolutely universal." Professor Calkins maintains that, while the assumption of the regularity of nature is necessary to scientific investigation, all that is really needed as a basis for this assumption is "an ordinarily uniform," rather than "an inevitably uniform experience" (p. 216).

The section in which the author criticises Kant's doctrine of the necessity of the categories (pp. 220 ff.) is one of the few passages in

the book which lack the lucidity that is a notable characteristic of the work as a whole. In the interests of clearness, I think it would be better to avoid interchanging the terms 'universality' and 'necessity.' The further identification of *a priori* with 'universal' (or 'necessary') and of *a posteriori* with 'individual' (or 'contingent') seems also unfortunate. If the student's knowledge of Kant were to be confined to Professor Calkins's book, this identification would probably cause little trouble; but it is liable to be somewhat confusing to a beginner who is struggling with the *Critique of Pure Reason* itself. The substance of the section is, briefly, that Kant is wrong in maintaining that space, time, and the categories have any other necessity than that which sensations have. All analytical judgments, — even judgments about sensations, — have logical necessity. And this is the only kind of necessity to which the categories can lay claim. Synthetic judgments are never necessary. Kant asserts, but never proves, that there are necessary judgments in mathematics which are synthetic. Professor Calkins follows Couturat in maintaining that these judgments are really analytic. The only case in which Kant tries to prove that there are necessary synthetic judgments is that of causality. And here "he is unsuccessful. For the truth is, as Hume saw clearly, that the causal principle loses necessity whenever it becomes synthetic — whenever . . . it seeks to prophesy uniformity, though it has experienced only customary conjunction" (p. 225). However the case may be with mathematics, I am unable to accept the argument involved in Professor Calkins's attack upon Kant's doctrine of causality. As the human mind is constituted, it seems impossible for us to believe that any given event is uncaused. And Hume has shown that, when we assert of an event that it must have had some cause, we are not making an analytical judgment. On the whole, I incline to think that Professor Calkins's objection to asserting the *epistemological* necessity of the causal relation is grounded upon her failure to distinguish between causal necessity and what Rickert calls 'Gesetzmassigkeit,' the absolute uniformity which is expressed in a 'law of nature.' Every event is something individual, unique; as Professor Calkins rightly says, precisely the same event never recurs. Hence, we are not justified in asserting causal uniformity in the sense of declaring that the future of the world, or of any part of it, will be precisely like the present. But every event has, nevertheless, its cause, and could not have been different from what it is unless that cause had been different. If we choose, we may, perhaps, express this by saying that, *if* precisely the same cause could recur, the same effect would ensue. But the expres-

sion is unfortunate, as involving the supposition of what we admit to be impossible.

Kant's doctrine of the self is also subjected to criticism. Hume's conception of consciousness as mere succession of ideas, rather than conscious self, created the demand for a new vindication of the doctrine of the self. Kant furnished this by showing that ideas and their relatedness "imply the existence of an identical and unifying self" (p. 228). But the only self that we can know is, according to him, the empirical self, and this reduces "to an ego closely resembling Hume's mere bundle of perceptions" (pp. 242 f.). In opposition to Kant, Professor Calkins brings forward arguments to show that the "real self" is knowable. In this connection a criticism suggests itself which might have been made at various other points in the book, namely, that Professor Calkins nowhere gives us so full a discussion of her own conception of the self as seems to be demanded. To be specific, one wishes that she had more fully defined her position with reference to the old doctrine of the substantial self, to which Hume and Kant gave the death-blow. That a satisfactory conception must occupy some intermediate position between that of Hume, on the one hand, and that of Descartes, Wolff, and Berkeley, on the other, seems to me evident. Professor Calkins indicates her dissent from Hume's teaching, but she does not make it quite clear how her conception stands related to the traditional doctrine of the substantial self. In this connection one might suggest that she lays herself open to the charge of teaching a dualism of the Berkeleian type. The naïve idealism of Berkeley explicitly posits two sorts of reality: 'idea' or state of consciousness, which is wholly passive, and the active spirit, "a thing entirely distinct from ideas." I do not mean to suggest that Professor Calkins really holds this naïve conception of the self. But, in view of the sharpness of her dissent from the Humian doctrine, it is incumbent upon her, I think, to show us more clearly than she does in what relation she stands to Berkeley's position. Her discussion of Berkeley would, in itself, suggest that she accepts his doctrine without qualification. And, in like manner, the way in which she deals with Kant's discussion of the 'paralogisms' seems to imply that she finds in it no valid criticism of the conception of the substantial self. Nor can it be justly urged, I think, that the treatment of the self in her *Introduction to Psychology* absolves the author from the task which we have indicated. In the first place, I do not understand that the present book takes for granted that all its readers are familiar with the *Introduction*. And, in the second place, I have myself not found it easy to learn,

from Professor Calkins's psychological writings, precisely what her doctrine of the self is, — just how it differs, *e. g.*, from that of Descartes and Berkeley.

The discussion of Spinoza seems to me less sympathetic than most of the other chapters. The doctrine of the attributes is criticised as being "inconsistent with the teaching that God is fundamentally one." For each of the attributes, according to Spinoza, constitutes the essence of substance, "and surely that which has many essentialities, or natures, cannot be truly one" (p. 294). The same objection is involved in the author's criticism of Spinoza's doctrine of parallelism. In both criticisms, it seems to me, Professor Calkins takes somewhat too literally Spinoza's insistence upon the distinctness of the attributes. What he is concerned to show is that the universe is not to be regarded as made up of thinking beings *plus* extended beings, but that each existing thing, — and, of course, the One of which each individual thing is a part, — is both thinking and extended. A thought-mode cannot be causally related to an extension-mode, because the two are, at bottom, one. Professor Calkins, of course, denies that they can be one, on the ground that the difference between the attributes is ultimate. But this is to emphasize the letter, rather than the spirit, of Spinoza's teaching. The only way, it seems to me, in which one can legitimately attack Spinoza's position is to insist upon the idealistic considerations which compel us to revise the naïve conception of the nature of extension. Professor Calkins mentions these idealistic considerations; but it would have been better if she had made them more prominent, and had laid less stress upon the other, and more doubtful, argument.

The discussion of Fichte is based chiefly upon the *Vocation of Man* and the *Foundation of the Whole Science of Knowledge*. The author interprets Fichte as teaching that reality is an all-inclusive Self, which is spiritual and yet impersonal. To this she objects that this "Absolute is not in any sense a self. . . . There is no such thing as impersonal consciousness" (p. 328). Moreover, Fichte's only reason for asserting that the absolute Self is impersonal is that personality, as he believes, involves limitations, and that he "cannot conceive of the ultimate reality as limited." The Absolute is truly conceived, however, "not as unlimited, but as 'self-limited,'" and "with this admission, the impossibility of a personal Absolute vanishes" (p. 330). This criticism seems to indicate that Professor Calkins rather underestimates the difficulty of conceiving the nature of an all-embracing consciousness. If the finite spirits are united in the Infinite Spirit in

somewhat the sense in which my own separate thoughts are united in my individual consciousness, it is hard to understand why these finite spirits are not aware of their oneness. It may be that, in spite of all its apparent defects, the conception of the Absolute Spirit gives us the most satisfactory explanation of experience which we can hope to find; but I think that most of those who adopt it fail to admit, or perhaps to recognize, the great difficulties inherent in it. It seems to me that Professor Calkins does not recognize fully the source of the difficulty which Fichte finds. What he is trying to do is to keep close to the facts of human life, and, in particular, to do justice to those aspects of experience which make many a serious thinker an out-and-out pluralist. He is continually teaching that actuality is not unitary, either qualitatively or quantitatively speaking. The unity of "all individuals" in the "pure Spirit" and the unity of subject and object in the perfected knowledge and the perfected moral life are an ideal, to which the world can only approximate. Thus, in one sense, we may say that reality *is* not, but is only *becoming*, one. In another sense, however, Fichte seems to teach that it is even now one, — one reality, which is conscious of itself only as many individuals (quantitative pluralism) and as subject opposed to object (qualitative pluralism), but in which consciousness is gradually developing toward unity. That this conception is free from objection, I am not prepared to say; but, at any rate, we should recognize that Fichte is led to it through his refusal to ignore certain obvious aspects of experience. †

Following upon the discussion of Fichte, we have a brief consideration of the doctrines of Schelling and Schopenhauer. The author's treatment of Schopenhauer is somewhat peculiar, particularly in the subordinate place which is assigned to his pessimism. "The common estimate" of Schopenhauer "as mere prophet of pessimism is both unfortunate and unjust. Brilliant and appealing as his pessimism is, it is after all only an offshoot from his metaphysical doctrine, and is not to be compared, in strength of argument or in keenness of analysis, with the idealistic philosophy on which it is based" (pp. 356 f.). "His great advance upon Fichte and Schelling consists in his implicit recognition of the personality of the absolute self." But "he falls short of an idealistic monism," because "he inadequately conceives this personality, . . . and because he fails to demonstrate its absoluteness" (p. 343).

In accord with the general purpose of the book, the discussion of Hegel is confined to a consideration of his fundamental metaphysical doctrines, with only brief reference to his philosophy of history and

philosophy of religion. Hegel's great achievement is his convincing argument for the doctrine that ultimate reality is an Absolute Self. This argument Professor Calkins presents with great clearness and force, and in considerable detail. Her exposition, as she points out, diverges "widely from Hegel's own order of thought" (p. 361, note), even involving a change in the order of the categories. But she holds, and I think rightly, that the gain in clearness justifies this procedure. The exposition is admirable for its directness and lucidity, and, as might be expected, is very sympathetic.

The concluding chapter is devoted to an examination of contemporary philosophical systems, with special reference to the issue between pluralistic and monistic personalism. The greater part of it is an exposition and defence of monistic personalism, and presents a theory closely akin to that of Professor Royce, whose influence upon her thought the author readily acknowledges.

Professor Calkins deserves the thanks of students and teachers of philosophy for the admirable piece of work which she has done. From first to last the book is fresh and suggestive, clear in statement, vigorous and penetrating in criticism. However much one may dissent from certain of the positions taken, the value of the book as a whole is unquestionable.

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L'évolution créatrice. Par HENRI BERGSON. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1907. — pp. viii, 399.

To readers of Bergson it is scarcely necessary to state that the general position adopted in this book is a form of voluntarism. In attitude the work is thoroughly empirical; while, on the side of content, its most prominent feature is its doctrine of time, which in the last analysis determines the position to be taken with regard to all important problems. As opposed to 'apriorism' and to all philosophies which maintain that the whole of reality can be summed up into some sort of unity and viewed *sub specie aeternitatis*, it is maintained that duration is a basal character of reality, and that the cosmic process is thus continuously creative, in that at each moment it produces something which is necessarily new and unpredictable to any intelligence whatsoever.

The first chapter, entitled "Mechanism and Finality," opens with an exposition of this conception of time. As psychological analysis has sufficiently shown, the element of change is pervasive of our whole

conscious existence. In every-day life this fact is habitually overlooked, with the result that consciousness is broken up into a series of more or less discrete and changeless 'states,' to which, by way of compensation for the omission of continuous change, there is superadded an equally changeless 'ego,' whose sole function it is to hold these states together. This changeless, timeless ego, together with the changeless and timeless states, is the static equivalent for the changing, enduring process of psychical existence. In this process the past persists in the form of tendencies, from which it results that the process is everywhere essentially irreversible and continuously creative.

This peculiarity of the time-process is ignored alike by doctrines of mechanism and of finality. For both the future is essentially predictable, and the entire process capable of being grasped by an intelligence that is sufficiently comprehensive. The consequences of this error exhibit themselves in an inability to secure proper perspective as regards certain scientific problems. In the discussions of vitalism, for example, mechanism constantly invites us to forget that life is not an affair of discrete elements, while the advocates of a 'vital principle' tend to find a remedy for this error in the vain attempt to place an additional factor in mere juxtaposition to the mechanical elements. As long as the fact indicated by the term 'vital principle' is conceived as limited to the individual organism, we remain on the plane of mechanism. If, however, we take it as a name for that indivisible and organic character which binds the individual organism to the whole of reality, and which reveals its true character most strikingly in the time-process, both views are seen to be based upon abstractions.

Our own conscious existence is able to afford us a clue to the truth, since it does not conform fully to the type of either mechanism or finality. Recent psychology shows that the division between focus and margin in consciousness is a product of development, that the focus is a sort of condensation of the margin or fringe. The category of finality or action with reference to ideal ends does not come into play until after this condensation has taken place. In order to allow scope to this category, it is necessary to break up the concrete flow into discrete parts, in the manner in which this is done by focalized consciousness, since this is the only way in which the intellect or understanding can operate. This breaking up is necessary, indeed, for the practical purposes of life; but, for a philosophy that endeavors to see things as they are, it is equally necessary to remember that the view thus presented is a distorted one. In its true and original form, life is of the type called 'marginal' rather than 'focal.' If this be the case, and

if, moreover, the reality which expresses itself in our conscious life is indivisible in character and inclusive of all that is, it seems evident that the categories of mechanism and of finality are equally inadequate. Instead we seem bound to conclude to a reality which, as contrasted with mechanism, is indeed psychical in character and which may be described as impulsive or striving, but which, on the other hand, is not guided by foresight, since our intellect is merely an aspect or phase of the evolutionary process in which this basal reality secures differentiation.

From this point of view, it is reasonable to expect that divergent lines of evolution should betray the identity of their origin and nature in certain common traits. Such expectation is in conformity with fact; since identical organs, such as the eye, appear in different lines of development. The attempts in current discussions to explain these similarities again reveal the inadequacy of the standpoint from which they are made. Appeal is here usually made to environment, which is held to operate either by elimination or by the production of permanent and transmissible effects upon the living substance. But in neither way can we account for the timely coincidence of all the parts in so complex a structure as the eye, a difficulty which becomes still more formidable when the coincidence is found to be repeated, in essentially the same form, in an independent line of development. On the other hand, if, with the neo-Lamarckians, we resort for explanation to the striving of the individual organism, we not only encounter the usual well-known objections, but we are also at a loss to understand how individual effort is able to produce each of the manifold differentiations which are involved. In brief, the mechanical view errs in that it views development as a process of association rather than dissociation or differentiation, while neo-Lamarckianism errs in that it limits the effort or striving to the individual organism.

The second chapter is a discussion of "The Divergent Directions of the Evolution of Life." It shows that classifications are possible only with reference to differences in the emphasis of certain tendencies or characteristics, a fact which indicates that at their origin each of the various lines of development contains the promise and potency of them all. Development, however, in any given direction involves a corresponding curtailment in the capacity for development in other directions. Plants accordingly have developed in the capacity to convert inorganic matter into organic, but at the expense of mobility and consciousness, while the reverse is true of animals. Again, certain animals have developed instinct at the expense of intelligence, whereas

others have moved in the opposite direction. Aristotle's view that the vegetative, the instinctive, and the rational life are three successive stages, a view still widely held, is therefore a cardinal error. The three are rather different branches of the same stem. To misconceive their relation is to misconstrue the nature and function of instinct and intellect. Instinct is to be conceived as a sort of 'sympathy,' a direct knowing from within. It gives us intuitions, whereby we can appreciate, *e. g.*, the identity between ourselves and the universal life about us; but it cannot give us this knowledge in intellectual terms. On the other hand, the primary function of intellect is to secure adaptation to the physical environment. Its material must first be rendered static and discrete, and hence the intellect cannot comprehend life.

In the third chapter, entitled "The Significance of Life," it is attempted to show that intellect and matter are constituted by reciprocal adaptation. Our conscious life is confined within two extremes or ideal limits. The one is represented by absolute freedom, a state in which there is absolute 'felt' continuity of past and present, a state of free activity; while the other is absolute passivity, with no real duration save the knife-edge of the present, of which the several moments are added together in an external fashion. Each of these limits marks a tendency. The state of reverie serves to illustrate both tendencies in conjunction. The reminiscences appear to come at random and in bare juxtaposition to each other, and yet their interrelations are not those of mere juxtaposition. This mutual externality of part to part is precisely the category through which the intellect operates, and the world which it thus constitutes is the world of matter. The 'uniformity of nature' is a creation of this same intellect, since it proceeds by the reduction of its material to a static or timeless condition, whereby it becomes amenable to mathematical treatment.

The assumption that the mathematical or quantitative form of knowing is the only type of knowing is due, at least in part, to an erroneous conception of disorder. It is commonly assumed that the function of science is to introduce order where before there was disorder or chaos. In fact, the progress of science is not the introduction of order where before there was no order, but it is the translation of our facts from one kind of order, *viz.*, the volitional, to another kind of order, the mathematical. A negation of one order is necessarily based upon the presence of some other order.

Of these two orders the mathematical, as was indicated before, is a sort of static equivalent of the volitional. Science is a construction, the ultimate purpose of which is to secure control over nature. The

unfortunate confusion, however, of 'disorder' with the absence of all order too often hides from our view the real, *i. e.*, the volitional, character of the world-order. The term 'volitional' indicates the psychical character of ultimate reality, but it is not volition as we know it in everyday life; it is rather a pure volition, divested of all backward or forward look. It is a perpetual growing or becoming; the universe is not made, but in the making, conservation of energy signifying simply that there is a certain balancing of processes within certain relatively closed systems. Consciousness, in the usual sense, appears whenever conditions are ripe for the possibility of choice. In order to give scope to choice, it is necessary to develop intellect at the expense of instinct. This development not only tends to conceal from view the nature of the real world-order and man's relation to the universal *élan vital*, but also leads to conflicts between the intuitional and the intellectual life. The former, *e. g.*, affirms freedom and immortality, for which the latter can find no place, or which it is at least unable to justify. They must hence remain without justification, since a philosophy of intuition involves a denial of the ultimate validity of the methods upon which science is based.

The fourth and last chapter consists in the main of brief discussions of a few leading philosophical systems, prefaced by some remarks on the conception of non-being. Existence in time is vaguely supposed, as a rule, to be a sort of conquest over non-being. Hence the tendency to give to Being, in its essence, a logical rather than a psychological or physical existence, and to make of temporal existence in some way a derivation from the non-temporal. But non-being, as is argued in some detail, is a pseudo-idea, from which it follows that an existence sufficient unto itself is not necessarily an existence without duration. It is owing to the fact that our ratiocinating intelligence is compelled to operate in its own peculiar way that we find everywhere a tendency to exalt the timeless at the expense of the temporal. Even Kant, who holds that knowing is not entirely resolvable into terms of intellect, admits of no middle ground between a time of which the parts are external to one another and the non-temporal; and in Spencer, with whom evolution is a watchword, there is in reality no serious discussion of evolution and becoming. He simply reconstitutes evolution with the fragments of its own completed product. His 'matter' is merely an integration of particles; instinct and will are obtained through manipulation of reflexes, on the assumption that these reflexes constitute preliminary stages; and his doctrine of association takes for granted that the facts associated are discrete facts, such as the intellect constitutes through abstraction for the sake of its own practical ends.

The book is extremely suggestive, and is written in a simple, straightforward style that makes for conviction. With regard to its main doctrine, however, the reality of the time-process, a few points are unfortunately passed by without sufficient elucidation. It is held, *e. g.*, that the farther back we go in the evolutionary process the less there is of differentiation. But plainly this regression cannot go on without end. It seems inevitable that there must be a point somewhere at which differentiation is either at a minimum or else vanishes altogether. In either case, the time preceding this point can scarcely be characterized as a period of continuous growth; nor is it evident why an increase of differentiation should occur at this point rather than at any other. If, however, this deduction must be repudiated, what becomes of the reality of time?

To put it differently, while the reality of the time-process is vigorously maintained, the precise sense in which it is real is not shown with any special clearness. Granted that the externalization of moment to moment is the work of the intellect, as opposed to intuition, in what sense are past and future to be accounted real? If the past is really dead and gone and the future not yet real, the externalization of moment to moment would seem to have a justification that is based on grounds other than those of mere expediency. And from this it would follow further that our intellectual knowledge of nature is more than simply an artificial construction. On the other hand, if the division into past and future is merely a sort of device, a practical interpretation of the actual present experience, then surely all this appeal to evolution goes for naught. If the whole process of differentiation or evolution which has led up to, and which is to account for, the experience of the present moment, has no other claim to existence than as a phase or aspect of the experience which it is to explain, then explanation becomes a make-believe and our science a juggling with words. That science is simply methodology, and truth a goal which must be reached along some different route, is a proposition that still awaits verification.

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NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

Leibniz et l'organisation religieuse de la terre, d'après des documents inédits. Par JEAN BARUZI. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1907. — pp. 524.

This is a volume in the *Collection Historique des Grands Philosophes* by a scholar already favorably known to students of Leibniz through his publication, in the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, entitled, *Leibniz : Trois dialogues mystiques inédits*. The work consists of three parts, entitled respectively, "The Expansion toward the East," "Construction of the Universal Church," and "The Glory of God." The first part deals principally with the outward spread of Christianity by means of the French conquest of Egypt, the development of Russia, and the spiritual conquest of China through the Jesuit missions; the second deals with the search after the true church and Leibniz's projects for, and labors in behalf of, the union of the Protestant sects and the reunion of the Protestant and Roman Catholic churches; and the third deals with the inner philosophical and religious bases in the mind and thought of Leibniz for these projects and labors. The third part might very well have preceded the other two, in view of the significance it gives to the schemes themselves; schemes which, advocated by an ordinary man, would have appeared as fantastic dreams, but, advocated by a Leibniz, appear as profoundly reasonable, projects of a true prophet of humanity and of a far-sighted philosophical statesman.

In an appendix to his book, M. Baruzi gives a brief but luminous statement regarding the character and condition of the still unpublished manuscripts of Leibniz at Hanover. In addition to familiarizing himself with the writings of Leibniz hitherto published, M. Baruzi has delved assiduously among these unpublished manuscripts and amid the archives of the French foreign office. The book is, thus, the outcome of painstaking and scholarly researches amongst a great mass of material relating to an extensive range of subjects. The richness of the material alone would give it much value. The author has, however, handled his material with skill and scholarly fairness. The book, nevertheless, is of more interest to the theologian interested in the development of religious thought, the church historian interested in the organization and progress of the church, the general student of the history of culture, and the biographer interested in the life of a versatile man, than to the philosopher. And still the work contains much that will interest the student of Leibniz's philosophy. Attention may be called, especially, to the interesting discussion of the relation of Leibniz to Pascal (pp. 220-230); the treatment of the mystical element in Leibniz's thought and its relation to his rationalism (pp. 434 f.); the hitherto unpublished letter of Leibniz on Spinoza (p. 236 n.), which seems to have been

overlooked by Ludwig Stein in his *Leibniz und Spinoza* (1890); the light thrown upon the nature of Leibniz's so-called *Systema Theologicum* and its relation to his own personal convictions; and the important 'inédit' cited on p. 324 and summarized on pp. 486-491. Scattered also throughout especially the second and third parts of the work are numerous citations and distinctions of great value relating to various scientific and philosophical subjects, and to such topics as the relation of faith to reason, the nature of grace, probability, the interior life, the conditions of salvation, authority, and the like; not to mention others on subjects of a more distinctly theological character. Striking remarks and suggestions, characteristic of Leibniz's breadth of interest, also constantly occur, as, for example, this remark: "The science of medicine is of more value than the science of war and would be so esteemed if men were only wise" (p. 440), and the suggestion that it would be well to establish a 'Conseil de Santé,' or Department of Health, consisting partly of trained physicians and partly of state officials, to look after public health.

As one becomes acquainted with the reach and depth of Leibniz's thought in metaphysics, in mathematics, in theology, or in logic, one is at first tempted to declare each of these branches in turn to have been Leibniz's primary interest and to be fundamental for his system. Each new study of Leibniz, however, such as this by M. Baruzi, or M. Couturat's of the logic of Leibniz, makes it evident that the sources of Leibniz's thought were much richer even than was formerly supposed. Leibniz's outlook on the world and on life and his activities have a 'universalistic' character, because his thought was essentially universalistic. There was nothing parochial in Leibniz. M. Baruzi's labors make it evident that theological and religious problems were among the earliest to engage Leibniz's attention, and that the supposed divergences between these and his philosophical activities, and between his religious philosophy and his practical activities, are illusory. Leibniz declared: "Je commence en philosophie; mais je finis en théologie" (p. 507). Yet in the order of development and of dependence the converse might have been said with equal truth. Leibniz's interests and activities in these lines were awakened simultaneously, and were dependent one upon the other.

Leibniz, while caring little for outward confessionalism, was, his mediocre secretary to the contrary notwithstanding, a profoundly religious man. Religion for him is, in one aspect of it, a spiritual unification, and utilization for the glory of God, of all the forces of humanity. M. Baruzi, in most interesting chapters, showing a wide acquaintance with the sources, makes it clear that the famous project for the conquest of Egypt, the schemes proposed to Peter the Great, and the encouragement given the Jesuit missions in China and the east, all aimed to change the relations existing between Asia and Europe, in order to bind together these widely separate and hostile regions of the earth in the service of a common and higher civilization, — a veritable 'Kingdom of God.'

A central and essential dogma for the religious thought of Leibniz is the necessity of love for God. 'Those who love God' constitute the true church; for the church is the miraculous union of men loving God. He never tires, therefore, laying stress on good will, holding that men of good will are saved even outside of the visible church, and even though they may never have heard of Christ (pp. 254 f.). The true church is nowhere realized perfectly. All national churches, including the Roman Church, are particular. 'Universality,' in fact, is proportional to perfection. Every church will be 'particular' according to its imperfection (p. 275). These thoughts underlie all his reasonings and labors in behalf of the union of the several branches of the Christian church. The greatest obstacle to perfection of the church and to its union is not dogmatic or theoretical, but practical, viz., the abuses that abound, like worship of images and prayer to the saints (pp. 325, 394, etc.).

In his labors to efface the divisions among the Protestant sects, Leibniz sought to limit their controversies to as few points as possible. In fact, these might be reduced, he thought, to three: the person of Christ, the supper, and the decree of election or reprobation; and the doctrinal differences regarding these he felt were not insuperable. Doctrinal unity once elaborated, the question of ritual unity could be taken up; and the best model for this would be, he thought, the Anglican ritual, which had much to commend it even to Romanists (p. 416).

M. Baruzi's account of the labors of Leibniz in behalf of the reunion of the Protestant and Roman Catholic churches, the obstacles to be overcome, and the cause of the final breaking off of negotiations with Bossuet, is most interesting, and adds much to our knowledge of these subjects. Bossuet appears in a more favorable light as a result of this fuller information, while Leibniz in no way suffers in the esteem of the reader. Leibniz holds that the day that the Roman church repudiates the, in his view, most unjustifiable Trentine anathemas, and throws itself methodically against all abuses,—corruptions of faith and of worship,—the reunion will be virtually effected. The doing away with abuses, the cause of the schism, would necessarily do away with the division itself.

M. Baruzi's discussion of the inner philosophical and religious sources of Leibniz's activities contains much that is suggestive. 'Glory of God,' 'general good,' and 'love of God' are three notions which are prominent in the thought of the philosopher; and in the three, nevertheless, he discovers an identity. True love for God finds expression in labors for the betterment of humanity, and to love God is also to recognize, and, as far as one can, to augment God's glory; for the glory of God is not, Leibniz conceives, that alone which God enjoys in his very essence, but it is found in the realization of his kingdom. Leibniz would, therefore, transform all the monastic orders into one,—an 'Ordre de Charité,'—with subdivisions to take up particular forms of labor looking toward the general good. "In fine," he writes, "I find everywhere God and his glory" (p. 505). "The

grand end is to love God,—to know the glory of God, to recreate it first in oneself and then in others" (p. 509).

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The Subconscious. By JOSEPH JASTROW. Boston and New York, Houghton, Mifflin, and Co., 1906.—pp. ix, 549.

"The purpose of this essay in descriptive psychology is to provide a survey of a comprehensive aspect of human psychic endowment. The very definition of psychology as the science of consciousness has tended to focus attention upon conditions of high introspective lucidity, and, by implication, to look upon areas from which such illumination is withdrawn, as quite too obscurely lighted for profitable examination." The aspect of human psychic endowment to which the author refers is the subconscious, and within the subconscious he would include "those manifestations of consciousness and . . . those varieties of its activities that take place below the threshold of our fully waking minds."

The subconscious functions of the normal (Part I) and of the abnormal mind (Part II) are considered in order, while matters of interpretation and of theory are reserved for separate treatment at the end of the book (Part III).

The First Part of the work brings together a great number of every-day instances of the subconscious,—in absentmindedness, in incubation, in lapses, in automatisms, in stereoscopic fusion, in auditory localization. It attempts to define the relation existing between the more general aspects of consciousness,—attention, volition, perception, association, habituation, elaboration, and self-apprehension,—and subconscious functions. Consciousness is, so the author maintains, an evolutionary agent, an elaborator of "means and measures," a reflective centralized "leader" which coöperates with the organized activities of the nervous system. This coöperation involves varying states of mind, which range from complete diffusion to complete concentration. Subconscious factors abound at both extremes; in states of revery, day-dreaming, *Zerstretheit*, as well as in the margins of the strongly attentive consciousness.

As to the mechanism and *modus operandi* of the subconscious, the same laws of association obtain as in full consciousness. Galton's conception of the subconscious as an antechamber suggests its importance to thinking. Within it is assembled and held *in Bereitschaft* a mass of relevant material which gives richness, resource, and variety to the topic of thought. Moments of distraction, "peripatetic diversions," periods of incubation, are useful, the author suggests, because they involve a distribution of attention over a wide area otherwise inaccessible. Although the subconscious is not actually creative, it ministers to thought by its unlimited store of assimilative processes.

The term 'subconscious' has been badly and loosely used. As a result,

psychology has come to regard it with disfavor. It is, however, only fair to ask whether a legitimate reinstatement is not possible, or even desirable. If the word can be used with success to cover such a variety of matters as 'trends,' 'dispositions,' 'lapses,' 'automatisms,' 'temperamental tendencies,' 'unconscious cerebrations,' 'unconscious inferences,' and the like, to say nothing of its service in the interpretation of the distinctly abnormal, it undoubtedly deserves a place in psychological terminology. Some such use as this,—a little less broad, possibly,—Professor Jastrow proposes. The attempt to measure his success raises at once two serious scruples which must haunt every critical consciousness solicited by the term. In the first place, the subconscious is either a part of, not a substratum to, consciousness (to use the latter term in the customary sense), or it is simply a name invented to cover certain hypothetical functions of the nervous system. The author seems to regard it as the dim, blurred, unanalyzed, unclarified portion of consciousness (although he often employs 'consciousness' in a less inclusive sense than is common). It may be said, therefore, to constitute a part of every normal mental state. Why, then, *sub*conscious? It may reduce to a choice of evils; but if the old, bad, equivocal word is to be retained, more definite notice of the precise meaning to be conveyed might profitably be given. Explicitness in the matter would not have been wasted upon the psychologist; but it is simply indispensable to the layman of strong prepossessions, who has, more likely than not, derived his notion of the subconscious from the gossip of Psychical Research.

But, again, some common element, if the term is to be retained, should pervade all functions or factors or 'procedures' labelled 'subconscious.' Is this common element to be found? Consider, as an instance, the assumed 'unconscious inference' in the perception of distance and of instrumental *timbre*, on the one hand, and, on the other, the linguistic lapse or the renewal of an old motor habit; or, once more, compare 'the scientific spirit' with the search for a pencil stuck behind the ear. The common factor is, to say the least, not obvious. If it be urged that all these matters alike imply conditions not resident in the immediate experience, the reply is that remote conditions are too widely involved to furnish a sufficient differentia of subconsciousness.

The Second Part of the book follows "the method of the abnormal." It gives a descriptive account of dreams and dreamlike states, of dissociated consciousnesses, and altered and disintegrated personalities. Criticism and explanation are left, for the most part, to the chapters on theory. The most important chapter of the volume (Part III, chapter i) devotes some fifty pages to "The Conception of the Subconscious." These fifty pages can scarcely be said to convey a clear and distinct idea of what, after all, this mysterious agent is. When the reader comes face to face with the ultimate problem of the book, he is met by elaborate and confusing figures of speech. Consciousness is represented as an impressionistic sketch, as a

complexly agitated current with a "unitary resultant that becomes the introspective representative," "a delegate . . . in the parliament of deliberation." To consciousness, "qualified applicants succeed in delivering their messages"; "the psychic instrument . . . has subtle and complex qualitative sensibilities"; "the voice of the single claimant towers," etc.; we give it a "recognizing nod," or "the sentinel sounds his alarm." Along with this allegorical exhibition of the subconscious comes the "experimental approach" through two bits of evidence, one of which is irrelevant (judgments of difference with two nearly equal stimuli) and the other doubtful both as to fact and as to interpretation (Müller-Lyer with shadows).

In the reviewer's opinion, a less veiled, more direct, and more matter-of-fact approach to the margin, or background, or fringe, or unanalyzable residue of consciousness (or, if you please, to the 'subconscious') would have relieved the reader and would have better served the main purpose of the book. This purpose is to demonstrate the participation of the factors under discussion in the adaptive functions, normal and abnormal, of the organized mind.

In the application of his subject to the psychology of the abnormal, the author seems (even on careful rereading of "The Subconscious as Abnormal") to rely less upon his favorite principle than upon certain imported concepts, namely, "dissociation," "personal quality," "mental energy," and "feelings of self-activity." With this generous importation, the treatment of the abnormal descends to the type of explanation to be found, for example, in Janet's works on hysteria. It is explanation by means of large, unanalyzed concepts, applied uncritically. Explanation of this kind can never be definitive. To say that the actions of the hysterical patient lack personal quality, or that sections of his consciousness are dissociated from the self, is more precise and more technical than the layman's crude diagnosis, but it is of exactly the same quality. It is neither an adequate psychological account of the hysterical consciousness nor a theory of the disorder.

Admirers of Professor Jastrow's *Fact and Fable in Psychology* will find *The Subconscious* to be a book of quite a different temper. While it is not more profound, it is more involved and more difficult than the earlier work. Inasmuch, however, as it includes mature criticism of a great variety of mental derangements, the book must be taken into serious account by all psychologists who set out to traverse the half-explored territory of the abnormal.

I. M. BENTLEY.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

Jesus Christ and the Civilization of To-Day. By JOSEPH ALEXANDER LEIGHTON. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1907. — pp. x, 248.

The aim of this work, as announced by the author, is to consider the bearings of the ethical teaching of Jesus upon the moral foundations of

modern culture. The result, however, is an argument to show that all the more advanced conceptions of modern ethics and civilization are the logical and historical outcome of the teaching of Jesus. The relation of moral ideals to natural conditions, the dependence of moral worth upon motive, the supreme importance of the individual and of individual freedom, the conception of society as a community of free and responsible beings united in mutual service, — all of these, according to the author, are contained in the teaching of Christ and presented more positively by him than by any other ethical or religious teacher.

The book is addressed to the general reader, to whom it should prove suggestive, while the ideas presented are of philosophical importance. But even a general work should rest upon a basis of coherent theory and exact analysis; and on this score there is much to criticise. I pass over the author's tendency to render the words of Jesus at somewhat above their face-value, and come to his main point, namely, that Jesus stands for individual worth and individual freedom.

First, it seems to me, his account of individual worth and freedom converts individuality into an illusion. The individual is to realize himself and to act freely according to the dictates of his conscience. But to what in particular does his freedom lead? The answer is: To social service. When he examines himself he finds that he has no aim but that of serving society, — in other words, no aims that are distinctively individual. This means, it seems to me, that he has no genuine individuality, and hence no real individual worth or freedom. Yet this doctrine of unlimited self-abnegation is the traditional interpretation of Christianity and is nowhere explicitly refuted by our author.

And on just this point it is a question whether there is not in fact a world-wide divergence between the moral standpoint of Jesus and that of modern civilization. The average citizen goes to church on Sunday and learns the lessons of humility and self-sacrifice. But by Monday he has no intention, either of turning the other cheek, or of selling all his goods for the benefit of the poor, or of sacrificing his family in the interests of society. Nor does he think that he *ought* to do these things. When it comes to the point, he is certain that he *ought not*. In a word, his genuine moral ideal is not the Christian ideal of humility and social service, but the European and essentially Greek ideal of self-respect and social justice. So far, then, from pointing to Christian influences, it would seem that the conception of individual worth is just the point to suggest the question whether the teaching of Jesus has ever really found its way into European thought, — whether, indeed, we have not here the contrast of oriental and European ideas in all its original force.

WARNER FITE.

INDIANA UNIVERSITY.

Die philosophischen Grundlagen der Wissenschaften. Von B. WEINSTEIN. Leipzig and Berlin, B. G. Teubner, 1906. — pp. xiv, 543.

The philosopher's work may be of two kinds : he may study philosophical problems in the hope of gaining new knowledge, or he may try to interest the lay mind in his own subject. The standards by which the former kind of work should be judged differ from those pertaining to the latter ; and in appraising a work of the latter class one must keep this difference in mind. The work before us belongs to this class. It is avowedly an attempt to set forth in a popular and conversational manner, such that no technical knowledge beyond that of general culture is needed, the mental activities, principles, and rules, which underlie science, art, religion, and practical life, — in a word, which underlie " all that occupies man's mind and heart " (p. 4). Consequently, in judging whether or not the book is a real contribution, we must not criticise the author's own philosophy, but must ask : Is his exposition clear, not too one-sided, adequate to the breadth of the subject, and, above all, has it the magnetism of interest ? To all these questions we unhesitatingly answer, yes, with one reservation. It is decidedly long ; more than five hundred pages, even when divided into thirty-five rather short lectures, — this book originated as a course of lectures, — are perhaps a little too much for the reader in these busy days, if not for the hearer.

The title is slightly misleading, to be sure, inasmuch as the book goes far beyond the foundations of science, into those of all intelligent life. Indeed, it is impossible to give an adequate idea of the wealth of topics discussed. A rough outline follows. In Lectures II and III we learn what sort of thing is indicated by the word ' foundations.' Some of them are really parts of a science, as the Conservation of Energy (p. 16); some could be dispensed with, while yet the science existed ; some are mere instruments of investigation (p. 17). The nearest approach to a definition is " the bearers and supports of a science " (*ibid.*). A list of such foundations contains three classes : the immediate, the derived, and those which are needed for the development and exposition of the science (*Entwicklungsgrundlagen*, p. 19). The first class contains definitions, assertions, rules, and perceptions. " Their sciences must embrace material and spiritual reality, or at least must be suited to (*dienen*) such reality " (p. 24). The second class contains such theoretical sciences as underlie applied ones, laws (which are, however, always subject to change and to some choice on our part), and hypotheses. The third class contains the rules we must obey in developing our sciences and in arranging them part by part for exposition. We must have articulate order, we must go from any part to an analogous part, must use induction, deduction, and doctrines, and must rest upon experience. The above list is regarded by the author as a complete one (p. 46). Of this list, most of the principles in the immediate class, and of those coming under the head of experience, are dismissed in this study as not properly philosophical (p. 49). Lectures IV and V discuss the soul, and Lecture VI its activities, which give rise to the

philosophical principles. The mechanical view of the soul is thoroughly discussed and rejected; the author regards the soul as a good concept, quite as conceivable in itself as force, or electricity (p. 68). Proof of its existence lies only in inner conviction. Its activities are of three kinds: (a) self-preservative, (b) directed toward the material world, and (c) purely inner activities. Only the last two classes concern the foundations of science, art, religion, and life: a table of them is given on pp. 92-3, and the rest of the book expounds their nature and implications.

To resume this exposition adequately is quite impossible, owing to the fulness of detail and illustration. The treatment is for the most part not argumentative. The author acknowledges his own opinions freely, but gives no full philosophical grounding of them. For this, as we stated above, he is not to be blamed, as the lectures were evidently intended to arouse interest in the subject and to give information about prevalent views, rather than to establish a system. His own philosophical attitude, while it follows no one of the known systems (p. 13), is on the whole fairly close to Kant and Fichte. Thus he argues much against the mechanical view (from Lectures IV to XI); believes in a soul while accepting Kant's refutation of the proofs; and gives a deduction of the categories of space, time, cause, substance, etc. The subjective character of his philosophy is indicated by his words: "What man puts forth from himself into the outer world is his own proper life-content" (p. 528). As for the remainder of his exposition, those activities of the soul, and their products, which form the foundations of science, art, and life, are treated in Lectures VII-XXXV. They are (to give only the headings of lectures); knowing (*erkennen*), perception, rivalry and combination of perceptions, intuitive concepts, inner perception, space, time, causation, infinity, substance, natural laws, forces, unity of substances, forces, and processes into a single world, conservation of that world, hypothesis, explanation, poetry, and life.

W. H. SHELDON.

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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mdt.* = *Revue de Métaphysique*; *Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scolastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I. Abtl.: Zeitschrift für Psychologie.* — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS.

Der Wirklichkeitsgedanke, V. GEORG WERNICK. *V. f. w. Ph.*, XXXI, 3, pp. 275-312.

We have the idea not only of objective reality, — psychologically analyzed in the preceding articles, — but also of subjective reality. Some contents, *e. g.*, feelings and acts of will, are never considered objectively real, owing to their ready separability from objective contents. In these cases the distinction between experienced and reproduced is less sharp than in the case of sensations. Experiences of one's own body also contribute much to the formation of the idea of subjective reality, through their far-reaching influence on the 'reality-coloring' of given contents. In judging a present perceived content to be psychic reality, I view the same content which, *qua* perception, was objectively real, as a reproduction, as *my* idea of the perception, without objective 'reality-coloring,' capable of vanishing, *e. g.*, when I close my eyes. Here, then, the subjective reality-process is an association of unlikeness between the given content and its idea. Similarly, in the judgment that a present reproduced content is real, we find associative connection in the sense of unlike 'reality-coloring,' along with ideas of bodily processes and will impulses. In the case of a content judged real as past reproduction (recollection), we may be guided by the association of a past objective situation in which our body formed a part, provided we are conscious that the association is based on previous contiguity. The same principle applies, with slight modifications, to future contents. Likewise where we attribute reality to a complex as past idea, memory of the idea is in practically all cases dependent on association with some element in the accompanying objective situation. And while in certain cases we do judge an idea to have been subjectively real in the past,

without having any association with the objective situation, we are then dealing only with abstract and empty contents. 'Pure memory,' *i. e.*, memory based on the association of subjective contents as such, without reference to any objective situation whatever, probably never occurs, though it is the ideal aimed at in our constructions of subjective reality as continuous and independent of objective reality. Thus subjective reality-processes are more numerous than objective reality-processes, rest on associations, both of likeness and of unlikeness, are accompanied by a consciousness that they are based on simultaneous occurrence, and include will and feeling elements, as well as ideas of objective contents, in particular those connected with one's own body. The chief motive for the subjective reality-process is that the ideas to be associated have previously been experienced together; though other motives play a secondary part, and in exceptional cases the primary motive may be absent. Ease and certainty of association of the elements of a given object indicate previous conjunction in perception. In the process of recognizing a content, or attributing past reality to it, we may distinguish three moments: weak association of the given elements, accompanied by a feeling of pleasure; confirmation of the reproductions by subsequent perception; and reproduction and association of ideas of the previous situation of the object. There is no difference in content between psychical and physical reality, between the subjective and the objective series; the difference lies solely in the law of connection of the elements. In the subjective series the connection between all the successive elements or links of the individual's experience must be continuous in time; in the objective series such linear temporal continuity is not necessary, and the temporal series in which the individual plays a part is only one among many complexly interrelated series. We cannot properly speak of a temporal relation between an object and its perception; the two are not causally related, but are one and the same process differently viewed or associated. And while it is perhaps permissible to speak of causal connections between objective and subjective processes, it seems preferable to use the term 'causality' only of relations wholly within one or the other of the two series, more especially within the objective series, and subject to the law of the conservation of energy.

F. D. MITCHELL.

La notion du réel. ALBERT LÉON. Rev. de Mét., XV, 3, pp. 348-362.

The Scholastic dogma that thinking the existence of an object differs from the simple thought of the object, has left traces in modern philosophy. To think an object as real requires an act *sui generis* of cognition; the representation of existence is not related to the other acts of the mind. But if this is true, how can one say that, in positing the reality, the mind does not add a new determination? To posit a fact as final is questionable; for an irreducible, *i. e.*, unrelated thing cannot exist for consciousness, the condition of which is that it grasp the relations of its terms. Consciousness

is essentially one, and this implies interdependence of parts. It affirms the existence of nothing beyond itself: otherwise the affirmation of reality would be foreign to the rest of the system of consciousness. Reality, then, is the perfectly determined system of relations which constitute thought as such, *i. e.*, one completely adequate thought. Actual and possible, existence and essence, are one; there is no unreal, only the more and the less real. There are two conditions of our notion of the real: the fact that we think, and the fact that consciousness is limited. Consciousness eliminates certain of its perceptions, and thus the real gets precisely stated; the unorganizable is the unreal, *i. e.*, the less real. Reality results from the process of determination, and the degrees of reality correspond to the degrees of adequacy of the process. The steps in the process are the more and more perfect integrations of perceptions, and with perfect integration consciousness would be entirely conceptual. Consciousness is selective of the real: passively, as limited by its environment; actively, as determined by our interests. The elements of the notion of the real are sensible perceptions, selective interest, and the principle of least effort. Thus the notion of the real has its source in the very laws of thought, and is imperfect inasmuch as thought is finite.

E. JORDAN.

Reality and the Criterion for Truth of Ideas. JOHN DEWEY. *Mind*, No. 63, pp. 317-342.

The point of departure of the present article is chiefly chapter xv of Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*,—the chapter on "Thought and Reality." Bradley's position, it is maintained, is merely a temporary half-way house between Kantian epistemology and a philosophy of everyday experience. The difficulty with the position is that, on the one hand, the ultimate claims of knowledge are discredited because of the inherent inability of thought to effect complete harmony of existence and meaning; while, on the other hand, a strictly logical criterion is maintained as the final criterion of the philosophical conception of reality. The argument is thus from the formal consistency of thinking to the material consistency of the constituents of reality. But, granted the incapacity of thought to transcend appearance, how can thought possibly establish a criterion of absolute truth? Its criterion obtains only within theory. Thinking must, indeed, be logical; but it does not necessarily follow from this that reality must itself be already logical. What, then, is thinking, and what the criterion of truth? Is thinking an isolated activity, or is it relative and instrumental? Is consistency merely logical, or is it simply an end for the operation of reason? These questions state at once the problem and the logical bias of the present discussion. Any particular exercise of reflective knowing is preceded by a practical condition of 'collision,'—a clash between the given and the wanted. Intellectual activity, or thought, is a statement of this conflict, an attempt to describe and define it. The

idea is advanced in order to meet the emergency and to bring meaning and existence into harmony. It is a tentative way in which the present specific problem is viewed, and the *right* idea frees the activities through which the problem may really be solved. Thus it follows that the criterion of the worth of an idea is its capacity to meet successfully the present situation ; this is its truth. The so-called 'eternal truths' are only tested ideas which have secured a certain permanent status by having proved themselves capable of meeting situations under circumstances other than those under which they were made true. But it must not be forgotten that such truths are only relatively unchanging ; in unique situations the oldest truths are, in a sense, remade.

G. W. CUNNINGHAM.

The Control of Ideas by Facts. JOHN DEWEY. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., IV, 8, pp. 197-203 ; 10, pp. 253-259 ; 12, pp. 309-319.

The development of a functional theory of logic was due to the lack of an adequate theory of the nature and agreement of fact and idea. If the fact is present to the mind, there is no need of an idea ; if only ideas are present, there can be no knowledge of agreement with fact. A strictly monistic epistemology, whether idealistic or realistic, does not get rid of this problem. Functional logic does not deny the distinction between ideas and facts, but insists upon its working character. It admits that the truth of an idea consists in its agreement with the actual environment, — but what do these terms mean ? Take the case of a man lost. The actual environment includes the visible facts and further extends from these to his home. The idea is the interpretation of the present environment in reference to its absent portions, — a plan of action. The agreement must be between this plan and its fulfilment. All are practical terms denoting certain values to be sustained or transformed through an operation. Baldwin insists that a confused situation and a new construction is not the complete statement. An object often forces itself upon us ; *e. g.*, the stone which the child takes for an apple and bites. In reply : confusion means not an emotion but tension in the organized system of value. In the conflicting situation, thought and datum get set against each other. If the child does not interpret the stone as incompatible with a purpose, there is no overriding fact. Baldwin seems to shift the issue to that of the relation of the 'external object' and 'me.' But there is no dualism of self and world, except as this emerges in the conflicting situation of action. To return to the question, fact is reality which is not full reality. It is self-discrepant, and is to be made full and real in the process of fulfilling its meaning. Fact and idea are functional distinctions with respect to the problem of the control of activity. The given facts are the reality in its existent, disorganized state of value ; the idea is the reality in its projected rectification ; the total reality is the tension in which these arise. There are two aspects of control : the idea by reference to the desired result controls the facts,

and, in turn, the facts are the basis for the formation of the idea. Agreement comes as a result of acting upon the idea. This desired result becomes accidental in so far as one maintains the full reality of either facts or ideas. The surrender of the conception of a rigid intellectual content of facts or meanings marks modern as opposed to Greek thought. Facts must be redefined in reference to the particular situation ; this is the essential problem of intelligence. The thoroughness and prominence of the logical function vary in different situations. The ease with which the practical character of fact, idea, and agreement is overlooked is due to the fact that it is so essential in them as to be constantly assumed.

C. H. WILLIAMS.

PSYCHOLOGY.

La spatialité des faits psychiques. L. DUPRAT. Rev. Ph., XXXII, 5, pp. 492-502.

The unextended ego of which Bergson writes should be seriously investigated. It is to-day generally admitted that any mental activity is only possible with the concurrence of biological functions. Thus the subject is the psycho-physiological personality occupying an extended place in an extended world. This subject, indeed, reaches a privileged position, since images vary as the body moves. But the ego is not therefore a substance nor an activity producing phenomena. Spiritualistic dualism is wrong in its separation of subject and object. Why not admit that knowledge of the object is the existence of the object ? Isolated from the extended ego, the unextended ego is reduced to nothingness. Thought under its highest form is still spatial. There is always a demonstrable influence of the extended ego, the biological organism, *e. g.*, in æsthetic emotion, and in internal speech, which implies kinæsthetic images ; the same is true of all mental forms, from sensations, which are originally extended, up to the most abstract thought. But how are we logically forced to recognize an unextended ego ? In the disappearance of phenomena from consciousness, there is no reason for the assumption of unconscious psychical substitutes. It suffices that there are psycho-physiological residues, and the remembered image is always a state of the extended ego. Finally, is not the localizing power of attention significant ? Attention transforms the diffuse feeling into the clearly extended representation. Space is the necessary condition of the distinction of all phenomena, of their synthesis as well as of their multiplicity.

C. WEST.

The Subconscious Factors of Mental Process considered in Relation to Thought. A. M. BODKIN. Mind, No. 62, pp. 209-228 ; No. 63, pp. 362-382.

The term 'subconscious' is used, in the present essay, to refer to grades of consciousness less organized than those usually taken as typical, — modes which are unconscious only relatively to clearer forms. The design

of the essay is to deal with such subconscious factors in their relation to the thought process: to consider, first, the distinction between what may be called sentience and the contents of thought or clear cognitive consciousness; and, following upon this, to speak of that organization of sense-material which may take place through bodily activity apart from the work of thought. The latter part of the paper is occupied with a consideration of the manner in which mental factors of different degrees of organization may be operative in inferential judgment without coming explicitly before the mind, and with a discussion of the nature of the process by which such factors become explicit. Even in sense-experience, it would seem, a degree of organization is involved; but still a distinction must be maintained between the mere existence of presentational material and its utilization in the process of thought. This distinction is evident from a consideration of the nature of the judgment process, which, being the reference of an ideal content to a reality beyond the act, goes beyond the immediately given. Psychologically considered, this process is apperception; that is to say, it is the process by means of which the perceived content is taken up and given a context. Such transition from the one stage to the other is illustrated in various experiences; for example, in the sudden success that often attends our efforts to recall a forgotten event. But not only is this process of apperception evident on the level of thought; below this level there is a process of organization of sense-material. Such organization is seen, for example, in the habits wrought into the physical organism by persistent efforts to master a game of skill, such as tennis or billiards. Passing to the more complex form of reflective consciousness, inference, we arrive at the stage of consciousness where the use of language is explicit; for in inference the particular experience is brought into touch with general knowledge embodied in universal principles. Inference is a complex form of thought or judgment, which has attained to the recognition of a distinction and a special relation among the contents which it asserts of reality. But between this explicit form of thought and simple sentience there are partially subconscious acts of inference; for example, we often arrive at a conclusion without being able to articulate the justifying grounds, etc. Justification of the conclusion thus arrived at demands an analysis of the mental complex whereby the operative connections are brought into the foreground of consciousness. Psychologically the mental complex cannot be adequately described in terms of preëxistent cerebral conditions; the process of analysis is felt to be the continuous development of a content already present. So it seems that there are 'implicit' factors within the thought process, which, though felt to be operative, are known only upon reflection; and, when reflected upon, they present themselves as subconscious elements corresponding to facts or principles embodied in forms of language. Between the subconscious, as that which has not been related within thought, and the implicit, as that which is unexpressed but organized within the structure of judgment, there is another type, namely, the case

in which the elements of the inference are grasped before they are expressed. In such a case, the expression of the process does not elucidate, but only explains it.

G. W. CUNNINGHAM.

ETHICS.

The Conception of Possibility in its Relation to Conduct. R. F. ALFRED HOERNLÉ. *Int. J. E.*, XVIII, 1, pp. 25-43.

When we have several lines of action before us, we naturally regard all as possible. We feel that the result of our choice comes to be determined in the moment of decision. After a particular decision has been acted upon, we feel that another course of conduct would have been possible. These facts are the basis of the free-will controversy. The theory of free-will usually takes the form of self-determinism; the self has determined itself to action, and it could not have determined itself otherwise. To have had the power of willing and of acting otherwise would contradict the principle that whatever is real is necessary, and, therefore, whatever is real is also the only thing possible. We think of reality as determinate and of necessity as uniform causal determination of consequent by antecedent events. We identify reality with the actual course of events. This involves a conflict between the reality of the course of events and the unreality of the past and future. The fallacy is this: the actual course of events includes the past and future only because it is an ideal construction on the basis of the present. Possibilities are practical or theoretical in so far as their realization depends or does not depend on our volition. Theoretical possibilities range between two extremes. They may be concerned with reducing knowledge to scientific universal judgments, or with the analysis of a particular situation so as to trace in it the data which will enable us to predict developments with more or less probability. In the former case, we begin with 'judgments of possibility.' The idea of possibility is our substitute for omitted conditions, which, if stated, would make our judgments scientific universals. Possibility is thus eliminated, but our knowledge has become 'ideal.' In the second case of theoretical possibility, possibility is again a matter of degree which complete knowledge would raise into certainty. But the future is practically possible in the sense that it is realizable. The present 'potentiality' contains the future. In conscious agents it manifests itself in volition; in natural processes, in 'tendency.' In complex situations simple succession of elements fails. The determinist's theory pushed far enough must maintain that since there exist illusions of possibilities, these illusions are necessary. If character determines the action, the determination is not causal, since it does not precede the action in time, nor can we see how action can at the same time determine character. Action also seems compatible only with a particular side of the whole character. The realization of a particular alternative does not seem necessary to the preservation of my self-identity. Repentance of an actual

course of conduct controverts the theory that every volition is *ipso facto* a realization of the 'true' self. We may conclude that will is not a form of ignorance, nor a theoretical attitude at all. A conception of possibility formed for theoretical purposes is not necessarily identical with a conception of possibility which arises on the basis of volition.

F. A. PECK.

La dépendance de la morale et l'indépendance des mœurs. J. DE GAULTIER. Rev. Ph., XXXII, 10, pp. 337-364.

The moral world is commonly set against the physical, and in the former the principle of causality is replaced by a principle of unverifiable arbitrary absolutism. This system of moral laws, so-called, is so entangled with dogmas, conventions, and traditions, that many an attempt at a consistent study of morality has finally taken the dogmatic side. The last great attempt of this sort was Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason*. When Kant defines and classifies the categories of the understanding, these fulfil a function analogous to that of the forms of intuition. When he comes to the field of ethics, however, he treats his subject in a less thorough manner than in the first Critique. Neither Kant nor the Neo-Criticists have given us the formal principle of morality, which could be reached by an analysis similar to the one which had resulted in the formulation of the categories of knowledge. The reason for this is plain. Defined, this principle would have become inadequate to the service expected of it by the Kantian ethics, with its fundamental ideas of duty and liberty and responsibility. The author proposes to present this form of practical reason, which Kant failed to do. Such a moral principle would imply that every act, in its relation to the subject performing it, is judged by that subject as good or bad. Such a principle, the author believes, would substitute for the dogmatic principle of Kant deductions authorized by the analysis of psychological experience. The physiological element which gives birth to this principle is to be found in *goût*. Thus the moral judgment is related to the ensemble of empiricism. And inasmuch as this physiological *goût* is a factor in the collective life of society, it follows that morality depends upon custom, — the social expression of this *goût*. Moreover, customs are independent of logic. To show this, Gaultier examines at length the logical concepts of causality and infinity. The latter signifies merely our inability to assign limits. And while the systematizing of knowledge necessitates the introduction of the principle of causality or the mere notice of hazard partially determined, one finds in both hypotheses, at the extremity of the series, a category of phenomena which escape calculation, and which therefore show the presence of an irrational element in existence. The moral phenomena are analogous to this last class, which could vary without imperiling thereby the system of knowledge; because, inasmuch as they are the last in the series, no consequent phenomenon requires their constancy. And these are actually the ones treated in the modes and norms of conduct, and called in

common parlance moral phenomena. The scientific activity of existence can never anticipate the modes of its spontaneous activity. The manifest absence of objective finality in moral life is compensated, as it were, by an infinite number of subjective finalities which form, in accordance with states of pleasure or displeasure, the original elements of morality: 'good' and 'bad' in the individual case, 'good' and 'evil' in the case of an entire civilization. Hence, in morality dialectic is displaced by conflict, the general form under which morality is manifested. Thus, to deduction and observation, the modes of scientific activity, are opposed spontaneity and conflict, the modes of moral activity; to evidence, the intellectual criterion, preponderance, as the moral standard. Finally, to the logician's wisdom and the dialectician's power, heroism is opposed, as the highest moral virtue.

R. A. TSANOFF.

Ethical Aspects of Economics, III. W. R. SORLEY. *Int. J. E.*, XVII, 4, pp. 437-448.

The author attempts to estimate in a general way the ethical value of the economic factor in life. This cannot be separated out from among the other factors of human life. By means of it the higher life keeps itself going. It is, therefore, the primary factor. Our practical attitude seems often to regard it as the most important factor also. Such ethical materialism could be carried out only by ignoring almost all the factors of morality. With the fall of this theory would disappear the only ground for estimating the importance of human activities by their material results. Asceticism remains a factor, because it appeals to the spiritual. Its defect lies in its condemnation of the very instruments which make the higher life possible. They must have at least a material value which will vary in degree as they tend to promote the higher life. Economic conditions are actually estimated by other than economic standards. The limit to the length of a working day, which allows for the development of the higher life, is ethical. We must discard both asceticism and ethical materialism. There is no absolute mean between wealth and poverty which can be named as most conducive to virtue. The worth of wealth depends on the purpose for which it is used and the manner in which that purpose is carried out. Wealth acquired by work contains an element of worth not found in inherited wealth. The dependence of moral development on work seems obvious. The old aristocratic view of work at least implies a side of life higher than the material side. The real objections to the aristocratic principle are: that many of the most reasonable privileges are restricted to a small minority, and that it gives no security against the abuse of those privileges by the wealthy class.

F. A. PEEK.

NOTES.

The American Philosophical Association held its seventh annual meeting at Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y., December 26, 27, and 28. A full account of the meeting will appear in the next issue of the *Review*.

The American Psychological Association held its sixteenth annual meeting at Chicago, December 31, and January 1 and 2, in conjunction with the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the Society of Naturalists.

Professor George Trumbull Ladd has recently returned from an extended lecture tour in Japan.

Professor Edward Bradford Titchener, of Cornell University, has been appointed non-resident lecturer on psychology at Columbia University for the current academic year.

We have received the first numbers of the English and French editions of a new monthly, to be published simultaneously in Paris, Berlin, and London, under the respective titles *Les Documents du Progrès*, *Documente des Fortschritts*, and *The International*. It will be devoted to literary, political, and philosophical subjects. Among the contributors are Frederic Passy, Professor Karl Lamprecht, Francis de Pressensé, Sir John Cockburn, and the editor, Dr. Rodolphe Broda.

Professor Warner Fite's *Introductory Study of Ethics* has recently appeared in Japanese translation. The translation was made by N. Oshima, and revised by Professor Rikizo Nakashima, of Tokyo University.

We give below a list of the articles, etc., in the current philosophical periodicals :

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, XVIII, 4: *F. Kuhlmann*, On the Analysis of the Memory Consciousness for Pictures of Familiar Objects; *L. W. Kline*, The Psychology of Humor; *Alexander F. Chamberlain*, Analogy in the Languages of Primitive Peoples; *H. B. Davis*, The Raccoon: A Study in Animal Intelligence; *Willis L. Gard*, A Preliminary Study of the Psychology of Reasoning; *Margaret K. Smith*, On the Reading and Memorizing of Meaningless Syllables Presented at Irregular Time Intervals; *Amy E. Tanner*, Spinoza and Modern Psychology; *H. E. Houston* and *W. W. Washburn*, On the Naming of Colors; Psychological Literature; Book Notes; Note.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, XIV, 6: *H. Carr*, Apparent Control of the Position of the Visual Field; *G. H. Mead*, Concerning Animal Perception; *E. H. Rowland*, A Study in Vertical Symmetry; *J. Mark Baldwin*, Logical Community and the Difference of Discernibles.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, IV, 11: *Arthur O. Lovejoy*, Professor Ormond's Philosophy; Psychological Literature; Discussion; Books Received; Notes and News.

IV, 12: *James H. Tufts*, On the Psychology of the Family; *Caroline M. Hill*, Voluntary Organizations, A Proposed Study in Social Psychology; Psychological Literature; Discussion; Books Received; Notes and News.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, IV, 22: *Evander Bradley McGilvary*, The Physiological Argument against Realism; *Rowland Haynes*, Attention Fatigue and the Concept of Infinity; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

IV, 23: *George Stuart Fullerton*, The Doctrine of the Eject (III); *Percy Hughes*, Concrete Conceptual Synthesis; *Bernard C. Ewer*, The Anti-Realistic "How?"; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

IV, 24: *Arthur Ernest Davies*, Imagination and Thought in Human Knowledge; *Shepherd Ivory Franz*, Psychology at Two International Scientific Congresses; *Wendell T. Bush*, Sub Specie Æternitatis; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

IV, 25: *Mary Whiton Calkins*, Psychology: What is it about? *Evander Bradley McGilvary*, Realism and the Physical World; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

IV, 26; *Giovanni Vailati*, The Attack on Distinctions; *Sidney Edward Lang*, Logic and Educational Theory; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

ARCHIV FÜR SYSTEMATISCHE PHILOSOPHIE, XIII, 4: *Ernst Vowinckel*, Determinismus in der Erziehung; *James Lindsay*, The Philosophy of Spain; *Ludwig Baur*, Zur Religionsphilosophie; *C. Bos*, Études de philosophie positive; *Oscar Ljungström*, Entwicklungslehre: Entwurf einer neuen Weltanschauung; *Vitalis Norström*, Naives und wissenschaftliches Weltbild; *Arthur Erich Haas*, Die Physik und das kosmologische Problem; *Georges Batault*, Nietzsche négateur de sa philosophie; *Ernst Schwarz*, Autologie und Logik: Eine erkenntnistheoretische Grundlegung; Die neuesten Erscheinungen auf dem Gebiete der systematischen Philosophie; Systematische Abhandlungen in den Zeitschriften; Eingegangene Bücher.

ARCHIV FÜR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE, XIV, 1: *Max Leopold*, Leibnizens Lehre von der Körperwelt als Kernpunkt des Systems; *Albert Goedeckemeyer*, Gedankengang und Anordnung der Aristotelischen Metaphysik; *Emmanuel Prüm*, Der Phaidon über Wesen und Bestimmung des Menschen; *August Ritter von Kleeman*, Platonische Untersuchungen. II. Menon; *Georg Wernick*, Das Dictum de omni; *Stefan Sterling*, Nietzsches Moral vom naturwissenschaftlichen Standpunkte aus; *R. Q. Bury*, Plato:

Philebus 15 A, B.; *Albert Leclère*, La philosophie au moyen-âge; *Th. Elsenhans*, Bericht über die deutsche Literatur des letzten Jahre zur vor-kantischen Philosophie des 18. Jahrhunderts; Die neuesten Erscheinungen auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte der Philosophie; Zeitschriften; Eingegangene Bücher.

KANT-STUDIEN, XII, 3 und 4: *Bruno Bauch*, Kuno Fischer; *Oskar Ewald*, Die deutsche Philosophie im Jahre 1906; *Gottfried Fittbogen*, Kants Lehre vom radikalen Bösen; *Alois Höfler*, Die unabhängigen Realitäten; *Felix Kuberka*, Sinnlichkeit und Denken: Ein Beitrag zur Kantischen Erkenntnistheorie; *Anton Thomsen*, Aus Hegels Frühzeit; *W. Reinecke*, Kant und Fries; *E. Sängler*, Neue Darstellung und Deutung der Lehre Kants vom Glauben; *Bruno Bauch*, Eine neue Ausgabe der Werke Nietzsches; *E. v. Aster*, Der 7. Band der Berliner Kant-Ausgabe; Recensionen; Selbstanzeigen; Mitteilungen; Kantgesellschaft; Revidierte Statuten der Kantgesellschaft.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE, XLVI, 3: *M. Pappenheim*, Merkfähigkeit und Assoziationsversuch; *Richard Baerwald*, Die Methode der vereinigten Selbstwahrnehmung; Literaturbericht.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, XXXII, 11: *A. Fouillée*, Doit-on fonder la science morale et comment? *E. de Roberty*, Le rôle civilisateur des abstractions: du totémisme au socialisme; *A. Rey*, L'énergétique et le mécanisme au point de vue des conditions de la connaissance; *Dr. Dromard*, De la "plasticité" dans l'association des idées; Revues critiques; Analyses et comptes rendus.

XXXII, 12: *J. J. Van Bieruliet*, La psychologie quantitative. III: Psychologie expérimentale; *Th. Ribot*, La mémoire affective: Nouvelles remarques; *Vernon Lee*, La sympathie esthétique; Analyses et comptes rendus; Revue des périodiques étrangers; Livres nouveaux; Table des matières.

REVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE, VII, 11: *X. Moisant*, Le problème du Mal; Notes et discussions; Étude critique; Analyses et comptes rendus; Périodiques; L'enseignement philosophique.

VII, 12: *E. Peillaube*, L'organisation de la mémoire. I. La fixation des impressions; *P. Duhem*, Le mouvement absolu et le mouvement relatif (III); *R. Meunier*, La psychologie et la philosophie de N. Vaschide; Notes et discussions; Analyses et comptes rendus; Périodiques; L'enseignement philosophique.

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE, XV, 6: *A. Job*, L'œuvre de Berthelot et les théories chimiques; *H. Delacroix*, Analyse du mysticisme de Mme. Guyon; *E. Borel*, L'évolution de l'intelligence géométrique; *E. Maillieux*, Le rôle de l'expérience dans les raisonnements des juriscultes; *E. Chartier*, Essai sur les éléments principaux de la représentation, par O. Hamelin; *P. Lapie*, Réforme électorale; Tables des matières; Supplément.

THE
PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH.¹

IN speaking on the same subject as that selected for the Discussion that is to take place to-morrow morning, I do not seek to forestall the results of that discussion. Nor shall I attempt to deal with what to many may seem the more profound and significant aspects of the problem, such as, for example, the relation of our finite knowing to absolute knowing, or the place which our particular truths must have in a final and complete metaphysical system. My aim is rather to set forth simply and clearly some of the more general considerations that ought, in my judgment, to be kept in mind when this subject is under debate.

Now the first requisite in this discussion is surely a definite understanding as to what truth the discussion is about. 'True' and 'false' are adjectives like 'red' and 'sweet' or 'good' and 'bad,' and, like them, must be taken to qualify some object or objects. But the objects they actually are taken to qualify are various, and hence an ambiguity in the conception of truth. We not only apply the terms to ideas, supposals, judgments, propositions, beliefs, and the like, but we also meet with true and false friends, true courage and beauty, false modesty and honor, and, alas, sometimes false dice, hair, and teeth. In this sense falsity may be itself a character of truth: "his faith unfaithful kept him falsely true." In the Hegelian philosophy we have another use of the term, according to which the higher category is truer than the lower, teleology is the truth of mechanism, spirit the truth of nature. We shall avoid at least one source of confusion if we

¹ Delivered as the Presidential Address before the American Philosophical Association at Cornell University, December 27, 1907.

agree, to begin with, that our concern is with the truth of propositions. We assume that propositions are either true or false, or neither true nor false, or, in case a number of propositions are involved, are at once partly true and partly false, and that, in any case, regarding any intelligible proposition the question can be asked whether it is true or false, and in what way.

If we agree to this, then certain not inconsiderable consequences would seem to follow. One, and most important, is that we recognize the truth we are talking about as a quality found in quite particular truths. For every proposition, whatever its range or comprehension, expresses and embodies a single, even if complex, truth, and the number of possible truths is as infinite as the number of possible propositions. This is not to say that truths are disconnected, or are, or relate to, 'independent entities,' or are merely externally connected in a series. Propositions hang together; one truth implies, follows from, leads to another. Hence the possibility is not excluded that many truths may cohere together to form a system, and that all truths may ultimately appear as elements in one comprehensive system or realm of truth. But this last should not be dogmatically assumed at the outset in such a way as to prejudice investigation into the nature and conditions of particular truths. Not even the most resolute defender of an absolute system would maintain that such a system was even remotely attainable by man.¹ Not only have the propositions in common use little or no evident connection, but within the most organized forms of our knowledge,—the sciences,—principles of wide import in one department are totally ignored in others. Moreover, a system of truth is really, from the propositional point of view, a system of truths, and cannot, as such, be expressed or exhibited in any single proposition. Philosophers, as we know too well, often require for the expression of their systems one or several pretty ponderous volumes. A true system would be one, all of whose propositions were true and also connected. Propositions about the system, however, are just as particular as propositions about its parts or about the

¹ "It would be impossible that any man should have a world, the various provinces of which were quite rationally connected, or appeared always in a system." Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 367.

connections of its parts. At the outset, then, we ought, I think, in this discussion to recognize to the full the particularity of all propositional truths, and that whether they have to do with the more special or the more general aspects of their subject-matter. We ought, as far as possible, to avoid talking of truth 'at large'; and we ought equally to be on our guard against any bias in favor of a peculiar type of truth, as, for example, scientific as opposed to philosophical truth, or *vice versa*, or of either as against the episodic truths of every-day life. For if every propositional truth is particular, there is no *prima facie* reason for regarding one as more or less true than another, so far, that is, as it is true at all. Truths differ in value and significance; some are trivial, some perhaps sublime. But, apart from special theory, there is no apparent reason why a proposition about even so trivial a circumstance as the present state of the weather, — which indeed may be important enough on occasion, — should not be as true as the truest propositions about such exalted objects as the existence of God, the constitution of the universe, and the destiny of the human soul.

The next point is, that the truth of any proposition must be judged with reference to its own unique meaning and intent. It means to assert something specific about something in particular, whether the form of the proposition be particular or general. If it means to assert something about 'this,' it must not be condemned because it does not assert something else, or because it tells you nothing about 'that,' or because it does not exhaust the possibilities or attain the ideal of a fully unified knowledge. It may be quite true, for example, that a certain train is scheduled to leave the station at five o'clock, whatever may be true, in metaphysical reference, as to the nature of space and time or, in economic reference, as to the management of a railway system. But if this is so, then we cannot admit, from the propositional point of view, that doctrine of 'degrees of truth' which asserts that every proposition is partly false because of the modification it would receive by supplementation and re-arrangement when brought into relation with other elements which, for the time being, have been left out of account. This assertion appears to

rest on a different conception of truth, Judged by its own meaning and intent, a proposition may be true without being all that is true, and a truth that is only true about the whole need not be more wholly true than one that is about the meanest of its parts. Again, a proposition that is complex may contain more truth than another without on that account being any more true. It is plausibly objected to this, that truths are not independent, that they at least tend to systematic union. And this we have admitted. But then, it is said, as elements in a system, each truth must modify and be modified by all the others; as a member of the system, it cannot remain what it was in isolation, it gets transformed, and the more so in proportion to the width and depth of its connections. And from this it follows, on the argument, regarding 'Reality' as a system one of whose aspects is a completely unified 'Truth,' that all truths, in the end, are 'error,' and that, for example, mathematics, the most exact of the sciences, is also, as the most abstract, the least 'true' of all.¹ We escape this consequence, I think, by holding strictly to our principle that the truth of any proposition must be judged with reference to its own unique meaning and intent, and by distinguishing between truth and its evaluation. A given truth does, indeed, suffer modification in being systematically connected with other truths, but such modification need not be at all one of the truth of the proposition, but only of the way the truth is held, understood, and appreciated. Thus the schoolboy may know only the isolated truths that $5 + 2 = 7$ and that $5 \times 2 = 10$; but if he later comes to see that these truths are connected, that $5 + 2 = 7$ because $5 \times 2 = 10$, and *vice versa*, that neither would be true if the other were false, or if, as a philosophical mathematician, he holds a theory of numbers which throws light on the nature and connection of these propositions, he certainly holds these truths in a different way, they have for him a different value; but how has the truth of either proposition been itself affected? That $5 + 2 = 7$ is, I suppose, as true, neither more nor less, to the mathematician as to the schoolboy, though the former has so many more connected truths at command that it has for him a richer signification. For truths too, like sensible facts, have an

¹ Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 370.

import beyond their own intrinsic quality. Of course, the proposition in question is quite true only relatively to the general character of its own number system ; but this was implied in its assertion. But in this reference its truth would not be in the least affected by the discovery, or invention, of a different number system, if that were possible, just as a truth in Euclid is not affected by the equally valid, though less serviceable, truths of other geometrical systems.

The fact that one truth is not, as such, altered by its connection with other truths, may appear perhaps in a still clearer light, if we take a case where, as things stand, there is no such connection, and then imagine what would happen if such a connection were brought about. "This table is round," and "this table cost \$500," are propositions which have no sort of logical connection ; and hence the truth of the one would, in so far, be unaffected by that of the other. But suppose that round tables were exceedingly difficult to make, and that, besides being rare for this reason, they were esteemed peculiarly beautiful. Then they would be objects desired of the rich and coveted by the connoisseur, and a connection between the shape and the price would be so definitely established that we should see at once that a true proposition about the one would involve a corresponding proposition about the other. But would either proposition be more or less true ? Would the table be any more or less round, or its price any dearer or cheaper ? The suggestion is manifestly absurd. The difference would lie not in the truth, but in the truth's evaluation.

It being understood, then, that the truth we are talking about is truth of propositions, that every proposition is specific, and that its truth is relative to its intended meaning, we may now state the essential problems in regard to this kind of truth. They may be expressed in two questions : (1) What do we mean by calling any proposition true ? and (2) How do we know that it is really true ? Or, otherwise stated, (1) What is the nature of the claim we make for it when we call it true ? and (2) How is this claim either established or discredited ? The first question relates to the nature of truth, the second to its evidence.

But before we attempt to deal with these questions, we ought, I think, to enquire more particularly, first, into the nature of the object to which the predicates 'true' and 'false' are applied, and the possession of which constitutes that object a truth or a falsity. We have agreed that our concern is with the truth of propositions, but the truth of a proposition is clearly not resident in the mere form of the words. What is true, if true, and false, if false, — and also, it may be added, what is doubtful, possible, necessary, etc., — is, primarily, what is asserted. In what is asserted we seem to have the original locus of a propositional truth. If what is asserted is true, then, and only then, is the proposition true, and thereby whatever mental act, content, or attitude it expresses on the part of the individual making or holding the proposition; and contrariwise, if it is false. Now to apply the adjectives 'true' and 'false' directly to what is asserted, we have, curiously enough, to change the form of the proposition. In the proposition something is asserted of something, something is declared to be or not to be, to happen or not to happen, or, in general, to be so-and-so characterized. If now what is asserted is to be itself characterized, if, for example, it is to be qualified as true or false, it must itself be expressed as the subject of another proposition having such a character as its predicate. And this, as especially pointed out by Meinong, is done by expressing the 'what' that is asserted by a sentence beginning with 'that,' or by some form of words equivalent to such a sentence. Thus in the proposition, "crows are black," what is asserted is *that* crows are black. The question we must now ask is, What is the logical import of such a *that*-sentence? A proper answer should throw some light on the meaning of truth.

In dealing with this question, we may proceed in either of two ways: we may abstract altogether from the thinking process and consider only the logical character of what is asserted, or we may connect the latter with the process out of which the assertion issues and the attitude in which its truth or falsity is recognized, and seek to determine its position and character relatively to that. From either point of view, its most salient feature appears to be that of belonging to an ideal realm of meaning distinct from and,

in a way, opposed to concrete and actually existent fact. That this paper is white, is neither an existing thing, like the paper, nor a real predicate of existence, like the paper's whiteness. The white paper exists, but I cannot in the same way say 'that this paper is white' exists. I do not mean that this truth can in no sense be said to be. It can be made the object of a reflective thought, it can be examined as such, it can be talked about and become the subject of other true or false propositions. Thus, if it is false that this paper is white, then that this is false, is true. The point is that what is asserted is always ideal, and is never identical in existence with the object that the assertion is about. This is true even in the case when the latter object is itself ideal. 'That 3 is greater than 2,' for example, is neither the number 3, nor the number 2, nor the greater magnitude of the one as compared with the other. This difference gives rise to the problem as to the relation of the two, the relation of the meaning to the fact meant, in which it is usual to find the defining character of truth. Leaving this for the present, I may here point to an important consequence of the distinction.

There is high authority for the doctrine that truth (and also error) is a content of predication qualifying reality, a doctrine which is developed in the assertion that perfect truth would be the universe.¹ But if our distinction holds good, either this is impossible, or it relates to another kind of truth than propositional truth. For the truth that so-and-so, for example, that this paper is white, is neither the subject of the proposition, nor the predicate, nor any quality of the object taken as real, but something quite different, namely, a truth about it. How is the case altered if for a particular finite object, like this paper, we substitute 'Reality' or the universe? For whether the content by which the subject of a proposition or judgment is qualified, — and you may interpret your proposition so as to make the 'real' subject anything you please, — whether this content, I say, be conceived as a simple quality, or as a complex of qualifying relations, or, again, be conceived in abstraction as an 'idea' divorced from

¹ "We must unhesitatingly assert that truth . . . if for itself it were perfect, would be itself in the fullest sense the entire and absolute universe." Bradley, "On Truth and Copying," *Mind*, N. S., Vol. XVI, p. 170.

existence, or concretely applied as actually qualifying an existent thing, there is, I submit, a clear distinction to be drawn between any finite object, or reality at large, taken as the subject of predication together with whatever it may be said to be or to have, and the truth (or falsity) *that* it is, or is of such a sort, or has such and such a character. The character of a being is one thing, and may be called an idea or the object of an idea, as we choose to define it; but that a being has this character is surely not an identity, pure and simple, with the character itself. If, therefore, we assume that Reality is one whole of being with a definite structure, and that this structure, its defining content, is grasped in a single thought, this thought, I suppose, might be said to possess the world in idea. But unless the thought went on to actually predicate of Reality as its structure the content thought, it would not possess the truth that Reality was so defined. But if it should effect this predication, then this truth, that Reality was so defined, would be, as truth and meaning, quite distinct from the content predicated, and this even though it were itself included in it. I am not, of course, maintaining that it is possible to grasp the world's structure without judging, or denying, on the other hand, the possibility of a speculative grasp, or æsthetic experience, of reality beyond judgment. I am only maintaining that the so-called 'truth' embodied in the content of predication, though the universe were the subject and though its whole content were exhausted in the predicate, would not be identical without difference with the truth of any possible proposition. And I accordingly deny that truth, in the propositional sense, is, properly speaking, a defining quality of any real being at all. It is neither the subject nor the predicate of a judgment; it is neither substantival nor adjectival. It is a form of ideality, but its own unique form.

Viewed *in se* this form appears, in each instance of it, to be (*a*) objective, that is, something cognized, or to be cognized, as distinct from the processes of cognizing on the part of any individual mind. Hence it may be treated, for certain purposes, independently, just as physical objects are treated independently in the physical sciences, without reference to the conditions of our

knowledge of them. It appears (*b*) as universal, that is, as claiming recognition and acknowledgment on the part of all minds. But whether it is actually acknowledged or not by any particular mind, seems indifferent to it. Failure to acknowledge it may be due to ignorance or to mental incapacity. Hence it may be maintained that truths, as such, are independent of their recognition by any mind at all. Truth, on this view, would consist in an ideal relation between what is theoretically capable of being asserted and the objective fact that the assertion, if made, would be about. So extreme a contention we may not now be prepared to admit ; but the recognition of even the relative independence of truth should serve, I think, as a salutary check on the tendency evident in recent discussion to interpret the problem of truth exclusively in terms of the process by which the claims of our ideas to recognition as true are tested and established. The view referred to would mean, I suppose, at least this, that there are real facts in the world, and hence, ideally, truths about those facts which are unknown and some of which, from the very nature of the case, are incapable of becoming known by any finite mind. And this we seem compelled to admit. For not only is knowledge progressive, so that more facts and objects get known or better known, but an infinity of facts collectively known are unknown to any single mind, and an infinity of facts once collectively known become irrecoverably lost, namely, the personal experiences of the individuals that made up the succession of all the generations past. Moreover, no finite mind knows, or pretends to know, the world's infinite multiplicity in all its details, nor the specific ground or grounds of its differences, nor all the implications of any one of its actual experiences. No one, however relative to our thought and purpose he holds the world to be, seriously believes that it is wholly plastic, that it is wholly made and remade by our volition, and that there is nothing, I will not say merely given, but given in any sense at all to be simply acknowledged, or that fact and truth only are as they are discovered by us. But if this is so, then the distinction between truth and recognized truth, as well as between truth and the process of testing and acknowledging

it, would seem to have theoretical importance, even though it should be held that what is truth for us cannot be determined concretely apart from the conditions under which it is known.¹

Relatively to the act and process of knowledge, the meaning that is capable of setting up a claim to recognition as true may be viewed in several ways. Primarily it is of the nature of a supposal. The ideal meaning may be simply entertained. So far, though the supposal be false, there is no error. If, however, it is accepted, there is judgment and belief, and the belief may be erroneous; but if it is also accepted, so to say, by the object as tested by the criteria suitable to the case in question, there is true opinion and knowledge. Three distinctions, pointed out by Meinong, seem to be essential in the analysis of judgment. We distinguish (1) the act of judging, — a temporal event in the mental history of the individual; (2) the object or subject-matter that the judgment is about, — this may be anything you please, but it is at any rate something other than the thinking and the particular thought that aims at the knowledge of it; and (3) the thought or supposal as an ideal, but immanent, objective content, — what the object is thought as, and what is asserted in the proposition. Here the problem of truth concerns the relation of the 'immanent,' thought-possessed, but objective content of the supposal to the contrasted 'transcendent' or quasi-transcendent object that the supposal's content means to be true of.

Another way of viewing the matter is to consider the supposal, the content of meaning expressed in the that-sentence, as of the nature of an answer to a question, or the solution of a problem.²

¹ Besides objectivity and universality, it is usual to ascribe timelessness and unchangeability also to what is asserted, taken as true; and these characters, interpreted in a logical and not in a temporal sense, would seem to hold except in cases where the notion of time enters into the predication, and there the relations are peculiar. If the reference is to past time, the truth (*e. g.*, that Cæsar existed) would not be true before the event, but would be unalterably true after it; if to future time, it would be unchangeably true before the event, and would cease to be true after it; while, if referring to present time, its truth would be limited to the present. The facts may be otherwise interpreted so as to make the truth appear timeless in all cases, and only its recognition an event. But the matter cannot be further pursued here. Given the fact, however, the special relation of its own truth to it is timeless in any case.

² It is from this point of view that Stout treats, successfully, I think, the problem of error in his essay in *Personal Idealism*. The point of view itself, however,

I do not, of course, mean that every time we frame a proposition we first consciously propound a question. But we can always put a question to which the proposition gives the answer. It answers such questions as whether, or what, or why, or how. And so far as it is an intelligible proposition, it is a specific answer to a specific question, and its truth or falsity must be judged with reference to its intention to answer just that question. This is but the familiar doctrine that we can't tell, and can't even properly inquire, whether a proposition is true or false till we know what it means, that is, what it means to assert and about what. And herein lies one of the most fruitful sources of error, that we don't always ourselves know what precisely it is that we do mean. It has been held, indeed, that this vagueness infects, in some degree, all our thinking, and that no one in asserting knows precisely the sense in which he affirms or denies.¹ But this assertion must itself, on the hypothesis, be at least a little vague, and must mean something at least a little different from what it seems to mean. Is it necessary to push scepticism so far? We can hardly hope in all cases to escape the pitfalls of language. But there are cases where our meanings can be referred to well-defined abstract relations, as in mathematics, and a sensible fact, to which other of our meanings are relative, can be, if not defined, pointed out and experienced. Our meanings must, in any case, be adequate to our purposes. Assuming that our meanings can be made adequate to our purposes, we demand of the proposition that it shall satisfactorily meet the conditions of our problem. The problem of truth, then, is to determine what, in specific cases, these satisfactory conditions may be.

With these considerations in mind, we now ask, What do we mean by calling a proposition true?—for a proposition is certainly not made true simply by being called so. The question, therefore, is, What is meant by a proposition being true? True, we ask, to what? and also, to whom?

The answers commonly given to these questions are, as we all goes back to Plato, who represents thinking as a sort of conversation in which the soul asks and answers questions. When the thought is decided, says yes or no, we have *dóxa*, or judgment. See Natorp, *Platos Ideenlehre*, p. 115.

¹ Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 367.

know, these. A proposition is true when the idea, thought, or meaning it expresses agrees with reality, or the facts, — reality, or fact, being what it is true to ; and, a proposition is true when the thought it expresses coincides with what would be the thought of an ideal thinker who had actual knowledge of the facts, — such an ideal thinker, actual or merely conceived, being the subject for whom it is true. In either case a proposition is called on to validate its claim to truth by reference to a standard, on the one hand, the standard of fact, on the other, the standard of an ideal thought. In the first case, the emphasis is on the verifiable objectivity ; in the second, on the logical universality of truth. This, in its most general terms, is the 'intellectualist' view of truth ; and so long as we stick to these most general terms and ask no embarrassing questions, it is the view which we all, I suppose, in a manner, accept. At any rate our leading pragmatist assures us that the definition of truth as agreement, and of falsity as disagreement, of our ideas with reality is accepted by pragmatists and intellectualists alike as 'a matter of course.'¹

But the difficulty here is to agree on what we mean by the terms of this definition. Following the indications already given, we come to some such conclusions as the following.

First as to the 'idea.' The truth we are considering being truth of propositions, the idea must not be taken primarily as a bit of psychic existence, a subjective state of mind or an event occurring in the flow of consciousness ; nor must it be taken as a single term, like the idea of 'red' or of 'equality' : such single terms or concepts, apart from their use in propositions, may be said perhaps to be accurate or inaccurate, but cannot be said to be either true or false. The idea that is to 'agree with reality' must be the whole objective, immanent meaning of the supposal, that so-and-so.

With this understanding of the term 'idea,' we ought to have no great difficulty in explaining what, in general, we mean by the other term in the relation of agreement declared to be essential to the constitution of a truth. The term 'reality' is, indeed, in my judgment, unfortunate, since it suggests too much the idea of either a physical or a metaphysical entity. But true proposi-

¹ James, *Pragmatism*, p. 198.

tions may be made about anything thinkable, and the range of the thinkable is unlimited. True propositions may be made, for example, about imaginary objects, like Alice in Wonderland, and impossible objects, like the *perpetuum mobile* and ropes of sand, as well as about things that actually exist and events that actually happen; and although these propositions may be interpreted as having an indirect reference to a world of objects regarded as more truly 'real,' it hardly seems necessary to do this in all cases in order to give them an intelligible meaning or to acquire insight into their truth.¹ But undoubtedly propositions, whether true or false, mean to assert about something. They may be taken as meaning to answer a specific question which one might intelligibly ask about the something in question. And obviously the right answer, the answer which would satisfy the interest of knowledge, whatever other interests it might or might not satisfy, would depend on the constitution, actual or ideal, of the object or subject-matter of the inquiry, and not alone on the cognitive activities and subjective interests of the thinker. He may even have himself made the object, in the more obvious sense of 'made'; it may be his sonnet; or it may be the experiences which are special to him and in their uniqueness unsharable, like the interior play of his mental imagery: the object once constituted, be its constitution eternal or limited in existence to the fleeting moment, demands cognitive recognition in its own right and dictates the terms under which a true answer can be given to any intelligible question about it. By 'reality' or 'fact,' then, in this connection, we mean whatever in the object of the thought or subject-matter of the enquiry must be taken account of in determining the nature of the answer, satisfactory to the intelligence, to a specific and intelligible question about it. 'Fact' is whatever in the object, be it sensible or ideal, a thing or event or action or attribute or any mode of relation, so controls the process of knowing *that* object as to make the thought or supposal not only acceptable to the individual thinker, but fit for acceptance universally; for such universality is logically implied, as we have seen, in the conception of truth. Thought so controlled is true,

¹ Attention may be called in this connection to the important investigations in *Gegenstandstheorie* by Meinong and his school.

whatever subjective motives may guide and inspire it; thought not so controlled yields no knowledge, however great the subjective assurance to the contrary. And perhaps so far there is no real ground for dispute. The dispute, I suppose, would relate to the nature of the control. Certainly no intellectualist has emphasized more strongly the coerciveness of outer fact and of certain 'relations of ideas' or, as we should prefer to say, ideal objects that function as facts than Professor James. He admits expressly that at least certain truths are determined in advance of our recognitions and any pragmatic testing of them.¹

I might be expected, perhaps, at this point to consider whether the 'reality' with which our ideas, to be true, should agree is not, in the end, no special and particular fact, least of all such imaginary objects as fairy tales and such impossible objects as round squares and ropes of sand, but 'absolute' reality, whose content, or one of whose aspects, is 'absolute' truth, which sets the standard for all 'truth' that is merely relative and finite. But a thorough discussion of this view would lead us too far, and I have already, I think, sufficiently indicated my position. I admit, certainly, that truths are connected together and tend to cohere in systems, though I have not been able to see that one truth interferes with another truth in the system from relation to which it derives an added significance. And I admit, of course, the linkages of facts, but I am similarly unable to see that one fact, from the point of view from which it is the particular fact that it is, is transcended and annulled through relation to other facts. The idea is thus suggested of an ultimate system of reality and an ultimate system of coherent truth, and this may perhaps be called 'absolute.' But, as we have seen, no such conspectus of the systematic connection of all realities and of all truths is attainable by man, and it is even conceivable that no such ideal system, completely self-fulfilled, actually exists, but that it is the end-term of a creative process in the universe itself. The universe has, we assume, a fundamental nature and constitution, and this grounds the possibility of truth, but also, we must add, of error. Meanwhile, as our Hegelian teachers tell us, anything may be taken as 'real' which

¹ "The hundredth decimal of π is predetermined ideally now, though no one may have computed it." *Pragmatism*, p. 211.

is taken for what it is and not for something that it is not. From this point of view, I have insisted that the truth of a proposition must be judged from its own chosen standpoint, the particular question it means to answer, and the special reality, fact, or object it selects and intends. And since our theme is the truth of propositions, and any proposition about the 'Absolute' and its relation to finite truth would, from our point of view, be no more true and would certainly seem much more difficult to establish than a proposition telling us, for example, what o'clock it is; since, practically, in many cases we have no need to appeal to the high court of metaphysics to derive satisfactory answers to our questions, and in many others have simply to ignore our metaphysical theories to get any valuable answers at all; since no way has ever been devised whereby we could use the 'absolute' criterion to measure our other truths by; since the conception of such a criterion and the conclusions drawn from it imply a conception of truth different from the propositional; and since, finally, we are assured that, in the end, there is no relation between truth and reality at all, since, in the end, there are no separate terms,¹ whereas this relation is just now our problem: I hope that these reasons for not pursuing the subject further may be deemed sufficient.

A difficulty might, however, be found in the conception of a relation of truth to fact, in that what is taken to be true is also taken to be the fact. If it is true, for example, that I exist, then that I exist is also a fact. Hence, it might be argued, there can be no relation of agreement or correspondence between truth and fact, since no difference between them can be discovered.² The difficulty, I take it, is purely verbal, and may be escaped by a verbal distinction. We may distinguish, if we choose, between fact that and fact of; the real distinction is between the object of the assertion and the content of the supposal or judgment. My existence is a fact, and the truth that I exist is also a fact; but the latter is surely not precisely and numerically identical with the fact of my existence, regarded as the real content of my

¹ Bradley, "On Truth and Copying," *Mind*, N. S., Vol. XVI, p. 172 f.

² So G. E. Moore, article on "Truth" in Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 717 (b).

being. It is a fact that the horse is a mammal, but this truth does not take into itself bodily the quadruped and its mammalian character, nor does it itself enter into the beast's vitals.

What, then, we at length ask, is the nature of that relation between idea and fact indicated by the term 'agreement'? Ideas to be true must agree with the facts, but how agree?

The view that a truth is, in some literal fashion, a 'copy' of the fact, is now pretty generally discredited. Too much honor is done it when it is accorded a limited sphere of validity in the relation of the mental image to its original. For granted that the image is a true and faithful copy, it (the image) is no more a truth, in the propositional sense, than any external resembling object; and the truth that it is like the original, while clearly in some sense agreeing with the fact of the resemblance of which it takes account, neither is that resemblance nor a copy of it. Yet even those writers who are most emphatic in rejecting the copy theory of truth not infrequently employ language which implies some form of correspondence. They will complain that their own views are *misrepresented*, or that those of their opponents bear no sort of *likeness* to the facts. And quite lately Mr. Bradley, after demolishing, from his own point of view, the copy theory as false in principle, goes on to mention four senses in which, from a lower point of view (which is, of course, our own), truth may be said to correspond with reality and even to reproduce fact. It is interesting to observe that the first three of these senses, referring to the acquisition of truth (the fourth referring to its communication), reduce essentially to that demand for the control of thought by the object, of which I have spoken: the individual must suppress what is special to him to attain what the thought of the many individuals must conform to; he must follow the object in whose ideal development he coöperates; and he must take up in reflection the given qualities of sensible matter and accept more or less brute conjunctions of fact.¹ These meanings may be generalized in the statement that a thought, to be true, must submit to the control of whatever objective conditions predetermine its fitness for universal acceptance.

¹ "On Truth and Copying," *Mind*, N. S., Vol. XVI, p. 174 f.

But the 'correspondence' of truth with fact is usually taken as a static relation in the result of thinking. Can any intelligible meaning be given to this conception? I incline to think that there can, although I admit a difficulty in expressing it, and shall, therefore, not be surprised if what I am about to say may seem crude and unsatisfactory. Still I am convinced that there is such a relation. Take, for example, the mental image which, by hypothesis, resembles, or copies, the percept. This object we both think and think about. Hence an ambiguity in the conception of the 'content' of our thought. On the one hand, *what* is thought is the object, the mental image. But this image, as we have seen, is not a truth, but an existent fact, whose resemblance to the percept demands our recognition. On the other hand, *what* is thought is that this object resembles the percept. And this, by hypothesis, is true and a truth. But *this* objective content of the thought,—to repeat a reflection now familiar,—is neither the image, nor the percept, nor anything that bears the slightest resemblance to them. It is the thought, and in the proposition the assertion, of *their* resemblance. But how could this assertion be truly made unless the meaning of both terms and the meaning of their resemblance were contained and established ideally in the thought of them? We use, to express the presence to a mind of this meaning of the object, the metaphor of reflection, and this suggests a prior independent existence of the object and some sort of copying. But there need be no priority in time, nor need the object have an existence beyond thought or apart from its presence in the reflection. The conception suits equally well an idealistic and a realistic interpretation. The full thought, in fact, is a reflected thought: it is at once a thought of and a thought about. And the complexion,—the terms and relations that make up the complex structure,—of the intended object, in that aspect of it which is at the time in question, must, it would seem, be ideally taken up into and define the complexion of the reflected content, whenever that content is true. Or we may say, perhaps, that it is the same content from different points of regard. It is impossible to avoid metaphors; but they must not be unduly pressed. The reflection in

thought is not on all fours with reflection in a mirror; it does not in the same way 'copy' its object; it apprehends and ideally assimilates it. I am speaking here, of course, of recognized truths. As to truths unrecognized by any human mind, we should have, I suppose, to define them,—apart from the admission of other forms of mind, and ultimately an omniscient mind,—as the capacity in the object—it is impossible to avoid the thought-reference—to manifest itself to some mind as being of the sort, character, or complexion that it is, that is, that it has in it to be seen to be whenever, under describable conditions, it is so manifested.

Truth, then, as related to the act of cognition, is intellectually reflected fact. The important question then is, How do you know, especially when the object referred to is not palpably present, that the assumed or reflected fact is truly so? How do you know in the given case that the thought has submitted so completely to the control of fact as to be not merely accepted as true, but worthy of acceptance?

In the course of reflection on this subject, various criteria have been proposed: the force and liveliness of the impression, clearness and distinctness of the thought, inconceivability of the opposite, coherency and systematic connection of ideas, verifiability in some definite experience. To some only certain propositions have seemed to require a criterion by which their certainty might be assured, other propositions appearing as self-evident. To some, again, the differences in propositions and in the kinds of subject-matter have seemed to demand corresponding differences in the criteria of their truth; Aristotle, we remember, regarded it as a mark of defective education to require the same kind of evidence in ethics that is demanded in mathematics. At the present time the most prominent candidate for favor in this field offers us a universal criterion; it is the theory of pragmatism that every claimant to truth is tested by the satisfactoriness of its working. But pragmatism is more catholic still; for while explaining how truth is tested, it professes at the same time to explain what truth is. Truth, it says in effect, is not a quality belonging from all eternity to some propositions and not to others; it is something

made in the process of what is called validation or verification. This conception gives a new meaning to the idea of 'agreement' in the definition of truth. The process of truth-making implies, not a static agreement, but a 'fitting' of the idea or meaning with the facts functionally, so that we are led by the idea from a less to a more satisfactory experience, from a less to a more satisfactory mode of thought, and are thus enabled to deal with our experience, in its various parts and aspects and as a whole, more effectively than if, instead of adopting the idea or supposition which is thus established as true, we had adopted some other idea or supposition. The test of a claimant to truth, then, is just this effective working; and that it works effectively, that it leads to good and useful consequences, leads to harmony and control of the processes of our experience, is precisely what we mean by calling it true. What does not so lead is rejected as, and is, error. Thus the whole problem of truth is solved at a stroke. You *know* that your thought is true, pragmatism says, when being acted on, being followed out in its consequences, theoretical or practical, it leads directly or indirectly to the specific experience which it promised, and thereby enables you to deal with the concrete situations of your life and with your life as a whole in ways which yield, in the long run, the greatest amount of satisfaction. You know it is true, because you choose to call that true which does this. The proof of the pudding is in the eating; the key that fits is the one that turns the lock.

If this account is correct, the gist of the pragmatist's contention about truth may be expressed in three propositions: (1) The test of the truth of an idea, supposal, proposition, judgment, or belief is its serviceableness in use; (2) truth, in the only intelligible meaning of the term, is a quality belonging to the ideas, beliefs, etc., that are capable of meeting this test; (3) since use is relative to ever-changing conditions, truth lives and has its being in a process of development, — it is something made, not ready-made, or, put bluntly, it is an event that happens.

With the first of these propositions, that which declares the test of truth to lie in its serviceableness in use, I at least, provided I am allowed to interpret the phrase, have no quarrel. A claim-

ant to truth, whenever its truth is not self-evident, must submit to be tested; and it is difficult to see how it could be better tested than by putting it to work. Even a 'self-evident' truth, like the law of identity, is known only by abstraction from its use in innumerable instances, and gets its meaning defined and qualified by application. How otherwise, while acknowledging that *S* is *S* and *P*, *P*, should we not hesitate ever to utter a simple proposition of the form *S* is *P*? But here everything depends on the interpretation. 'Serviceableness in use' may be taken so narrowly as to make a lie which saves a life or extricates from an embarrassment a splendid truth, and the recognition of a disaster which paralyzes the energies of the man affected by it a fatal error. On the other hand, it may be taken so broadly as to include all other criteria, and especially that of the systematic coherency or harmony of experience and thought, since one of the uses of 'true' thought will certainly be to reduce the various items of our world to consistency, and to develop insight into and comprehension of the nature of things. Of the second proposition I am more doubtful; for though I admit that theoretically every truth implies capacity of verification, I am by no means sure that this is the sole meaning of truth, and still less convinced that we are justified in assuming that every truth must needs be capable of actual verification under the conditions of our human experience. As there are even now truths acknowledged of some which are yet unacknowledged of many, why may there not be truths forever incapable of being thought, acknowledged, or validated by any human individual? I understand, however, the pragmatist to mean that every truth has an actual or potential existence in human experience. This is suggested by the third proposition, which appears to make truth a quality of our knowledge, and change and growth in our knowledge a process of change and growth in truth. Our analysis leads to a different interpretation. I have maintained, namely, that we must distinguish in cognition the act or process, the object that it is about, and the objective content of the supposal, the meaning expressed in a that-sentence when truth or falsity is predicated of the proposition. I have further maintained that true and false are

primarily predicates of this objective meaning and only secondarily predicates of our judgments and beliefs. Finally, I have contended that this meaning is not a subjective apprehension, but an objectively apprehended somewhat, having logical characters of its own, much as physical objects have physical characters, independent of their recognition by any finite mind. Consequently I hold, with Mr. B. Russell, that some propositions, that is, their objective meanings, are true, and some false, just as some roses are red and some white; in other words, that the proposition, if true, bears, as such, a purely logical relation to the fact that it is true of, and that this relation is not a process or event, like the cognitive process through which it gets into our minds, but merely,—to use the familiar expression,—one that ideally holds or obtains. Hence the claim to universality, a claim which, of course, if it is to be acknowledged, must be tested in a process of knowledge, but the validity or falsity of which is not first made when it is first made out. Thus the realm of meanings to which the objectives of our judgments belong constitutes, in my view, not a realm of actualities, but one of ideal possibilities. Unless we are prepared for the metaphysical interpretation of a universal consciousness, it cannot be said to exist, save as particular items of it appear from time to time in recognizing minds. What sort of existence has the truth that Cæsar once lived when nobody is thinking it? The presence of a truth in a consciousness, from the logical point of view, can only be regarded as an accident, that is, as an incident due to empirical conditions, and not necessarily contained in the conception of the meaning. It is something that the individual mind may become conscious of, but again may not. It may be objected that this notion of an objective truth distinct from the objective fact that it is the truth of and logically independent of subjective belief, is a fiction. It may plausibly be held that the only terms we have here to deal with are the objective fact and somebody's idea, opinion, or belief about the fact, and that the only question at issue is that of their relation, which is also a fact. I should reply to this by saying that, of course, the question cannot be raised about the truth of any particular statement unless the statement is first made, and this

certainly implies the existence of the ideas or belief involved in somebody's mind. But when we consider more closely what the statement means, we find that its meaning is not limited, as is the act of judgment or the disposition of belief that it defines, to its existence in the temporal flow of anybody's consciousness. This is a peculiarity of the logical aspect of our thought, and this, I take it, is as deserving of recognition as are the facts of mental or of extra-mental existence.

Pragmatism, in the view of its advocates, is so much the subject of misunderstanding that I shall not be surprised if I am told that my criticism is beside the point. I have the feeling myself that it may be so ; for the writings of those who are commonly regarded as pragmatists make on me the impression of a conflux of tendencies rather than that of a settled doctrine that has been worked out to a common agreement. It is hard sometimes to tell whether a particular statement by a pragmatist writer is to be taken literally, or whether it is to be taken sympathetically, with a large license to the imagination. My object, however, is not so much to criticise as to offer considerations that may serve to bring out discussion and to clear up a situation that certainly at present seems not a little confused. At the risk, therefore, of appearing to misunderstand and in the hope of a solution, I will venture to mention two other difficulties that have occurred to me in the endeavor to follow the current of the pragmatist tendency. The first relates to the instrumental character of thought, the second to truth's claim of universality.

1. Pragmatism insists, as we have done, on particular truths rather than on the 'truth' of system, on relative truth rather than on truth absolute, recognizing, however, as we also have done, the important function of particular truths to hang together in systems. But whereas we have regarded the supposal or belief so to say structurally, as in itself reflecting or not reflecting the state of the facts, pragmatism, at least in one of its tendencies, appears to regard it solely in its instrumental character as a plan of action and means of effective control of situations. But, granting the instrumental nature of thought, must we not also in the end adopt once more the structural point of view ? The idea con-

ceived, let us say, as a plan of action, — though many of our ideas, and notably those of the man in the much discussed illustration who, lost in the woods, ideally constructs his environment, seem rather to instigate than to be themselves plans of action, — the idea, we will suppose, has been worked out ; it has been verified ; it has fulfilled its purpose ; it has been found true. What, then, we ask, is the relation of this true, validated, fulfilled idea to the facts ? We surely cannot say now that it is true because it leads to consequences which validate it, for whatever further consequences it may have, it has already been validated. Pragmatism perhaps might answer that in this case we read the consequences retrospectively. But even so, the process has clearly come to a pause, been summed up, stands there in its result relatively complete. We have discovered, for example, that the creature dimly discerned through the foliage was a stag by tracking and shooting it ; does the now verified truth that it is this noble animal mean only the particular hunting activities by which this truth has been surely ascertained ? Or does it mean certain further consequences to be realized by action, for example, the supper by the camp fire and the antlered trophy in the hall at home ? It means, that is, suggests, implies, stands for, leads up to all this, or it may ; but does it not, as truth, mean a certain structural relation of the ideas to the fact, and does it not mean this all along ?

2. Pragmatists seem at times to come perilously near saying that what seems true to you is true, provided it effectively meets your requirements ; or, again, that it is true, if it meets the temporary demands of a group or generation. Truth is in the making ; the truth of one age is the error of the next. And if we say, not that truth is useful, but that truth is the useful or the expedient, are we not bound to say that whatever is found useful in any respect, as, for example, in satisfying an emotional interest, is true in so far forth ? Hence the charge that for pragmatism truth is 'any old thing that works.' This would, of course, be absurd. To interpret the doctrine, we must say, I think, that nothing is ever true simply, but is only true for me, for you, or for them. But how does this agree with the demand of logical universality that every proposition taken for true

claims? The pragmatist theory of truth itself, for example, is just now urging its claims to general acceptance, not because Professor James and a few other philosophers find that it 'works,' or proves satisfactory, to them, but because, being a true theory, we, as reasonable beings, ought to accept it; and were Professor James alone in his belief, an *Athanasius contra mundum*, he would still, I presume, find its lack of social recognition no evidence of its failure as truth, but would, appealing to future experience, try more than ever to convert the rest of us. How now does the pragmatist explain this character of logical universality which even he, when he argues with us, assumes to belong to *his* truth? I cannot speak for him; but taking him literally, in some of his utterances, I should suppose he might say, we make this demand because, on the whole, we find it *better* to assume that we live in a common world, and that truths about it are common truths, than to assume that every man has a private truth and world of his own; it works better intellectually and practically. 'On the whole' it no doubt does. But the pragmatic testing, I supposed, was to be applied not merely in general, but in particular. And in the case of the martyrs of science who have died for *their* truth, might it not have seemed to 'work' better to conform to the generally accepted opinions, to what we now characterize as prejudice and error? I am speaking not of the inherent agreement of truth and fact which, with its implication of a constitution in the nature of fact, is the anti-pragmatist's explanation of universality, but of its relation to general recognition. How in a particular case can pragmatism justify, in this regard, a deviation from accepted social standards? The appeal, in the case of such a departure, is not to actual and effective working in this regard, but to an ideal possible working, which assumes the principle, but which gives, and in the nature of the case can give, no actual verification of it. It is not enough to reply that the martyrs of science found it more satisfactory to die faithful to their convictions than to surrender their convictions to the popular clamor, for this only gives us the criterion of private feeling and not effective working on the whole. So far as appears, we shall have to adopt, on the principles of pure pragma-

tism, one of two alternatives : either the assumed logical universality of truth is without justification, since there are instances in which it cannot be practically verified, — in which case, it may be disallowed, whenever to do so seems to work better ; or it is justified by the fact that it is found to hold in many or the majority of instances, — in which case, the appeal is made to mere numbers. But the principle itself is appealed to in every discussion that aims to convince by argument. Hence it seems to be something that claims acceptance not merely because it works, but because it is seen to be the indispensable condition of any finally harmonious working in a world rationally ordered and socially common. The objection that pragmatism fails to give a satisfactory account of the universality of truth has been frequently made. It was urged, for example, by Professor Royce in his address before this Association four years ago at the meeting at Princeton ; it has recently been urged, with great acuteness, from a somewhat different point of view, by Professor Baldwin in his work on Genetic Logic.¹ This, perhaps, more than anything else, is the stumbling-block in the way of many to accepting the pragmatist's account of truth as final and complete. It is greatly to be hoped that discussion may bring out the true bearing of the pragmatist's contention on this point, that we may see clearly what justification, if any, can be given to the demand that what is true for me shall be true for you also.

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¹ See especially the article "On Truth," *Psychological Review*, July, 1907.

SUBJECTIVISM AND REALISM IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY.¹

IN this paper I have a two-fold object in view : First, to state the arguments which seem to prove that subjectivism is in all its various forms incoherent and untenable ; secondly, to present for discussion that particular form of realism which seems to contain most promise of a satisfactory solution of the complex problems involved.

Let me define precisely what I intend to signify by the term 'subjectivism.' I take it as being interchangeable with the phrase 'subjective idealism.' It appears in varying forms in Descartes, in Spinoza, and in Leibniz, in Locke, Berkeley, and Hume ; in short, in every one of the chief pre-Kantian philosophies. But however variously interpreted in the different systems, it is determined by the fundamental assumption, that the objects immediately apprehended in sense-experience exist only in the mind of the individual observer, and that they are numerically and existentially distinct for each observer. According to Descartes, they represent real material bodies ; according to Berkeley, they reveal the world which is abidingly present to the mind of God. What is fundamental in this position is not, therefore, the particular view adopted of the causes of our mental experiences,—the difference in this respect between Descartes and Berkeley is by comparison unimportant,—but the interpretation given to mental experience itself.

If we leave Arnauld and Reid out of account, as not sufficiently thoroughgoing, we may regard Kant as being the first to question the underlying assumption of the subjectivist position. In so doing he was led to formulate what has been named 'objective idealism.' Each individual, through subjective processes, constructs a world which is permanent and which is the same for all observers. The mental processes are distinct for each observer ; the objects immediately apprehended are identical for

¹Read before the American Philosophical Association, at Cornell University, December 27, 1907.

all. But though the historical value of the Kantian idealism can hardly be overestimated, we cannot accept it as a genuine solution of the special problems involved. It is, I should say, impossible to extract from Kant, and still more impossible to gather from Hegel, any coherent account of how consciousness stands related to the brain; why it is that the world apprehended varies for each observer together with this small and insignificant portion of itself. Objective idealism has, in the past, been parasitic. It has lived on the weaknesses of its opponent. It has taken the refutation of subjectivism as equivalent to its own establishment. And as a consequence, objective idealism has made practically no headway except among those who have devoted themselves to the study of pure metaphysics. It has yielded no fruitful orientation for scientific research. As a practical standpoint, subjectivism has retained its hold over those who are chiefly occupied in physics, physiology, and psychology, and who accordingly do not have constantly before them the logical and metaphysical difficulties to which it gives rise.

Even within the sphere of the positive sciences the subjectivist position does not, however, prove really satisfactory. As a working hypothesis it fairly well satisfies the needs of the physiologist; but as a view-point in physics and psychology it hopelessly breaks down. Accordingly, within recent years, workers in physics and in psychology, but especially in the latter, have occupied themselves in seeking some other standpoint. And as they strive to develop this substitute out of our detailed knowledge, through study of those very facts which have hitherto been the stumbling-block of all objectivist theories, there is good hope of a successful issue.

The two most courageous and thoroughgoing attempts to establish realism have been those of Avenarius and of Bergson. Avenarius is probably the most original thinker that Germany has produced within the past forty years; Bergson is the leading constructive philosophical thinker in France at the present day. Both are primarily psychologists, and both have been impelled to develop a realistic philosophy through their detailed study of the actual facts of our concrete experience. As they substantially

agree in the criticism which they pass upon subjective idealism, I may state that criticism before proceeding to consideration of their constructive views.

The contradiction inherent in subjective idealism consists in its view of our mental states as standing to objects in a two-fold simultaneous relation: cognitively, as their apprehensions, and mechanically, as their effects. The first is a relation of inclusion, the second is a relation of exclusion. By viewing ideas in terms of the first relation, the subjectivist reaches his starting-point, namely, the real material body acting on the material brain, and through the brain generating or occasioning the mental state. The object is separated from its effect by a large number of intermediate links which bear no resemblance to it, save in that they are physical processes in space. The facts, therefore, which prove that the mental state is a mechanical effect of the real object justify no assertion as to its internal resemblance to that object, and so inevitably undermine the view of mental states from which the argument starts. If the subjectivist conclusion is accepted, there can be no ground save only the *deus ex machina* of a preëstablished harmony for retaining our primitive belief in the objective validity of the mental state.

The first view of mental states, as cognitively related to objects, must be accepted as valid if the subjectivist argument is to have a starting-point; it cannot be valid if the subjectivist argument is correct. Either, therefore, the subjectivist must establish his position without assuming the ultimate truth of his starting-point, or he must recognize the truth of that starting-point as proving the falsity of his conclusion.

This argument has in one form or another been so frequently stated, and in spite of its simplicity seems to be so cogently valid, that as a rule subjective idealists now recognize its truth. They therefore endeavor to start from facts which involve no realistic assumptions. And, in so doing, they propound their argument in a new form, as the argument from relativity. Even while remaining within the field of consciousness, our perceptions can, they contend, be proved to be subjective, numerically and existentially distinct in the mind of each observer. Sense-per-

ceptions are, as is easily shown, conditioned by the individual circumstances, view-point, and previous experience of each observer. They vary proportionately with changes in the relation of our bodies to the objects, as when objects alter in apparent size and form according to their distance from us. Or they may vary in correspondence with variations within our bodies, as when what is red to the ordinary observer is grey to the color-blind, or as when objects are seen double upon displacement of one eyeball. And in all cases the exact nature of the variations can only be discovered in and through determination of the influence exercised by objects on the brain. The perceptions vary independently of the objects apprehended, and directly only with the brain-states. They are conditioned, mediately by objects, immediately by the brain-states which these objects cause.

These, then, are the undeniable facts. They can neither be called in question nor ignored. They constitute the problem which awaits solution. How, now, are they interpreted by the subjectivist? He may argue in either of two ways. If he believes that our mental states carry us to a transsubjective reality, he will argue from this conditionedness of our perceptions to their subjectivity. He will contend that, as our perceptions vary directly only with the brain-states, they must be effects distinct from the real objects and separately existent in each individual mind. But, obviously, in so arguing the subjectivist falls back upon the realistic interpretation of experience. The argument from relativity reduces to the previous argument from causal dependence of experience upon the brain.

The subjectivist may, however, take a very different line. He may entirely give up the belief in a transsubjective world, and consequently in the existence of a material body and brain. He may contend that we know and can know nothing but sensations, that sensations remain the sole possible objects of all our thoughts. And from this position he may then argue that the objects immediately known are subjective for a twofold reason: first, because they are sensations; and secondly, because they vary from mind to mind.

The first reason is that objects are known only as sensations

and therefore as subjective. Now, without questioning the contention that objects are known as sensations, we may dispute the inference drawn from this assertion. Psychologists have come to recognize that 'sensation' is a thoroughly ambiguous term. It is used with two very different meanings, as process of apprehension and as object apprehended. If sensation is mental process, then for that sufficient reason it must fall on the subjective or mental side. But if, on the other hand, sensations have to be regarded not as mental processes, but as objects revealed in and through such processes, this argument will fall to the ground. Though red is known only as sensation, it is undoubtedly an objective content. Similarly, a sound or an odor or a taste is an object apprehended by the mind, and is therefore distinct from the processes through which such apprehension is brought about. Nothing but confusion can result from employing the term 'sensation' in both these conflicting connotations. The ambiguity is very similar to that which makes the term 'experience' so serviceable to certain contemporary schools of philosophy. It may be said that the two aspects, — process of apprehension and object apprehended, — are inseparable; but even granting that, they are none the less distinguishable. And a name that is adequately descriptive of the one aspect cannot rightly be applied to the other.

Now the subjectivist argument, that objects are known only as sensations, and therefore as subjective, makes use of this fundamental ambiguity. Only by interpreting sensations as signifying objective contents, can it justify the assertion that objects are known as sensations; and yet, only by regarding sensations as mental processes, can it legitimate the inference that they are therefore subjective. The ground of the argument involves one interpretation of the term 'sensation,' the conclusion implies the other. It is open to us to propound the counter-argument. Since sensations are distinct from mental processes, objects which are known as sensations cannot be mental or subjective. This is the meaning now ascribed to the term 'sensation' by such psychologists as Ward, Stout, and Alfred Binet. They limit it to denote objective content. Binet admits that there is no contra-

diction in speaking of an object both as sensation and as material.¹ He also points out that there is no reason why sensations, so regarded, may not have permanent existence. That is to say, the use of the term 'sensation,' when thus clearly defined, decides nothing either for or against realism.

This, however, brings us to the second argument. Sensations vary from mind to mind, and for that reason must be numerically and existentially distinct for each observer. Now if by sensation is meant mental process, there is no question. Mental processes are undoubtedly subjective; they take place separately in the mind of each conscious being. But if by 'sensation' we mean content apprehended, the conclusion does not follow. The same identical objective content may be differently apprehended by different minds. The subjectivist tacitly makes the impossible assumption that if we apprehend real objects in sense-experience, we must apprehend them in their intrinsic, absolute nature, and that, on a realistic theory, sense-perception must therefore be identical with scientific knowledge. If realism proceeded on any such assumption, it could, of course, be condemned as an absurdity from the very start. The difference between subjectivism and realism consists not in the acceptance or rejection of any such underlying assumption, but only in this, that the subjectivist seeks to explain the varying sensations in terms of themselves, the realist by equating them with variations in the totality of the complex conditions, both subjective and transsubjective, which are therein involved.

The mere general fact, therefore, that such variations do occur is by itself no conclusive proof either for or against any one theory of knowledge. The variations constitute a problem to which subjectivism and realism remain as alternative explanations. This argument may therefore be rejected as invalid. By itself it proves nothing, and would never have been put forward had not the subjectivist been already convinced on other grounds that the objects of mind are purely mental. These other unexpressed grounds would seem ultimately to reduce to the physiological argument which I have already considered.

¹ *L'Âme et le corps*, pp. 13, 63.

The belief that sensations are mechanically generated through brain-processes is, so far as I can discover, the sole originating cause of subjective idealism. Other arguments may be employed to develop the position, but they cannot be regarded either as causing or as justifying it. The subjectivist who seeks to ground his position on the facts of relativity is still chiefly influenced by the physiological standpoint which he professes to reject.

Thus it matters not from which side the subjectivist may approach the facts. He may start with the physicist and physiologist from material bodies and the material brain, or with the psychologist from our immediate mental experiences; in either case he lands himself in the same quandary. He can only prove mental states to be subjective by proving them to be externally related to objects as their mechanical effects, and yet this can only be done by simultaneously interpreting the mental states in the cognitive terms which justify the realistic standpoint. This perpetual alternation between realism and idealism is as contradictory as it is unavoidable.

Now, if we accept this criticism of subjective idealism, and at the same time hold fast to the fundamental fact upon which that criticism is based,—the fact, namely, that any view which regards mental states as effects generated or occasioned by the brain must render impossible the understanding of their representative function,—we are brought to the view propounded by Avenarius and by Bergson, that the brain is in no sense the seat or organ of the conscious life, that its function is purely motor and never cognitive. It differs from the spinal cord only in degree of complexity. It is not the material substrate of consciousness, but only the motor instrument through which it actively intervenes in the material realm.

That the body is the instrument and not the necessary substrate of the mind has often been propounded as a pleasing speculation, as for instance by William James in his Ingersoll Lecture on the immortality of the soul. It is a very different matter, however, when Avenarius and Bergson strive to work it systematically into the web of our scientific knowledge, urging that it is the only feasible interpretation of the empirical facts. Both are

led to its adoption by the requirements of the detailed psychological enquiries in which they are engaged. They possess a genuine interest in cerebral physiology and are thoroughly acquainted with its established results.

As regards Avenarius, it must be admitted that in his mouth the contention means very much less than at first sight appears. He developed his realistic theory comparatively late in his philosophical development, and never thoroughly succeeded in bringing his general metaphysic into harmony with it. He oscillates between parallelism, on the one hand, and materialism, on the other; that is to say, between a view which entirely separates mind from matter, and a view which denies the existence of anything but matter. Avenarius meant, indeed, to develop a view very different from either of these two familiar standpoints. For in both of them, as he has been careful to show, subjectivism is necessarily in some degree involved. He does not, however, seem to have succeeded in establishing the realistic philosophy whose programme he has sketched. His criticism of subjectivism is remarkably thorough, and, as it seems to me, entirely successful. But he fails to provide a satisfactory substitute.

With Bergson matters stand very differently. He rejects parallelism and materialism with equal emphasis. No one can possibly accuse him of coquetting with either. His words may, therefore, be allowed their full weight. He means everything that he says when he contends that the brain has no cognitive function. Moreover, he has developed his position in considerable detail. In his *Matière et mémoire* he has shown how the facts known regarding brain-localization, specific energy of the nerves, Weber's law, and the like, can all be satisfactorily interpreted from this point of view. His philosophy has, therefore, the unique value of establishing a new possibility, one that has not been developed by any preceding thinker.

I shall conclude by indicating, — I can do no more than indicate, — the chief consequences which Bergson's position entails. In the first place, it involves our giving up the attempt to explain the genesis of our knowledge. Our starting-point is the world of material bodies in space. The problem is not to account for

consciousness of it, but to explain why we know it in the form relative to our individual position and practical needs. By right it is knowledge of true independent reality; in actual fact it is limited in extent, permeated with illusion, and largely personal.

Secondly, Bergson does not mean to imply that physiology and psychology have gone off on an entirely false scent, and that, in seeking to explain the mind through study of the nervous system and brain, they are looking for light where none is to be found. It is from the physiological point of view that Bergson propounds the fundamental problem of his philosophy. As he recognizes, and indeed insists, the world perceived varies together with that special portion of itself which we name the brain. Accordingly, all knowledge of the organization of either casts light upon the nature of both. The more fully we understand the manner in which the brain reacts upon the external world, the better shall we comprehend the nature and meaning of the conscious life. The subjectivist explanation of this functional relation is that the brain-processes are either the sufficient or the occasional cause of the mental states. Bergson's explanation, on the other hand, is that ordinary consciousness is essentially practical. The orientation of the healthy, unsophisticated mind is exclusively towards action. Therein it harmonizes with the brain, which by its changes determines the possible actions through which the body may adapt itself to its material environment. The stimuli coming from objects to the various sense-organs prepare the reactions, potential or actual, whereby the body adapts itself to them. By controlling the reactions thus caused the mind can intervene in the material realm. The mind can only act through the bodily mechanisms thus placed at its disposal. It is limited by the motor instrument which conditions all its activities. And since the activity even of scientific or philosophical thinking depends upon sensuous instruments, such as language, this limitation reaches even into the purely theoretical domain.

Thirdly, mind and body must be regarded as standing in a one-sided relation of interaction. The mind controls the body. The body, on the other hand, while not itself acting on the mind,

limits and defines all mental activities, even those which seem to be of an exclusively cognitive character. Thus the mind in sense-experience develops only those perceptions which are necessary for action, and develops them in that particular form which best enables them to fulfil their practical function. Ideas which can gain no purchase on the body can form no integral part of our real life, and therefore, though possible to the mind, will not appear within the conscious field. Inefficacy is equivalent to unconsciousness.¹ In this manner the limitation of our sense-experience to the immediate environment in which the body stands, and also the various illusions, convenient though false, which characterize the visual field, may one and all be explained. They reveal the transformations which our consciousness of the real world undergoes in order the better to gain control over the material body.

Fourthly, though this position involves a pragmatist attitude towards ordinary consciousness, it implies an anti-pragmatist view of knowledge as a whole. True knowledge consists in emancipation, within the theoretical domain, from the tyranny of practical needs.

These, then, are the chief consequences which follow from Bergson's position. His philosophy is a detailed and very definite contribution towards the establishment of realism. It makes

¹ Professor McGilvary, in his very interesting and valuable articles on realism in the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, has taken up a midway position. "The *sentire* may be the effect of the physiological process, and yet the *sensum* may be the same as the *sensibile* which initiated the physiological process on which the *sentire* depends. Consciousness arises as the correlate of physiological functioning, and when it arises it does not produce its object. . . . Is consciousness, therefore, a function of the bodily organism? Yes and no. . . . The *fact* of consciousness is a 'function' of the bodily organism in the sense that this fact does not exist unless certain changes take place in the brain, and it exists when these changes do occur. But when changes of a certain kind thus occur, changes of the brain *within the limits of this kind* do not occasion changes in consciousness. The only changes that consciousness undergoes, if we may speak of them as changes of consciousness, are changes from existence into non-existence, and *vice versa*." (Vol. IV, pp. 593-595.) I shall be surprised if, in developing this view, Mr. McGilvary is not compelled to advance the whole length of Bergson's position. That consciousness is a sort of transparency always identical with itself, and not rather a mental process varying with variations in the objects apprehended, requires further argument than Professor McGilvary has yet presented.

a bold frontal attack upon all the main obstacles which stand in the way of a realistic interpretation of sense-perception. As I have already said, it has the unique value of establishing a genuinely new standpoint from which to approach the problem of knowledge. We have, it seems to me, no right to put forward realistic theories of our own until we have discussed and definitely come to terms with this highly elaborated system. For myself, I can neither accept nor reject it; but it seems to me to afford better promise of further light than any theory yet presented. If this paper will in any measure serve to draw the attention of others to Bergson's works, it will have been written to good purpose.

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GREEN AND SIDGWICK ON THE COMMUNITY OF THE GOOD.

THE doctrine that the true Good is necessarily common or non-competitive in character is not new to ethical thought. For its first expression we should need to look far back. But it has gained an added importance for English students through the emphasis with which it was held and defended by T. H. Green, and the no less emphatic criticism brought to bear on it by Sidgwick. This paper will be chiefly devoted to a discussion of the question as it has been left by these rival leaders of English ethical thought; but it may be worth while in the first instance to refer to some earlier phases of the theory.

We have provisionally referred to the theory as a single one; but on closer examination we find that it may be held in two somewhat different forms, corresponding to the terms 'common' and 'non-competitive.' The idea that the true Good is necessarily a *common* Good might be said to be the master-thought of Greek ethical reflection, and it has been enforced anew by Hegel and his successors. But it is possible to hold that the good life can only be a life in which others share, a life of reciprocal service and benefit, and yet to stop short of the conception of the Good as something that cannot be the subject of competition, as necessarily raised above all conflict of individual interests, and so *common* in the strictest sense. The idea is not radically different in the two cases; but the added precision and sharpness of the latter form of the theory renders it especially open to criticism.

And as the theory may take two forms, differing in precision if not in substance, so it may be reached by two different lines of argument which, in analysis at least, can be distinguished. The first is the line of thought already referred to as especially characteristic of Greek ethics, — that a man can only find his true manhood in a community which claims his allegiance and his service, and that it is only as citizens, bearing all the responsibilities and restraints of citizenship; not as private and isolated units,

that men can participate in the Good. By surrendering the pursuit of private gain or inclination to share in the public burden, the individual citizen makes himself heir to the whole riches of the life of the body politic; by sacrificing his immediate good, he becomes the possessor of the true Good.

The second argument belongs in its full development to a later period, although it appears in the teaching of the Cynics and influences certain aspects of the thought of Plato. It sets out from the conception of the Good as strictly inward and personal, as so entirely a matter of a right attitude of the soul that outward goods are indifferent or negligible. And if this view of the Good as depending entirely on the inner life of each man be consistently held, there can clearly be no question of a conflict of interest in its attainment. It is non-competitive because its seat is in the breast of each man, secure from the effect of outward influences. This line of thought carries the doctrine to its full length, in claiming for the true Good an absolutely non-competitive character; but in order to do so, it is forced to give a narrow and rigoristic, or Stoical, account of the Good. Thus those thinkers who have been unwilling to carry the Stoic type of moral philosophy to the length of paradox, have often reinforced the argument from the essential inwardness of moral good or Virtue by an appeal to the social character of man as a moral being. In other words, the two arguments which we have distinguished have been as a rule combined and blended.

We find this fusion of the two lines of thought in both the Stoic and the early Christian ethics. The main reliance of the Stoic was placed on the second argument, for he never tired of emphasizing the inwardness of Virtue and its accessibility to all, — “*Rex est qui posuit metus,*” — the wise man alone is truly happy, wealthy, and regal. But to this negative view of the community of the Good, he added the positive conception of the essential brotherhood of all true followers of Wisdom, whatever their station in life, nationality, or outward circumstances. So also in Christian thought there has been a constant, or at least a recurrent, tendency to disparage external and competitive goods in comparison with the Good which is inward and inalienable.

“ Having nothing, yet possessing all things,” the early Christians submitted to be despoiled of their outward possessions without feeling that anything of real value had been lost ; but they also added a positive conception to the negative one. For they realized much more vividly than the Stoics themselves the Stoic principle of the brotherhood of man ; and their keen sense of solidarity made them feel that any true good gained by one member of the community was of benefit to all.

When we turn to modern ethics, we at once find the principle that the true Good is common at the centre of a great ethical system, — that of Spinoza. His treatment of this point is so striking as to call for a few quotations, even if we are led by them into an apparent digression. Spinoza sees in the passions the great divisive forces of human nature, while it is by Virtue and the pursuit of the true Good that men are bound together. Thus he holds that “ in so far only as men live in obedience to reason do they always necessarily agree in nature.” And “ the highest good of those who follow virtue is common to all, and therefore all can equally rejoice therein ” ; for “ to act virtuously is to act in obedience to reason, and whatsoever we do in obedience to reason is to understand ; therefore the highest good to those who follow after virtue is to know God, that is a good which is common to all and can be possessed by all men equally in so far as they are of the same nature.” “ This love towards God cannot be stained by the emotion of envy or jealousy ; contrariwise it is the more fostered in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to be joined to God by the same bond of love.” For “ this love towards God is the highest good which we can seek for under the guidance of reason, it is common to all men, and we desire that all should rejoice therein.”¹

In the teaching of Spinoza on this point, there may be traced an expressed or implied *a priori* argument from the unity of Reason to the unity, and hence the non-competitive character, of the true Good. To a thinker who believes firmly in the unity of Reason, especially in its highest ethical and social manifestations, it may well seem incredible that its demands on different moral beings

¹ *Ethics* (Elwes's trans.), Pt. IV, props. xxxv, xxxvi ; Pt. V, prop. xx.

should be ultimately conflicting, or should in the end produce anything less than a thorough and organic unity of all. But if this mode of thought, to which we shall have occasion to refer again, is present in Spinoza, yet his advocacy of the theory that the true Good is non-competitive gains a great part of its persuasiveness from the fact that he himself had sought and found satisfaction, not in outward possessions where one man's gain is another's loss, but in that "acquiescence of spirit" which he felt all might share if they would, and each be richer for the wealth of his neighbor.

In the ethics of Kant, as in the Stoic philosophy, we find the inwardness of true Good so firmly insisted on that it is an obvious inference that in respect of it no conflict of interests can occur. From the formal and subjective point of view, the Good is not competitive. But Kant also suggests, though he does not work out, a positive application of the same principle by his conception of a 'Kingdom of Ends,' in which each member shall legislate for himself and all others, and the wills of all shall be in complete harmony. In this idea of the common character of the Good, the widely diverse systems of Kant and Spinoza show a striking agreement. Spinoza holds that every man who follows after his own good according to the guidance of Reason necessarily acts in harmony with all other good men; while Kant passes straight from his principle of the 'Autonomy of the Will' to the idea of all good (*i. e.*, autonomous) wills as necessarily coöperating and harmonizing in a 'Kingdom of Ends.' For both thinkers the morality of a principle and its universality (in the sense of capability of being willed by all moral agents) are practically equivalent terms.¹

When we come to the philosophy of T. H. Green, we find that his doctrine of the non-competitive character of the Good does not differ essentially from Spinoza's, though it is worked out in the *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Book III, chapters iii and iv, from the historical point of view. He shows how, from the rudest beginnings of human society, men have been impelled to pass beyond

¹ Cf. R. A. Duff, *Spinoza's Political and Ethical Philosophy*, p. 130; also ch. xi, "The Good as the Principle of Sociality."

the mere attempt to gratify their immediate desires, and to seek the good of a larger and more permanent body, with whom they have identified themselves, whose interests they have made their own. "The man cannot contemplate himself as in a better state, or on the way to the best, without contemplating others, not merely as a means to that better state, but as sharing it with him."¹ And this idea of a Common Good acquires the force of an imperative, nay, is the foundation of all obligation, as against every momentary inclination. "There is an idea which equally underlies the conception both of moral duty and of legal right . . . the idea of an absolute and a common good; a good common to the person conceiving it with others, and good for him and them, whether at any moment it answers their likings or no."² The satisfaction for which man seeks is an abiding satisfaction, but on this very ground it is one "which no man can contemplate as abiding except so far as he identifies himself with a society whose well-being is to him as his own."³ The society with which he so identifies himself may at first be limited in numbers; but such is the strength of the advancing principle of sociality that finally he is bound to recognize in every man or woman one who has at least a potential claim on his respect and his service. Thus "the extension of the area of the Common Good" proceeds towards the ideal state, in which every moral agent shall be looked on as an end in himself, and as entitled to share in that Common Good. Further, Green finds that men, by identifying themselves with the interests of a family or society, came "with more or less distinctness to conceive that permanent welfare of the family, which it was their great object to promote, as consisting, at any rate among other things, in the continuance of an interest like their own; in other words as consisting in the propagation of virtue."⁴ Here we have the idea of a good of character, of an inner good, of desert. "And the recognition of desert is in itself a recognition of a moral and spiritual good, as

¹ *Prolegomena*, § 199.

² *Ibid.*, § 202.

³ *Ibid.*, § 232, end.

⁴ *Ibid.*, § 242.

distinct from one sensible or natural."¹ And now, Green proceeds, "we have the beginning of that education of the conscience of which the end is the conviction that the only true good is to be good."²

Now whether or not we accept all the steps of Green's argument, considered as a genetic account of the origin and extension of the idea of the Common Good, it is important to notice that he traces in the process by which this idea is developed both the elements or moments which at the outset we found to be involved in it; he emphasizes both the necessity for each man to pass beyond himself that he may contribute to and participate in the good of a body of his fellows, and also the growing inwardness of ethical thought which leads to the exaltation of an inner, and hence non-competitive, good as alone ultimate. And he sums up his argument in the words: "The one process is complementary to the other, because the only good in the pursuit of which there can be no competition of interest, which is really common to all who may pursue it, is that which consists in the universal will to be good,—in the settled disposition on each man's part to make the most and best of humanity in his own person and the persons of others. The conviction of a community of good for all men can never be really harmonized with our notions of what is good, so long as anything else than self-devotion to an ideal of mutual service is the end by reference to which these notions are formed."³

Such, in outline, is Green's theory of the common nature of the Good. Sidgwick's criticisms of it are to be found in the posthumously published *Lectures on the Ethics of T. H. Green, Mr. Herbert Spencer, and J. Martineau*. It was natural that he should single out this theory for special notice; for he freely admits its attractiveness, especially in its avoidance of the difficulties raised for the hedonist by the conflicting claims to happiness of different individuals. "I cannot," he says, "be accused of underrating these difficulties; in fact it was a main object of that part of my treatise on *The Methods of Ethics* which deals with hedonistic method to

¹ *Op. cit.*, § 243.

² *Ibid.*, § 244.

³ *Ibid.*

bring them into full view. If Green can consistently maintain an 'idea of a true good' that 'does not admit of the distinction between good for self and good for others,' his system will in this respect have a fundamental superiority over Hedonism."¹

The acknowledgment here made regarding the merits of a theory of ethics which conceives the good as non-competitive is a striking one; and it may be worth while to ask, before considering in detail Sidgwick's objections to Green's 'proof' of the principle, whether, on the lowest estimate of the strength of this proof, an idealistic ethic has not "in this respect a fundamental superiority over Hedonism." For a philosophy such as Green's, Goodness in the sense of purity of character and devotion of will is the true end of life; and no refinement of criticism can permanently obscure the significance of this quality, considered not merely as an abstract attitude of the will, but as rightness of will expressing itself in character and action. It may be hard to define, but its existence and influence are felt, and felt as something *sui generis*, whenever it is present. Now, while pleasure is to a limited extent self-propagating, yet the enjoyment of one individual often rests on pain suffered by another, or by reaction causes pain to the same man at a later time. Goodness, on the other hand, is not limited in this way. It is cumulative for the individual and contagious in its tendency to pass from one to others. Thus, when we take it in a wider sense, because nearer to the concrete reality of experience, than that of the abstract Good Will, the 'Good Character' still has an advantage over Pleasure in its more common, less competitive, nature; and, as Sidgwick himself suggests, has *pro tanto* an advantage as the ethical End.

But, returning to Sidgwick's specific criticisms, we may for the sake of clearness distinguish between the two arguments on which he lays the chief stress, although in themselves they are closely related. The first argument is that Green's treatment of Justice, and his repeated use of the terms 'self-sacrifice' and 'self-renunciation,' show that he cannot consistently carry out the principle that the true good is non-competitive; and the second, that he could not defend the principle at all, if he did not oscillate between a wider and a narrower conception of the Good.

¹ P. 65.

Sidgwick first examines Green's treatment of Justice, and his description of the just man as one who "will not promote his own well-being or that of one whom he loves or likes . . . at the cost of impeding in any way the well-being of one who is nothing to him but a man." This description, Sidgwick argues, "implies that the promotion of one's own well-being or that of one's friends may really involve the cost of impeding the well-being of others : otherwise what need of this resolute impartiality? It implies, in short, that Good, as implied in the notion of benefit and well-being, does really consist, at least to some extent, in objects that admit of being competed for, though Green's theory of a true Good denies this."¹ Similarly, in regard to 'self-sacrifice,' Sidgwick asks: "What, in strictness, can such a man be said to 'sacrifice' when he is seeking his own greatest good with true insight, and with the knowledge that his true good cannot lie in 'objects that admit of being competed for'? What 'sacrifice' is there in giving up things that are no sort of good to one?" And he concludes: "In all this I seem to find . . . pagan or neo-pagan elements of ethical thought — in which the governing conception takes the form of self-regard — combined with Christian or post-Christian elements, without any proper philosophical reconciliation of the two."²

Now when we examine this formidable charge regarding the supposed element of neo-paganism in Green's position, we find that it hardly amounts to more than this, — that the sphere of the moral life, in which alone the Good Will becomes actual and operative, is one in which material 'goods' and their distribution play an important part. It would be pedantic to refuse to allow a thinker to use the term 'good' or 'benefit' of these things because he held that the 'true good' was ultimately of a higher order. Such an idea as that of Justice must be wrought out in the midst of existing conditions, in which most men hold very frankly that 'goods' are both material and competitive. Nor does Green refuse to speak of "good things of the body,"³ though their

¹ Pp. 66, 67.

² P. 68.

³ *Prolegomena*, § 243.

goodness may be "merely relative," when they are compared with "good things of the soul." And so when Sidgwick challenges Green "to reconstruct the conscientious man's notions of justice and injustice, and show us exactly what they come to when the distinction between good for self and good for others is eliminated,"¹ it is enough to answer that Green says repeatedly and explicitly that we cannot so construct in detail the ideal state, in which all men would live for the good of others as for their own. Doubtless in it 'justice' would be transformed or transcended. But under present conditions it is only by 'faithfulness in the unrighteous mammon' that the 'true riches' can be gained or even their existence made apparent to a sceptical world.

Similarly, in regard to self-sacrifice, Green is certainly as far from holding that this involves the sacrifice of man's *ultimate* good as any other thinker who believes that life must be lost in order to be saved. But it seems little more than a play on words to assert on this ground that 'sacrifice' means "giving up things that are no sort of good to one." Surely 'sacrifice,' in its ordinary sense of giving up inclination, leisure, immediate and proximate goods of many kinds, is an intelligible term even in the mouth of an idealist. And Green has recorded his belief that in an ideal society, though self-sacrifice might no longer be needful in the forms which we know, yet there might still be "demands for the rejection of possible pleasure" and need for the "self-devoted will."²

But it is the second of Sidgwick's criticisms which is most important and penetrates furthest. If, he argues, Green takes seriously the position that the only true or ultimate Good is to be good, and that this is so entirely an inward and personal matter as to be wholly non-competitive, he is not entitled at a later stage of his argument to introduce the wider ideal of the Good as the realization of all the capacities of man's nature. If the good will includes "the will to know what is true, to make what is beautiful," Sidgwick asks, "is it not idle to tell us that the idea of a

¹ *Lectures*, p. 67.

² *Prolegomena*, §§ 276, 302.

true good does not admit of the distinction between good for self and good for others, and that a man's true good does not consist in objects that admit of being competed for, — so long as the material conditions of human existence remain at all the same as they are now?" "Virtue, no doubt," he continues, "and the highest virtue — though not every particular virtue — admits of being exercised under any external conditions of life ; but the faculties that find expression in the arts and sciences — no."¹ If, on the other hand, self-realization is taken as the end, by what right can a man be called on to sacrifice in his own case those æsthetic and intellectual faculties which Green in some passages includes as part of the Good? Or rather, if it is even possible that the individual may be called on to sacrifice, not only enjoyment, but also opportunities for self-development in these directions, how can it be said that the Good, which admittedly includes development, is non-competitive?²

This argument is summed up in a sentence in which Sidgwick charges Green with allowing "his thought to swing like a pendulum between a wider and a narrower ideal of true good, sometimes expanding it to Culture, sometimes narrowing it to Virtue and the Good Will. When he thinks of full realization of human capabilities, he brings in the development of artistic faculties and the cultivation of taste, as well as the development of scientific faculties and the pursuit of knowledge of all kinds ; when he wants to bring out its non-competitive character, we find it shrunk to virtue and goodness of will."³

Thus Sidgwick states a dilemma : either the non-competitive ideal, which is essentially the same in its Stoic, ascetic, and Kantian forms ; or the Hellenic ideal, including that manifold development of human capacities which was comprised under the conception of ἀρετή. The first is non-competitive, — *common* in the strictest sense, — but empty of content ; the second has content and breadth, but it is common only to a limited extent. And we must make our choice between the two, for they are alternatives which cannot be combined.

¹ *Lectures*, p. 69.

² Pp. 70 n., 95.

³ P. 71.

Now there seems little doubt that Green would not have accepted this presentation of the question as final. He would probably have classed Sidgwick's dilemma as an instance of the "either . . . or" of the abstract understanding, and have sought to answer it in orthodox Hegelian fashion by a "both . . . and." For we have seen that his argument involves both the contributing elements which we distinguished at the outset, and which Sidgwick insists are mutually destructive. And Sidgwick's own argument seems to involve a double assumption, — both that the Good Will, whose non-competitive character he admits, is a "will that wills nothing"; and conversely, that those intellectual and æsthetic faculties, whose cultivation is necessary to the full development of human nature, and which the Greeks included in the wide conception of *ἀρετή*, are necessarily self-regarding. Now we have already seen, in discussing Sidgwick's remarks on Green's idea of Justice, that the former assumption is out of harmony with the general trend of Green's thought. Even in the 'Kantian' passage already quoted, he defines the good will as "the settled disposition on each man's part *to make the most and best of humanity* in his own person and the persons of others,"¹ — thus combining the two thoughts which Sidgwick insists can only be held apart. The good will finds its sphere of action among "things which admit of being given and taken";² and even in self-sacrifice there is a positive moment and purpose, — the extension to the whole of society of those opportunities of a rich and varied life which were, even in the best days of Greece, the privilege of a minority.³

From the other side, it is a groundless assumption that "the will to know what is true, to make what is beautiful," is necessarily self-regarding. It may be no less altruistic, no less responsive to the claims of the Common Good, than the more obviously practical and philanthropic forms of public service. For the 'community' of the Good must not be taken as excluding variety, if we would avoid the 'excessive unification' which Aristotle criticised in the Platonic Communism. There should

¹ *Prolegomena*, § 244.

² *Ibid.*, § 256.

³ *Ibid.*, §§ 270-273.

be many different tones in the harmony of the common will. As Green says, the Common Good "may be pursued in many different forms by persons quite unconscious of any community in their pursuits."¹ And again, "we are justified in holding that it could not be attained in a life of mere scientific and artistic activity, any more than in one of 'practical' exertion from which those activities were absent."² The movement for social reform during the nineteenth century could ill have spared Ruskin, William Morris, or Watts. Now this recognition of diversity of function no doubt implies that some lives will be more fruitful in enjoyment, that some will be wider and richer than others; but this does not affect the essential matter, which is that each man, looking neither to self-sacrifice nor to isolated self-development as the true end, should seek to find and to pursue that calling which will enable him to make the most valuable and necessary contribution to the general Good. In an early essay on Matthew Arnold, Sidgwick himself admitted the necessity of the two classes of service spoken of by Green, and their complementary character in so far as they promote the same wide ends. "The religious man, obeying the instinct of self-sacrifice," and "the man of culture seeking self-development," alike believe that they are following the highest good. And yet "each dimly feels that it is necessary for the world that the other line of life should be chosen by some."³ Thus may various aptitudes work together for a common end. And from this point of view the most vital distinction for ethics is not that between self-sacrifice and self-development, but between the use of gifts and capacities of whatever nature for the common Good and for private gratification. This is the distinction between the greatest art of the fifth and of the fourth century in Greece, — between Phidias, bending all the strength of his genius to express perfectly and finally in a great statue or a great temple the ideal character of Athens as it was apprehended by her noblest sons; and Praxiteles, dedicating the statue of Aphrodite, which was accounted his masterpiece, to the glorification of his mistress.

¹ *Op. cit.*, § 283.

² *Ibid.*, § 288.

³ *Miscellaneous Essays and Addresses*, pp. 45-6.

On some such lines Green would probably have worked out his answer to the question of the relation of the intellectual and artistic faculties to the strictly moral good, as he intended to do in a later work.¹ The difference between his position and that of Sidgwick in regard to this question might be summed up by saying that Sidgwick considers the Good, at least in the case of intellectual or artistic pursuits, to consist in *acquisition* or *enjoyment*, whereas for Green it is essentially *contribution*, or acquisition only as a means to fuller contribution. Thus Green says in one description of the good man's attitude of mind: "The thought of his well-being will be to him the thought of himself as living in successful pursuit of various interests which the order of society . . . has determined for him"; and these interests are directed to "objects which, when realized, take their place as permanent contributions to an abiding good."² This point of view of contribution might be illustrated by the motto of Watts's picture, *Sic Transit*, — "What I spent I had: what I saved I lost: what I gave I have." Or, to take a more strictly philosophical illustration, it is the principle of the Platonic legislator, seeking to ensure that every citizen should make his own proper and individual contribution to the Common Good, to the end that he should not follow his own private inclinations, but become serviceable in the welding together of the state.³

When we look at the question from this point of view, and consider the Common Good, neither as merely abstract, nor as involving a dead and monotonous level of uniformity, but as concrete and requiring the most varied contributions, intellectual and artistic as well as practical, the dualism between the principle of Community and that of the wide realization of human capabilities has largely disappeared. And if it should be objected that the standpoint of contribution as opposed to acquisition is too exalted to be generally adopted or maintained, one may reply

¹ See *Prolegomena*, § 290 and editor's note. This later work was, of course, never written; and it is only fair to remember, in criticising this part of Green's system, that it is admittedly incomplete.

² *Ibid.*, § 234.

³ *Republic*, 519E (cf. 420B), "ποιῶν μεταδίδοναι ἀλλήλοις τῆς ὠφελείας, ἣν ἂν ἕκαστοι τὸ κοινὸν δυνατοὶ ὦσιν ὠφελεῖν, κ. τ. λ."

that it is certainly a high conception ; yet it is none the less exemplified, not only in the heroism of the patriot or the martyr, but in the daily life of every man who sees in his work a means of making some definite, though perhaps inconspicuous, contribution to the public good. And the fact that such an attitude is far from universal can hardly be used as a disproof of the principle involved. For what ethical principle is there which does not transcend its application by average men and women? We may, indeed, admit that under present conditions there are many to whom no opportunity is, so far as we can judge, afforded of reaching the level of ethical development at which such a rule of life becomes possible or even conceivable. But this is because the principle of the Common Good is still far from complete realization ; and in such realization moral influences would be so diffused that no man whose mind was open to receive them would fail through lack of the necessary ethical stimulus and guidance.

As we are now approaching the close of our argument, it may be well to review its chief results. At the outset, we saw that the doctrine of the common and non-competitive nature of the Good could be based immediately and certainly on the idea of the true Good as wholly inward, as consisting entirely in an attitude of will. But it is at once apparent that this result is reached by depriving the idea of Good of its concrete content and riches. It gives a theory, logically conclusive, but practically unsatisfying, since the Good Will only becomes actual and operative in its relation to and effect on the objective world. The question was thus suggested, whether this ideal of the Good *Will* as common, could be combined with the Greek ideal of the good *life*, taken in the concreteness of experience, as essentially a *social* life, and thus a life from which the private standpoint, the standpoint of competition, is excluded ; and we saw that Green's argument did indeed combine these two ideals. We saw further that such an attempt to combine the two elements in the complete idea of the Good as common and non-competitive has a solid basis in fact ; for the very concreteness and variety of this complete idea makes it necessary that not only the practical life of

self-sacrifice, but the contemplative and artistic life, should be pressed into the service of the Common Good.

But just because the idea is concrete, because it has passed beyond the region of the Kantian 'Metaphysic of Ethics,' and begun to find embodiment in the real world, it follows that we must not expect to find it fully developed and explicit in the sphere of experience. We are dealing with a developing principle, not with an empirical generalization. And thus the principle appears both as an ideal and as an imperative. That Green looked on it in this light, and not as a mere induction from existing facts, appears clearly at several points in his argument. "The idea of the good," he tells us in one passage, "is primarily a demand. It is not derived from observation of what exists, but from an inward requirement that something should be."¹ And in another he says that, with the first undeveloped idea of a common good, "there is given 'in promise and potency' the ideal of which the realization would be perfect morality, the ideal of a society in which every one shall treat every one else as his neighbor, in which to every rational agent the well-being or perfection of every other such agent shall be included in that perfection of himself for which he lives."²

Now the difference between the positions of Green and Sidgwick on this whole question is in the last resort a difference as to the validity of a principle reached in this way. Sidgwick would probably refuse to accept any principle which could not be made good by an "empirical criterion," such as he desiderates in a slightly different connection;³ while Green is eager to follow out those indications of the principle of the Common Good, which he finds by reflection on the facts of the moral life (though not, indeed, by simple induction from them). Thus it may be argued that Green's ready acceptance of the principle as possessing ideal validity causes him at some points to underestimate the difficulty of establishing it by observed facts; and on this point we may allow that Sidgwick's criticisms⁴ have a certain force. In par-

¹ *Prolegomena*, § 230.

² *Ibid.*, § 205.

³ *Lectures on T. H. Green*, p. 71.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 57-8, 77.

ticular, Green seems to consider the "extension of the area of the Common Good" as a more direct and unbroken process than it has actually been, and to overlook the difficulty mentioned by Sidgwick, that conflicts frequently occur, not only between egoistic and altruistic interests, but between a wider and a narrower altruism.¹ In Green's favorite instances, the family and the state, there arises a frequent conflict between the nearer and the more remote obligation, as well as between obligation and mere individual interest. But if we admit that Green minimizes such difficulties, owing to his belief in the possibility and value of the principle of the Common Good as an ideal, we must at the same time acknowledge that Sidgwick's suspicion of any such ideal viewed as an ethical principle causes him to take too unfavorable a view of the actual evidence for that of the Common Good. Even if a *complete* empirical proof is unattainable, we cannot disregard such considerations as the readiness of men in all ages to identify themselves absolutely with the Common Good in some great crisis, to the point of giving up life itself for the sake of country or religion. And not in such extreme instances alone is devotion to the Common Good exemplified. It may, as we have seen, be the ruling motive in the life of the scholar or the artist, as well as in that of the humbler citizen who does his work steadily and earnestly, seeing in it his proper contribution to the general interest. Finally, there is the fact of the self-propagating character of goodness in whatever rank or calling it appears.

The final question, then, comes to be: Is it possible to accept the principle of the common and non-competitive character of true Good, as an ideal, *i. e.*, a normative and regulative principle, based on the facts of the normal and social life, but pointing beyond any actual past or present fact to an ever more complete realization? That such principles are possible and necessary is surely implied in the claim of ethics to be a 'normative science,' — and, if normative for the individual, then why not for the community and the state? Moral philosophy claims to be more than a mere inductive study of 'the phenomena of the moral consciousness,' and more than sociology, though it uses the results of both.

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 70.

And if this claim is to be substantiated, it can only be by the establishment of such a principle and its use as a criterion to test existing social institutions. To such considerations, Sidgwick would probably have replied that, "when we abandon the firm ground of actual society we have an illimitable cloudland surrounding us on all sides, in which we may construct any variety of pattern states; but no definite ideal to which the actual undeniably approximates."¹ It is, indeed, true that Utopias have differed in every possible detail; but, as we have seen, Green disclaims all intention to construct a detailed Utopia;² his endeavor is to establish a principle to which the ideal state must conform, and by which it may be recognized as ideal. Now it might surely be shown, that in spite of all divergences as to the exact form of the 'pattern state,' no moral philosopher would refuse to accept as a necessary characteristic of such a state the principle of the Community of the Good. Whatever else might be present or absent, there would at least be secured to every member of the community that power to share in his degree in the good which he helps to create; while, on the other side, no such member would be used simply as an instrument to forward the designs or the pleasures of others. The use of men and women as instruments for the promotion of a good in which they have no share, which is the disgrace of modern Industrialism as it was of the ancient society founded on slave-labor, would be replaced by the willing self-sacrifice for the Common Good which is the moralization of human instrumentality.³

Now in this double condition,—that each moral agent should be a participant in the good of the whole community, and that no such agent should be made the instrument of the ends of others unless he first makes them his own by free consent,—we have, in truth, the principle which we have been discussing in its positive and its negative forms. But if we can trace a gradual, though slow and often arrested, development of this principle in the progress of human society; if we can consider the fullness of its realization as in itself a criterion of progress; and if we are assured

¹ *The Methods of Ethics* (sixth ed.), p. 22.

² *E. g.*, *Prolegomena*, §§ 202, 247.

³ *Cf.* § 247, end.

that its full development would inevitably be reached in this ideal state, — then it has indeed the highest ethical validity, the validity of a supreme regulative principle. In the words of Kant, it “has therefore objective reality, not as referring to an object of intelligible intuition (which we cannot even conceive), but as referring to the sensible world, conceived as an object of pure reason in its practical employment, and as a *corpus mysticum* of rational beings dwelling in it, so far as their free-will, placed under moral laws, possesses a thorough systematical unity both with itself and with the freedom of everyone else.”¹

G. F. BARBOUR.

PITLOCHRY, SCOTLAND.

¹ *Critique of Pure Reason* (Max Müller's trans., 2d. ed.), pp. 648–9. I cannot omit a reference to the passage, too long to quote here, in which Dante discusses the doctrine of the common nature of the true Good, *Purgatorio*, Canto XV.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL
ASSOCIATION: THE SEVENTH ANNUAL
MEETING, CORNELL UNIVERSITY,
DECEMBER 26-28, 1907.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY.

THE seventh annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association was held at Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, on December 26, 27, and 28, 1907. At the business meeting the following report of the Treasurer, for the year ending December 31, 1907, was read and accepted:

The balance on hand, as reported by Professor Hibben, December 31, 1906, was \$177.44. After the acceptance of the report by the Association, Professor Hibben received from dues of members \$2.00, making a total of \$179.44. Of this amount he spent \$10.00 to defray the expenses of the Columbia 'smoker'; \$31.50 for printing and stationery; \$6.35 for clerical aid and stenographer; \$3.91 for postage and telegraph; or a total of \$51.66, leaving a balance of \$127.78, which was turned over to the new Secretary, who presents the following statement for the year 1907:

FRANK THILLY, SECRETARY AND TREASURER, IN ACCOUNT
WITH THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION.

Receipts.

Received from John Grier Hibben, the former Secretary and Treasurer.....	\$127.78
Received from Dues and the sale of Proceedings	191.90
Interest.....	2.30
Total	\$321.98

Expenses.

Printing Proceedings of the Association for 1906	\$15.42
Stamps and Envelopes.....	11.60
Reply Postals.....	5.00

Announcements of Meeting, Stamps, and Envelopes	5.10
Printing of Programmes, Stamps, and Envelopes	10.75
Stationery and Printing.....	3.00
Clerical Aid and Stenographer.....	8.65
Express	1.29
	<u>\$ 60.81</u>
Balance on hand, December 31, 1907.	261.17
Total	<u>\$321.98</u>

The following officers were elected for the ensuing year: *President*, Professor Hugo Münsterberg, of Harvard University; *Vice-President*, Professor W. P. Montague, of Columbia University; *Secretary-Treasurer*, Professor Frank Thilly, of Cornell University; *Members of the Executive Committee*, Professor Ernest Albee, of Cornell University, and Professor Ralph Barton Perry, of Harvard University.

The following were elected to membership in the Association: Professor Frank C. Doan, The Meadville Theological School; Dr. Bernard Capen Ewer, Northwestern University; Professor A. Ross Hill, Cornell University; Professor James Gibson Hume, Toronto University; and Dr. Isaac Husik, Gratz College, Philadelphia, Pa.

Upon motion the President was instructed to appoint a committee of three (including the chairman) to consider the advisability of undertaking the publication of certain works of early American philosophers, and to present a report at the next meeting. Professors Gardiner, Royce, and Dr. I. W. Riley were named as members of the Committee.

It was voted that the selection of the time and place of the next meeting be left with the Executive Committee.

A resolution was passed by the Association "gratefully acknowledging the most courteous hospitality of the members of Cornell University."

The following are abstracts of the papers read at the meeting:
The Problem of Truth. H. N. GARDINER.

[The President's Address, which appears in this number (March, 1908) of the PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.]

Visualization in Logic. GEORGE R. MONTGOMERY.

A system of visualization is valuable both for giving a different line of approach, and for articulating logic with mathematics. A system, useful both in formal and in inductive logic as well as in showing the relation between the two, can be based upon any system of geometrical coördinates where the relation to a certain point or axis is the basis. Any other particular relation will fall in its projection either within or outside the limits of the given fixed relation.

In formal logic, where the universe of discourse is impliedly present, the extension of terms may be represented by radii drawn to the circumference, having lines for the predicate, light lines for the subject, and unfinished radii for the possibilities in particular propositions. Such a system will be like Euler's circles, with the substitution of segments for circles, and like Lambert's lines, with the substitution of arcs for lines, besides having many advantages of its own. The easy rotation of the radii about the centre will enable a single figure to represent the different possibilities in any single proposition, and, the negation of the terms being constantly visualized, conversion can be readily pictured, as can also the various propositions which differ from the conventional four. By letting broken radii represent the middle term, the system can also be used in syllogisms, where single diagrams will sufficiently represent each form.

Such a system of visualization will be at the same time related to the representation by polar coördinates and also to representation by rectilinear coördinates. In the latter case, the y -axis is regarded as the circumference of an infinite circle. The system is also directly related to the system of points suggested by Kempe in his paper: "On the Relation between the Logical Theory of Classes and the Geometrical Theory of Points" (*Proc. London Math. Soc.*, Vol. XXI, p. 147).

The Nature of Absolute Knowledge in Hegel. G. W. CUNNINGHAM.

In the conception of absolute knowledge, as reached by the *Phenomenology of Mind*, we have Hegel's definition of the nature

of thought as it appears in concrete experience. This interpretation finds its justification, not only in explicit statements to be found in the preface of the *Phenomenology*, but also in the actual procedure of the *Phenomenology* itself, which is an investigation of experience from the epistemological point of view. Whatever may have been Hegel's view concerning the relation between the standpoint of absolute knowing and that of Absolute Experience, there seems to be no doubt that his point of departure in arriving at the former is the knowing experiences of finite individuals. Some of the more important characteristics of thought upon which Hegel here lays emphasis are the following: (*a*) In opposition to Kant and Fichte, who after all make thought essentially subjective, the standpoint of absolute knowledge emphasizes the essential objectivity of thought. And such objectivity, we are informed, implies that thought does express the essence of things, that is, is adequate to the real; and, secondly, that thought is not to be regarded as a private or particular state of the individual, but as in a sense transcending the individual. (*b*) Thought, therefore, being truly objective, has no datum opposed to and independent of it; on the contrary, it exhausts reality. But this is not to reduce reality to terms of mere abstract thought. For (*c*) thought is to be conceived of as possessing genuine universality; in Professor Bosanquet's phraseology, it is a process, not of selective omission, but of synthetic analysis. Thus the categories are concrete universals, identity in difference, and not blank identity. (*d*) Finally, thought has its criterion of truth immanent within it; indeed, truth is progressively defined only by means of its activity.

Evolution and the Miraculous. GABRIEL CAMPBELL.

[Read by title. This paper will be published in full in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, April, 1908.]

The Bible in the History of Philosophy. ISAAC HUSIK.

The Bible and Greek Philosophy were developed in the main (so far as the first two divisions of the Canon are concerned and the early parts of the Hagiographa) independently of each other; and not until each was essentially complete did historical accident

bring them together in Alexandria. Here reciprocal influence was inevitable. The individuality of each was strong and not to be crushed. The one claimed to be the revealed word of God ; the other, the conclusion of experience and reason. Extremists rejected one or the other. The rest accepted the two pillars of knowledge, *i. e.*, authority and reason, and endeavored to prove that there was no opposition between them. On the one hand, the Bible caused all the weight to be laid on the transcendental instead of the natural. The doctrine of the Trinity had an immediate influence on the fate of Nominalism and Realism. On the other hand, the conclusions of philosophy, particularly the Aristotelian philosophy, influenced the understanding of the Bible. In order to harmonize the physics and metaphysics of Aristotle with the Bible, and to find Aristotle's teachings therein, recourse was had to allegorical interpretation, to esoteric meanings. Hence each school of philosophy had a different conception of the teachings of the Bible. To determine with precision how the text of the Bible influenced any thinker in formulating his philosophical views, we must know when he lived and in what schools he was trained. These general statements may be illustrated in Philo. The method as well as the content of his philosophy bears distinct traces of Biblical influence, *viz.*, his God, Logos. In his method of interpretation, he changed the map of the Bible, so to speak. Philo influenced some of the writers of the New Testament and the Fathers of the Church, *e. g.*, Clement of Alexandria and Origen. What has been said of the Patristic period applies equally to the early Scholastic period from the eighth to the twelfth centuries. The Jews were subject to Mohammedan rule, and got Aristotle from the Arabs. The Bible they knew in the original. The Mishna and Talmud were used as collateral authorities. The synthesis of Maimonides was superior to that of Abélard or Scotus Erigena, because more methodical and rational. The second Scholastic period, from the thirteenth century, was different from the first. The whole of Aristotle was known through translations. The effect was twofold : (*a*) Widening of the sphere of philosophy to include all branches of thought represented in the Aristotelian *corpus* ; (*b*) narrowing of the sphere

of philosophy by separating out specifically religious doctrine. This separation was emphasized later by the Nominalists. Interpretation with Lessing and Kant was no longer naïve and spontaneous, but conscious and artificial, in the interest of the moral law.

The Teaching of the History of Philosophy. BROTHER CHRYSOSTOM.

[Read by title.]

The Factual. WALTER T. MARVIN.

By the 'factual' is meant the content of which we are immediately aware. The problem of the paper is: Are there judgments of which the factual forms the complete warrant; and if so, how are these judgments related to the remainder of our knowledge?

The chief premise of the paper is that any body of knowledge can be regarded as a deductive argument and as such can be submitted to logical analysis to determine its premises. The ultimate premises, *i. e.*, the premises that are not conclusions from other premises, are called primary judgments. These can be *conceivably* of three kinds: axioms (assumptions that we are unable either to prove or to disprove); factual judgments (those having full factual warrant); logical leaps (pure inductive inferences).

That human knowledge is not a deduction from axioms alone, all admit. Can it be from axioms and logical leaps? That mere guess *plus* a few axioms should have given us a body of knowledge as consistent as the special sciences, would be little less than miraculous. In fact, all admit that what we see and hear does influence our knowledge; but by hypothesis this influence can be only that which a premise has upon a conclusion. In short, there must be judgments having full factual warrant, *e. g.*, mere awareness of difference between red and green, or that *a* is bigger than *b*.

It will be objected: First, none of our actual judgments are merely factual and primary. Reply: Our actual judgments are logically complex in which factual judgments exist but cannot be isolated. Secondly, their existence would mean a limitation

to the scope of the principle of contradiction, since such judgments in no way depend upon consilience with other judgments for their proof. Reply: Such limitation would not mean that these judgments might contradict one another because they are absolutely particular. Only conclusions from them can contradict, and this would require not new premises but a revision of our inferences.

Thus part of our premises have immediate warrant; others (logical leaps) and our conclusions await their proof, and the principles of consilience form the basis of this proof. Moreover, the existence of these factual judgments must be taken into account in working out a theory of judgment. The judgments usually made the basis of study are often highly complex, in short, can be analyzed into several judgments. That is, a judgment is mere awareness of relation between terms.

The Mental Process in Cognition. A. E. TAYLOR.

The real 'Copernican revolution' in modern philosophy has been made by Avenarius rather than by Kant. What Avenarius has done is to show how the subjectivism which infects most modern philosophy is due to the confusion of two views of the relation of the external world to the knowing individual. According to one of these views, the external world is the cause or stimulus of which knowledge is the effect; according to the other, the external world is related to the knower simply as the object of his apprehension. The relation of cause and effect holds good between various constituents of this object, but must not be conceived as subsisting between the object of knowledge and the knower. From the thoroughgoing rejection of a 'cause and effect' theory of knowledge, some important consequences may now be deduced. The starting-point for a theory of knowledge is not the existence of stimuli, but the existence of a multitude of apprehended objects, colors, tones, bodies, concepts, feelings, emotions, volitions, etc. On inspection this aggregate is found to fall into two minor mutually exclusive aggregates, that of 'mental' states or processes, and that of extra-mental things. The peculiar characteristic of the members of the mental aggregate is that any

proposition asserting their existence can be replaced, without change of meaning, by one which asserts a predicate of the knowing subject itself. This is not true of the aggregate of the extra-mental. When I experience blue, it is not I who am blue, but some presented object other than the experiencing 'I.' Now the extra-mental, as thus defined, includes not only bodies and their perceived qualities, but all so-called 'mental images,' 'ideas,' 'concepts.' None of these are what they have too often been called, 'states of mind'; their predicates are fundamentally different from those of the processes in which they are apprehended. They are, in fact, objects experienced, not processes of experiencing. What, then, are the mental processes involved in cognition? The sole ultimate cognitive process of which we know is belief, or judgment, and it is of processes of judging, not of 'ideas,' that knowledge is built up. Perception is, *e. g.*, properly, simply the assertion of an existential proposition which includes in its meaning a reference to present time and to a determinate region of space. The cognitive process thus takes its place by the side of the other forms of the Yes-No attitude of mind towards its objects, which it is the function of Psychology to study. There is no reason to believe in the existence of any simpler or more ultimate mental processes corresponding directly to the action of stimuli on the organism. The alleged correspondences established by Psychophysics between variation in mental process and variation in stimulus should be conceived of rather as correlations between variations in the qualities or bodies outside my skin and variations in the behavior of an object in space inside my skin, *viz.*, my nervous system. The chief difficulty likely to be suggested by the foregoing view of 'ideas' as extra-mental objects is the question, "What kind of object, in particular, is it that we apprehend when we have, *e. g.*, a visual image of the face of an absent or dead person?" One may perhaps reply, that the object in such cases is identical with the real physical object of the corresponding actual perception, the only difference lying in the *bodily* concomitants of the experience, just as the object I see when I look into a mirror is really not a 'reflection' of my body, but my own body itself, 'mirror-

vision' and direct vision differing not in the object apprehended, but only in the character of the physical cause of the accompanying stimulation of the retina. Images would thus be, for a theory of knowledge, merely a peculiar class of percepts, percepts of what does not actually exist as a constituent of my *present* physical environment. That such perception of what does not actually exist is possible is shown by any case of genuine hallucination. The interpretation of the presented image as standing for past or future real physical fact, of course, belongs not to the object, but to the judgment made about it. In any case, it is false to speak of knowing as a process of combining 'ideas,' since knowing is a mental process, and 'ideas' are extra-mental objects. To know is not to put extra-mental things into certain relations, but to affirm that they *are* so related. Two general corollaries may be appended. (1) A sound philosophy has to start with concessions both to Dualism and to Pluralism. Both the contrast between the I-element and the extra-mental elements in the world of the experienced, and the plurality of I-elements, or knowers, appear among its data, and cannot be simply suppressed in its result. The real difficulty is not to see how there can be a reality 'behind' 'phenomena,' but how any element in the real presented world can be mere 'appearance.' (2) Of existing doctrines that which approximates most closely to the truth is probably the Monadism of Leibniz, though it is clear that some of the logical postulates of Monadism must be false, since they lead to the view that the physical world is made up of distinct and independent causal series, and there is good reason to regard this conclusion as untrue.

Subjectivism and Realism in Modern Philosophy. NORMAN SMITH.

This paper has a twofold aim : First, to state the arguments which seem to prove that subjectivism in all its various forms is incoherent and untenable ; secondly, to present for discussion that particular form of realism which seems to contain most promise for satisfactory solution of the complex problems involved. The contradiction involved in subjectivism consists in its

view of our ideas as standing to objects in a twofold simultaneous relation : cognitively, as their apprehensions, and mechanically, as their effects. The first is a relation of inclusion, the second is a relation of exclusion. The first view of mental states must be accepted if the subjectivist argument is to have a starting-point ; it cannot be valid if the subjectivist conclusion is correct. The only way of escape seems to be that which is followed by Avenarius and by Bergson. We must deny that sensations are effects generated or occasioned by the brain. The brain is the organ only of our activities and not of our consciousness. Avenarius fails, however, to establish this realistic philosophy. Bergson, on the other hand, has developed it in commendable detail, showing how it may adequately interpret the known empirical facts.

The Objectivity of Knowledge. EDMUND H. HOLLANDS.

The aim of this paper is to consider the bearing upon objective idealism of a new type of realism. This neo-realism is sharply distinguished from the older realism by an explicit rejection of the representative theory of knowledge. In this it agrees with idealism ; but it differs from it in holding also that knowledge makes no difference to the facts. This necessitates a polemic against idealism. Thus far, all the realistic writers have assumed that the fundamental tenet of idealism is, that *esse is percipi*. This is a radical misconception of the idealistic statement that reality is spiritual, for this is not meant in a psychological and subjective sense, and it is a conclusion, not a point of departure. A further objection of G. E. Moore to the idealistic definition of reality is invalid, as it involves an untenable distinction between possibility and reality. The idealist, therefore, accepts the realist's polemic against subjectivism, while denying its application to his own theory. On the constructive side, neo-realism has taken two directions. One set of writers regard consciousness as 'awareness,' which is the same for any objects whatever. Consciousness as *mere* awareness, however, is only an analytic abstraction. Others define consciousness as a relation, of meaning, between the objects. This second definition has not as yet been very clearly stated or exemplified. However, even if we admit a relational

definition of consciousness, its implications are not, as has been supposed, realistic. Terms presuppose relations, just as much as relations presuppose terms. Nor does the supposition that the terms are 'simples' avoid this conclusion, especially when we raise the question as to the truth of a proposition or of an inference. When it is pointed out that objects are shown by evolution to be prior to consciousness, and that consciousness is not a permanent relation, it may be replied that objects are nevertheless admitted to be determined for knowledge, and that time is no less a difficulty for the realist than for the idealist. To start, then, with relations, and try to arrive at reals, and to start with reals and try to arrive at their relations, are equally abstract procedures. The first is the method of *subjective* idealism; the second is, apparently, that of this type of realism, in so far as it is in any way distinguishable from idealism. The concrete reality is a system of related things; and the metaphysical problem is, What is the nature of this system?

What is the Function of a General Theory of Value? WILBUR URBAN.

In the first part of the paper the writer argued for the necessity of a general theory of value, which, being based upon general psychological analysis, would make possible a systematic treatment and fruitful genetic correlation of the different values and value judgments of Economics, Ethics, *Æsthetics*, and Religion. In the development of the argument, the writer showed that the present change of emphasis from truth to value had brought to light the interrelation of all values and the inadequacy of the points of view and methods of these separate sciences of value when working alone. From such a general theory, it was further argued, in the second part of the paper, would develop an *axiological* point of view, similar to the epistemological, in which the nature and grounds of the *objectivity* of value judgments would be determined, as well as their relation to factual and truth judgments. The paper [which was published in full in the January number of the *PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW*] seeks in addition to estimate the contributions already made to such a general theory.

Ultimate Reality and Progress. J. A. LEIGHTON.

A brief discussion of the relation between the notion of spiritual progress in individuals, cultures, and peoples, and the notion of time-transcending, intrinsic, intellectual and moral values. The discussion started from the premise that the validity of truth, as a systematic organization of values, and ethical goods, as realized in a systematic whole of sentient beings, presupposed the reality of a dynamic and systematic whole of meanings or intrinsic values in the universe; in short, the validity of a dynamic intelligence. The reality of historical progress in and through individuals was recognized. This field was designated the realm of 'historical reality.' It was argued that ultimate reality and historical reality are not separable kinds of reality; that ultimate reality must manifest itself continuously in the realm of historical reality; that, consequently, values are realized in a living 'now,' which transcends the temporal distinctions of past, present, and future; and that in this living present reality is expressed. It was maintained that past and future have real meaning only as contained in the concrete, over-historical present. Objections to this view were regarded as resting: (1) on a confusion of the qualitative and quantitative concepts of reality; (2) on an illegitimate extension of the notion of terrestrial evolution to the whole meaning of reality. It was insisted that the very notion of progress implied timelessly valid norms of progress. It was suggested that there might be a real meaning in progress, while yet the notion that ultimate reality progresses in its intrinsic values may be illusory. Finite elements of reality may change while the unity of values maintains itself invariant. Ultimate reality may be a concrete, dynamic unity, ever manifesting itself in the processes in and through which finite centres of experience realize values, and yet maintaining itself somehow as the systematic time-transcending principle of intrinsic values, as the unchanging unity of the meanings that are temporally winning expression in the realm of finite multiplicity.

An Introductory Statement of Realism. BERNARD C. EWER.

Realism, as an epistemological doctrine, exhibits two divergent types. According to one, consciousness is a relation, usually

called awareness, between the knower and an external object, and all qualitative distinctions attributed to consciousness are properly regarded as really located in the objects themselves as essential qualities or forms of organization. The principal difficulty with this view arises in facts like illusions which seem to inhere in the nature of consciousness itself. The second type is representationalism, according to which the object of consciousness is a state of consciousness corresponding to an external reality, — a position which slips easily into idealism. To save realism, it is necessary to hold both of these positions together, *i. e.*, to say (1) that consciousness is directly aware of external things, (2) that it has internal qualitative differentiations of which it is also conscious, and (3) that these characters appear in varying degrees of relative prominence in actual experience. It is not a sound objection to assert that awareness of external reality is inexplicable; and the alleged inconsistency between such awareness and the temporal duration of intermediate physical processes, *e. g.*, light, fails if awareness may be retrospective. Where the object of consciousness is conscious content itself, there is in general no real distinction between the two. Denials of this identity serve only to show that there may be a superimposed self-consciousness, and so miss the point. The best statements about these two characters, awareness and conscious content, are furnished by descriptive psychology. It is objected that the assertion of such a dualistic nature as essential to consciousness is unphilosophical, since there is an inevitable presumption in favor of reducing one character to the other. To do this, however, is to belie the facts, and simply to continue the outstanding differences of epistemological theory.

The Problem of Sin. H. H. HORNE.

The modern sense of sin is social in character, not ceremonial as with primitive peoples, nor individualistic as with the Semites. But no school of modern philosophy has as yet adequately interpreted this new phase of the sense of sin. Absolutism proposes a solution of the problem of evil that does not sufficiently distinguish physical and moral evil. Pragmatism has not yet treated the problem.

The question raised by this paper is, Can the problem of sin be solved on absolutistic principles and at the same time in accord with legitimate pragmatic demands? The general answer to this question is in the affirmative. What sort of a world is it in which sin occurs? Pragmatism says: (1) a temporal world, (2) a world in which a better is possible to men, but is not made actual by them; (3) a world in which the better is conceived as the will of God for man; (4) a world that at any moment is, in so far as man is a sinner, short of the best possible world; and (5) a world whose moral value fluctuates from moment to moment with the deeds of men.

The body of the paper indicates how, by distinguishing the temporal from the eternal order, the position of absolutism can be so stated as to include and fulfil these pragmatic demands. But such reconciliation between absolutism and pragmatism in the problem of sin involves the introduction of the idea of an Absolute suffering for the sins of men. Sin is man's failure to embody as much of God's perfection as he might in the temporal order, and the modern social sense of sin means damage to the establishment of the will of the Eternal in the kingdom of the temporal.

Discussion: The Meaning and Criterion of Truth.

WILLIAM JAMES.

My account of truth is realistic, and follows the epistemological dualism of common sense. Suppose I say to you: "The thing exists," — is that true, or not? How can you tell? Not till my statement has unfolded its meaning farther is it determined as being true, false, or irrelevant to reality altogether. But if now you ask, "What thing?" and I reply "a desk"; if you ask, "where?" and I point to a place; if you ask, "Does it exist materially or only in imagination?" and I say "materially"; if, moreover, I say, "I mean *that* desk," and then grasp and shake a desk which you see just as I have described it, you are willing to call my statement true. But you and I are commutable here; we can exchange places; and as you go bail for my desk, so I can go bail for yours. This notion of a reality independent of

either one of us, taken from ordinary social experience, lies at the base of the pragmatist definition of truth. With some such reality any statement, to be accounted 'true,' must 'agree.' Pragmatists explain this last term as meaning certain actual or potential 'workings.' Thus, for my statement, "The thing exists," to be true of a determinate reality, it must lead me to shake *your* desk, it must explain itself by terms that suggest *that* desk to your mind, etc. Only thus does it 'agree' with *that* reality, and give me the satisfaction of your approval. A determinate *reference* and some sort of satisfactory *adaptation* are thus constituent elements in the definition of any statement as 'true.'

And you can't get at the notion of either 'reference' or 'adaptation' except through the notion of 'workings.' *That* the 'thing' is, *what* it is, and *which* it is (of all the possible things with that *what*) are points determinable only by the pragmatic method. The *which* means our pointing to a locus; the *what* means choice on our part of an essential aspect to apperceive the thing by (and this is always relative to what Dewey calls our 'situation'); and the *that* means our assumption of the attitude of belief, the reality-recognizing attitude. Surely these workings are indispensable to constitute the notion of what 'true' means as applied to a statement. Surely anything less is insufficient.

Our critics nevertheless call the workings inessential, and consider that statements are, as it were, *born* true, each of its own object, much as the Count of Chambord was supposed to be born King of France, though he never exercised regal functions, — no need of functioning in either case! Pragmatism insists, on the contrary, that statements are true thus statically only by courtesy; they practically pass for true; but you can't *define* the particular truth of any one of them without referring to its functional results.

J. E. CREIGHTON.

A philosophical account of the nature of truth is possible only in the light of a general theory regarding the nature of experience. The history of the recent discussion regarding Pragmatism illustrates the comparative barrenness of philosophical criticism which is not carried on from any systematic point of view. The

failure of the pragmatists to define their own standpoint, or perhaps to take any definite standpoint at all, is mainly responsible for the misunderstandings of which they complain. Nevertheless, although the sensational side of Pragmatism, — the account of truth in 'practical' terms, — has been definitely refuted, it is possible to regard the pragmatic movement as a protest against abstraction, the besetting sin of philosophical constructions. In particular, it may be regarded as a protest against a narrow and formal view of logical consistency, and therefore as akin in aim and spirit to Hegel's appeal from the abstract distinctions of the Understanding to the more concrete standpoint of Reason.

CHARLES M. BAKEWELL.

The impossibility of defining truth in terms of the verifying process comes out clearly in the writings of the pragmatists themselves wherever time is in question; for they are then forced to admit that "when new experiences lead to retrospective judgments, using the past tense, what these judgments utter *was* true, even though no past thinker had been led there." This is equivalent to making truth consist in a relation that is there to be discovered prior to the process of truth getting. And it is a fundamental mistake to take the agreement formula as giving the original, natural, instinctive, and obvious meaning of truth; for men sought after truth, used the word, knew what they meant, and were more or less successful in their search long before they were sufficiently self-conscious, and sufficiently sophisticated, to understand what the agreement formula means. The natural standpoint is far more object-minded, and we get most light on the meaning of truth by asking what men are actually after when they are seeking truth. As a matter of fact, they are always trying to anchor a passing experience by getting it in a setting where it will 'stay put.' It finally appears that this means trying to conceive a particular experience in the light of its idea, or concrete universal, that is, to conceive it in its total context or setting. One is trying to read the momentary fact of experience as it comes along in its absolutely total experiential setting, such a setting being the one in which no item of possible or actual experience is left out. The implication is that each particular

object of experience has its definite place in that complete context, which is commonly referred to as the realm of experience. When one appeals to experience as giving the test or control of truth, it is always experience in this transcendent sense that is meant, transcendent, because it is more than my experiences, or the sum of all of our experiences, since it must include the possible as well as the actual experiences, and also all experiences that once were, but no longer are possible experiences. Truth means grasping the transient fact in this transcendent context. This context is real, and lives in every fact of experience, being just the setting that is needed to give the particular experience *its own* significance. There may be, and are, many contexts, and one may, as in the special sciences, view a fact in one context ignoring all others. None the less the other contexts are part of that same fact's meaning, and to get the truth about it the ignored contexts must be restored. So surely as we are entitled to refer to experience *im prägnanten Sinne*, or to an order or realm of experience, so surely must we hold that these partial contexts have their place in the complete context; and, since the particular context is defined by the categories through which the object is viewed, this is equivalent to saying that all possible categories must have their own organic interconnectedness. Thus truth finally means vision in the light of the whole.

JOHN GRIER HIBBEN.

Pragmatism, when submitted to its own test, is found wanting in certain cases. It is obviously inadequate as a theory of truth, and this in the following three particulars :

1. It is inadequate as a working hypothesis. The expedient as such is very often found to be a false lead. There are many cases of concealed utility which only long stretches of time can reveal; moreover, the most significant instances of utility are often the result of a combination of a number of separate elements, each one of which is in itself absolutely useless. Where the utility is thus not apparent, it cannot be taken as a practical test of immediately necessary choices. Again, in the development of science the need has not always created the discovery in order to meet it; but the discovery, due wholly to speculative and

theoretical interest, has created the need. As instance of this, I would cite the discovery of the relation between magnetism and electricity, and the consequent inventions of the telegraph, the telephone, and electric motors of various kinds. Needs never before imagined have been created by the discovery of this new world of knowledge. The demand for the cash value of every truth forces a result which represents truth at a discount. For cash value in general is secured in most cases only through some discounting process.

2. Pragmatism is inadequate because we instinctively subordinate its testing principle to higher considerations. While emphasizing the importance of purposive thinking, we must not forget that we must obey the rules of the game. We think towards certain desired ends; but it is always under the limitations of rule and penalty. Professor James is conscious of these necessities of thought and reality. He speaks repeatedly of the need of a moral order, an eternal order, an ideal order, of the coercion of our sensible experiences and of our mental operations. Our 'funded experience' is not a collection of particular experiences, but a system of coördinately related parts showing order, coherence, universality, and necessity. We not merely ask the question, Does it work? but the further question, Why does it work? The man who understands best the nature of things and their controlling necessities can do most with them practically.

3. Pragmatism is inadequate because of the limitation of the alleged creative function of thought and endeavor. We can force things actually to be and to behave according to our wills only within limited areas of experience. It is only in a very restricted sense that we can be said to make truth. If we are progressing towards a more complete unification of the body of our knowledge, does not the growing coherence and unity indicate an underlying ground as well as a desired goal?

C. A. STRONG.

The criticisms I am going to offer on Professor James's theory, unlike those of previous speakers, will (I think I may say) be from his own point of view. I accept his epistemological realism, — the view that cognition and object are separate existences, — and

his disbelief in an existential Absolute whose business it is to bring them into relation; I hold with him that the existential basis of truth must be sought in the concrete connections which join them as parts of a universe. My complaint is that his account of these connections is incomplete; that he mentions only those by which cognition and object converge in future consequences, and overlooks, (1) the causal relations by which the object, or a similar object, has produced the cognition; (2) the spatial connections between the object and the cognition, or at least between the object and the brain-event with which the cognition varies uniformly, connections which hold the cognition even now in relation to the object, much as a well-aimed gun is held in relation to the mark it is going to hit; (3) the relation of resemblance (or correspondence, or conformity, or relevancy, as you please; I refer to the degree of resemblance actually existing) which makes this image the right one among all our images to let loose the reaction appropriate to *that* object.

These relations are antecedent to the consequences, and play a more important part than they in constituting the existential basis of what we call truth. Or rather, as we ought perhaps to say, the connections in their totality, including the consequences or workings, constitute the existential basis of *cognitive reference*; and truth, as distinguished from this, lies more especially in the relation of resemblance or correspondence.

To say that truth 'consists in the consequences' is as if one should say that the correctness of a sportsman's aim is not merely proved by, but consists in, his actually hitting the bird. But, surely, it consists rather in his holding his gun at a certain angle, such that, given the laws of physics, the bullet or shot must pass through the body of the bird. The correct aiming comes before the hitting, and is possible without it.

Professor James replies that you cannot define what you mean by correct aiming without including the concept of hitting. This is true, but it is important to note that the hitting is included as a potentiality, and not as an actual performance. Suppose the world should come to an end at this moment: would my idea, *e. g.*, of Cæsar's assassination on the Ides of March be any the

less true, because by hypothesis it can have no consequences? The example shows that it is only the potentiality of the consequences that is essential. But this potentiality, when you consider it, is exactly equivalent to the relations of space and of correspondence which predetermine what the consequences shall be. Truth, then, is antecedent to the consequences, and does not consist in them.

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(Members are requested to notify the Secretary of any correction to be made in the above list.)

REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

The Theory of Good and Evil: A Treatise on Moral Philosophy.

By HASTINGS RASHDALL. 2 vols. Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1907. — pp. ix, 312; xv, 464.

It is needless to say that the long expected work of Dr. Rashdall will receive, on this side of the Atlantic as well as on the other, the interest and the attention that it undoubtedly deserves. It is "an attempt to deal with the chief topics usually discussed in books bearing the title 'moral philosophy' or 'ethics'" in a manual intended chiefly for the use of "undergraduate students." Its spirit is to be in the main that of Green and Sidgwick, "neither of whom of course said the last word upon the subject."

The treatise consists of three books: Book I, "The Moral Criterion," in which in the fashion of the text-books rival theories are set forth and examined, — Hedonism [first of all!], Rationalistic Utilitarianism, Intuitionism, the Categorical Imperative, and Ideal Utilitarianism [his own theory]; Book II, "The Individual and Society," "which is largely occupied with replies to objections and with the criticism of views more or less opposed to my own," with chapters on "The Hedonistic Calculus," "The Commensurability of Values" [a well-known *Mind* article], "Self-Realization and Self-Sacrifice," "Vocation," "Moral Authority," and "Moral Autonomy"; Book III, "Man and the Universe," dealing "with metaphysical questions which do not admit of an altogether popular treatment," with chapters on "Metaphysic and Morality," "Free-Will," "Morality and Evolution," and "Casuistry."

After a short introduction, — had it been longer the work itself would have been clearer and perhaps shorter, — Psychological Hedonism (which Dr. Rashdall, but without Sidgwick's distinction, practically treats as the equivalent of Egoistic Hedonism) is taken up and easily disposed of by some of the familiar objections. Such elements of truth, however, as the author sees in the theory are retained, the chief of these being that there is and may be such a thing as the desire for pleasure, that we can desire a sum of pleasures, and that we can compare and choose between different lots of pleasure, — contentions that become the ground of his later position of the commensurability of all values and of the Good as having "elements" or parts or aspects that may be distinguished and compared.

Rationalistic Utilitarianism is then considered. This is for Dr. Rashdall practically the Utilitarianism of Sidgwick *minus* the Sidgwickian 'Dualism of the Practical Reason' and the Sidgwickian Hedonism, it being presumed from Sidgwick's various failures that a "rationalistic ethic cannot be hedonistic." The Moral Consciousness of mankind, too, pronounces goodness to have value as well as pleasure. We have thus arrived [?] at Kant's position [the treatment of Kant is throughout inadequate] that there are two *prima facie* rational ends, Virtue and Happiness. But, again, the Moral Consciousness of mankind does not favor the theory that nothing but pleasure [there is no more warrant in Rashdall than there is in Sidgwick for treating pleasure and happiness as interchangeable] and virtue are intrinsically good; it includes, besides, other elements, *e. g.*, Culture and Thought, and Volition as well as Feeling.

Intuitionism is next discussed, partly in the ordinary way as one of the theories of conduct, and partly as the outcome of Dr. Rashdall's Sidgwickian attitude to Rationalistic Utilitarianism. He accepts, *e. g.*, the distinction of Philosophical from Common Sense Intuitionism, and also (but without Sidgwick's ingenious attempt at proof) the Sidgwickian selection of the axioms of Prudence, Rational Benevolence, and Equity "as intuitions which really commend themselves upon reflection." "In the acceptance of those axioms as genuine moral axioms, Sidgwick has laid the foundations for a reconciliation between Intuitionism and Utilitarianism."

"The general result then . . . is that the true criterion of morality is the tendency of an act to promote a Well-Being or *εὐδαιμονία* which involves many other good things besides pleasure among which Virtue is the greatest. The value of these elements in human life is determined by the Practical Reason intuitively, immediately, or (if we like to say so) *a priori*. All moral judgments are ultimately judgments as to the intrinsic worth or value of some elements in consciousness or life." This "well-being," it is insisted, is "made up of elements of consciousness, *each of which is itself an object of moral valuation*" [italics mine]. The Intuitionism of the Good is thus definitely and deliberately substituted by Dr. Rashdall for the Intuitionism of the Right. "The Intuitionists were mistaken in supposing that the moral Reason on which they rightly base our ethical judgments either lays down fixed and exceptionless laws of conduct; or issues isolated arbitrary disconnected decrees *pro re nata* without reference to probable results."

Now this declaration of the unsatisfactory character of a merely

Dogmatic or Perceptual Intuitionism is only what we would expect from a scholarly thinker like the author. But is he himself so free from the taint of an unsystematic intuitionism as he thinks he is? I think not. And for the following reasons. (1) It is, as has been stated, an integral part of his own theory that the various 'elements' in the Good are estimated intuitively and immediately and *a priori* by the Practical Reason. (2) The Intuitional aspect of his Ideal Utilitarianism is not sufficiently differentiated either from Perceptual Intuitionism or from the Moral Sense theory and the entire 'Value' philosophy of so many recent European thinkers. The chapter on "Reason and Feeling" (another famous Sidgwickian title), which is intended to differentiate the 'rational' aspect of his moral judgments from the merely æsthetic character of the Moral Sense theory, only ends by bringing moral and æsthetic judgments very closely together. (3) Apart from the *quasi* Intuitionism of sentences like the following: "No experience will tell us what the good is unless we include in our experience an unavowed judgment of value, and value therefore is the ultimate characteristic of the moral judgment, the fundamental idea of morality," — the 'Value' philosophy of Dr. Rashdall is nowhere conclusively proved or rationally grounded at any stage of the argument.

I do not of course, in this connection, feel competent either to affirm or to deny that a judgment of value is the ultimate and the determining element in any moral judgment, and I willingly admit that, from a general speculative or even a common sense point of view (*e. g.*, about the 'new' this and the 'new' that, things which of course we 'value' in different ways), the 'value' of a course of conduct is often apparently the only thing we seem able to estimate. But this is not what the man does who does his 'duty,' and I do not think that it is the highly sophisticated concept of 'value' that is present to the mind of the man who reverences his conscience as his king or the man who thinks of his duty, — as do nine-tenths of mankind, according to Dr. Rashdall, — in terms of religion. Instead of thinking, then, with Dr. Rashdall, of our "distinctively moral judgments" as "our ordinary judgments of value," I would be inclined to relegate (as does Ehrenfels apparently) value to economics, æsthetics, epistemology, comparative psychology, etc., and 'right' and 'wrong' to the normative aspects of human volition, — a thing that is touched but not developed in this treatise.

"Our view that acts are right or wrong according as they tend or do not tend to promote a Well-Being or *εὐδαιμονία* or good consisting of various elements the relative value of which is intuitively discerned

may be called Ideal Utilitarianism." That is to say, Dr. Rashdall's theory, although Utilitarian, goes, in its position that all moral judgments are ultimately judgments as to the "value of ends," altogether beyond ordinary Hedonism. "The 'Utilitarianism' will perhaps suggest that we do estimate actions by their tendency to promote human good, while the qualification 'ideal' will remind us that the good for which we seek is not a conception got by abstraction from a number of empirically given experiences of pleasure or pain, but an ideal set up by rational judgments of value passed upon all the elements of our actual experience."

So much, then, by way of an attempt to get at Dr. Rashdall's teaching, very largely in his own way and very largely in his own words. The arrangement of the work as a whole, however, it seems to me, will prove almost as perplexing to the average reader or to the junior student as the comparative absence of a convincing or independent proof of its central contention about value. The longest and most interesting portion of Book III is the metaphysical part. And even here what we find is not so much a systematic treatment of all the main problems of the metaphysics of ethics as a highly impressive treatment of some ethical problems in relation to contemporary or recent views upon the philosophy of religion, the latter being obviously the region of our author's deepest interest, and that upon which the entire weight of his constructions will be seen to rest. The chapter on "Morality and Evolution," for example, might well have gone elsewhere,—in Book I, say, to which the average student will come with his head full of presuppositions about Evolution as a sort of Copernicanism of the Nineteenth Century. Or it should not have stayed where it is without being associated with a thorough metaphysical discussion of the concepts of good, evil, adaptation, final cause, optimism, pessimism, meliorism, development, change, etc. The "Casuistry" chapter, too, would seem to belong elsewhere,—to a possible section (suggested by the title of Book II, "The Individual and Society") on applied Moral Philosophy. Dr. Rashdall has, in fact, abundant material for a section on the topic just mentioned, *e. g.*, his chapter on Justice [a luminous chapter containing the roots of a better theory of morals than the value theory, *i. e.*, a theory connecting the moral judgment with personality, Sidgwick's lack and Green's strong point], his chapter on "Punishment and Forgiveness," that of the existing Book II on the belated or abstract topic of "Self-Realization and Self-Sacrifice," and the idea he mentions in his few words on Evolution, that race maintenance requires the elimination of the unfit.

A great deal, indeed, of the present Book II, its entire treatment of objections and so on, might perhaps have been put in a condensed form in Book I, to clarify or justify the treatment of Value and the Good. And the existing arrangement gives an almost unintelligible prominence to the Pleasure theory, especially when we bear in mind the fact that it is thrown out of his own Ideal Utilitarianism. Dr. Rashdall might well in fact have explained to the ordinary student how it came into ethics at all, for its "frank naturalness" and its "extreme simplicity" are no valid reasons. They do not do away with that opposition between virtue and pleasure which is as old as the story of the Fall or of the Choice of Hercules.

Then, as compared with Book III, Book I is certainly too short. It might well contain indications of the origins and the limits and the natural scope of the different theories, instead of merely presenting them in a quasi-dialectic or artificial thought construction. And its omission of the Evolutional and the Sociological theories of morals affects not only the matter of the volumes but the form of the whole and the central argumentation about value. Dr. Rashdall, for example, cannot and does not really abide by his attitude toward the Evolution theory, — that it belongs more to Anthropology and Sociology, etc., than to ethical theory and the history of philosophy. He admits that its facts "may contain instruction for the philosopher." And the effect of Evolution on the Value theory, in view of the teaching of men like Nietzsche, Harnack, and others, is surely a subject to which he might have given some careful attention.

Then, like Sidgwick (who merely quoted the opinion of someone to this effect), Dr. Rashdall seems to think of Sociology in the purely external way, as "tending to break up into a group of Sociological Sciences." This attitude takes almost no recognition of the effect of the concept, faulty as it is, of the social organism upon our English moral philosophy from the days of the Essay of Professor Jones in the Seth-Haldane volume to those of Mackenzie, Stephen, Alexander, Bosanquet, and many others. Sociology, even of the biological and the psychological description, has rendered obsolete or at least merely relative the distinction between Self-Realization and Self-Sacrifice. It also throws important light, *e. g.*, upon the supposed derivation of Altruism from Egoism to which Dr. Rashdall expresses his general adherence, and, — what is more important for his book, — upon the relations of the 'valuations' of the individual to those of the (religious) community to which he ultimately appeals.

There can be little doubt, I think, that it is the speculative or the

concluding portion of the treatise that will excite the greatest general and special interest. The impressions produced by it upon the mind differs altogether from those awakened by the earlier books. Here it is the Oxford Idealist who speaks out of a fullness and resourcefulness due to his consciousness of standing at last upon his own ground. It is just as if Sidgwick had rewritten for us his *Methods of Ethics* in terms of the philosophy of postulates that is drawn across the very last of his last editions. The first thing with which we are gratified is the formulation of a sound and justifiable position in respect of the familiar controversy as to the dependence or the non-dependence of ethics upon metaphysics. Metaphysic and Morality, we are told, are connected because (1) a true account of Morality involves metaphysical postulates, (2) some of the conclusions of Metaphysic are of importance for Morality, (3) Moral Philosophy supplies data to Metaphysic. The postulates of ethics, the facts of the ethico-religious consciousness (we shall immediately see how closely he identifies ethics and religion) which Dr. Rashdall deems of supreme importance to general constructive philosophy are substantially the *Ideas* of Kant,— Freedom, *i. e.*, the reality of a finite individual self to whom, as their cause, actions may be attributed, God as the Mind and Will in which the Absolute Moral Ideal exists (for it cannot exist nowhere, he contends), Immortality as a postulate of the belief in a rational world order or in God. And then, although this half of his subject is by no means so adequately treated as the other, a "fourth postulate," the reality of evil, the "negation of optimism, the assertion that not everything in the Universe is very good, and that the distinction between good and evil belongs to the real nature of things and not merely to appearance." There is of course nothing new about the Theism and the Pluralism of these positions. They were present in the author's well-known "stroke" essay (one of the best in the book, along with that of the "bow," Professor Stout) in the "Oxford Eight" volume. The idealistic theory of Being on which they repose both there and here, the cosmic idealism that prevents his present ethical argument for the existence of God from being construed as a mere argument from thought to being (open, say, to the difficulties of the 'correspondence theory' of Mr. Joachim) is, however, a reason against associating Dr. Rashdall's philosophy of postulates with that of Pragmatism, as popularly understood, although his anti-Intellectualism is at one with the Personal Idealism or the Humanism associated with Pragmatism. Still it is just possible even that the philosophy of religion of the future may have to incorporate elements of truth from the transcendent or the

super-moral Absolute of Mr. Bradley and his associates along with some of Dr. Rashdall's Pluralistic results. For if there is one thing that is not perfectly cleared up in Dr. Rashdall's philosophy of postulates, it is the relation of the Idealistic faith that the distinctions we are compelled to make about experience owe their existence to the Universal Mind, to the relativity philosophy of such a sentence as the following: "That all human knowledge is inadequate to express the true nature of ultimate Reality will be admitted by metaphysicians of almost all schools," and to some of his declarations about the "defective nature" of our moral ideas. Morality may, in other words, be from the standpoint of speculative theology much more of a merely human affair than Dr. Rashdall makes it out to be.

And now for the specific relations that for Dr. Rashdall exist between Ethics and Philosophy and Religion. Like Dr. McTaggart, he practically comes before the world with the position that the greatest service of Philosophy or Idealism is to be found in the matter of the foundations it lays for the religious interests of mankind. And just as Dr. Martineau's *Types* might be regarded as in its day an important piece of Apologetic for Theism, so may the *Theory of Good and Evil* be regarded as one of the most important of recent apologies for Christianity. It was essential, we remember, to Dr. Rashdall's theory, that the Good should be seen to consist of various elements of well-being, each of which was itself an object of moral valuation, — a position that exposes him not only to the difficulty of expressing "objective relations of conscious mind" (the term is Sidgwick's) like Truth and Beauty and Culture and Volition in terms of his Hedonistic or Value Calculus, and to the difficulties of a merely Perceptual Intuitionism, but also to the more serious difficulty of providing for the *authority* or the *objectivity* of the moral standard. This is a difficulty that was noticed by the careful Sidgwick in the following words: "In the recognition of conduct as 'right' is involved an authoritative prescription to do it; but when we have judged conduct to be good, it is not yet clear that we ought to prefer this kind of good to all other good things; some standard for estimating the relative values of different 'goods' has still to be sought." Now nowhere in his two volumes does Dr. Rashdall find an authoritative or objective standard for estimating either the good or different goods, short of the moral will or the revealed moral will of the Deity. In one place at least he speaks (with Mr. Moore) of the 'good' as indefinable, but in other places, and generally, as having no meaning apart from its elements, which men, of course, will value to the end of time in their own way. Only in his

moral theology do we get the authority and objectivity demanded by any tenable theory of morals. "The belief in God, though not (like the belief in a real and active self) a postulate of there being such a thing as morality at all, is the logical presupposition of an objective or absolute Morality."

Now, however interesting and important this dictum may be, in many respects, it must nevertheless be regarded as a confession of the author's failure to do what he set out to do, — to give the student of ethics a tenable or a working theory of the meaning and authority of the terms right and wrong, etc. Even if we defend him by saying that his solution of the moral criterion is the Revealed Will of God, — at least a theory and perhaps in one form or another the theory of the greatest number of men, — we must remember that it was only the moral ideal that enabled him to maintain the supremacy of the Christian Religion as the religion containing the most complete 'identification' of the 'Will of God' with the 'ethically best.' And apart from this point of the present or the future of liberal religion being connected with an independent theory of the moral ideal, Dr. Rashdall seems to have discovered by accident, as it were, the fact that: "The true ideal of human nature is undoubtedly the ideal which has been expressed by the word *Autonomy*. The ideal is that each individual should do what in the exercise of his own consciousness he sees to be right." It is true that he adds that the "education of the moral consciousness up to this level" is only possible through the action of a strong social conscience, but it is not clearly enough recognized by him that this social or religious consciousness is in turn bound up with a legislative or normative conception of personality, — beyond which it would seem that ethics *qua* ethics need not vitally concern itself to go. Dr. Rashdall could, in other words, have made good in a preface or an appendix all the points he makes (and with reason) about the actual connection in the case of the majority of mankind of moral with religious ideas, and about the improvement that would take place in their books, if philosophers could only bear this in mind, or at least recognize it as a fact; and then go on, as do books on economics, say, to consider man from one single point of view, the *ethical* in his case, the case in point. In this case his value theory and his theory of the authority of the moral standard would have been reconstructed from the first of his four postulates rather than the second, and we should have had from him an ethical work proper instead of one, — for which of course we are more than grateful, — upon the contribution of ethics and ethical considerations to general philosophy.

Enough has doubtless been said to represent the contents and the scope of these two accomplished and suggestive volumes. *Wer vieles bringt wird manchem etwas bringen*, and Dr. Rashdall has really given to both junior and senior students, and to the general intelligent reader of the day, — to the person, say, who is anxious to read something incorporating the older Intellectualism of the Idealists with the Voluntarism of the Pragmatists, — a veritable magazine of reflection. His work, too, is a noble monument to the industry and the breadth of mind of an academic teacher who has attempted not merely to criticise, as do some recent books of the same high level, the teaching of Green and his school, but to combine this with other traditional views and with newer views. And the fact of its continuing the work of the *rapprochement* of English Idealism and English Empiricism, begun by both Green and Sidgwick, renders it valuable and interesting not only to Englishmen but to all future students of British philosophy. As a sort of fusion, however, of the teaching of Green and of Sidgwick, his own Value theory cannot pass muster, I fear, without a far more penetrating study of the presuppositions and limitations both of the doctrines of these men, particularly Sidgwick, and of the entire Value philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. Meinong and Ehrenfels, for example, do not seem to be mentioned at all, although Simmel is frequently referred to. And although a prominent post-Kantian like Hartmann receives a good deal of attention in connection with such points as Autonomy and Heteronomy and the doctrine of a supermoral Absolute, it seems strange that Dr. Rashdall's Ritschlian and Voluntaristic sympathies did not lead him to give more attention to the views of Lotze on the Good and on the world of worths.

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Ästhetik: Psychologie des Schönen und der Kunst. Zweiter Teil: Die ästhetische Betrachtung und die bildende Kunst. VON THEODOR LIPPS. Hamburg und Leipzig, Voss, 1906. — pp. viii, 645.

Part I of this work, *Grundlegung der Ästhetik*, which appeared in 1903, was noticed in this REVIEW (Vol. XIII, pp. 677 ff.), and I may refer to that notice for a characterization of the general standpoint and method. The present volume devotes a hundred pages to a further exposition of general principles, and the remainder to a study of the plastic and spatial arts. There is abundant evidence of penetrating analysis, subtle discrimination, and suggestive comment. There is a detailed study of the various fundamental or type forms of

curves employed in architecture, ceramics, and tectonics, along the lines marked out in the author's earlier studies in *Formästhetik*, with more general discussion of other features in the arts studied, much of which commends itself at first blush. But it is an extraordinary procedure to present the reader with twelve hundred pages of material without an index, and containing scarcely a single allusion to any other treatment of any part of the theme. It is true that the work may claim to be largely the development and application of a single central conception, '*Einführung*,' rather than such a comprehensive discussion of various possible factors in æsthetic experience as would compel a comparison and sifting of other theories. Nevertheless, '*Einführung*' is not the exclusive property of the author. Nor is it certain that the values possessed by certain outlines and methods of distribution or support of masses, are so simple in their constitution as the author's analysis would indicate. The exposition is plausible until the reader begins to think of other factors which have historically entered into the production of certain styles of architecture. Then he wishes that the author would give some indication as to how far the theory presented is intended to be exhaustive or exclusive, how far it is supported by other æstheticians and by the actual test of use, and how far it is regarded as original with the author. The art consciousness is much like the moral consciousness in one respect: Some of our morality can be rationally justified and psychologically analyzed, and some of it has a considerable residuum of the customs of earlier days which were possibly started in an accidental fashion and finally got value because of use and wont. So some features of architecture and tectonics represent survivals of what was merely accidental, so far as any æsthetic value was concerned.

In the first section, on "Æsthetic Contemplation and the Work of Art," especial attention is given to the part played by 'activity' in the æsthetic consciousness. '*Einführung*' implies feeling, and feeling must be toned as pleasant or unpleasant. But pleasant and unpleasant are qualities attaching to activity. "I never feel pleasure or the opposite absolutely, but when I feel pleasure or the opposite, I always feel myself inwardly *active*, in the way or with the peculiar character which the words pleasant and unpleasant mean." "The activity feeling is the fundamental feeling (*Grundgefühl*, *Basis*, *Substrat*) for pleasure and the unpleasant, just as color or tone sensations are the fundamental sensations for brightness and darkness sensations, or for those of high and low in pitch. The author then goes on to argue that the cognitive processes, forming opinions, believing, judging,

involve no 'activity' and therefore no pleasure. It may "take activity to reach a judgment," but this means that "the judgment itself is not itself activity." There may be pleasures in the process of reaching the judgment or in succeeding, but not in the judging itself. This seems to the reviewer an artificial isolation of the believing-judging process. The aim of the author is toward a distinction between æsthetic value and cognitive validity. But is not the peculiar quality of validity to be located on the content side? In the judgment, "This is true," I have doubtless abstracted the content of my judgment from all my own feelings, or even from my own rôle in forming the judgment. I do not incorporate any emotional or volitional element. But this very process of abstracting or universalizing may involve the most strenuous purpose. I 'try hard' to give a 'cool' or disinterested opinion. And it is difficult to see the justification for cutting out the act of 'assent' from the whole process in which it is one stage. Granting for the sake of argument that æsthetic value does signify a certain expanding life, that it lies in the object just because it is put there by an active, striving self, it does not necessarily follow that there may not be a striving which does not put itself into its objects. Validity is more abstract than value.

The 'isolation' of the æsthetic object, its objectivity, its relation to reality, are suggestively treated. One aspect of the last is what the author terms the "principle of æsthetic negation." The artist omits this or that aspect because his particular branch of art has no means of presenting it. The principle is, of course, not novel, but it is employed and illustrated instructively. The universal aim of art is "to put life into a sensuously given object in such fashion that we may find and feel it there immediately, may experience and enjoy it" (p. 121). Each art realizes this end so far as its technique admits. Sculpture in the round gives the form, but cannot give the space, the environment, the light and air. Painting can give light and air, but has its own "negations." It negates, to some degree at least, the individual; the individual is subordinated to a whole. The various effects reached by curves, as illustrated with a hundred and fifty-nine figures, are analyzed, and their general principle is formulated as follows: "Those forms are æsthetically valuable in which we feel ourselves freely active; those are æsthetically undesirable in which we feel ourselves cramped or disturbed in the freedom of our activity." This gives rise to the conception of "æsthetic mechanics": "Those forms are æsthetically valuable which are mechanically intelligible of themselves." The ancient forms stand for forces which are given, as

it were, once for all at the beginning and complete their operation where the line ends. The "modern" line arises from a successive introduction of moving forces. Later chapters treat of technical arts, in their general principles, in their language, in the relation of their matter and form, in the kinds of symbolism they use, and of decorative art and ornamentation in its various fields.

The work is one that no student of æsthetics can neglect. The interpretative value of much of the material does not stand or fall with the acceptance of the author's principles as the exclusive principles. And finally, if the author has not seen fit to lighten the reader's labors in the ways suggested at the outset of this notice, he has done much to atone for his omissions by expressing his thought in clear and luminous style.

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American Philosophy: The Early Schools. By I. WOODBRIDGE RILEY. New York, Dodd, Mead, & Company, 1907. — pp. x, 594.

It was the fortune, good or bad, of the present writer to be the first to go, "like a modern Diogenes Laertius, through the country, in the philosophical cloak, to glean the scattered traditions of the past,"¹ and to publish, in the French language, the first *étude d'ensemble* on Philosophy in America.² It is but natural, therefore, that he should take a special interest in any subsequent work on the same subject, written by a competent author, since, from the very nature of the case, such a work must needs supply either a corrective or a supplement to his own previous 'Essay.'

Ours was largely a pioneer work, if the word may not appear too pretentious; short summaries and partial studies of great value, as is well known, existed already, but there was as yet no work 'd'ensemble.' No organized system of roads, to use the simile, had been broken through the maze of speculative growth which had arisen on the American soil from the seeds blown across the Atlantic from European fields. The purpose of the author of *La philosophie en Amérique* was to attempt to contrive some system of footpaths through that maze, which an eventual successor, who should prove a better engineer, could not fail to enlarge to an interdependent system of good roads and broad drives, for the convenience of later explorers and amateur students. It must seem now that that expectation has been fulfilled by the appearance of the work of Dr. Woodbridge Riley.

¹ *American Philosophy*, p. 3.

² *La philosophie en Amérique*, by E. L. van Becelaere, 1903.

The 'Essai historique,' the latter remarks, was "expository rather than critical"; it was purposely so. The author, belonging, as one may anticipate, to the school of theistic objectivists, and more particularly to the Scholastico-Thomistic type of philosophers, felt that, in view of the unshakable *a priori* notions that prevail in the minds of so many, any criticism, however intrinsically sound, along the lines of the system to which he has given his spontaneous and deliberate allegiance, would, in the eyes of many unconsciously biased readers, have hopelessly marred his account and destroyed the value of his exposition. Critically, there was 'a world to say'; practically, it was thought best to refrain, and to offer 'plain cooking' rather than a 'spiced dish.'

That the work, such as it was, left ample room for a more complete and thoroughgoing study, even as an exposition, is a fact that was obvious enough from the contents of the book. Addressed primarily to an audience who were, as Europeans commonly are, ignorant of almost everything concerning American thinking, and who were, moreover, presumably not very anxious to go too deeply into the matter, such limitations were inherently necessary. Of course, an American, writing for Americans, would have been expected to produce a work of a more encyclopædic and exhaustive character, just such a one, in fact, as Dr. Riley has at last given us.

There is, however, an additional personal remark of the author, about which we beg permission to make some reservation, when he speaks of the "French Catholic's air of bewilderment at the vagaries of Calvinism," and his astonishment at "the refined New-England school, through whose veins slowly coursed a mixture of ink and ice water." We must confess that this imputation of "bewilderment" and "astonishment" did actually bewilder and astonish us somewhat.

Simple-minded indeed ought to be considered the minister of any denomination, in whom even a short experience will not have worn off any tendency to become bewildered and astonished at any vagaries inspired by religious exaltation or fanaticism. Besides, to purely philosophical phenomena the same principle may also apply, and it should be enough to recall to the mind of the reader the humorous remark of the French scientist Dumas: "In presence of a scientific fact, a real philosopher is capable of anything." Philosophers themselves would probably grant that.

We claim, therefore, the right to "save our exception" to the above statement of Dr. Riley. While relating the eccentricities, doctrinal or other, of the divines of New England, we did write most of the

time with, so to speak, 'a smile on our lips,' — not, however, the contemptuous or conceited smile of the 'stultus in viâ suâ ambulans,' but the 'benevolent' smile which might play on the countenance of any observer, at witnessing some strange performance on the part of one whom he would, nevertheless, willingly grant to be estimable and sane after all; in fact, just such a mood as is apparent in the pages of American writers themselves, like Coit Tyler, Richardson, Sears, and others, when referring to the same men and to the same subject. These remarks being made in order to clear up some misunderstanding, they will not impair the good harmony which we assume to prevail between Dr. Riley and the writer; we will now betake ourselves to the task of analyzing and appreciating the work before us.

The book is manifestly intended both as a source book and as a critical exposition, and may therefore be examined in that double capacity. As to the first purpose, we must recognize that the author has been highly successful. The special facilities which Dr. Riley enjoyed, and his own conscientious and thoroughgoing researches, have enabled him to unearth and bring together a considerable mass of information, and so to give us a work which is, apparently, as nearly exhaustive as the case required. It is possible that some further documents may eventually be brought to light, but there is little doubt that they will be in the nature of secondary additions or complements only.

Moreover, the way in which the material is handled is also a merit of the book, as it makes its reading sufficiently interesting and attractive. Clearness in a book of exposition, either historical or doctrinal, is a quality on which too much stress can never be laid, and there is certainly enough of that in *American Philosophy*.

It is the commendable method of Dr. Riley to preface his account of each of the phases which he reviews with a short exposition of the tenets of the system with which it is identified. This method has the merit of delimiting the subject, defining the terms, and familiarizing the reader with the nature of the peculiar system of which the account is to follow, thus preventing equivocations and misunderstanding. It seems to us in, particular, that Dr. Riley has been especially felicitous in his delineation of the mental physiognomy of the various thinkers whom he introduces to us, such as Ethan Allen, Benjamin Franklin, Jefferson, B. Rush, Priestley, Thomas Paine, etc. He depicts them, for the most part, in the manner obviously the most trustworthy and the least liable to controversy, viz., by letting them speak for themselves from their own writings. So that, 'in summâ,' he may be said to

have given us a very substantial and sufficiently interesting account of the various phases of American thinking, during the period to which he has limited himself in this volume, that of the "Early schools,"—practically to about the first decade of the nineteenth century.

As a source book, therefore, it is certainly a success. As to its merits as a text-book, we should not be quite so emphatic. The personal views of the author concerning philosophical problems are not very distinctly discernible; his way, however, of characterizing the system of Emerson, which he considers as the highest product of American thought, and of identifying it with pantheism, which he also professes to find in Edwards and many others, together with an apparent leaning toward Idealism, will suggest that he is inclined to favor some kind of idealistic Monism as the true solution of the riddle of the universe. He does not, on the other hand, show a very marked sympathy for common-sense realism or other systems more or less indirectly connected with orthodox theism, so that, in the main, it must be said that his presentation of the doctrine is more or less swayed by speculative views that smack somewhat of pantheism, although it would be unfair to label him a pantheist, as he nowhere definitely adopts such a stand. The result is, that his estimate of individual thinkers and schools cannot but be influenced by his personal speculative leanings; and, while this is unavoidable and natural, it will render the work less acceptable to such as have other preferences and inclinations.

Otherwise, his classifications of authors and the historical connection which he establishes between the various schools and thinkers seem adequate and well founded. Perhaps, however, it might be regretted that, by limiting himself to the early periods of American thinking, he has deprived himself, to some extent, of the additional light which the final issues reflect on the earlier periods.

The work is divided into five books, corresponding to the five schools which he believes to have divided the allegiance of the early American thinkers. After an Introduction that falls into two sections,—an "Historical Survey" of the field of investigation, and a chapter on "Philosophy and Politics," showing the relation of the political attitude of the Americans to their respective speculative affiliations,—he takes up, in the First Book, the question of early Puritanism in New England, which is summarily examined, and that of the anti-Puritan reaction, which the exclusive domination of the former religious tendency was bound to call forth. He introduces the latter to us in the person and writings of a man, Ethan Allen,

who to the merit of having been the conqueror of Ticonderoga added the merit of being a shrewd and penetrating, if also a somewhat crude thinker; in fact, surprisingly clear-headed for the age, and considering his own presumably rudimentary education.

The Second Book deals with early Idealism, which is represented by two men of unequal but both of exceptional significance, Samuel Johnson, the first president of King's College (Columbia), and Jonathan Edwards, who died as president of Princeton. Both are made the object of a thoroughgoing study. Johnson, who was soon won over to the Idealism of Bishop Berkeley (in connection with their mutual correspondence, Dr. Riley gives us some interesting, hitherto unpublished letters), left "no palpable trace" of his influence over the then existing generation. Edwards is accorded a treatment proportionate to his own importance in the development of American thinking, not less than seventy-eight pages being devoted to him. The author sympathetically dwells on the exposition of his thinking in its three phases, as he views them, of mysticism, idealism, and pantheism. To what extent Edwards himself would have enjoyed the latter qualification, we cannot say; but it appears likely that many scholars would object to it in the name of the Puritan divine himself. The question of the 'originality' of Edwards's Idealism is carefully examined and finally declared insoluble.

Under the heading of "Deism," the Third Book deals with the speculative emancipation of the various colleges, Harvard, Yale, King's College, and Princeton, in a deistic direction. The two chapters on Philadelphia and Franklin, and Virginia and Jefferson, contain very interesting material, ably presented, in connection with the delineation of those two striking personalities, so intimately associated with the independence and early development of the American nation. Here the author duly differentiates the brilliant but shallow French Deism, which had practically no influence on American thinking, from the native Deism, which enjoyed, at that early period, an extensive if not very durable influence. Thomas Paine may be considered the personification of Deism of the popular stamp. He was a man of little original inspiration, but with a talent for forceful and vigorous expression that reminds one of the undoubting and unreserved utterances of French unbelievers. Deism, however, soon declined; free-thinking aroused not only the distrust, but the dislike of the morally and religiously inclined average American; "the clergy rejected it and the colleges thrust it out."

Materialism, the prevailing form of thought in the South, is the

object of the Fourth Book. Cadwallader Colden was its first and foremost adherent, and is accorded a commensurate treatment; others treated at length are Joseph Buchanan, the physician of Kentucky, Joseph Priestley, the discoverer of oxygen, whose anthropological materialism "was scarcely comprehended by Americans," Thomas Cooper, the disciple and son-in-law of Priestley, and Dr. Ben. Rush, "the most conspicuous of the American medical materialists of the eighteenth century." As a sort of subsidiary planetary system, the "minor materialists" are next reviewed.

Realism of the Scottish type, imported to Princeton by John Witherspoon, with its subsequent claim of being the typically American school of thinking, is introduced in the Fifth Book. It cannot be said that Dr. Riley has any great partiality for the system or for the one who introduced it to America; and it is apparent that he does not relish the elimination of Idealism, which was the almost immediate and natural result of its introduction into this country. Samuel Stanhope Smith is not more favorably reviewed. Samuel Miller, the first American critic of Kant, and Frederick Beasley, "with the cry of back to Locke," are subsequently taken up. We may be permitted here to call attention in passing to the erroneous statement, that "an opinion was falsely ascribed to Aristotle by his misinterpreters, the Schoolmen, that sensible *films* or species passed off from the object, and, impinging upon the senses, make their way into the mind" (p. 521). As a matter of fact, neither Aristotle, of course, nor the Schoolmen either, ever held such a ridiculous view of "films impinging upon the senses"; as a specialist in that domain of Scholastic philosophy, the present writer may be permitted to remark that he ought to know. If, in the order of sensible vision, the image of an object can be reproduced on the retina without any 'impinging film,' much more so in the order of intelligible vision: no Scholastic ever dreamt of such an interpretation.¹

The lesser Realists, Nisbet, Law, and Ogilvie, close the series and the work. An Appendix, consisting of about thirty additional pages of notes and documents, completes Dr. Riley's somewhat voluminous study.

The summary which we have given of the work is sufficient to show its importance. As a source book, at least, it bids fair to be a practically definitive work. It is offered as "a preliminary study, to be followed by others in an historical series," and every one will grant

¹In confirmation of this contention, I may refer Dr. Riley to my article on "Saint Thomas's Philosophy of Knowledge," *PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW*, Vol. XII, especially pp. 620-622 and 624, 625.

that with such restrictions as, we think, ought to be made, it is a truly valuable beginning, and will wish that in subsequent editions the same excellent qualities may appear, *minus* some objectionable features.

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Source Book in Ancient Philosophy. By CHARLES M. BAKEWELL.
New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1907. — p. xii, 395.

This book is a collection in English translation of what Professor Bakewell considers the most significant documents illustrating the history of Philosophy from Thales to Plotinus. Its primary aim is to supplement the instruction in this subject by text-book or lecture by bringing the student into touch with the original sources, so far as that is possible in translation and within the compass of a single volume. Many teachers must have felt the need of such a book. The standard source book in this field, Ritter and Preller's *Historia Philosophia Græca*, gives all its texts in the original, and although, of course, along with many other works, indispensable to the scholar, contains much that is of little value to the average undergraduate. On the other hand, good English translations of ancient philosophical texts are not always available and are, in any case, scattered through many volumes. With the practical aim in mind of meeting the needs of the larger number, Professor Bakewell has omitted all documents relating merely to the lives and writings of the philosophers, and has selected only those relating to their opinions. He has made a further selection from among these. In this way he has succeeded in bringing within the limits of a book shorter by two hundred pages than the *Historia* of Ritter and Preller some of the choicest and most representative passages illustrating philosophical opinion during the period covered. And this has been done in the main without producing the impression of scappiness. The passages are, as a rule, sufficiently full. It is a book which may be read with pleasure on its own account.

Concerning the choice of passages opinions will naturally differ. On the whole, they seem to me to have been well chosen for their purpose, and the balance to have been well maintained in their distribution. To the fragments of and concerning the Pre-Socratics, including the Atomists and Sophists, are assigned 85 pages; to Socrates, including the whole of Plato's *Apology*, 56 pages; to Plato, 69; to Aristotle, 52; to the Epicureans and Stoics, including the Roman Stoics, 71; and to Plotinus, 53. The relatively large amount of space given to Plotinus is explained and temporarily justified by the general

inaccessibility of his writings to English readers and the common misunderstanding of his doctrines. The most serious defect is the entire absence of anything from the Greek sceptics. This is the more surprising in that some prominence is given to Stoic and Epicurean discussion of the process of knowledge and criteria of truth. This defect will no doubt be remedied in a second edition, even if room has to be made by omissions elsewhere. It seems a pity, too, that no account should be given of the metaphysics of the Stoics, with its doctrine of the Pneuma, or of their psychology of the passions. The extant fragments of pre-Socratic philosophers are pretty fully represented; but why should a secondary source be used for Empedocles's theory of vision (p. 47), when he has himself described it in a well-known and picturesque passage (Diels, fr. 84)? And why should no reference be made to the cosmology of the Pythagoreans, which has at least as much historical interest as many of the early scientific speculations which are here recorded? As it is, Pythagorean doctrine, except for the late 'Golden Words,' is represented here only by two passages from Aristotle, important passages certainly, yet not perhaps wholly objective; at any rate a genuine Pythagorean like Philolaus conveys a different impression on so fundamental a point, for instance, as the relation of the original number doctrine to the doctrine of opposites. The question what to select from such authors as Plato and Aristotle must have presented no little difficulty, and not every one will agree that it has been successfully surmounted. One misses, for example, in Plato such doctrines as those of reminiscence, the immortality of the soul, and future retribution, and in Aristotle his theories of nature, of the state, and of art. But the selections appear to have been well considered; they contain in Plato the great passages, — without reference to chronological order, — from the *Phædrus*, *Philebus*, *Timæus*, *Parmenides*, and *Republic* bearing on the doctrine of Ideas and the supreme aim of life, and in Aristotle a chapter of first principles, another on psychology, and a third on ethics. To have given more would have required either more space or a shortening of the passages here given, and no doubt there were serious objections to either course.

The translations are by various hands. Many of them are standards and well known, others already printed but less familiar, others again appear here for the first time. Of the last are Professor Bakewell's own translations of most of the early fragments, of the *Apology* of Plato in full, and of portions of Aristotle; also Dr. Fuller's translations from Plutarch and Plotinus. A fine-comb criticism would perhaps bring out minor inaccuracies. I can only say that, after

examining a score or so of passages in the new translations, I have found nothing worse than a possible ambiguity (as p. 360, where "space in the intelligible world is represented by logical implication" means, not that it is logically implied that space is represented there, but that what corresponds to it there is logical implication, the being of one thing in another) or slight infelicity (as p. 361, where the *art* of χειρονομία is rendered 'gesticulation' instead of 'mimicry' or 'pantomime'), and that renderings which at first seemed doubtful have later proved, in my judgment, correct or, at least, defensible. Indeed, most of the new translation seems to me excellent. The severest criticism on the translations admitted attaches to Yonge's rendering of the doctrines of Epicurus from Diogenes Laertius, especially the passage relating to the method of knowledge, which is here made nonsense. The sources for Epicurus should be re-examined and freshly translated. Whether Hammond's translation instead of Wallace's should not have been used for the passages from Aristotle's *De anima*, is an open question; it may be noted that since this work was published a new rendering has appeared, by R. D. Hicks, which is more literally exact than either. Piety to a friend's memory was what, apparently, led to the adoption of two metrical translations by the late Thomas Davidson, that of the Pythagorean 'Golden Words,' and that of the 'poem' of Parmenides. They do but give us, however, the semblance of poetry without its substance, and look out of place in a volume where Empedocles and even Lucretius appear in prose. The translation of Parmenides is remarkable in its way, but it takes up in this form a good deal of valuable space, and is really less effective than a prose translation like Burnet's.

As a minor point of criticism, I should like to express a mild protest against the idiosyncrasy, interrupting eye-movement and necessitating new habits of attention and inattention, of making the references to the foot-notes which give the original sources of the citations after the first word of each passage, instead of before the passage or, as is the better custom, at the end. The references themselves I have generally found correct, but those to Plotinus vary perplexingly, if one does not happen to have the editions cited, especially where a book is referred to as a chapter or section (p. 371, *Enn.* V. § 2, for V, 2 § 1; V. § 4, for V, 4 § 1; p. 372, V. § 1, for V, 1 § 6; p. 373, V. § 1, for V, 1 § 7; p. 378, I. § 7, for I, 8, § 7). Further, it is to be regretted that Diels's numbering and clumsy arrangement of the fragments of Heraclitus has been adopted instead of the certainly not worse order and more familiar numbering of Bywater. Finally,

I would raise the question whether the book might not be made more helpful as a source book if, without neglecting the many, some regard were paid also to the few who have in them the royal seed of scholarship? What I mean is this, that it might well include an Introduction,—I have in mind the kind of thing, though on a less elaborate scale, that one finds, *e. g.*, in Lee's *Source Book of English History*,—giving definite information concerning the sources for the study of ancient philosophy, the extant writings of the philosophers, the doxographers, etc., together with the best modern editions, translations, and aids; that where the citations in the book represent only certain of the teachings of the philosopher or school, the fact should be noted and indications given as to what the more important, at least, of the neglected aspects are, and where they may be found; and that, in addition to an index of names, there should also be an index of topics. This would doubtless add somewhat to the bulk of the volume, and possibly slightly to its cost, but it would also, I think, greatly enhance its value. It is so good and useful a book that it deserves to be made, if possible, still better and more useful.

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NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

Über die Stellung der Gegenstandstheorie im System der Wissenschaften.

Von A. MEINONG. Leipzig, R. Voigtländers Verlag, 1907. — pp. vi, 159.

This book is made up of a series of articles which have appeared in the *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*. It constitutes a defense of Meinong's views and a further explanation of his new science, 'Gegenstandstheorie.' Such an explanation was needed, for with some discriminating criticism has been combined a considerable amount of misunderstanding, and this despite the fact that, whatever we may say of the validity of his views, his main contentions are clear and demand consideration.

It was to be expected that his claim for the existence of a class of objects which, because of our "prejudice in favor of the real" (all existing sciences, with the exception of parts of mathematics, being concerned with the real), are "homeless," and should therefore have a science of their own, would meet with little sympathy, especially when this science, according to specifications, includes the unreal and the impossible. At this time, when Science is having all she can do to take care of her multitudinous children, and when Philosophy, in some of her main tendencies at least, is counselling a somewhat drastic treatment of this overplus as useless and illegitimate, it is not surprising that such a claim should raise the cry of 'useless knowledge'! That, for instance, — to take the illustration which Meinong is continually using, — he should insist that there is a distinction, on the one hand, between colors *as objects* and color *presentations*, which are mental facts, and, on the other hand, between these objects and the physical equivalents of colors, which are material facts, is, in itself, not remarkable. But to insist further that the propositions about colors, as objects, belong to a third science different from either of the 'real' sciences, psychology or physics, must seem, and has seemed to many, a useless development of distinctions. To this cry of 'useless knowledge,' however, Meinong has replied in the spirit, and with the weapons, characteristic of the best (or worst, according to the point of view) in German scholarship. His comprehensive view of the methods of the sciences, which has enabled him to show that, apart from any question of the abstract and ideal demands of science, of knowledge for its own sake, it is precisely these propositions about non-existent and impossible objects which have many times in the history of science been most important in determining the truth about the real, is in striking contrast to other hasty and over-confident judgments as to what is, and what is not, 'useless knowledge.'

The second phase of his main contention, that the knowledge of these objects is of a 'peculiar' kind, is *a priori*, has met with scarcely more sympathy. There are many who will agree, and indeed have agreed, with him that, if by *a priori* is meant independent of experience in the narrower sense of perception, — and he assures us that the term is used merely in the negative sense of knowledge free from experience as far as the judgment is concerned, and that he does not mean that the constituents of the proposition are necessarily known independently of perceptual experience, — then many of the judgments of relation among ideas, as for instance in mathematics, are non-experiential and *a priori*. The formidable array of reasonings with which he supports this thesis in the present work should, it would seem, if such argument were still necessary, convince us that the establishment of the validity of propositions in geometry does not depend upon the *perception* of the relations established. It is, as Meinong has shown, irrelevant to observe that the equality of the angles of an equilateral triangle would not have occurred to any one without inspecting the figure itself. The important thing is that the equality is proved, and can only be proved by *a priori* reasoning.

But the real difficulty arises in connection with his conception of the *relation* of these two forms of knowledge to *reality*, as it finds expression in the proposition, "Daseinswissen ist von Natur empirisch, daseinsfreies Wissen von Natur apriorisch," and its converse, which he also accepts, that all empirical knowledge is knowledge of existents, while all *a priori* knowledge has non-existents as its objects. For it is, in the first place, doubtful whether the difference between empirical and *a priori* can be reduced to one of *form* of proposition. Existential judgments, as for instance those which are the products of inference, frequently contain *a priori* as well as empirical elements, while judgments which apparently have to do merely with the consistency of propositions, with relations, presuppose some reference to reality, immediate or remote.

Meinong, to be sure, denies that reality is implicated in judgments other than existential, and his discussion at this point is among the most interesting in the book, although to the present writer not convincing. The judgments of non-existence of impossible objects, such as ghosts, Pallas Athena, phlogiston, are for him *a priori*, and arise out of insight into impossibility. Thus the proposition, "ghosts do not exist," is not to be interpreted as having reality as its subject and "no ghosts" as predicate. The ideal construct 'ghosts' is the subject and non-existence the predicate, the judgment being directed upon something which is not within the sphere of reality at all. The fact that the thought that the object 'ghost' is non-existent, and the judgment, "such and such a bit of undetermined reality (a shadow, or what not) is not a ghost," are for practical purposes identical, should not blind us to the essential difference in the nature of the two judgments. Similarly, the attempt to reduce the categorical propositions of mathematics, *e. g.*, geometry, to hypotheticals is, to his mind, no less mis-

leading ; it leads in fact, to the sophistry which would logically find expression in the proposition that, "if an equilateral triangle does not exist, it is then not equiangular," when, as a matter of fact, the question of existence is not involved. His proposition that all attempts to reduce *Sosein* to *Dasein* leads to scepticism we can grant, however, only on the assumption that reality is to be limited to perception, an assumption which is, to say the least, doubtful.

No less difficult is it to follow Meinong in the second consequence of his divorce of the 'what' from the 'that.' Corresponding to the denial that reality is in any way logically implicated in propositions which deal with the 'what' (the *Sosein*), it is necessary, in his view, to insist equally upon the irrelevance of the psychological presuppositions of these objects and their meanings. In his war against all *Psychologismus* in the theory of knowledge, he goes so far as to deny that the fact that the ideal objects are predetermined by experience relates them in any way to reality. The ideal objects of geometry, the impossible objects of thought (ghosts, phlogiston, etc.) have, he admits, a pseudo-existence ; they exist in the mind, are predetermined by certain past experiences ; but this inherence in experience, this existence in mind, is irrelevant for the knowledge of their intrinsic nature, and has nothing to do with real existence. It is here that many of Meinong's readers, though compelled to acknowledge that precisely in this extreme *Zuspitzung* of the problem he has done good service, will find it necessary to part company with him. That there are some objects of knowledge which are 'daseinsfrei,' in the sense that judgments about their 'Sosein' may be passed without explicit reference to reality, is undoubtedly true ; but reality is implied as a more ultimate objective intent, and is presupposed in this inherence in psychical content. Should not the very fact, that the exigences of the situation required the formation of the concept of 'pseudo-existence,' have aroused doubt of the reality of the situation itself?

Meinong admits that his insight into the relation of the 'what' to the 'that' leaves much to be desired, and it is to be feared that it will continue to remain imperfect so long as he works with his present concepts of experience and reality. What is the ultimate nature of our ascription of reality to a content? This is, of course, the point upon which the whole right or wrong of Meinong's contention must turn, and into the discussion of that problem we have no intention of entering here. Grant Meinong his primary assumption, the 'absolute' theory, that the ascription of reality is a fundamental unanalysable act of consciousness, the perceptual judgment, and there are, without question, many objects of thought, with their own meanings and values, which are 'daseinsfrei.' To so describe them, and to seek to do them justice, would be merely a recognition of facts, and would merit the characterization of 'radical empiricism,'—a term which the present writer applied to the standpoint in *Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie*, and one of which, as Meinong says, "it

may well be proud." But can we grant this assumption, and with it the restriction of experience to perception? Apparently not, unless we ignore the great variety of ways in which we ascribe reality to a content. But if there is no single fundamental act which assigns reality to the mere 'that,' apart from all relations, then the process of experiencing reality must consist in a relation of the content in question to other contents. On this 'relative' theory, the distinction between empirical and *a priori* could not be ultimate, for all forms of discovery and realization must fall within experience, in the wider sense of the term. A 'genetic logic' would, of course, be abhorrent to Meinong; but it is difficult to see how, without such a point of view, he is ever to get the *dissecta membra* of knowledge together again.

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Hauptprobleme der Religionsphilosophie der Gegenwart. Von RUDOLF EUCKEN. Berlin, Reuther & Reichard, 1907. — pp. 120.

This attractive book consists of three lectures, "Die seelische Begründung der Religion," "Religion und Geschichte," and "Das Wesen des Christentums," which were delivered at a theological *Ferienkurs* in Jena in October, 1906, and give in popular form the application of Eucken's activist Idealism to those highest and ultimate problems of life and of philosophy, the problems of religion.

The opening lecture deals with the basis of religion in the soul. The author first sets aside two false accounts: the intellectualistic, which bases religion upon an insight into the excellence of the structure and constitution of the world; and that which makes religion merely subjective, a mere form or product of human feeling. Over against these, — which are not adequate to the nature of religion as it actually is, an experience in which "something more than human works in man and lifts him above himself, makes a new being of him and opens up to him a new relation to other men," — Eucken sets his own principle of the "Selbstständigkeit des Geisteslebens." This is the central principle of Eucken's philosophy, and it is also the central difficulty of the student of that philosophy. Does it mean simply the *independence* of spiritual life? If so, the question at once arises, Independent of what? and the philosophy falls to pieces as a dualism. But if it means the *self-dependence* (*i. e.*, absoluteness) of spiritual life, we have a profound and self-consistent philosophy which must be ranked as a form of Absolute Idealism; a philosophy which holds that spiritual life is not only the primary, but the sole and all-inclusive, reality of the universe.

As between these two interpretations, Eucken's phraseology, — especially his frequent application of the terms "überlegen" and "Überlegenheit" to spiritual life, — might incline us to the former; but the latter is surely the true one. In the first place, it is the only one that does any sort of justice to those ethical and religious interests which Eucken has most at

heart. Religious feeling, in its first indignant and enthusiastic condemnation of the world, may be dualistic ; but if it reflects, it soon finds that its own root is severed unless all existence be a unity, and a unity because divinely constituted throughout. In the second place, such an absolutism is the goal toward which any ethico-religious Idealism like Eucken's naturally and rightly tends. And as Boyce-Gibson points out, it is the goal toward which Eucken actually is moving as the development of his thought goes on from year to year. Nor does such an Absolute Idealism do any injustice to the two central pillars of his system, Personalism and Activism ; on the contrary, it is the only metaphysic which can do justice to these. For the freedom of man, and those capacities of reason and volition in virtue of which man is in his own order a creator and originator, can be adequately explained only as a self-communication on the part of God, a reproduction, however qualified, of the divine nature, which is the supreme and ultimate principle of the universe, in and as human nature. It is only thus that we can account for those rational, ethical, and religious capabilities which make man a person at all ; and only thus that we can view the universe as *Idee*, — as, through and through, a reasonable and spiritual system, and therefore a true seat of religion. Indeed, in spite of the occasionally dualistic language, it is virtually to this that Eucken comes as he goes on to base religion upon the operation in man of that totality of existence to which man and nature both in some way belong, and to follow the development of religion through the three stages of spiritual life. The lecture closes with a brief but luminous discussion of three closely connected topics : immediacy in religious experience ; certainty in religion ; the personal character of religious truth and of the process in which that truth is apprehended.

In the second lecture the relation of religion to history is considered. The discussion (aside from an objectionable view of the effect of knowledge upon religious devotion) is based upon another of the main principles of Eucken's system, — the conception of a present superior to time, so that the past is still in the present and is therefore still capable of being altered and lifted to a new level of being. In accordance with this, two views are set aside which subject the present to the past : the "Historicismus" which regards the course of human affairs as a mere chain of events, and the present, therefore, as a mere result of the past ; and the tendency to make a single point in the past so final that all subsequent religious life must be a mere holding fast to that point.

The third lecture, in attempting to indicate the essence of Christianity, finds the point of departure of religion in the unbearableness of the present condition of the world by reason of its evil ; and then classifies the religions which attempt to heal that evil into religions of law, which accept the elements of the world but seek to introduce a better order among them, and religions of redemption, which demand a radical transformation of the world. Among the latter, Hindu religion is altogether negative, — to it

the very existence of a world is evil, — while Christianity is affirmative, but involves in its affirmation a great negative; the world is to be affirmed, but only as revolutionized ("a new heaven and a new earth") through divine grace. Then follow highly suggestive discussions of the inwardness of Christianity; of the Christian view of suffering; of the possibility of affirming the world, because of the presence of the divine nature to the human; of the nature of Christian love, its breadth and its capacity for unflinching discipline; of the originality of Jesus; of the universality of Christianity with regard both to races and epochs; and the lecture closes with a reference to the present outlook for religion in face of the tendencies which oppose it.

The tone of the book cannot be too warmly commended. Eucken is, among philosophers, one of the great race; those to whom, as to Plato, philosophy is a life and a character as well as a theory of the universe. He writes, not like one who contemplates and scrutinizes religion from without, — a method upon which an adequate philosophy of religion never has arisen and never can arise, — but like a man who possesses, and is possessed by, the experience which he seeks to interpret. Hence every one who has the interests of religion at heart, every one who wishes the interests of religion to become the supreme interests of our life upon the earth, could most heartily welcome the book, even though he accepted not one of the special doctrines in it.

G. J. BLEWETT.

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An Introduction to Philosophy. By GEORGE STUART FULLERTON. New York, The Macmillan Company; London, Macmillan and Co., 1906. — pp. xiii, 322.

One leaves Professor Fullerton's book with the regretful feeling that here is a delightfully written work that has just missed its aim. One wishes that it had been entitled "An Introduction to a Theory of Dualistic Realism" in order that full meed of praise might be given it. It is not, in truth, an "Introduction to Philosophy," for well-nigh half of the book (Chapters IV to XI) is directly occupied with the proof of the author's particular philosophical doctrine, while the remainder is so colored by that doctrine that it is impossible not to detect its presence. There is no reason, to be sure, why, in a "System of Philosophy," an author should not present, as cogently as he is able, the views which he has come to accept: there would seem to be many reasons why this should not be done in an "Introduction to Philosophy." The object of such an introductory work, as Professor Fullerton himself recognizes, is not to convince a student of the truth of this or that solution of the world problem, — he is not yet prepared for conviction, — but rather to make him vividly aware that there *is* a problem, and to give him some notion of its scope and difficulty. Professor Fullerton fails, in the main, to do this. It is his evident wish to set

the student right. In the statement of each of the cardinal problems of philosophy, therefore, he is careful to omit as fully as he may all that would complicate and would make impossible a ready conclusion. He then proceeds to detail, with a briefness that allows no just weight to the views, certain historical attempts at solution; and, easily proving these to be wholly or partially false, he proceeds at some length with his own solution. The method, to say the least, is an unfortunate one. In the first place, the student fails to see what the real difficulty of the problem is; in the second place, he marvels that most of the thinkers of the past have childishly blundered in matters of very simple moment.

The book, too, is unfortunately restricted in its philosophical outlook. Although Professor Fullerton has a considerable section devoted to "Some Types of Philosophical Theory," he practically ignores Plato and Aristotle, Plotinus, Middle Age philosophy, and the whole German movement of thought, with the doubtful exception of Kant. Concerning Plato, there are seventeen lines scattered throughout the three hundred pages; and in these there is no mention of Plato's fundamental contributions to philosophy; the references to Aristotle are but passing; while Plotinus is treated with ill-concealed scorn. After detailing in eleven lines Plotinus's doctrine of the soul, and, as I must think, failing in any real sense to give the doctrine its due, Professor Fullerton remarks (page 103): "Let the man to whom such sentences as these mean anything rejoice in the meaning that he is able to read into them!" This is short shrift for Plotinus and a good laugh for the student! Professor Fullerton's discussion of Kant can hardly be called a satisfactory one, even for an introductory treatise. He is willing to end a long section on the Critical Philosophy with the observation: "But one thing certainly he has accomplished. He has made the words 'phenomena' and 'noumena' familiar to us all, and he has induced a vast number of men to accept it as established fact that it is not worth while to try to extend our knowledge beyond phenomena" (p. 180). Professor Fullerton's second section on Kant does not help to lessen the impression that, after all, Kant's work, and all the favorable criticism upon it, are a fantastic yet rather stupid way of wasting time. I am not taking issue with Professor Fullerton's preference for other than German modes of thinking; I merely wish to protest against arousing the student's opposition to that thinking before he is given a chance fairly to know what it is. Of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, Professor Fullerton has practically nothing to say. It is enough for him to remark of them that "to one accustomed to reading the English philosophy, they seem ever ready to spread their wings and hazard the boldest of flights without a proper realization of the thinness of the atmosphere in which they must support themselves" (p. 217). And again the student laughs!

Professor Fullerton's outlook is confined almost wholly to the English and Scotch schools. Again, one finds no objection to the acceptance of these points of view; but one does object to an almost entire lack of sym-

pathy with all other points of view. The effect upon the student can hardly be to induce in him catholicity of spirit.

A distinct merit of the book is its attempt to bring the problems up to date, as in the sections on "Is the Material World a Mechanism?" "Critical Empiricism," "Pragmatism," etc. But here, too, Professor Fullerton's undialectical treatment is often in evidence. To take a somewhat typical example, on page 148, the author mentions Dr. Ward's "attack" upon the mechanistic view of reality, describing the attack in five lines in such a general way that no student not familiar with Dr. Ward's work can be intelligently aware of the grounds upon which the attack is made. Thus, naturally, Dr. Ward makes but a poor showing.

And yet the critic wishes that there had been no need to make these strictures. The book is written with such delightful clearness and directness that the weary philosopher comes to it with joy. It is refreshingly free from technical jargon, and it holds the attention to the end. Indeed, it is as interesting as a novel. It is just this marked excellence of the book, however, that makes one regret so thoroughly its defects of philosophical organization. In particular, the two chapters of Part I on "The Meaning of the Word Philosophy in the Past and in the Present," and the chapters of Parts V and VI on "The Philosophical Sciences" and "On the Study of Philosophy," are written with admirable skill and with a full understanding of the needs of students.

Obviously, this is not the place to enter upon a discussion of Professor Fullerton's own views. As they have been stated more fully in his larger work, criticism of them should have reference to that more adequate presentation. It may be said, however, that the presentation in the smaller volume has the merit of simplicity and clearness.

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A Short History of Philosophy. By ARCH. B. D. ALEXANDER. Glasgow, Maclehose & Sons; New York, The Macmillan Co., 1907. — pp. vii, 601.

This book proposes to treat in a systematic way the entire course of European speculation. Its author notes that since Lewes no British author has done this. He makes no allusion to the volumes of Rogers and Turner, and refers to our other texts in current use as translations. While not all will feel keenly the need of a British text, a gratifying welcome will probably await any new book on this subject which is distinguished by special excellencies in standpoint, plan, and execution.

The standpoint of the present author is not at once apparent. The book has no ulterior purpose, as has for instance that of Professor Turner. Internal indications seem to show, however, that the author occupies essentially the position of English Neo-Hegelianism. But he is entirely free from the characteristic Hegelian fault of forcing the facts of history in

the interest of a preconceived theory of development. Indeed, the treatment is objective almost to a fault.

The plan of the work involves a very cursory treatment of Greek, patristic, and scholastic philosophy; a fairly extended treatment of that of the seventeenth century; and then a very full account of the English, French, and German Enlightenment, of Kant, and of the movement from Kant to Hegel. Post-Hegelian thought is touched lightly. A hundred pages are given to Greek philosophy, twenty to the patristics and Neo-Platonism, twenty more to the Middle Ages, six or seven to the Renaissance thinkers, and on page 146 the discussion of Bacon begins. Reid and Hamilton are completed on page 273, before the book is half done. The discussion of German idealism begins with Kant on page 347, and ends with Hegel on page 520. Sixty pages are then given to sketching briefly the main tendencies since Hegel. A book thus planned would seem to be better fitted for the intellectual atmosphere of Germany than for that of English-speaking peoples.

In point of execution, the work is uneven. The author seems to be more at home in the philosophy of the Enlightenment and of the early nineteenth century than elsewhere. Until he reaches these periods, he writes as if he were compiling at second hand, and rarely shows evidence of independent research. The style is plodding and matter-of-fact. But when the book is about half through, a distinct improvement is to be noticed, and much of what remains is well written, interesting, and instructive. In one very important respect, however, it may be expected to draw a severe criticism from the *Fach*. It is marred by loose and inaccurate statements of fact, ranking in this respect far beneath any of our standard manuals. My notes record a large number of places where the writer is simply misinformed, inadequately informed, or hazy; while it is by no means uncommon for him to bungle the statement of a simple matter on which he presumably has information. A few citations may exemplify this. The chapter on Aristotle, for instance, begins (p. 62), after "passing over Epensippus" [Speusippus] and others, by sketching Aristotle's life: "In 335 he returned to Athens, where, amid the groves of the academy [!], he walked and meditated and engaged in teaching." In fact, the covered walks (*περίπατοι*) in the grounds of the temple of the Lyceian Apollo were on the other side of Athens from the gymnasium and grove named after the hero Academus (not Academicus, p. 47). "Charged with atheism, he left Athens in 322 and died of self-poisoning in Chalcis, in Eubœa, at the age of 63." This story is repudiated by all modern authors with whom I am acquainted; by Zeller (*Aristotle*, Eng. tr., Vol. I, p. 37, n. 2) "because the best evidence is against it,—because it is contrary to Aristotle's own principles, and because it does not fit the circumstances;" by Turner (*Hist. of Phil.*, p. 126) as a 'fable' having "absolutely no foundation." Our author continues: "Aristotle was the most voluminous writer of antiquity,"—a statement which I cannot verify in face of Zeller's citation from Diogenes

(*Stoics*, etc., Eng. tr., p. 407, n. 6) of a passage which awards this somewhat doubtful honor to either Epicurus or Chrysippus, and of Grant's remark (*Aristotle*, p. 47) that "*we*, however, have no reason for joining in this opinion. His genuine works that have come down to us fill altogether less than 3,000 pages, and this amount in mere point of quantity is not anything unusual or surprising." When we come to the account of the system: "Aristotle starts with a treatment of logic, which he does not consider a division of philosophy proper, but rather a study of method" (pp. 64, 65). But this was rather by the followers of Aristotle than by Aristotle himself. "Logic he calls the instrument (*Organon*) of thinking." This term, however, was fixed by his editors; Aristotle spoke generally of 'Analytics.' "The second section of the *Organon* [On Interpretation] treats of language as the expression and interpretation of thought." In fact it treats of propositions rather than language, and it carries the entire doctrine of immediate inference. These citations from the first three pages of the account of Aristotle are a fair sample of the want of precision shown by the author throughout the Greek sections of the book.

While the description of the modern period is better written, it is still studded with errors, which we may illustrate by a few quotations from the account of Spinoza. The author expounds *causa sui* as "something of which the cause involves existence" (p. 186); Spinoza said: "*cujus essentia involvit existentiam*." This indicates nothing more, perhaps, than bad editing; rather more serious is the confusion attending his criticism of the geometrical method (p. 183): "But Spinoza failed to see that this method, though suitable to the finite sciences, is wholly inadequate to the treatment of speculative subjects. Euclid was dealing with a different subject-matter from that of Spinoza. Mathematics avowedly deals only with objects of the imagination. . . . But in the case of speculative philosophy it is otherwise. . . . Philosophy deals not with objects of the imagination, but with being, existence itself. The demonstrative method is not concerned with the truth as such; whereas it is the truth as such which is the special concern of philosophy." Here the Kantian distinction between perception and conception gets tangled up with the Platonic doctrine that geometrical knowledge involves idealization, the latter teaching being read, however, in the light of Hume's interpretation of ideas as secondary and therefore removed from reality. The result is a sorry mess. Philosophy becomes more empirical than "finite science," but loses the ideal of demonstration, perhaps all ideals; while finite sciences not only lose touch with reality, — which is an extreme error in one direction, — but they all become amenable to the geometrical method, — an equal error on the other side. Regarding attributes, the author quotes Spinoza's famous *tanquam* definition, and comments: "In other words, an attribute does not constitute the real essence of the substance itself, but only in relation to the *finite intelligence* which contemplates it" (p. 191). In thus assuming the attributive or phenomenalistic view, he gives no intimation that this is a disputed point, that the weight

of critical opinion is on the other side, or even that another view is possible. "The unity as we know it differentiates itself into infinite attributes and then into finite modes" (p. 190). The author thus totally loses sight of Spinoza's infinite modes.

While the book is thus unreliable on delicate matters throughout, candor demands the recognition that much of it is instructive and effectively written, and presents material not otherwise so readily available. This is true especially regarding the French and German philosophy of the last century and a half. It should be placed upon the index of books forbidden *usque corrigantur*; but should a second edition evidence a thorough overhauling, it will be of service to those teachers who work in accordance with its plan.

E. L. HINMAN.

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA.

A Student's History of Philosophy. By ARTHUR KENYON ROGERS. New Edition, revised. New York, The Macmillan Company; London, Macmillan & Co., 1907. — pp. xiii, 511.

The first edition of this book appeared in 1901, and since that time it has abundantly proved its usefulness as a handbook for college students and for general readers who desire a clear and compendious account of the history of philosophy. "In the present revision," to quote the author's words, "I have corrected some errors of fact, and a large number of mistakes of judgment and infelicities of expression. In several cases the exposition has been in greater or less part rewritten. I have also added references in connection with passages quoted, and have brought the bibliographies down to date. . . . I have not considered it advisable, however, to add essentially to the fulness of the treatment, even in the case of matters which in themselves are well worthy of greater emphasis. . . . In the concluding sections only has there been a slight expansion" (p. ix).

Of these changes the addition in footnotes of references in connection with the numerous passages quoted, is perhaps the most important. One of the most valuable features of the book is the admirable selection of numerous clear and direct statements from the writings of the philosophers themselves; and the utility of these quotations is much increased by the references, largely wanting in the first edition, which enable the student to verify them for himself and to read them in their proper context. The bibliographies at the end of the different sections do not of course profess to be at all exhaustive, but mention only the main translations and the English books most likely to be serviceable to the class of readers for whom the work is intended.

Professor Roger's book is so excellent in many respects, — so simple and direct in statement, and so genuinely philosophical in spirit, — that one is tempted to express regret that he did not use the occasion of the present revision to make his treatment somewhat more extensive and thoroughgoing. This is especially desirable, I think, in the part dealing with modern

philosophy, which fills only about two hundred and fifty pages, and therefore necessarily has to omit entirely or to treat summarily matters of great importance. But the book made a distinct place for itself in its original form, and it is quite possible that any attempt to extend its scope or modify its character might have defeated the purpose which the author has had in view. It is to be regretted that the type, which has been largely reset, is not so clear as in the first edition.

J. E. C.

Aristotle on his Predecessors: Being the First Book of his Metaphysics.

Translated, with introduction and notes, by A. E. TAYLOR. Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Company, 1907. — pp. 159.

Twenty-seven years ago a "Cambridge Graduate" (the authorship of the book is thus veiled on the title-page) published a translation of the First Book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. An Oxford Graduate, who has neither used nor needed such veil, now offers us a new translation. The commentary promised in the preface of the Cambridge translation never appeared (so far as the reviewer can learn), but that lack is fully remedied by Taylor, who has prepared an introduction, summary, notes, and appendices, covering the essential problems raised by the text, so far as they are of interest to students of Philosophy. There is no adequate translation of the entire treatise in English. The work is so difficult and tedious, that no competent scholar seems to have had the heart to undertake it, or at least to complete it. Schwegler, Bonitz, and Lasson have made excellent translations in German, but one is rather loath to turn to a foreign language for an interpretation of a Greek classic, and it is a disagreeable reflection that English readers are obliged to do this.

Taylor has aimed to "supply students and teachers of philosophy, especially on the American Continent, with a faithful rendering of Aristotle's critical sketch of the history of Greek speculative thought" (p. 7). The translation is based on Christ's text and exhibits, on the whole, a high degree of clarity and linguistic skill. There is little opportunity in translating Aristotle to display any literary gifts. One cannot avoid feeling, however, in reading this translation, that Taylor has an unusual facility in word and phrase. Indeed, his skill and accuracy, as translator, seem to me much superior to his learning and accuracy, as commentator. He is not held in bondage by the letter or the syntax; but, without violating these, he allows the meaning to emerge unmistakably in words equivalent in significance and flavor to the original. He never loses sight of the wood because of the trees. In the Oxford school of translators, if one may so speak of them, there appears to be a traditional and persistent ideal, in which the following factors are prominent: singleness of eye for the genius of the English language, parity of literary quality between the original and the rendering, and clarity of expression. This type of ideal tends to beget a paraphrastic treatment of the original, but in the hands of a trained scholar it undoubtedly yields the best results.

The reviewer wishes to call attention to a few details. The statement appears to be dogmatically made (p. 14) that Aristotle was tutor to Alexander from 343 to 336, which is only conjectural, so far as the latter date is concerned. In fact, there is much greater likelihood that the tutorship terminated in 340. There are numerous examples of careless proof-reading. On p. 9 *αὐτο* for *αὐτό*, *μετά τὰ* (p. 17) for *μετὰ τὰ*, Leibnitz p. 19 but Leibniz p. 145, *τί ἐστὶ* (p. 27) for *τί ἐστι* or *τὸ τί ἐστι*, *πολιτεία* (p. 29) for *πολιτεῖαι*, *ἐπὶ* (p. 20) for *ἐπὶ*, *μὲν συμβαίνει* (p. 116) for *μὲν συμβαίνει*, *ἐν ἐπὶ* (p. 117) for *ἐν ἐπὶ*, Philetus (p. 74) for Philebus, *οὐσία* (p. 121) for *οὐσία*, *τὰς πρώτας* (p. 144) for *τὰς πρώτας*, *ἀποδειξέων* (p. 145) for *ἀποδείξεων*, *γνωστικώτερον* (p. 146) for *γνωστικώτερον*, *αἰτιον* (p. 152) for *αἰτιον*. It is of questionable advantage to explain the distinction made by Aristotle between the theoretical and practical sciences as analogous to the distinction drawn in English between sciences and the arts (p. 19). The distinction would not apply to the latter term as it is most currently used.

Taylor has a particularly poor opinion of Aristotle's account of the Pythagoreans, the Eleatics, and the Platonists, and as the discussion of these three schools forms, perhaps, the most important part of Aristotle's historical sketch, the disparagement is serious. The Aristotelian account of Parmenides is "gravely vitiated" (pp. 27, 84) by the fact that he (Aristotle) regards the second part of the Parmenidean cosmology as representing Parmenides's own view of the world of illusion, and does not regard it as a criticism by Parmenides of the Pythagoreans or other contemporaries, as Burnet does. In fact, Burnet appears throughout Taylor's Commentary somewhat in the rôle of a fetich. The *Early Greek Philosophy* is a work of Burnet's youth, and is a *tour de force* of learning and sane judgment, but it is not good to get the habit of following his *αὐτὸς ἔφα* blindly. Burnet adopts Tannery's specific reference of the *Δόξα* to the Pythagoreans and defends this view with considerable resources, while Diels is not disposed to be so specific, but considers this part of the poem merely as a kind of doxography of Parmenides's predecessors and contemporaries in general, and Gomperz (*Greek Thinkers*, Eng. Tr., Vol. I, p. 180) has no doubt that the second part refers to Parmenides's own view of the perceptual world. The opinions of the moderns are thus not without variety. When Taylor censures Aristotle for evaluating his predecessors in terms of his own philosophy (pp. 32 ff.), and then turns around and evaluates Aristotle's historical worth in terms of his (Taylor's) own rather uncertain critical conclusions, it is not giving Aristotle a fair chance.

Now, personally, I cannot see why a world that appeared to the senses of Parmenides's contemporaries, should not have appeared also to the senses of Parmenides. The difference between them and him is that he regarded the sense-world as an illusory appearance, while they ascribed Being to its appearance. But Being is that which *persists* (*τὸ ὄν vs. τὸ γιγνόμενον*); it is the static, immutable, and is revealed in the universality and validity of reason. The sense-world, on the other hand, is a world of evanescence

and Becoming, revealed in the particularity and flux of perception. It is the false identification of the latter with Being and stable reality that is the object of the polemic in the second part of the poem. The former is a philosophical conception of an ultimate and immutable real; the latter a naïve confidence in the finality of the immediately given. The perceptual world is illusory only in the sense that it is not the ultimate or basic reality, as mortals naïvely believe. The one view (*τὰ πρὸς ἀλθθειαν*) is the "immovable heart of persuasive truth," and the other view (*τὰ πρὸς δόξαν*) is the "belief of mortals, in which no real trust can be put" (fragm. 29, 30). While there are Pythagorizing elements in the second part, there is no good reason to suppose that Parmenides had the Pythagoreans exclusively or particularly in view as the object of attack. However, matters of interpretation like this cannot be adequately discussed in a brief book notice, such as is contemplated here. I can only say summarily that Aristotle's reference (984^b4) to the two principles in Parmenides seems unimpeachable, when one regards the *τὰ πρὸς δόξαν* as expressing the views not only of popular empiricism, but also Parmenides's own view of the nature and structure of a non-persistent, and in so far non-beñt, world of Becoming, whose Being is illusory. There is no opportunity here to discuss Taylor's general estimate of Aristotle's value as a historian of Philosophy or the relative credibility of Plato's and Aristotle's historical statements. In this matter, he seems simply to echo Burnet (*cf. Early Greek Philosophy*, p. 370), from whose view I dissent. The fact is, the rather facile and cavalier way in which Taylor evaluates or dismisses the judgments of the Stagirite is irritating. It would be most astonishing, if Aristotle, with his deep regard for the factual and his sense of ἀκριβεια, should turn out to be a less credible historian than Plato, who is more poet than man of learning. An unbiased examination of Plato's historical references will prove the best antidote to any such incipient astonishment. No reasonable scholar, to be sure, will expect to find exemplified in Aristotle those canons of historical narrative and evidence that have been formulated in the processes of modern research.

As to Taylor's remark (p. 78) that Aristotle had "little mathematical capacity," I venture to suggest that 'interest' would be a more moderate and, so far as we know, perhaps a truer word than 'capacity.' We are aware, of course, that Aristotle's main interests were in the biological sciences, on the one hand, and in the practical disciplines of Ethics and Politics, on the other. Mathematics, or quantitative science, had little contribution to make either to the understanding of ethical values or of physical energies, and so it received no special treatment by Aristotle. The numerous references, however, to mathematics in his various works (*Physics*, *De cælo*, *Analytics*, *Metaphysics*) show that he was not unacquainted with nor apparently unskilled (I say 'apparently' owing to my own meagre knowledge of this subject) in the mathematical theories of his time (*cf. Cantor, Geschichte der Mathematik*, Vol. I, pp. 238 ff.).

It is perhaps an oversight that Taylor has omitted from his bibliography (p. 60) the highly important work of Schwegler (*Die Metaphysik des Aristoteles*, 4 Bde., Tübingen, 1847). There seems to be no reason for the repetition of note¹ in note² on p. 80. On the same page one does not see why the translator changes the tense from *hold*, etc., to *held*. The translation of *τέχνη* generally by *art* (pp. 68 ff.) in Chap. I is not very happy. The emphasis in this part of the treatise is on the distinction between sense-perception or rule of thumb and rational theory, not between sense-perception and production. On p. 74 the translation reads, "that science is more competent *to teach*" where the meaning would be more intelligible if we were to say "better adapted to instruction" or "more instructive." The word bears both meanings. On p. 76 *κτῆσις* is translated by *enjoyment*, but more correctly on p. 77 by *acquisition*. Cannot the word *μετριώτερον* (p. 98) bear the meaning *mediocre*? On p. 92 we are advised that we must not translate *οὐρανός* by *universe*, but on p. 115 the translator permits himself this liberty.

The mechanical make-up of the book is not worthy of the contents.

WM. A. HAMMOND.

The Argument of Aristotle's Metaphysics. By EDITH HENRY JOHNSON.
New York, Lemcke & Buechner, 1906. — pp. 186.

One of the greatest requirements of both teachers and students of the history of thought on this side of the Atlantic is a satisfactory English version of Aristotle's lectures on 'First Philosophy.' Pending the production of such a version, Mrs. Johnson's little book should prove of real value, as a full and clear epitome of one of the most difficult and involved of ancient compositions. The author modestly lays claim to no higher merit than such as belongs to the intelligent epitomizer of an ancient author, and her claim is, on the whole, abundantly made good by her performance. The discussion of critical questions has been eschewed on principle. No question is raised, *e. g.*, as to the unity of the *Metaphysics*, or the authenticity of its component parts, though Mrs. Johnson is quite aware that both points have been, and are still, the subject of much discussion. For the purpose of the analysis, the Greek text is taken as constituting a continuous work, and a work the argument of which is fairly consecutive, even with the traditional arrangement of its separate 'books.' This abstinence from discussion of most points is, no doubt, largely necessitated by the end at which the writer aims; yet I think it a pity that the pretty certainly erroneous notion of the *Metaphysics* as being one 'book' at all, in the usual sense of the phrase, should have led her to imagine a consecutiveness of treatment which is not really to be found in Aristotle's text. We should never forget that the 'works' of Aristotle are for the most part posthumously edited 'lecture-courses,' and that there is no reason to suppose that all the lectures dealing with 'First Philosophy' of which Aristotle's pupils and editors possessed copies, must have been part of a single 'course' with a

single continuous plan. Thus, *e. g.*, the inclusion of Book A in the scheme is not only opposed to the best ancient testimony as to the non-Aristotelian character of the work, but actually breaks the logical connection between Books A and B. If we place B immediately after A, the *Metaphysics* is seen at once to conform to Aristotle's usual practice, which is to open his 'course' with an historical sketch of work previously done upon the subject, and then to supply a preliminary statement of difficulties suggested by this previous work, before proceeding to his own dogmatic treatment of the material under examination. Book Δ, again, can be positively proved not to belong to the course on 'First Philosophy,' a fact which makes the author's bold attempt to prove that a collection of definitions is logically in place at this point superfluous. It is also perhaps to be regretted that it is not recognized that the chief source of the definitions criticised by Aristotle is the previous work of the Academic school in this direction. Something, too, should have been said of the question how far the theology of Book Δ, which Mrs. Johnson treats as the 'final cause' of the whole 'treatise,' can safely be ascribed to Aristotle, and how far it may represent in its details a later development of the Master's views by religiously-minded disciples. It is in connection with this part of the work that I note what seems to me the one serious departure of the interpreter from Aristotelian principles. Mrs. Johnson rightly asserts, of course, that with Aristotle God is the 'final cause' of the whole world-process, but she unfortunately adds (pp. 170 ff.), that God is not an 'efficient cause' of the world. This is to run absolutely counter to Aristotle, whose whole object in Book Δ is to prove the necessity of such a being as God as the *ἀρχὴ κινήσεως* or 'source of movement' to the universe. Where Mrs. Johnson goes wrong is in the assumption that a 'source of movement' for Aristotle means an antecedent event, which would itself demand a more remote antecedent 'source of motion,' and so on *in indefinitum*. It would follow from this that the *end* or 'final cause' of a process can never be numerically the same as its 'source of motion' or efficient cause. Now Aristotle's doctrine, as fully explained in *Physics B 7*, is that this is true of such causes as the physicist considers; in their case final and efficient cause are one only in kind, not numerically. *E. g.*, as he says "one man begets another man, and so generally in the case of things which *κινούμενα κινεῖ*, — are at once in motion themselves and set other things in motion." "But," he goes on to say, "things which do not act thus (*i. e.*, which are producers of motion without being themselves in motion) are beyond the scope of Physics. For they produce motion (*κινεῖ*) without containing motion or a source of motion in themselves, but being unmoved." The ancient commentators rightly explain this as referring particularly to God, who is himself changeless and yet the source of all change in the world, and observe that here the efficient and the final cause are numerically one. It would perhaps be hardly fair to add that the account of Aristotle's attack in Book M on the Platonic mathematics is so superficial and brief as to be hardly intelligible,

since this is as much Aristotle's fault as his interpreter's. What we find in Book *M* is, in fact, a criticism by an author whose own mathematical notions are as crude as, *e. g.*, those of Mill, of conceptions so original and profound that they would require a Leibniz or a Peano to do them anything like justice; though it must be added that until this book of Aristotle ceases to be the enigma it has hitherto proved to his modern commentators, the real scope of the Platonic 'dialectic' and the full meaning of the doctrine of 'Ideas' will remain a mystery.

A. E. TAYLOR.

MCGILL UNIVERSITY.

Outlines of Psychology. By WILHELM WUNDT. Translated by CHARLES HUBBARD JUDD. Third Revised English Edition from the Seventh Revised German Edition. Leipzig, Wilhelm Engelmann; New York, G. E. Stechert and Co., 1907. — pp. xxiv, 392.

This third edition of Wundt's *Outlines* gives us a translation of what in all likelihood will stand as the final form of the original. The ten years that have elapsed since the appearance of the first English edition have seen several important changes and numerous improvements. The volume is thicker by about fifty pages, and, since the size of the page has been slightly enlarged, there is considerably more new matter than the mere increase in the number of pages would indicate. As the chief distinctive change embodied in the second English edition was the appending of reference lists to the several sections, so the new feature of this third edition is the addition of over twenty figures and diagrams scattered throughout the text. These, even more than the reference lists, aid in making the book a more serviceable working manual for the beginner. The actual additions to the text are in the way of amplifications and clarifications, the general scheme of the book remaining entirely unchanged.

One is glad to say that the present edition has a far less forbidding aspect than the first. The earlier criticism that the text was so dogmatic as to seem almost curt in tone is now less in point; for the new insertions, both of figures and of supplementary text, have done much to reduce the former abstractness and to lend vividness and interest to the presentation of material.

The translator has thoroughly revised the English for this edition, and what was originally an excellent translation is now exceptionally attractive and readable. The revision has not, however, carried with it any change in the general terminology previously employed, and the appended Glossary of terms stands as before. The typography has been much improved by the Leipzig printers, and the size of the volume has been made uniform with the German edition of the *Grundzüge*. Minor changes occur in the Index, but only such as are calculated to render it more useful to the reader.

In the reviewer's opinion, the reference lists could have been made more helpful to those who are likely to use this English edition by the addition of

supplementary references to sources which are more accessible than those cited in the original; for American periodical literature and American writers in general have been given the scantiest possible recognition. Nevertheless the translator has deemed it wisest to leave Wundt's selected lists unchanged, on the ground, no doubt, that these should fully represent the author's estimates of existing literature upon the topics treated.

On the whole, one has only words of praise for this volume as it now stands in its third English dress, and Professor Judd is to be warmly commended for the skill and pains with which he has executed his task.

A. H. PIERCE.

SMITH COLLEGE.

Philosophical Problems in the Light of Vital Organization. By EDMUND MONTGOMERY. New York and London, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1907.—pp. 462.

In philosophy, as in life, a worthy intention often fails to embody itself in an adequate performance. And of the truth of this statement Mr. Montgomery's book is an excellent illustration.

The author's intention is to illumine the dark fields of metaphysic with the search-light of science, and to bridge the chasms discovered therein by means of the principles of vital organization; his performance consists in propounding a dualistic realism of the type made classic by Locke's distinction between secondary qualities and their primary substratum,—a theory which, if true, would turn the search-light of science into a useless toy and would consign the principles of vital organization to the limbo of the unknowable. The volume is, indeed, a belated representative of the form of realism so annihilatingly criticised in T. H. Green's classic introduction to Locke, Berkeley, and Hume.

Two movements are to be discovered in Mr. Montgomery's argument,—the one critical, the other constructive. In the critical movement, the author exposes, clearly and tersely, the antinomies which have arisen in connection with quantity and quality, substance and accident, identity and difference, permanence and change, causation, universal and particular, subject and object. The discussions are suggestive and constitute by far the most forceful portion of the argument.

The constructive treatment, which is painfully repetitious and long drawn out, centres in the well-known realistic fallacy of dividing the cosmos of experience into two mutually exclusive portions. On the one side, are the 'subjective' states of consciousness; on the other, is the 'objective' extra-conscious world of things and persons united somehow into a system. The states of consciousness are fragmentary, evanescent, unsubstantial, sheerly fluent; the extra-conscious world is complete, permanent, identical, solid, dynamic. The true relation of the two spheres is this: in conscious states alone is there any awareness and knowledge of reality; in the extra-mental world is to be found the real basis from which the

evanescent conscious states proceed and in which the definite orderliness of their connected appearances latently consists. This, we see, is Locke's contrast of the conscious qualities and the extra-mental substratum all over again.

Mr. Montgomery spends much time in repetitiously demolishing Idealism, which he thoroughly misunderstands, and in warning the reader against Materialism, to which, nevertheless, his own argument pretty definitely leads. Were he able to follow the suggestions thrown out by his own analysis, in which he here and there naïvely admits that the conscious medium contains all values, he would have saved himself the trouble of knocking down men of straw. He would also have had an opportunity to understand Objective Idealism and to avoid the leap in the dark which he finally makes. For, having convinced himself that nothing is revealed except in consciousness, and that consciousness is utterly phenomenal and evanescent, he advances the profound argument that, unless we are willing to admit that we are fools, both as common-sense individuals and as scientists, we must admit that there is an extra-conscious world of real substantial being. Here again we have Locke. It would have been open to Mr. Montgomery either to adopt the position of Hume, or to work over to an Objective Idealistic basis, or to endeavor to operate the impossible conception of a something or another, one knows not what, which subtends evanescent conscious states. But to posit an extra-conscious reality, and then to interpret it in conscious terms as he must and does to make science 'objective,' is to play too fast and loose altogether.

Nevertheless, despite the impossibility of uniting an extra-conscious realism with an all-revealing ephemeral consciousness, Mr. Montgomery has propounded a very suggestive view-point in his contention that vital function presents analogies which are of fundamental value in the treatment of the old paradoxes of the Many and the One, etc. This he limits too narrowly, indeed, to the ordinary biological or sub-human organization. Withal, however, it is suggestive, as Royce, James, and Taylor among others have recently shown. Such a position, however, will never receive due recognition until it has freed itself from the limits of Realism, whether Transfigured or Ideal-Real, and until it has wrought itself upon a basis which is objectively Idealistic, into a theory which is essentially Humanistic, and by means of a methodology which is concretely and individually teleological, *i. e.*, Pragmatic.

S. F. MACLENNAN.

OBERLIN COLLEGE.

The following books also have been received :

Nietzsche in Outline and Aphorism. By A. R. ORAGE. Edinburgh and London, T. N. Foulis, 1907. — pp. viii, 188.

The Will to Doubt: An Essay in Philosophy for the General Thinker. By ALFRED H. LLOYD. London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Lim., 1907. — pp. xi, 285. 4s. 6d.

- The Philosophical Basis of Religion.* By JOHN WATSON. Glasgow, James Maclehose and Sons; New York, The Macmillan Co., 1907.—pp. xxvi, 485. \$3.00.
- The Early Traditions of Genesis.* By ALEX. R. GORDON. Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark; imported by Charles Scribner's Sons, 1907.—pp. xii, 348.
- The Pastoral Teaching of St. Paul: His Ministerial Ideals.* By W. EDWARD CHADWICK. Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark; imported by Charles Scribner's Sons, 1907.—pp. xxii, 394.
- Jesus Christ the Son of God.* By WILLIAM MALCOLM MACGREGOR. Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark; imported by Charles Scribner's Sons, 1907.—pp. xi, 284.
- The Inward Light.* By H. FIELDING HALL. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1908.—pp. viii, 228. \$1.75.
- The Philosophy of History.* By S. S. HEBBERD. Revised edition. New York, Maspeth Publishing House, 1908.—pp. 307. \$1.50.
- The Psychology and Pedagogy of Reading.* By EDMUND BURKE HUEY. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1908.—pp. xvi, 469. \$1.40.
- Value and Distribution: A Critical and Constructive Study.* By HERBERT JOSEPH DAVENPORT. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1908.—pp. xi, 582. \$3.72.
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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scolastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I. Abtl.: Zeitschrift für Psychologie.* — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS.

Über den Begriff und den Satz des Bewusstseins. MAX FRISCHEISEN-KÖHLER. *V. f. w. Ph.*, XXXI, 2, pp. 145-201.

Everything that enters into experience is a fact of consciousness. The whole world, both psychical and extramental, is in the first place given as content of consciousness. Thus the starting-point of all experience lies in consciousness or in the awareness of the events of consciousness. Are ideas only facts of consciousness, phenomena, and perhaps proofs of a transcendent being distinct from them? Or can they themselves be considered as something transcendent, to which belongs a being without any reference to consciousness? Or are both alternatives impossible, and is pure phenomenology the only philosophic standpoint? The investigation of these questions constitutes the fundamental problem of philosophy; and their solution depends largely on the clearness of the all-important concept consciousness. In its psychological sense, consciousness means the sum-total of psychical events which are correlative to organic functions. This is to be distinguished from transcendental consciousness, on which depends the possibility of a valid judgment. This transcendental consciousness is only an empty abstraction, a thought in the psychological I; but it is the chief condition on which depends the possibility and existence of the ideal world of thought. How, then, is the content of the given, which we must first consider as a complex of sensations, related to this double concept of consciousness? The relation between sensation and the concept of transcendental consciousness is of a purely logical nature. Transcendental logic has nothing to do with the determinate being of things and their characteristics, but only with their knowability. It has not to deal with being as such, but only with judgments about being. The solution of the problem

of transcendental logic can therefore have no value as the solution of the general problem of knowledge. The constitutive categories are only abstract expressions for the different ways in which our understanding combines sense-intuitions, and for this very reason the sphere of their validity is limited to the world of appearances. If this combination is an intellectual function of our own consciousness, we are landed in Solipsism. We can avert this, however, and preserve the actuality of the categories, as Critical Idealism does, by rendering the transcendental deduction objective. For if I think over the conditions on which alone the experience of the individual subject is possible, I am necessarily led to the assumption of a rational order, independent of this subject, which must be objectively valid for every subject. Difficulties arise with regard to this problem, in order to remove which an enquiry into the psychology of sensation is necessary. The theory which, contrary to the testimony of inner experience, classifies sensations as elements of the mental life, had its rise in the mechanical view of the world during the seventeenth century. If one understands consciousness in the psychological sense, as the sum of psychical events, the question as to the dependence of sensations on this consciousness is comparatively easy to settle; for mental events cannot be taken as the condition of the existence of sensations as phenomena. Inner experience justifies the view that sensations are independent of the laws of mental events, and have an independent reality of their own. A common characteristic belongs alike to sensations and to mental events, which we designate the characteristic of being known. Every experience is accompanied by a kind of knowledge which, if not in the act of experience itself, yet in reflection on it can be expressed in an existential judgment. By consciousness we can therefore understand that which, preceding all knowledge, is the condition of awareness in all experience. Over the psychological consciousness, which is only the content of the psychological process, and over the transcendental consciousness, rises this primary consciousness which is the condition of all knowledge. If we introduce this concept of consciousness into the discussion of the sensation problem, and especially into the question concerning the dependence of the given on consciousness, we arrive at an important result. Sense-qualities have no object. They bear no relation to an other which they are not, but through which they first become what they are. In them the real and what Brentano calls the 'intentional' content coincide. Sensation and consciousness are not two factors in coexistence, but form an inseparable whole; only in reflection can they be distinguished as moments. Sensation includes a continual reference to consciousness, and hence contains no positive meaning apart from it. This is, however, not equivalent to saying that it is only subjectively given. It is futile to ask whether sensations have an existence independent of consciousness. The whole content of experience is content of consciousness. Thus there is no sense in saying that the content of consciousness is only phenomena for a subject. All our experience must come under the condition of being

a fact of consciousness. But this consciousness which is the condition of all experience is not my consciousness : it has nothing individual in it ; it is impersonal ; it embraces the totality of all experience. This experience in general is not only logically related to my experience, but includes it in itself. Whether the word ' I ' is taken in its psychophysical or in its psychological meaning, it possesses the same kind of existence and becomes known in the same way as other things in space and time. Every attempt to comprehend consciousness as a function of an unconscious shows only the impossibility of such an undertaking. We do not raise the question whether human thought can pass beyond the limits of consciousness. It is enough here that outer world and inner world stand in like dependence on this consciousness. The gist of the proof for the reality of an outer world independent of our self lies in the evidence that it is not only inferred from the data of experience, but is included in the relation of impulse and restraint. Subject and object are within consciousness given as correlatives. In the sphere of external events, the ' You ' now appears as a strange self ; but the inference of the ' You ' is no step into the transcendent. The whole earth is only a world of appearances ; it is a dream, an illusion, if you will, but it is not *my* dream. In this sense the fact that the world is a phenomenon does not alter the stability of its physical nature. The principle of consciousness, far from explaining away the world of hard facts, is a sufficient guarantee of its empirical reality.

M. MOLLOY.

Beschreibung und Einschränkung. JULIUS PIKLER. V. f. w. Ph., XXXI, 3, pp. 313-335.

Ernst Mach defines natural law as 'limitation of experience' rather than 'description,' which he considers 'a naturalized term.' The purpose of the paper is to examine this view. Two questions are asked : (1) Is 'limitation' merely a new term for the same thing, or does it mean something different from 'description' ? (2) Is science, if the latter be the case, limitation *or* description ? As regards the first question, then, what is the relation between limitation and description ? Limitation implies the consciousness of the exclusion of possibilities. Description means answering questions which might be asked. Kirchhoff, who 'naturalized' the term, never uses it in this sense as identical with limitation. What Kirchhoff means by 'description,' Mach calls 'Mitteilung,' and Avenarius 'theoretical apperception.' While limitation and description are mutually necessitated, it is evident that they are two different things ; they are used as identical neither by Mach nor by his followers. A limitation can be communicated through lingual description only in case the one addressed knows from his own perception the precluded possibilities not indicated in the description. The understanding of the lingual communication of a description presupposes this acquaintance on the part of the one addressed with the excluded possibilities implied in the 'Mitteilung.' Turning now to the second ques-

tion, is science description *or* limitation? In the case of science in general, it is limitation. The joy of description is an artistic, poetic joy; but a scientific judgment requires limitation. The material of science is not a chaotic heap of sensations, but sensations standing in relation to an object, which give rise to questions. The goal of science is not to establish the coherence of those sensations through description, but rather to determine these questions through limitation. Laws can contain no descriptions which are unessential to the goal of limitation. Science often understands by 'true' that which is useful from the standpoint of limitation. Only distinctions experimentally established are not 'descriptions of facts happening in nature,' to use Kirchhoff's expression. In general, the communication of science through speech-description demands that the one addressed should have the same possibilities in view as the speaker or writer. Turning now to practical science, we find that it, too, like science in general, consists not in descriptions but in limitations. Science conducts our affairs through the limitations of their thinkable issues, and that is its exclusive practical content. Knowledge of nature is practically necessary for the attainment of such limitations. The contention that science is a description of facts occurring in nature, is, therefore, doubly false as regards practical science.

R. A. TSANOFF.

The Nature of the Soul and the Possibility of a Psycho-Mechanic. C. L. HERRICK. Psych. Rev., XIV, 3, pp. 205-228.

One may accept the doctrine that energy is the real, and that its 'standing in relation,' or limitation, is the basis of substance, while still recognizing the fundamental contrast between the self and the outside world. A certain form of energy, expressed in alternating modes, impinges on equilibrated energy in an animal organism in such forms as to modify the latter. The equilibrated organism is affected, and the equation of the subsequent life of the equilibrium is permanently modified. The first result is a state (act) of consciousness; but only one such interference can occur at any given moment of time. Then experience is composed of a series of impressions, and these are projected as a phenomenal series. Now, along with the experience series is a constant from the organism, the recognition of which gives rise to the feeling of a continuous self, an unvaried, unanalyzable experience. Similarly, along with the phenomenal series is a constant which produces the sense of an external continuum. The spiritualist regards the two ways of looking at activity as two incommensurable and coexisting realities, and gives to the psychical a separate objective existence. While denying this, the author holds that the psychical is *sui generis*, entirely other than and non-commensurable with any physical process. Repeated sensation results in permanent distortion of the equilibrium, so, as a result of experience, each stimulus brings a perfect rain of activities, and this complex of inner and outer elements is the external

world. The reality consists in thinking a thing, in affirmation of attribute, in union of subject and object. This connects us, as souls, with the rest of the universe, and the psychical and physical differ only as the result of logical analysis. From the concept of the unity of energy we attempt a psycho-mechanic. From our point of view, only one preliminary concept is necessary, viz., that the mechanism of consciousness is dynamic. This presupposition links psychical phenomena to the world of experience. Another attribute of the soul is, that it is an indivisible continuum and is simple. Consciousness is unitary, yet complex. On the dynamic view, one condition alone corresponds to the requirements of the given phenomena, and that is a condition of equilibrium, which alone can unify diverse processes. The highest reality in my being is the stream of consciousness, which constitutes myself as I know myself. This soul, by current definition, is the sum of conscious activities. But because we can analyze human activities into various departments, it does not follow that the realities back of these departments are separate or independent. Of course, for purposes of scientific description, the content of sense must be objectivized. In this sense the subjective is always epiphenomenal to science, which must rest content with her equilibriums and her algebraic expressions therefor. Accepting the dynamic view and admitting the best known of all facts, *i. e.*, the effect of mind on body and body on mind, we recognize that the unity of soul and body is an organic one. This is life. Thus the psychical equilibrium is part of a more general vital equilibrium. The article ends with some historical notes which show the hopeless confusion in modern psychological literature regarding the concept of soul. A supplementary note mentions some theories similar to those of the author.

E. JORDAN.

PSYCHOLOGY.

La perception du temps. B. BOURDON. Rev. Ph., XXXII, 5, pp. 449-492.

All phenomena having a duration of more than a minimum have for perception a certain duration, and can be perceived in the relation of simultaneity or of succession. Duration and position in time can be traced back to nothing more elemental. Nor does duration occur in isolation; it is a property of phenomena, and is as irreducible as intensity, color, number, etc. The sensation of duration increases to a certain point with the duration of the excitant. After some seconds it gradually loses its unity; there is produced an association of memory and perception, while the estimation of the duration becomes less precise, absolutely and relatively. By the end of one minute it has very little precision. A unified and precise sensation of duration is only possible for sensations of less than about ten seconds. The distinction of full and empty durations has little value. An empty duration is really always filled by some sensation or representation. The objective duration appears the same by

whatever sense we perceive it. Probably our facility in comparing these heterogeneous durations, in associating the representations of a predominant kind with those of all other kinds, of substituting the estimation of duration from one kind with another has been acquired. By the simultaneous impression of different senses an assimilation of the sensations of duration has occurred. In the writer's own case, the sense of touch, including vocal and motor representations, preponderates in his perception of duration. This special sense peponderance varies with the individual. Visual representations probably play a small part in perception of duration. The persistence of impressions in these different sense departments influences the relative estimation of duration. The normal sensation of duration is that of continuous duration. The perception of succession presupposes a psychological synthesis of the succeeding impressions. This synthesis is only possible when the intervals between the impressions are not more than a few seconds. The maximum interval of succession perceptible probably equals the maximum perceptible duration. We cannot perceive long durations, as that of a month or a year. Psychologically, a year is only a duration as the temperature of 1000° is a temperature. The frequent use of the same words, 'length,' 'interval,' 'position,' etc., for time and space is explained by the fact that time and space are often associated in our experience. Notions of past, present, and future are simple cases of before and after. The future is usually spatially before us and the past behind us. Association by contiguity in time, recollection of dates, and reasoning serve to localize in past and future.

C. WEST.

Les caractères affectifs de la perception. DR. WAYNBAUM. J. de Psych., IV, 4, pp. 289-311.

There are two classes of perceptions, each of which is affective in its character. In the case of the first class, perception becomes affective because the mass of stimuli or sensations in the perception lacks the usual intellectual process or is found in contradiction with it. In the case of the second class, perception acquires affective color, because the emotive element is already contained in the perception, which comes from the external world. If the habitual conscious product of perception is an intellectual state, it is because the perception takes into account the subject's previous knowledge. If something unknown or unexpected frightens us, the result of perception will be entirely different; we shall be affected by an emotional shock more or less intense. If one sees or hears something unusual or unexpected, there will be nothing else but to receive it. The first effect of the perception is thus to arouse an emotion. Properly speaking, the perception resolves itself into two times. In the first time there is the 'émotivité' produced by the absence of representation, and in the second time there is recognition of the external impression or the inhibition of the 'émotivité'; but these two times, purely theoretical, follow one after

the other with such rapidity that the whole process is simply an affective perception. The author represents the physiological process by a concise diagram. According to the description, external impression proceeds horizontally toward the central nuclei of the perceptive organ, then usually vertically up to the superior cortical centres ; but here is a possible bifurcation at the centre of the perceptive organ, *i. e.*, in the case of the absence of representation, the impression passes horizontally to the centre of organic life or the general centre of emotion on the floor of the fourth ventricle, at the level of the pont de Varale. But it should be understood that the direction of these intercentral paths can be reversed, for it is well known that an emotional state reacts upon our psychic state and even produces perceptive hallucinations. With infants, almost all perceptions will follow the direct horizontal path to the emotional centre, because generally they do not have any definite notions or preconceptions. Any habitual perception loses its affective character, and becomes a purely intellectual process, because the perception, by producing the notion, will directly pass to the superior cortical centres instead of proceeding to the emotional centre. Thus the 'affectivité' of perception is in inverse ratio to perception. The typical example of the second class of affective perception is sympathy, whose original emotive states are due to the external affective elements contained in, and carried by, a certain class of perceptions. The second class of affective perceptions differs also from the first in this point, that the perception follows the vertical ascending path instead of directly proceeding to the emotional centre, and then takes the descending path to the same emotional centre. In conclusion the author declares that the greater part of our perception is purely intellectual, while the remainder is exclusively affective ; but this perceptive 'affectivité' can be in turn intellectual or reflective in its origin.

T. NAKASHIMA.

De quelques propriétés du fait mental. EDMÉ TASSY. *J. de Psy.*, IV, 3, pp. 193-215.

Intelligent life may be functionally divided into a feeling life, a mental life, and a psychic life, as mental pathology tends to prove. By mental life is meant that which affects the cerebral mechanism. The need of expression is a need of intellectual activity which can be reduced to a need of muscular activity, and this is a fact of mental life. Thought solicits organic activity, muscular or glandular. The idea and its phenomenon are a single phenomenon. Again, the sensation of an object is equivalent to its expression, and the sensation is the expression of the image. These, then, belong to mental life also. Ideational and muscular force, therefore, are identical. And this is confirmed by the observation that muscular force is increased during intellectual effort, and inversely ; proving that thought is not supported by a special force. As a consequence, ideas are often aroused not by external association, but by an internal dynamic diffu-

sion. The work of association of ideas is also facilitated by the mental sensation. Molecular movements of cerebral cells, not responding to external excitation, and exercised contrary to their normal activity, are perceived as a vague, infinitely attenuated sensation, the mental sensation, which is without the field of ideation but communicates with it. Every impression of exaltation, the beautiful idea, the word-play, rhyme and rhythm, all occasion mental sensations, sensations lacking a work in the past. So also does what is new bring a mental sensation. When this sensation is not useful for the progress of ideation, it provokes the laugh reflex. The mental fact is a distinct mechanism continuing the sensorial. It translates to thought the bodily reaction to quantitative external excitation. Careful investigation of mental life, as distinguished from the psychic, would facilitate very much an understanding of the psychic.

C. WEST.

La conscience sociale : catégories logiques. A. CHIDE. Rev. Ph., XXXII, 1, pp. 41-65.

Within each social group is gradually formed a chaotic consciousness, an ill-assured unification of disparate elements, which presents a striking analogy to that of the individual consciousness. Each distinct consciousness is governed by differing logical, æsthetic, and moral categories, justifying the aphorism, 'Truth on this side the Pyrenees is error on the other side.' Montesquieu's disciples find in these disparate formulations the result of environment and of the nature of things, — a naturalistic effort to reestablish unity, such as Rationalism had made by means of the category of cause and effect. But if in the individual, as in each social group, there is a logical movement, its categories are often the result of chance, and not of assignable physical laws. The unifying of an existence is a work of artificial construction. The unifying idea often does not appear until the end, if at all; and the material influence is usually the smallest. One finds a common thought uniting a scattered people, or a common dream or a common hatred, such as unites the Jews; and some nations, indeed, never mature into unity for the lack of topographical limits, while others mature too quickly because of obstacles which throw them back upon themselves. If natural boundaries and climate are unifying factors, however, much more are myths and the deeds of heroes. As in the social, so in the individual consciousness, the most diverse categories control without the power to synthesize themselves into a concept. Over the Rationalist's philosophy of concepts the Pragmatist seems to have triumphed in his exaltation of life with its incoherences, if he dare not go so far as to avow that the illogism of life shatters the concepts one imposes upon it. But the supposed illogism of life is in reality composed of an infinity of equally important logics. To live is to deduce a principle, and lives without a fixed concept are yet possible syntheses, and are perhaps more vitally synthesized.

C. WEST.

ETHICS.

Immortality. JOSIAH ROYCE. The Hibbert Journal, V, 4, pp. 724-744.

In our discussion of immortality, time must in some sense be treated as a reality. If God as God absolutely foreknows, time is for him an eternal present, a total expression of his will which he views as one whole. Time is in God rather than God in time. Hence there can be no absolute loss of what is once to be viewed as real. We often ascribe true reality to the present only, yet it has no duration, but vanishes immediately and becomes past. Time thus defined consists of two unreal regions. But to the being who looks before and after, the past and future are especially real. Time is an essential practical aspect of reality, which derives its meaning from the nature and from the life of the will. And when I acknowledge one universal world-time, I do so only by extending the conception of the will to the whole world. All our wills are together partial expressions of the world-will which is continuous with our own. I came into existence when the world-will needed my deeds; if ever I in my private personality cease to exist, the world-will will thenceforth presuppose my deeds as irrevocably done. Time distinctions, then, are relative to deeds and meanings, and some idea of time must enter into the real world. There might be individual lives whose meaning would require them to be endless. There is no loss of individuality in the infinitely complex unity of the world-will. Through these individual lives the world-will finds expression. God is the totality of the expression of the world-will when considered in its conscious unity. The concept of personality is an ethical concept. Man as an ethical being is what he purposes to be, so far as his purpose is temporally expressed. His worth lies in the seriousness of his intent to express himself. The sinner is not yet true to his own will, is not yet his ideal self. Both saint and sinner are dissatisfied; the saint with his opportunity to express himself, the conscious sinner with the will he is trying to express. Dissatisfaction arises from the need that the eternal should be expressed through the temporal. God is dissatisfied with me in so far as he is partially expressed in me. This dissatisfaction, then, is my personality. Divine satisfaction can be attained solely through the deeds of the individual. This is our rational warrant for insisting that every rational person has in the endless temporal order an opportunity for an endless series of deeds.

F. A. PEEK.

The Ultimate Value of Experience. S. S. COLVIN. Psych. Rev., XIV, 4, pp. 254-263.

Ultimate experience cannot be known as such, for only objects can be known. Still ultimate experience is an actual reality. It cannot be described except by saying that it does not possess the attributes of objects of experience. There is in the experience of every person a group of objects,

— the core of our objective existence, — which may be taken as a symbol of pure experience. This seems to possess ultimate value in itself. Out of this immediate experience have arisen utilitarianism and pragmatism. Utilitarianism has assumed the validity of this immediate experience in its doctrine of pleasure as the goal of striving ; pragmatism has made a similar assumption in its doctrine of satisfaction as the badge of truth. Both beliefs have, however, departed from the immanent point of view. Moreover, utilitarianism has failed to take account of the goodness that is good in itself. In like manner, pragmatism has failed to note the truth that is self-contained and unconditioned. Both have disregarded the ultimate value of that part of our experience that is relatively subjective. On the other hand, intuitive ethics and absolute logic both take account of the immediate aspect of experience.

C. H. WILLIAMS.

Self-Realization as the Moral End. H. L. STEWART. Int. J. E., XVII, 4, pp. 483-490.

It is desired to vindicate self-realization as the moral end. The first criticism usually is, that to define man's duty as his social function is to move in a circle. It should be remembered that a similar criticism of utilitarianism has lost its former force ; moreover, a mere tautology could not have had the effect on other theories which self-realization has had. The second criticism is that self-realization is vague and inapplicable in concrete cases. This might be urged against any theory ; but, aside from that, whatever vagueness there is, is due, not to any defect in the criterion, but to incomplete knowledge of the circumstances. Even the physicist may be baffled by the many competing forces, his principle remaining true ; this may be true of the moralist also. Bradley urges that self-assertion contradicts self-denial. While such conflicts are natural with partial knowledge of circumstances, it seems that the antithesis as here urged is due to a confusion of 'right' and 'good.' For perfect knowledge, self-denial is but a form of self-realization. The fourth criticism, that virtue is reduced to a form of knowledge, would apply as well to any other standard. In any case, it may be answered by pointing out that a criterion must be clearly apprehended, not by those who act upon it, but only by those who formulate its theory.

C. H. WILLIAMS.

The Ought and Reality. J. E. BOODIN. Int. J. E., XVII, 4, pp. 454-474.

Physical science describes reality in terms of three dimensions, space, time, and energy ; it implies another, that of meaning. Without this, truth and error are the same, and any philosophy is impossible. To have meaning, it is necessary that there be flux and an absolute direction (ought) eliminating what is contrary. This direction is not constituted by what

each individual desires ; for impulses conflict, and, moreover, the ideal refers to a constitution beyond impulse. Nor can self-realization furnish a standard ; for (1) it does not tell what kind of self is to be realized, and (2) it assumes harmony with race ideals, which, being subject to the law of survival, themselves imply direction. Neither can social agreement or individual reason furnish a standard, for both are relative. So only absolute direction, or 'ought,' remains. The concept of validity requires one of two standards,—an all-embracing, eternal consciousness or an absolute direction. On the basis of the former, we cannot explain finitude, change, or plurality. On the basis of the latter, the problem of the one and the many finds its solution ; for the absolute direction furnishes the necessary unifying principle, while the diversity of the stuff to be transformed accounts for plurality. It also gives a standard of worth. Immortality can have meaning only on the basis of absolute direction, for the question of survival is one of worth. This direction, this 'ought,' cannot create its content or arrest the flux, but it can determine that the worthy shall survive. Though the 'ought' is non-being, *i. e.*, not stuff, it is no less real. Not being stuff, it is not subject to time or process and so is eternal. The evidence of this fourth dimension is our developed feeling of 'ought.' We can characterize the 'ought' only in general terms ; it is orderliness and comprehensiveness ; it determines the direction of the historic process. God himself is determined by the 'ought.' Causality, also, is relative to this criterion, which is an independent variable. There is evil in the world, but the unworthy will ultimately be eliminated. Still, since the world is process, the absolute system of truth will ever be the yet-unborn. Our guide in life must be the 'ought' as exhibited in the direction of human history.

C. H. WILLIAMS.

Le matérialisme historique. B. JACOB. Rev. de Mét., XV, 4, pp. 401-420.

Historical materialism, the doctrine that economic considerations alone determine all the activities, institutions, and ideas of men, is best understood in connection with the psychological doctrine of epiphenomenalism. Both, the one in the individual, the other in the social life, regard the higher forms,—consciousness itself in the one case, jurisprudence, politics, religion, etc., in the other,—as superficial manifestations of underlying material realities. Historical materialism often furnishes a plausible explanation of political phenomena ; economic conditions no doubt often shed light on party and class struggles. The same method of interpretation may also be applied to religious and moral phenomena : not when Christianity began to preach human worth, but when economic conditions were ripe, slavery disappeared ; and ideas of duty and right always depend on the nature of the economic system in which they arise and develop. This account is in a sense true ; but it is incomplete, and becomes false if

taken for the whole truth. Man is social ; his feelings, purposes, and ideals count no less than economic conditions, which often depend on them for their full effect. Political, religious, moral, or intellectual ideals may be ends in themselves, and may bring about vast changes while economic conditions remain unaltered. Not new methods of production and exchange, but spiritual ideals, have produced the world's great religions ; and religious exaltation may come not only from material misery and economic oppression, but from joy and happiness as well. Freedom of thought, if related to free competition at all, is its cause, not its effect. The moral code of class hatred is due to socialistic agitation, not to economic changes as such. Moral ideas may actually ameliorate the economic conditions of which they are on this theory supposed to be the epiphenomenal results. Civilization, on its spiritual side, has its own laws of development, and is relatively independent of economics. The material conditions of the development do not constitute the complete cause. The more critical socialists now accept historical materialism only in a modified form, less paradoxical and less original, holding only that economic conditions are the chief cause, not the sole cause, of historical development. But even this we cannot admit ; intellectual, philosophical, psychological, sociological, and historical conditions are at least equally important. The same economic foundation may support the most various superstructures. The milder form of historical materialism, if less false than the extreme form, is hardly less dangerous. Progress must come by moral, not merely by material changes ; otherwise the new régime may retain all the vices of the old, and mere economic advance may be a very doubtful gain. Without denying the influence of economic conditions, we must insist that they are neither the sole nor the chief cause of historical development. Progress has always depended, and will more and more depend hereafter, on spiritual forces ; education of mind and heart will accomplish more than will mere reform of social conditions.

F. D. MITCHELL.

NOTES.

The Third International Congress for Philosophy will be held at Heidelberg, September 1-5, 1908. The Congress will hold four general sessions, and will be divided into sections as follows: History of Philosophy; General Philosophy, Metaphysics, and Philosophy of Nature; Psychology; Logic and Epistemology; Ethics; Æsthetics; Philosophy of Religion. It is probable that the International Congress for the History of the Natural Sciences will arrange its sessions for the same time and place.

The first six of the first series of Gifford Lectures for 1907-8 at the University of St. Andrews were delivered by Professor James Ward, of Cambridge, December 7 to 17. The general subject was "The Realm of Ends," and the subjects of the individual lectures, which fell under the subdivision "Pluralism," were: "Introductory," "The One and the Many," "Pluralism," "The Contingency in the World," "Evolution as Epigenesis and Equilibration," and "The Goal of the Higher Life."

Mr. William Warde Fowler, of Lincoln College, Oxford, author of various works on Roman religion, has been appointed Gifford Lecturer at the University of Edinburgh for the years 1909-1911.

We have received the first number of the Harvard Theological Review, a quarterly magazine issued by the Faculty of Divinity in Harvard University, under a partial endowment by a bequest of the late Miss Mildred Everett. The contributors include Francis G. Peabody, Arthur C. McGiffert, William Adams Brown, Benjamin W. Bacon, David G. Lyon, Thomas N. Carver, and Charles F. Dole.

Dr. Émile Boutroux, Professor of the History of Modern Philosophy in the University of Paris, has retired. Dr. L. Lévy-Brühl has been appointed his successor.

Messrs. Swan Sonnenschein & Co. announce for early publication, in Professor Muirhead's "Library of Philosophy," a work by Professor Wilbur M. Urban, of Trinity College, Hartford, on *Valuation: Its Nature and Laws*.

Professor William James's Gifford Lectures on *The Varieties of Religious Experience* have been translated into German by Dr. Georg Wobbermin, of Breslau, under the title *Die religiöse Erfahrung in ihrer Mannigfaltigkeit*.

The Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology held its third annual meeting in Washington, D. C., February 25-27.

We give below a list of the articles, etc., in the current philosophical periodicals:

MIND, No. 65: *Hubert Foston*, Non-Phenomenality and Otherness; *The Editor*, Immediacy, Mediacy, and Coherence; *Mary Hay Wood*, Plato's Psychology in Its Bearing on the Development of Will (1); *Carveth Read*, A Posthumous Chapter by J. S. Mill; Discussions; Critical Notices; New Books; Philosophical Periodicals; Notes.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL, VI, 2: *George Tyrrell*, The Prospects of Modernism; *Father Gerard*, The Papal Encyclical from a Catholic's Point of View; *L. Henry Schwab*, The Papacy in Its Relation to American Ideals; *The Bishop of Carlisle*, The Catholic Church: What Is It? *Sir Oliver Lodge*, The Immortality of the soul; *Wm. Wallace*, The Religion of Sensible Scotsmen; *Nathaniel Schmidt*, The "Jerahmeel" Theory, and the Historic Importance of the Negeb; *J. H. Muirhead*, Religion a Necessary Constituent in All Education; *George A. Coe*, The Sources of the Mystical Revelation; *Mrs. Stuart Moore*, The Magic and Mysticism of To-day; *Wm. Adams Brown*, The Reasonableness of Christian Faith; *L. P. Jacks*, The Alchemy of Thought; Discussions; Reviews; Bibliography of Recent Literature.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, XVIII, 2: *Ramsden Balfour*, The Moral Development of the Native Races in South Africa; *John A. Ryan*, Is Stock Watering Immoral? *Chester Holcombe*, Oriental Ethics Compared with Western Systems; *E. Boutroux*, The Psychology of Mysticism; *Chas. W. Super*, Motive in Conduct; *Ira W. Howerth*, The Social Ideal; *Charles Theodore Burnett*, A Fundamental Test for Determinism; Book Reviews.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, XV, 1: *H. R. Marshall*, The Methods of the Naturalist and Psychologist; *G. M. Fernald*, The Effect of Brightness of Background on the Appearance of Color-Stimuli in Peripheral Vision; *B. Sidis*, The Doctrine of Primary and Secondary Sensory Elements (1).

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, V, 1: *Edward Franklin Buchner*, Psychological Progress in 1907; Psychological Literature; *Mary W. Calkins*, The Ego and Empirical Psychology; Books Received; Notes and News.

V, 2: Proceedings of the American Psychological Association, Chicago, December-January, 1907-8; Psychological Literature; Discussion and Correspondence; Books Received; Notes and News.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, XIX, 1: *William Morton Wheeler*, Vestigial Instincts in Insects and Other Animals; *William H. Burnham*, Attention and Interest; *Alexander F. Chamberlain*, Notes on Some Aspects of the Folk-Psychology of Night; *Florence Bernice Barnes*, Some Aspects of Memory in the Insane; *C. E. Ferree*, The Intermittence of Minimal Visual Sensations; *Timothy J. Stevenson* and *E. C. Sanford*, A Preliminary Report of Experiments on Time Relations in Binocular Vision; *E. B. Titchener*, The Method of Impression and Some Recent Criticism; Psychological Literature; Book Notes.

THE MONIST, XVIII, 1: *W. E. Ayton Wilkinson*, Will-Force and the Conservation of Energy; *Wm. Pepperrell Montague*, Are Mental Processes in Space? *Editor*, A Monistic Conception of Consciousness; *Lynn Thorndike*, The Attitude of Origen and Augustine toward Magic; *John Wright Buckham*, The return to the Truth in Mysticism; *Editor*, Mysticism; *Arthur Mac Donald*, Moral Stigmata of Degeneration; *Editor*, Ernst Mach, in Congratulation on His Seventieth Birthday; Criticisms and Discussions; Book Reviews and Notes.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, V, 1: *Arthur O. Lovejoy*, The Thirteen Pragmatisms (I); *Mary Whiton Calkins*, Psychology as Science of Self: (I) Is the Self Body or Has It Body? Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

V, 2: *Arthur O. Lovejoy*, The Thirteen Pragmatisms (II); *George P. Adams*, Sub Specie Aeternitatis; Societies; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

V, 3: *Archibald B. D. Alexander*, Kuno Fischer: An Estimate of His Life and Work; *Mary Whiton Calkins*, Psychology as Science of Self: (II) The Nature of the Self; Discussion; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

V, 4: *John Dewey*, What Does Pragmatism Mean by Practical? Discussion; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

ARCHIV FÜR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE, XIV, 2: *Max Leopold*, Leibnizens Lehre von der Körperwelt als Kernpunkt des Systems (Schluss); *Basilius Antoniadès*, Die Staatslehre des Mariana; *Ernst Schwarz*, Beiträge zur Kantkritik; *D. Adolf Müller*, Die Religionsphilosophie Teichmüllers; *Wolfgang Schultz*, ΠΥΘΑΓΟΡΑΣ; Jahresbericht über sämtliche Erscheinungen auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte der Philosophie; Die neuesten Erscheinungen auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte der Philosophie; Zeitschriften.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE, XLVI, 4; *Rich. Müller-Freienfels*, Zur Theorie der Gefühlstöne der Farbenempfindungen; *Richard Herbertz*, Die angeblich falsche Wissenstheorie der Psychologie; Literaturbericht.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, XXXIII, 1: *A. Lalande*, Pragmatisme, humanisme et vérité; *F. Paulhan*, La contradiction de l'homme; *J. J. van Biervliet*, La psychologie quantitative (fin); *Dr. Jankelevitch*, Guerre et pacifisme, d'après des ouvrages récents; Analyses et comptes rendus; Revue des périodiques étrangers; Nécrologie.

XXXIII, 2: *Maurice Millioud*, Essai sur l'histoire naturelle des idées; *F. Paulhan*, La contradiction de l'homme (fin); *Dr. Champeaux*, Une critique des langues conventionnelles; *G. Dumas*, La logique d'un dément; Analyses et comptes rendus; Notices bibliographiques; Revue des périodiques étrangers.

REVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE, VIII, 1: *Gabriel Dromard*, Les éléments moteurs de l'émotion esthétique; *E. Peillaube*, L'organisation de la mémoire: (II) Vie latente des souvenirs; *J. Martin*, Une histoire des idées esthétiques; *La Direction*, Par exploit d'huissier; Analyses et comptes rendus; Périodiques; L'enseignement philosophique.

VIII, 2: *La Direction*, Enquête sur l'idée de démocratie; *Phillippe Borrell*, L'idée de démocratie; *Camille de Beaupuy*, L'argument de saint Anselme est *a posteriori*; *P. Duhem*, Le mouvement absolu et le mouvement relatif (IV); *Étienne Rome*, Le dualisme pascalien; Analyses et comptes rendus; Périodiques.

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE, XVI, 1: *Émile Boutroux*, William James et l'expérience religieuse; *H. Bergson*, À propos de l' "Évolution de l'intelligence géométrique"; *H. Bouasse*, Évolution de la matière et physique des corps solides; *G. Dwelshauvers*, De l'intuition dans l'acte de l'esprit; Études critiques; Discussions; Questions pratiques; Supplément.

REVUE NÉO-SCOLASTIQUE, XIV, 4: *N. Balthasar*, Le problème de Dieu d'après la philosophie nouvelle; *M. de Wulf*, Première leçon d'esthétique; *A. Michotte*, À propos de la "méthode d'introspection" dans la psychologie expérimentale; *P. Madonnet*, Le traité "De erroribus philosophorum" (XIII^e siècle); *M. de Wulf*, Bulletin d'histoire de la philosophie médiévale; Mélanges et documents; Bulletin de l'Institut de Philosophie; Comptes rendus; Ouvrages envoyés à la rédaction; Supplément.

JOURNAL DE PSYCHOLOGIE NORMALE ET PATHOLOGIQUE, IV, 6: *Dr. Grasset*, La responsabilité des criminels devant le Congrès des aliénistes et neurologistes de Genève; *Revaull d'Allonnes*, L'explication physiologique de l'émotion; Société de Psychologie; Bibliographie.

RIVISTA FILOSOFICA, X, 4: *B. Varisco*, Che cosa consti; *S. Tedeschi*, Valore e abitudine; *G. Salvadori*, Fede e ragione (fine); *L. Miranda*, La posizione logica del rapporto giuridico; Attualità; Rassegna bibliografica; Il Congresso di Parma; Discussioni; Sommario delle riviste straniere; Libri ricevuti.

X, 5: *E. Juvatta*, Il metodo dell'economia pura nell'etica; *G. Rossi*, Vico ne'tempi di Vico; *E. Morselli*, Vita morale e vita sociale; *E. Di Carlo*, La filosofia del diritto ridotta alla filosofia dell'economia; *A. Faggi*, Un poeta filosofo (Sully Prudhomme); Rassegna Bibliografica; Bollettino bibliografico; Articoli di riviste straniere; Notizie e pubblicazioni; Fuori di programma; Sommari delle riviste straniere; Libri ricevuti; Indice dell'annata.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

THE OBJECTIVITY OF THE MORAL JUDGMENT.¹

THE sphere of ethical investigation includes the two distinct though related subjects of the right and the good. The problem of objectivity, therefore, arises for ethics at two different points. In the address of to-day, however, I shall attempt to deal with it only in connection with the right.

The great historical methods of establishing the objectivity of the judgment of right are, as is well known, two in number. The first is that of Rationalism. It asserts the universal existence in man of certain moral judgments which are the product of reason, reason being defined as the faculty of apprehending necessary truths, — truths which the senses are unable to supply. From the very definition of reason it follows that these judgments are regarded not merely as mental facts, but as in some way the revelation of that which exists independently of them.

The second method is that which finds its characteristic expressions in the writings of the Egoistic Psychological Hedonists, on the one hand, and in many of the Egoistic Perfectionists, as Green, on the other. The method of both parties is fundamentally the same. On the basis of the obvious fact that morality must represent a possible mode of conduct, they start with an analysis of motives. The infinite diversity of human conduct is first reduced to the expression of a single desire. With the actual attainment of the desired end as the result of superior insight and firmness of will you are thereupon invited to identify morality.

It is not my purpose to make a systematic examination of the

¹ Read as the Presidential Address before the Western Philosophical Association at the Chicago meeting, January 1, 1908.

arguments advanced by either the Rationalistic or the Egoistic schools. They have been subjected to a merciless and continued criticism, and this criticism is finally beginning to tell. As a result, the historic forms of these doctrines are either dead or dying. Various attempts, of course, have been made, and others will be made, to save their lives by an extensive process of grafting. I do not intend to enumerate and discuss these ventures. I shall content myself, instead, with trying to show that there is another road leading to the same goal. Perhaps if that fact could be demonstrated, these other theories would lose much, if not all, of their remaining plausibility. In any event it is to a work of construction that I invite your attention to-day.

Objectivity in morals means that the adjectives 'true' and 'false' may be attached to the moral judgment independently of how any particular person happens to think or feel about the action. This definition at once suggests the two fundamental problems, which are: (1) Is objectivity a fact? (2) What is the content of the objective standard? According to the view which is to be presented here, the first can be fully treated only in connection with the second. Nevertheless the start must be made with some account, however incomplete in itself, of the grounds for asserting objectivity. We may begin with a conditional statement. The moral judgment will be objective, in a perfectly legitimate sense of that term, if it always and necessarily, as the result of its inmost structure, makes a certain claim or certain claims whose validity can be determined by an appeal to facts. It is easy to show that the moral judgment makes such claims and that the application of the adjective 'right' to an action means that the claims are justified by the facts. To the verification of these assertions we may now proceed.

In the first place, then, when I say this action is right or wrong, I am claiming to look at the situation under criticism from a particular point of view, out of all relation, namely, to my own so-called 'personal interests.' The moral judgment announces a rule that holds for man as such, as is shown by the commonplace: "What you judge right for one, you must judge right for everyone else under the same conditions." The words

“under the same conditions” save us from any such perversion of the principle as would make it read: “All persons have in every respect the same duty, whatever the diversity of their gifts, their opportunities, and their relations to each other.” It does say, however, that where conditions are identical, the duty which, for instance, my children owe me must be rated as neither higher nor lower than those which any child owes his father. To be sure, a state in which the individual, though sensitive to injuries done to the members of his own group, is absolutely indifferent to all injuries inflicted by anyone upon anyone else outside these boundaries, is commonly called ‘group morality.’ But such a state, if it has ever existed in its purity, is not yet morality, though undoubtedly on its way to becoming morality. Admit evolution as a fact, and such transitional stages between the standpoint of pure egoism (which doubtless is never actually found) and morality properly so-called are to be expected. But there is no such thing as ‘group *morality*,’ in the proper sense of the term ‘morality,’ until a man is ready to say: “Whoever, whether a member of my group or of some other, injures a member of his own group has done wrong, though he need not spare anyone who happens to be outside of it.”

This has been formulated by Adam Smith in the well known words: “The moral judgment is the judgment passed from the point of view of the impartial spectator.” I may actually feel inclined to resent the action of a man who sets up a grocery store next door to mine or that of my son. But I shall not call it wrong, unless I believe the ‘impartial spectator’ would condemn him. There are reasons why I think the formula, “Right is that which we approve of everyone’s doing under the conditions,” is more accurate than that of the great economist;¹ nevertheless the latter will serve our present purposes as well as the former, and may be a little more easy to use. I shall therefore not hesitate to employ it at pleasure.

In the second place, when I say, “this action is right” or

¹These are enumerated in my paper, “An Analysis of the Moral Judgment,” in *Studies in Philosophy and Psychology* by former students of Charles Edward Garman, pp. 120 ff. All the features of the moral judgment here referred to are discussed in that paper at somewhat greater length.

“wrong,” I mean that my judgment is based upon a complete survey of the situation, or, at all events, that a more complete survey would make no difference in my opinion. Partial views may be mistaken for complete ones in ways that can be easily imagined. The immediate effects may alone be considered by one person, the remote effects, in addition, by another ; again, the interests of the community which are affected by the actions of its members may be overlooked in one case, or apprehended with varying degrees of accuracy in other cases.

In the third place, the moral judgment claims to be the expression of our ideals of conduct as they are when worked out into a consistent system. Hold up before a person two of his moral judgments that appear to contradict each other. He will at once either assert that there is really a difference between the two situations under consideration, or he will proceed to modify one or the other of his judgments. The moral judgment no more tolerates the contradictory than does the judgment of which logic treats.

These three principles, so obvious and withal so well known as to sound like platitudes, are those upon which the objectivity of moral distinctions rests. For of any particular judgment we may ask : Does it represent accurately the moral ideal when this ideal is what it claims to be ? This is a question of fact. Accordingly the judgment which does represent the ideal accurately is entitled to the designation ‘true.’ The words ‘true’ and ‘false,’ however, when used in this connection, are liable to prove misleading, as is shown by the history of Rationalism in ethics. For this reason I should prefer to use the term ‘valid.’ For validity in an argument means, not necessarily that it is true, but that it possesses just that measure either of truth or of probability which it claims to have. In morality, therefore, ‘validity’ is the most accurate and least misleading term by which to mark the fact that a profession has been matched by performance.

An important point, however, has been left unconsidered. Whose ideal must the judgment represent in order to be entitled to the designation ‘valid’ ? Primarily, I reply, the ideal of the person judging. If A’s judgment, whether upon his own action

or that of another person, represents A's ideal of conduct when that ideal is what it pretends to be, we are justified in asserting that the action under consideration is objectively right from his point of view. But may we leave out the words "from his point of view" and call it right from the point of view of any possible human being, or right *per se*? For some moralists there would be no such thing as objectivity at all unless this question could be answered in the affirmative. As will be obvious from what is said above, I am unable to agree with this position. Nevertheless I believe that the affirmative answer is the true one, and I shall accordingly proceed to present the evidence in its favor. In order, however, to do so effectively, it will be necessary to make some examination, however brief, of the content of our moral judgments. This involves an all too long excursion from the main track of our inquiry, but it seems to be inevitable. In any event, it will enable us to deal with our problem in the concrete. We pass, accordingly, to a consideration of the standards used by common sense in the determination of right and wrong.

No careful observer of the life about him can have failed to discover that common sense in passing moral judgment makes use, not of a single standard, but of a variety of standards. This fact, to be sure, finds but scant recognition in the majority of treatises on ethics. But this is doubtless due in part to an excessive zeal for unity, in part to the absence among moralists of a disinterested curiosity in the phenomena of the moral consciousness, as a result of which most of them study it only so far as it promises to supply plunder for metaphysical theory or for immediate application to practice. A little examination, however, will reveal clearly the existence of at least four of these standards.

The first to be described may be called the 'eudæmonistic.' Where it is employed, conduct is approved or disapproved according as it aims or fails to aim at the welfare of some individual or individuals or social group that will be affected directly or indirectly by the action. The word 'welfare,' as here used, is not to be hastily identified with 'pleasure.' It stands for the good; and whatever common sense regards as a good therefore forms a part of its denotation.

The widespread belief in the duty of revenge points to a standard the polar opposite of the eudæmonistic. For here suffering or evil of some sort is demanded, and demanded for its own sake. We may call the judgment thus revealed the 'dysdæmonistic.'

If such authors as Sir Leslie Stephen and Mr. Bradley¹ were correct, we should not be justified in classifying this as an independent standard. For according to them delight in torturing others is simply a form of the love of power and of emotional excitement. From this it would follow that the belief in the duty of exacting vengeance is nothing else than the judgment that we ought to allow ourselves a pleasure derivable from the gratification of these emotions. But even if there were not an abundance of arguments that could be urged against the view, this corollary alone would be sufficient to condemn it. For such a conception of duty would be altogether anomalous. We all like to break up the tedium of the daily grind; and most of us love the consciousness of power. But how we could ever come to look upon their attainment at the expense of terrible torture to our fellow-men as the most sacred of duties is absolutely inconceivable. I conclude, then, that the aim to do another harm for the sake of vengeance is not primarily a form of the aim to do ourselves (or anyone else) good. Approval of such an aim accordingly represents an independent standard of moral judgment.

We now turn to a third class of judgments. Of a man who has lost his desire to live we may believe that he ought to control the impulse to suicide because of the services he is able to render to his family, the community in which he dwells, or the world at large. But it is possible to reach the same conclusion from a very different starting point.

"When all the blandishments of life are gone,
The coward sneaks to death, — the brave live on."

Here is a point of view which apparently pays no heed to considerations of service. It is not the poor fellow's ills, on the one hand, nor the needs of his family or the community, on the

¹ It is only fair to Mr. Bradley to state that he has apparently abandoned his earlier position; see *Mind*, Vol. XIII, p. 160.

other, that primarily interest. We have placed ourselves at the point of view of the spectator of a pageant ; and we accordingly applaud the beautiful spectacle and condemn the mediocre or ugly one. From a similar point of view, we may approve the independence of the Scotch peasant woman who chose to die of starvation rather than to beg for food from her neighbors or the parish ; the loyalty that fights for a lost cause when the agent himself recognizes that nothing but ruin to all concerned can be the outcome of his devotion ; and much else of the same kind. What the exact purpose was in each case we may not know, and perhaps may not care. We admire the spectacle ; and it is for that reason that we pronounce it good. This form of judgment may be called the 'æsthetic.'

The æsthetic judgment must not be treated as a form of the 'eudæmonistic.' Beauty is, of course, a good, but the exact object judged in the eudæmonistic judgment is very different from that in the æsthetic. Morality, as every one knows who stops to think, is a matter of aims or purposes. In the eudæmonistic judgment, conduct is pronounced right because it aims at the good of some person or persons ; it is the *direction* of the aim that counts. In the æsthetic judgment, on the other hand, it is the power or harmony exhibited in the aim that attracts. The agent is not approved because aiming to supply us, the spectators, with a certain good, viz., material for admiration. In the majority of instances, I believe, he is not thinking of his appearance in the eyes of anyone, either himself or another. Instead of that, he is absorbed in the attainment of some utterly different end. Because of this absorption he may at the same time be the object of another judgment, eudæmonistic or dysdæmonistic ; but over and above this he is also, in the case under consideration, the object of an additional judgment, the æsthetic.

A fourth class of judgments may be called the 'antipathetic.' They are based upon the direct antipathy we feel toward certain actions and indulgences. The emotions are unreasoned and often of the greatest intensity. They command in negatives : "Thou shalt not." At first sight nothing could appear more arbitrary and incalculable than the distribution of these judgments.

On apparently no other grounds than an unreasoned antipathy are based certain of the prohibitions of animal food, smoking, which, according to authorities cited by Spencer, is in some parts of the world counted among the deadly sins, and the wearing of false hair, which, as Lecky informs us, has been classed at times almost with murder. However, it will be found that certain judgments of antipathy are well-nigh universal, while others again are characteristic at least of all the more civilized races. These are traceable to the following sources: First, disgust at certain species of sensual indulgence in any form, and at indulgence in exceptional amounts in most, — but *nota bene* not all, — forms. Second, contempt for weakness of will, as cowardice, lack of self-control, etc. This is a positive emotion and is by no means identical with mere disappointment at the failure to find will power. Possibly this short list could be somewhat extended, but the attempt to do so would lead us into boggy ground, and, even if successful, would not affect our ultimate conclusions one way or the other.

Of the antipathetic judgment we must insist, as we have insisted in the case of the æsthetic, that it is not a form of the eudæmonistic. The reason is the same as before. The characteristic feature of the eudæmonistic judgment is lacking. It is not the direction of the aim in its relation to the welfare of those affected that is condemned, but some other characteristic of it (of one kind or another) that raises our gorge. Such coincidence between the disgusting or the contemptible and the harmful as exists is due to the provident care of nature, and need not be present to the consciousness of the man judging at all.

The question whether the vast multiplicity of the moral judgments of common sense can be reduced to cases of the employment of these four standards is one which it is impossible to attempt to answer within the limits set for this address. Of course I believe that the list here given is at bottom complete, or I should name and describe the missing members. At the same time, I am well aware that there are several claimants that have been ignored that could urge much in their own behalf. But even if they be accorded a place among the recognized standards, they

can, I believe, be dealt with after the same fashion as those already admitted ; so that whether they go or stay should make no difference in our final conclusions concerning objectivity.

After this long parenthesis, we are now ready to take up the problem of universality. We have found that common sense makes use of at least four distinct and more or less conflicting moral standards. We have found that, when a man pronounces an action right from his own point of view, he is thereby explicitly or implicitly making a number of claims with respect to the manner in which he is using these standards. We have seen, furthermore, that he is entitled to call an action right as such only if his own ideal of conduct, when purged of all one-sidedness and inconsistency, is identical with the like ideals of every one else. We shall now attempt to determine whether any such identity exists.

We may begin our examination most conveniently with the *dysdæmonistic* judgment, and may put our problem with respect to it into this form : Is the *dysdæmonistic* judgment capable of forming a part of a self-consistent system of moral judgments ? Or, since the only actions dictated by malevolence that ever claim to be justified are those in which it has been aroused by some harm done or attempted, we may state the problem in more concrete phraseology thus : Can any principle governing revenge be found which anyone would be able and willing to adopt and carry through consistently ? I shall anticipate the conclusion reached by asserting at once that it cannot.

This will appear if we squarely face the question : How are we to determine what is the amount of suffering or loss that we are entitled to inflict in retaliation for an injury ? In those times and among those races in which the law of retaliation is still a living principle and not the mere vestige of a decaying ideal, the measure of punishment is the actual satisfaction of the desires of the avenger. If you are to accept such a principle, you must be prepared to look on with approval wherever human beings are made the victims of a vindictiveness that knows no bounds. For the fact that such vindictiveness has existed in the past, and may exist to-day or to-morrow, cannot be doubted. This, however, it will be objected,

is not a fair inference from our definition of right. The severity of punishment in any *moral* system must be determined by the impartial spectator. But, at bottom, this shift does not help matters in the least. For the impartial spectator is simply one who would mete out the same amount of suffering whether he himself was the victim or merely an outsider. And actually his vindictiveness may be as great as that of many others who are themselves the aggrieved party. According to Plutarch, Draco, the Athenian legislator, appointed death as the punishment "for almost all offences, in so much that those who were convicted of idleness were to die and those who stole a cabbage or an apple to suffer even as villains that committed sacrilege or murder. . . . [Draco] himself being once asked why he made death the punishment for most offences replied: 'Small ones deserve that, and I have no higher for the greater crimes.'"¹ If this statement really represented his indignations and not a mistaken utilitarian calculus, the principle that will validate any expression of your malevolence in relation to those who happen to fall into your power will validate his bloody code. And the mere accident that his vindictiveness (or that of his fellow-citizens) may chance to have been rather more vigorous than yours, no more justifies you in condemning what he did, than the fact that yours may chance to be stronger than mine requires you to temper it to suit me. If you urge that wrongs must be avenged, not according to anyone's feelings, but according to their relative seriousness, you are still within the same circle. For, apart from the difficulty of grading wrongs according to such a standard, the old question is still before you: What amount of suffering are you to inflict for each unit (whatever that means) of wrong-doing? This is precisely the thing that not merely will be, but also must be, determined by the vindictiveness either of the judge or the community which he represents.

Perhaps, in order to gain your point, you are ready to accept this conclusion. If so, you must be prepared to go farther. For the malevolence aroused by an injury done and the malevolence that seemingly without external stimulus springs upon its victim

¹ Life of Solon.

as the hound upon the hare are, as mental states, in no sense different in nature. Of course the former is the sign of a more altruistic man than the latter. The man who feels indignation at wrong is, indeed, necessarily altruistic, whereas the blood-madness of the tyrant of the Italian Renaissance, so graphically described by Symonds, may well be the obverse of an all-engulfing egoism. For this reason the former is universally regarded with an indulgence which the latter has never obtained. But even if the despot, seeking out ever new victims for his lust for blood, has no altruism to overcome,— a statement by no means self-evident,— it still remains true that to feel indignation at the wrongs of another is one thing, to allow the malevolence thus awakened from its slumber to carry you away into action is another, and that, if you do the latter, you are putting yourself for the moment in the same place and are being ruled by the same passions as the spontaneously malignant. You cannot, then, with consistency forbid anything to malignity that you permit to indignation.

Some persons, you may perhaps think, could be found who would take even this step. These Italian despots with their blood-madness, would they not have done so? By no means, I reply. Remember that what a man judges right for himself, he must judge right for everyone else under the same conditions; that is to say, morality represents an ideal of universal human relationships, or, in other words, a demand upon the conduct of men generally. Accordingly the introduction of the practice of malignity into the moral code would involve a demand for similar treatment of one's self by others. But this is impossible except as a man actually hates himself. Now partial or temporary self-hate is possible and actual. But self-hate as a permanent attitude of mind would soon bring about the destruction of its victim, so that if such a man had ever appeared he would have been quickly eliminated. Malevolence, then, consistently carried out as a rule for everyone who may happen to feel its stirrings within him, is a principle absolutely incapable of adoption.

If any of you have agreed with the preceding argument, I shall have said enough. Nevertheless, since there may be some

who are still unconvinced, I shall venture to refer very briefly to another phase of the problem. If the principle of retaliation were to be carried through consistently, every member of human society would be continuously under the ban. For we are all doing wrong constantly, whether by way of commission or omission. The only alternative is that it be indicated where the line is to be drawn below which wrong-doing (positive or negative) is not to be punished, and why it is drawn just there. Now the *where* and the *why* could be answered only by a reference to the amount of some one's vindictiveness. The door is thus thrown open to the establishment of a régime in which every member of society is made to suffer,—who shall say how much?—for every lapse from perfection. Of course no one would consent for a moment to the existence of such a state of affairs. Even the most malignant demand vengeance only sporadically, when the wrong is gross enough or near enough to “get on their nerves,” as the phrase is. This is still more obviously true of the rest of us. Not every train can fire the powder of our indignation. But it is not of such stuff as this that the moral judgment claims to be made. The creation and maintenance of a system of private or public retaliation can accordingly form no part of the genuine moral ideal.

Precisely the same thing is true of the æsthetic and the anti-pathetic judgments. The actual use of the æsthetic standard by common sense is an indubitable fact. Early in 1906 a number of casuistry questions were given to certain members of the College of Letters and Science in the University of Wisconsin, and seventy-five sets of answers were received. Among the questions was the following: “At the burning of Moscow in 1812, two guards at the royal palace were in the confusion forgotten and the order to relieve them was not given. They nevertheless remained at their post and were buried under the burning timbers. Was it their duty to remain when they knew there was nothing left to guard? If not strictly their duty, would you think less of them for making their escape?”

The great majority of the students answer in the spirit of the poet who wrote :

“The boy stood on the burning deck
Whence all with sense had fled.”

A few others are inclined to believe that the best interests of discipline require them to remain.

“Their’s not to reason why,
Their’s but to do and die :”

as one of them quotes for my benefit. But amidst this chorus of utilities may be heard a far different voice: “These guards are certainly to be admired for their firmness. Not one out of a hundred would have done the same, and so we would naturally not think it was their duty [in the strict sense of the term] to remain there. But even if not strictly their duty, I would think less of them for making their escape. Because the former shows a determination and fixedness of purpose elevating one’s moral character not shown in escaping.” Three there were who took this position. And although the written answers were slightly ambiguous, a searching oral examination proved that the ground of the judgment was in each case admiration of the beautiful. Other questions put to these same students orally disclosed the fact that this attitude was not something accidental or unique, but that it was the determining factor in a rather wide range of decisions. The æsthetic judgment is thus, I repeat, an indubitable fact.

But will these partisans of unfruitful heroism remain loyal to it till the end? In order to test this, I asked our three students the following question based upon an incident related by Guyau. It was as follows: “A number of workmen in a French village were wheeling lime-stone in barrows to a lime kiln, into which they were throwing it through an aperture in the roof. In so doing, one of the workmen slipped and fell and was precipitated into the chamber below. There was no possibility of rescuing him, even if life was not extinguished instantly. The interior glowed with a heat of many hundred degrees; the walls and ceiling were curved like those of a bee-hive. Nevertheless the five workmen who were following him threw themselves successively into the kiln after their fellow laborer and perished as he did. Do you think better of them morally for so doing?” Two

of the three students at once replied that such action was wrong ; it was a mere throwing away of one's life. But the third, the beauty-loving daughter of a beauty-loving race, nourished from childhood upon stories from Plutarch and Rollin, still responded as before that this was what the highest type of man must do. "What would be their motive?" I asked. "That is impossible to answer," was the reply ; "something mysterious, undefinable." "Suppose they did it in order to show their courage?" "Then it would be wrong."

It might seem as if such a person would be willing to carry the æsthetic ideal through consistently to the very end. This, however, proved not to be the case. For when I universalized precisely the above situation and asked whether she would approve of everyone killing himself who had a strong desire to live, whose self-inflicted death would thus bear witness to the existence of a high degree of courage, she replied at once in the negative. This was not because of the possible presence of complicating factors, such as duty to one's family. For in the case of the French workmen, the existence of a family dependent upon them was not allowed to make any difference in the answer. But the conversion of a principle applied in occasional instances into a law for all men similarly situated was something for which she was not prepared. In this it seems undeniable she represents the race. If so, the æsthetic standard is no part of the ultimately valid moral ideal.

It should not be difficult to prove the same conclusion with regard to the standards created by what I have called the antipathies. We all have these feelings for certain modes of action. It may be for using a tooth-pick in public ; it may be for wearing false hair ; it may be for running away in order to live to fight another day. But no one would deliberately adopt as a principle of action to be carried through consistently : Whatever arouses in me emotions of antipathy (in the sense of the term here intended) is *ipso facto* wrong. Our conclusion with regard to this standard (or perhaps group of standards) is accordingly identical with that reached in the case of the two preceding ones : It can form no part of the moral ideal in so far as that ideal is what it claims to be.

We now pass to the remaining standard, the eudæmonistic. The aim to serve, to create a good or annihilate or minimize an evil is here approved, and approved, as perhaps most of you will agree, because of our interest in the existence of the good or our hatred of the evil. This statement, however, leaves still undetermined how great the amount of service is that one person owes to another. Differences of opinion on this point can be shown to be the source of all remaining fundamental diversities in moral judgments.¹ These different opinions fall into two classes. On the one hand there is the plainly discoverable tendency to say it is a man's duty to choose the greater good under all circumstances. There is the tendency, on the other hand, to approve the choice of the less good: (1) where that is the good of the agent, or of some one closely bound to him by ties of blood, friendship, gratitude, etc., or where for any reason whatever one party is held to be "nearer" the agent than the other; (2) where the less good is that of some one who is an object of admiration, whether for his bodily, intellectual, emotional, or moral qualities; (3) where for a number of other reasons, impossible to enumerate in a few words, but fairly familiar to every one, the less good appeals to the sympathies of the person judging more than does the greater. Our problem now is: Can any consistent principle be obtained from these conflicting claims? I shall attempt to show that this is possible.

Let us begin by attempting to discover the effects of applying the criterion of consistency to the common view of the extent of the duty of self to others. "That in the pursuit of our own happiness," writes Bain, "we shall not infringe upon the happiness of others, is duty in its most imperative form. How far we shall make positive contributions to the good of our fellows is less definitely settled." These words represent the views, and

¹ This statement is made subject to the truth of the assertion above that the four standards which I have described form, together, the ultimate sources of the content of all moral judgments. It assumes, furthermore, a recognition of the fact that 'material rightness,' as distinguished from 'formal rightness,' is not a moral category; that the elements which differentiate the former from the latter are accurate working of the intellect and similar factors, which, however valuable, are not the object of the *moral* judgment. Here, again, I venture to refer to the article already cited in the Garman Commemorative Volume, page 107.

also the uncertainties, of civilized man as to the limits of self-sacrifice, not accurately indeed, but as well as is required for our present purpose. They assert implicitly a difference in the claims of positive and negative beneficence which is in effect a difference in kind. Can any such position be maintained? I answer, it cannot. William of Orange (later king of England), stood by and allowed an ignorant and infuriated mob, which he could have bent to his will by a few words, to kill those patriots and statesmen, the brothers de Witt. Macbeth hired assassins to rid him of Banquo. The former refrained from acting in order that he might fall heir to the political power of others, the latter acted that he might strengthen his hold upon power. But if the wrongness of an act is determined by the motives as revealed in the intentions; and if to say 'no' is as much an act as to say 'yes,' there is certainly no essential difference between the two cases. The principle that thus emerges, as a little reflection will show, holds throughout the entire range of human conduct. Accordingly, whatever obligation exists to refrain from injuring others is equally operative as against the laziness, the indifference, or the preoccupation with our own affairs which leaves us satisfied to let others endure privations or sink to ruin where it lies in our power to give them help. This statement must not be misunderstood. There may be a real difference in degree of culpability between seizing food which belongs to another and letting a man starve whose wants I am able to supply. But the difference does not lie in the presence of an obligation in one case, and its absence in the other. It is based upon the fact that in the former case I wrong two parties, the individual and the community, whereas in the second I may be injuring only the former. Other things being equal, then, a positive service is just as binding as the refraining from injury. Opportunity is the sole measure of responsibility; a fact which, with the growth of the humanitarian spirit, is becoming more and more clearly recognized by society at large each succeeding year.

Shall we then go to the other extreme and say with Swedenborg: "In the next world,"—that is, in a state of perfection,— "we shall love our neighbor better than ourselves." Lecky

tells of a hermit in the Egyptian desert to whom an admirer once brought some particularly appetizing dainties. But of course the good man could not lose the opportunity thus provided for doing a deed of charity. So he took the food to his nearest fellow-hermit and presented it to him. This man, actuated by similar considerations, passed it on to a third; and this continued until it returned finally to its original starting-point. The moral is obvious. It is impossible, as a rule, to make a sacrifice except as some other party accepts it. But it cannot be right for a person to offer to give that which by the same principle it is wrong for the other party to receive. The same thing can be put in a somewhat more rigorous way. A right action, as we have seen, is one which I can wish everyone to perform under the conditions. Why, then, should I wish A to make sacrifices out of all proportion to the good they do B, with the result of a net loss in the total well-being of A and B?

If we bear in mind that the moral judgment claims to represent the point of view of the 'impartial spectator,' we shall have as little difficulty with the determination of objective rightness when the choice lies between the good of some member of our family and the good of a greater number outside of its boundaries. It happened some years ago that a man returning home from his day's work discovered that a careless switchman had left a switch open, which would mean death or injury to the several hundred passengers on the train which was approaching. At the same moment he saw his only child playing upon the track in front of the engine. He had only time to turn the switch and save the train, or else to save the child. What was it his duty to do? You may perhaps feel tempted to say: He ought to have saved his child. But if you are to stick consistently to the point of view of the impartial spectator, why should you value the welfare of this child any more than that of any other child that may have been in the train? Or again, that of this child more than that of an adult? Perhaps, however, you are thinking of the feelings of the father. Why then of this father, rather than of those others left childless by the destruction of the train? The eudæmonistic judgment, I repeat, has its source in the valuation of welfare. But is it not

inconsistent to measure the value of a man's welfare in one scale when he happens to be the agent in a given situation, and then to measure it in another when he happens to have changed places and to be the patient? To do this would be no different at bottom from complaining bitterly when we are injured by another and thinking it merely a clever trick when we try the same thing on him. You may indeed refuse to actively condemn the father who, carried away by parental love, hears in this hurried instant only the promptings of his own heart. For, apart from other obvious considerations, the amount of our praise and condemnation in matters of both character and intellect is determined to a very considerable extent by the actual level of attainment reached in the community in which we happen to live. But the demands of the moral ideal are one thing; the excuses that may be offered for those who fail to live up to them are another. And it is only the former that concern us here.

The same line of reasoning, I cannot refrain from pointing out, would have led us directly to the position already reached concerning the extent of our duty to others, where our so-called 'personal interests' are primarily concerned. If I have chosen to argue the matter upon slightly different lines, I now have the advantage that accrues from the obtaining of identical results by the use of two distinct methods.

The principle that has emerged in the preceding discussion will be found applicable, I believe, to every phase of the conflict between the claims of the greater and the less good, and furthermore to human beings as such, whatever their position in the scale of civilization. A man has not reached the stage of *morality*, it must be remembered, until he desires to see certain rules, however few in number and bare in content, obeyed by man as such. He need not, of course, have explicitly before him any idea corresponding to 'man as such.' He must simply be one who feels approbation or disapprobation at obedience or disobedience to the rule wherever he may know of it, whether it takes place within or without his own class or community. That within such a person which makes him desire the universal realization of any eudæmonistic rules can find its consistent expression only in the demand

for the choice under all conditions of the greater good. If so, the rule, "Choose always the greater good," is valid for all men. This, then, is the objective form of the eudæmonistic standard.

Perhaps this conclusion will seem a little more plausible to the incredulous if I venture a suggestion as to the principal cause of the failure to keep consistently to the point of view of the impartial spectator in eudæmonistic judgments. It seems to be due primarily to unevenness in the working of the imagination. This is strong enough ordinarily to light up only one side of the picture. Which side that shall be will usually, though not always, depend upon the direction of the interests. Thus a small boy, was once taken by his mother for purposes of edification to see the painting entitled "The Christians Thrown to the Lions." After gazing at it for some time in silence, he exclaimed: "Look, mother, there is one poor lion that hasn't got any Christian!" The 'consciousness of kind' had arisen in the soul of the young barbarian, and made him as oblivious to one side of the situation as his pious mother had been to the other.

The influence of the imagination upon the moral judgment can be made clear by a few illustrations. In the investigation referred to during our discussion of the æsthetic judgment, the following questions were given out: (1) May a poor man without money, out of work, and unable at the time to find employment, take without the knowledge of the owner a loaf of bread from a baker's shop in order to save from starvation the young children of a neighbor? Their mother, a widow, is sick in bed, unable for the time to earn money for their support. The man is unable to get the bread in any other way. (2) Is it right for a physician, by administering an overdose of morphine or otherwise, to hasten by several weeks the death of a patient, hopelessly sick with cancer and suffering terrible torture all the time? One of the students answered the first question in the negative and the second in the affirmative. When inquiry was made into the reasons for this somewhat peculiar combination, it appeared that he was able to imagine with great vividness the situation of the patient racked and torn with the agony of cancer; whereas the sufferings of the family dying of starvation did not form any

definite picture in his mind. Hence arose, according to his own declaration, the difference of attitude in the two cases.

In the illustration just given, the variations in the workings of the imagination are conditioned upon factors which it was impossible to discover. In the following, the imagination clearly follows the interest. In a study reported in Volume IX of the *American Journal of Psychology*, certain questions were given out dealing with choice between the greater and the nearer good. The first was the one already quoted, dealing with the father who was compelled to choose between the life of his child and the lives of the train-load of people. The second was the problem that John Howard had to face when called to choose between the moral welfare of his son and the continuance of his work in prison reform. In the instance before us, however, it was also presented in a modified form, as follows: This same alternative, the reformation of a number of prisoners and the reform of a dissipated son whose rescue imperatively demanded a removal to another place, was presented to a certain prison official. His opportunities for doing good were very insignificant compared with Howard's; he might reasonably expect, if he remained in his present position during the ensuing ten years, to restore to a life of honorable citizenship perhaps twenty or thirty of the unfortunates committed to his care. The chances, on the other hand, of the appointment of a successor who would take any interest in carrying on his work, were very slight. What ought he to do? One student answered the first question: "Save the child;" and the last one (as well as the problem concerning Howard): "Continue the work for the prisoners." When asked for the grounds of this remarkable exhibition of inconsistency, he replied that the idea of the helpless little child sitting, all unconscious of its fate, upon the track in front of the on-rushing train, had appealed so strongly to his sympathies that it overcame every opposing consideration. And the strength of this appeal was due to the fact that he had a little brother of his own to whom he was devotedly attached.

Such facts, I believe, enable us to explain why, in our moral judgments, we are ordinarily so much more tender of the inter-

ests of the agent than of those of the patient. When the question is raised whether a given mode of conduct is right, we seem usually to put ourselves in the place of the agent almost automatically. The question, in other words, takes for us the practical form, What would it be my duty to do under the circumstances? When the matter is once put in this form, the interests of the patient have little chance of receiving impartial consideration, for we can imagine what we ourselves have to gain or lose by the transaction far more vividly than we can the effects upon him. As a result, the average judgment is far more lenient to the agent than it is justified in being.

We are now ready to hear the conclusion of the whole matter. When I pronounce an action right or wrong, I tacitly claim to have taken into consideration every aspect in the situation which could in any way influence my attitude; to have looked at the diverse and perhaps conflicting interests of the different parties concerned from the point of view of an impartial spectator; and, finally, to have given expression to an ideal of conduct which can form a part of a self-consistent whole. Or, in slightly different words, 'right' means "demanded by my ideal of human relationships in matters of conduct, in so far as this ideal has been made a self-consistent one." This ideal,—the right in the proper sense of the term,—common sense believes to be one, and therefore, at bottom, universal. I have tried to show that this belief is justified. If so, actions may properly be called right or wrong as such. And the judgment which pronounces an action right will be valid or not according to whether the claims it makes are or are not justified by the facts.

As to the content of the ideal, I have tried to show that it rejects three standards actually used by common sense, though I think with ever-increasing hesitation and infrequency, viz., the *dysdæmonistic*, or standard of malevolence, the *æsthetic*, and the *antipathetic*; and that the *eudæmonistic* standard in its valid form, and therefore the moral ideal as such, demands an equal regard for equal amounts of well-being wherever found, and a corresponding desire to realize it as far as lies in our power.

To the conclusions that I have presented some persons will

undoubtedly make the following objection. The objectivity you offer, they will say, is something very different from anything of which we have been in search. According to you, the moral ideal, after all, has its roots in the changing and the accidental. Even if its sources lie deep in the universal elements of human nature, it is still human nature that it represents. Modify the structure of man's mind sufficiently, and what is now immoral becomes praiseworthy. But we seek that which is independent of all accident; we want to find in morality something that is necessary and eternal.

I am not one of those who believe that an argument based upon what people want has any cogency whatever. Nevertheless I am prepared to meet this objection on its own ground. At the very outset, however, I wish to insist that, for the view which I have been presenting, our moral code is not a superficial organ of the mind, something that could easily have been different and yet man be in other respects essentially what he is to-day. This seems to be the opinion of Darwin in that famous passage in the fourth chapter of the *Descent of Man* in which he discusses the hypothetical morality of a race of men reared under precisely the same conditions as hive-bees. But the moral judgment is so completely bound up with the structure of the intellect, the emotional nature, and the will of man, that any change in it that would affect the objective moral code would leave him no longer man in anything more than name. This assertion, however, would require a treatise to demonstrate. Moreover, I am well aware that it does not exactly meet the issue, though I think if accepted and realized it would satisfy the motives which force the issue to the front. Whether this last statement be true or not, it will be clear in any event that I do not believe the satisfaction demanded can be obtained from the study of ethics as such. The place of man in the universe and the relation of his moral and other ideals to ultimate reality can be determined only by metaphysics. But what I wish to point out is that the doctrine of this paper supplies all the materials for the purpose desired, when supplemented by a spiritualistic metaphysics which conceives of man as made in the image of God. Any community of nature

between man and God must have to do with the fundamentals, and in Him these elements must exist in their ideal completeness and harmony ; whereas in us their development is circumscribed and hindered at every point. We are thus justified in attributing to God as actual the human code in its ultimately valid form. By no other path, — except those rejected at the beginning of our paper, — is such a result attainable. Those theories which, in their anxiety to uphold the dignity and cosmic significance of the right, start from the nature of the Absolute and argue from that to the objective moral code inevitably assume from start to finish that might makes right. On the other hand, a doctrine that denies moral objectivity *in toto* is certainly arbitrary in identifying any actual or prospective code with the ideals of God. But if there is for man but one valid code, and the foundations of this are laid in the very depths of human nature, the identification of such a code with that of God becomes inevitable for any metaphysics that admits the existence of a personal God at all.

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SELF AND SOUL.

THE conception of the self has undeniable significance in contemporary philosophy. By many who call themselves pragmatists as well as by many rationalists, and by almost all idealistic thinkers of whatever type, the universe is conceived as ultimately personal. And even our present-day realists are — most of them — qualitative dualists, that is to say, they admit that selves exist alongside of extra-mental realities and related to them. In view of this modern emphasis, laid by writers of diverse tendency on the conception of self, there is timeliness in a recent suggestion¹ that the contemporary conception of self should be more carefully compared with the 'traditional doctrine' of soul, or spiritual substance.² Such a comparison is here attempted.

I.

It is necessary, in the first place, to consider the essentials of the conception of self. In offering the outline which follows, I am of course formulating what is primarily my own doctrine. So far, however, as I am aware, there is nothing in my account of the self which diverges essentially from that expressed or implied by modern personalists.

At the outset it must be insisted that any conception of the self is taken over, by philosophy, from psychology conceived as doctrine of conscious selves. This view of the relation of philosophy to the psychology of selves need not obscure the difference between the two methods of treatment. The psychologist as such accepts the self as object of introspection, raising no questions about its ultimate reality, whereas the philosopher must attempt to settle the question of the place of the self in the whole scheme of things. If he is a materialistic philosopher, he regards the self of the psychologist as a fiction ultimately reducible to non-

¹ In a review by Professor Ellen B. Talbot (in this REVIEW, Vol. XVII, p. 81) of my book, *The Persistent Problems of Philosophy*.

² The expressions 'soul,' 'spirit,' 'mind,' and 'spiritual substance' are used throughout this paper as virtually synonymous.

psychic reality ; if, again, he is a dualist, he accords to the self a position more or less coördinate with that of things or external objects ; if, finally, he is a personalist, he conceives the universe as ultimately consisting in self or selves. But to the end he must include in his concept of self essentially what the psychologist should mean by the term. It is true that the consideration of the relation of the self to the rest of reality may lead him to infer from the characters discovered by the psychologist other attributes, — for example, moral predicates — of the self, but he can only supplement and modify, he can never obliterate any characters of the psychologist's self.

There are two reasons for insisting, thus, that the self of philosophy is an immediately known and then reflected-on reality, not a merely inferred being. For so one gains both the guarantee of the existence of the self and a clue to the description of its rich content. By self is meant (1) a reality which is basal to the many conscious experiences, — whether these are named ideas, mental processes, psychic contents, conscious functions, or faculties, — a reality which in some sense includes the experiences and to which they belong.¹ This self is also known, both immediately and on reflection, as (2) persistent, as (3) unique, and (4) as further related (either assertively or receptively, and either egoistically or altruistically) with other-than-itself. By the *persistence* of a self is meant the realized fact of being the same self now as at some other time, — a consciousness which is emphasized in anticipation and in recognition, but which forms an unaccented part of every experience. The *uniqueness* of a self is that character which distinguishes it from every other self, — from every other reality of any sort. Such uniqueness, or irreplaceableness, the character by virtue of which one realizes that a self is a this-not-to-be-replaced-by-another, is an emphasized part of emotion, will, and faith, but an unattended-to factor of all consciousness. The

¹ Cf. *The Journal of Philosophy*, Dec., 1907, Vol. IV, pp. 676 ff., and authors there cited for proof, or argument, that those who treat psychology as science of idea or of function implicitly assume the existence of the self whose the idea is, or of the self which functions. On the conception of the self, cf. the later papers of the series just mentioned (*Journal of Philosophy*, Jan. and Feb., 1908), and my *The Persistent Problems of Philosophy*, especially pp. 408 ff., 422 ff.

relatedness of a self, finally, so sharply emphasized by students of social psychology, may be shown to be a character of all consciousness. Always in being conscious I am aware not only of myself but of an other-than-self (either personal or impersonal). I may emphasize myself, — for example, in will or in desire, — and then I am egoistically conscious; or I may emphasize the other-than-self, as in sympathy or in loyalty, and then I am altruistically conscious. And my consciousness, whether egoistic or altruistic, may be assertive or receptive: I may assert myself or some other self, as in will and in faith; or I may fail, as in perception or in æsthetic emotion, to react upon my environment.

II.

The conception of self, thus briefly outlined, has now to be compared with the doctrine of the soul; and the discussion will be limited to the consideration of the soul-doctrine in the systems of philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It must be noted at the outset that there is no one fixed and accepted concept of the soul; but that, in spite of divergences, all these spiritualistic thinkers, from Descartes downward, (1) agree in the teaching that the soul (or mind or spiritual substance) is a reality fundamental to its acts or faculties, its ideas or operations or experiences. Thus by Descartes spirit¹ is defined as “the substance in which thought [later described as including will, understanding, and even perception²] immediately resides”; and by Locke as “substratum to those operations which we experiment to ourselves within.”³ And Berkeley declares that, “besides that endless variety of ideas . . . there is likewise something which knows or perceives them and exercises divers operations. This . . . being,” he asserts, “is what I call mind, soul. . . .”⁴

This teaching of the soul as fundamental to its operations readily (2) involves the implication or the affirmation of its persistence,

¹ *Meditations*, Replies to the Second Objections, Def. VI. Cf. Wolff, *Psychologia Rationalis*, § 10; Baumgarten, *Metaphysica*, § 505.

² *Principles of Philosophy*, Part I, prop. ix.

³ *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. II, chapter xxiii, § 5.

⁴ *Principles of Human Understanding*, § 2.

or identity. Berkeley¹ implies and Locke² definitely teaches the identity of the soul; and Leibniz unequivocally asserts that a monad, or soul, is an identical unity of its own states. "My inner experience," he says, "convinces me *a posteriori* of this identity, but there must also be some reason *a priori*. It is not possible to find any other reason, excepting that my attributes of the preceding time and state, as well as the attributes of the succeeding time and state, are predicates of the same subject . . . the so-called I . . . which is the basis of the interconnection of all my different states."³

Most of these writers (3) imply also the uniqueness of the soul. Leibniz lays special stress on this character. The uniqueness of the soul becomes in his hands its complete independence of everything else excepting God.⁴ On the other hand, these seventeenth and eighteenth century writers (4) do not explicitly consider the essential and inherent relatedness of the self.

It is thus evident that the contemporary conception of self is a reaffirmation and amplification of certain central factors of the earlier concept of soul. It is most important to recognize this fundamental likeness of the two doctrines; for in the exuberance of the criticism which Hume made fashionable and which later philosophers have perpetuated, too little justice has been done to the 'traditional doctrine' of spiritual substance, or soul. It is high time to insist on the truth involved in the older doctrine, and to avow boldly the partial identity of the concept of self with the Cartesian and the Berkeleyian conception of spiritual substance. It should be noted also that most of the older thinkers more or less consciously use the terms 'spirit' and 'soul' as synonym for 'self,' or 'I.' Berkeley indeed says explicitly: "What I am myself, that which I denote by the term I, is the same with what is meant by soul or spiritual substance."⁵ Only

¹ *Principles*, §§ 27, 89, et al.; *Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, III, Open Court edition, p. 95.

² *Essay*, Book II, chapter xxvii, especially §§ 2 and 14.

³ *Letters to Arnaud*.

⁴ *Ibid.*, IX.

⁵ *Principles of Human Understanding*, § 139; cf. *ibid.*, § 2; cf. also Descartes, *Meditations*, II; and Leibniz, Letter to Arnaud, XIV, and *Système nouveau*, § 11.

Locke, whose teaching will presently be discussed, distinguishes the two.

III.

This admission of the likeness of 'self' to 'soul' should not, however, obscure the important differences between the earlier and the later conception. These are of two main types: The conception of soul differs from that of self, first, in that it is, in one sense or another, subordinated to that of body; second, in that it is needlessly empty and abstract. The first of these distinctions is, primarily, a difference in origin. According to the most primitive belief, the soul is merely a shadowy sort of body, a sublimated and attenuated material substance. This conception, crude as it is, tends to persist as an unharmonized feature of doctrines with which it is inherently incompatible. The soul is in truth conceived, in terms which seem to be more or less covertly materialistic, as body deprived of certain inconvenient or undesirable characters. Thus, the conceptions of qualities as 'inhering' in a 'substratum' has, as Berkeley¹ suggested, a distinctly materialistic flavor. And Locke's admission, though only for the sake of argument, "thinking being may also be material,"² suggests the latent materialism of his conception. Even more obviously the theories of soul in its relation to the body show the taint of an unrealized materialism. This appears both in the efforts to indicate the seat of the soul and in the doctrines of the soul as moving the body. So Descartes holds that there is in the body an organ, the pineal gland, "in which more particularly the soul exercises its functions"³; Wolff teaches that "souls preëxist in the preëxisting organic particles from which the fœtus is formed";⁴ and Baumgarten discusses the 'locomotive faculty'⁵ by which the human soul moves the body.

¹ *Principles*, §§ 16 and 17.

² *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, Book IV, chapter x, § 13. It will be remembered that Locke is contented when he has pointed out that "the notion of spirit involves no more difficulty in it than that of body" (*Ibid.*, Book II, chapter xxiii, §§ 5, 15).

³ *Les passions de l'âme*, Première partie, art. 31; cf. art. 42 et al.

⁴ *Psychologia rationalis*, Sect. IV, Cap. II, § 704.

⁵ *Metaphysica* (1779), Pt. III, chapter ii, sect. i, § 750. Cf. Locke, *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, Book II, chapter, xxiii, § 20.

From the fact that the conception of soul is reached by way of that of body follows another difficulty. Instead of starting, like modern personalists, from the introspective observation of the conscious self, these spiritualistic philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries describe the soul from the standpoint of its relation to the body, that is, they attribute to the soul predicates which are mere negations of bodily characters. The soul is described, for example, as a simple being,¹ and this character is inferred from the opposition of soul to body. Because body is extended and divisible, therefore, it is argued, the soul is unextended, indivisible, simple. In its purely negative signification, this doctrine is unobjectionable; but it is also useless. Certainly the soul is not extended; but introspection and reasoning fail to disclose its 'simplicity' in any other sense of the word, unless by simplicity be meant no more than by identity.

It should be noted that Kant's criticism, in his "Paralogisms of Pure Reason,"² is directed in great part against this doctrine of the soul as thing, this conception of the soul as analogous, though opposed, to body. Kant, following Hume, points out that simplicity, identity, and the other traditional characters of the soul-thing are not objects of sense consciousness.

A second crucially important difference between the conception of soul and that of self is the following: The conception of substance, as often held, is a very barren and empty abstraction and is therefore sharply contrasted with the modern concept of the self as possessed of concrete characters, in a word, as conscious. The abstractness of the soul-concept is explicit and avowed in the philosophy of Locke; and Locke's doctrine of substance must, accordingly, be considered at somewhat disproportionate length.

The peculiarity of Locke's teaching is the following: He holds to the existence of a conscious self, but he assumes, in addition, the existence of a soul or spiritual substance. The 'self' or

¹ Cf. Wolff, *Psychologia rationalis*, §§ 48, 49; Berkeley, *Principles*, §§ 27, 141.

² *Kritik d. r. Vernunft*, edition A, pp. 344ff.; edition B, pp. 402ff. Of course, the criticism of the Paralogisms is directed, also, against the conception of the transcendental unity of apperception (or self), as known object. Indeed, Kant does not, in this section, sharply distinguish the two concepts.

'person'¹ is characterized, Locke teaches, by consciousness. "Consciousness" he declares, "is that which makes every one to be what he calls self; . . . as far as ever it can be extended, should it be to ages past, [it] unites existences and actions . . . into the same person . . . so that whatever has the consciousness of present and past actions, is the same person to whom they both belong."² This suggests what Locke unequivocally teaches, the identity of the self. He describes the self as "a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places."³ He emphasizes, also, the individuality, realized in the emotional experience, of the self. The "intelligent being," he says, "sensible of happiness or misery must grant that there is something that is himself that he is concerned for and would have happy."⁴

From these quotations it is clear that Locke has a vivid conception (in its essentials closely parallel with that outlined in this paper) of the conscious self. But instead of following the fashion of preceding spiritualistic philosophers by identifying the concept of self with that of spiritual substance, Locke teaches that, besides the conscious, identical, individualized self, there exists an immaterial substance, a soul. He even regards it as possible, although unlikely,⁵ that the identity of the self may persist through a change of souls, — in other words, that "the same consciousness," instead of being "annexed solely to one individual substance . . . can be continued in a succession of several substances." A man's "immaterial spirit" may be, for example, "the same soul that was in Nestor or Thersites at the siege of Troy . . . ; but he now having no consciousness of any of the actions of Nestor or Thersites [cannot] conceive himself the same person with either of them."⁶

Locke reaches this conclusion, — that besides the self there exists a spiritual substance, or soul, — by the keen observation of

¹ *Essay*, Book II, chapter xxvii, § 26: "Person, I take it, is the name for this self."

² *Ibid.*, §§ 9 and 16.

³ *Ibid.*, § 9.

⁴ *Ibid.*, § 25.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, §§ 10 and 14.

the fact that "consciousness being interrupted always by forgetfulness . . . doubts are raised whether we are the same thinking thing, *i. e.*, the same substance or no."¹ An estimate of this reasoning would lead us too far from the main topic of our study, the analysis of Locke's conception of soul thus distinguished from the self. "If anyone will examine himself," Locke says, "concerning his notion of pure substance in general, he will find he has no other idea of it at all but only a supposition of he knows not what support of . . . qualities." From this notion of 'pure substance in general,' Locke proceeds to form that of spiritual substance by the mere addition of the negative predicate 'immaterial.' For though he also calls spiritual substance 'thinking thing,' he deprives this positive attribute of all its meaning by the repeated and unequivocal teaching that consciousness belongs not to soul but to self, or person.

This arbitrary distinction, drawn by Locke, between abstract soul and concrete self has had a most curious result in philosophy. The justified polemic of Hume and others against that empty nonentity, the spiritual I-know-not-what, has been interpreted as a successful criticism of the concept of self.² And so it happens, — in defiance of Locke's sharp distinction between soul and self, — that the unhappy self has staggered along through these two hundred odd years burdened with the obloquy which, with some show of justice, is heaped upon the Lockian spiritual substance.

Other philosophers have been guilty of over-abstractness in dealing with the self. For example, the whole difficulty with the outlawed doctrine of the mental 'faculties' is simply this: that the soul, or mind, is first conceived abstractly, after Locke's fashion, as mere substratum or agent, and that then specific kinds of consciousness are referred back to this empty nothing as if

¹ *Loc. cit.*, § 10. The whole chapter is full of suggestion to the student of what is nowadays called the dissociation of personality. It should be added that Locke is not always true to his own distinction between self and soul. For example, he describes each, in the same terms, as 'thinking thing.'

² It should be noted that Hume is not himself guilty of this confusion. He devotes one section of the *Treatise* to the doctrine of the 'immateriality of the soul' and a different section armed with different arguments to the doctrine of self, or, in his words, 'personal identity.' (*Cf. Treatise*, Book I, Part IV, Sections 5 and 6.)

explained by being called faculties of what is, by hypothesis, a mere 'somewhat,' or x . The weakness of the doctrine lies not so much in the vagueness of the concept of 'faculty' as in its total neglect of scientific introspection, and in its effort to explain 'faculty' by 'soul,' or 'soul' by 'faculty,' without adequate observation of consciousness under either designation. Another significant example of the tendency to divorce spiritual substance is Berkeley's insistence that "spirits and ideas . . . [are] kinds [of being] entirely distinct and heterogeneous,"¹ "natures perfectly disagreeing and unlike."² Berkeley's whole 'copy-theory' of knowledge, so prolific of results mischievous to later idealism, may be traced to his failure to recognize that the ideas are really what he himself calls operations of the mind, and that mind is never rightly conceived in abstraction from these very operations or ideas.

The result of this comparison of the concept of 'self' with that of 'soul' is in brief, then, the following. The affiliation, logical and historical, between the two has been freely acknowledged. It has been argued that Descartes and Leibniz, Locke and Berkeley, Wolff and Baumgarten, were right in so far as they taught that the occurrence of forms of consciousness implies the existence of a unique, persistent, and self-identical, conscious soul, or self. It has been pointed out, on the other hand, that the traditional doctrine of the soul suffers from two significant defects: that it conceives soul either after a material analogy or as endowed with mere negations of corporeal characters; and that it tends to rob the concept of soul of its concrete predicates. Modern personalism, on the contrary,—the doctrine of the self,—starts from the introspective study of the immediately realized self and recognizes in this self all the rich content of actual experience.

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¹ *Principles*, § 89.

² *Ibid.*, § 139. The inconsistency should be noted with Berkeley's equally emphasized teaching that spirits possess ideas; and that ideas inhere in spiritual substances.

THE FACTUAL.¹

VARIOUS words are still used to denote that content of which we are immediately aware as opposed to what we know either through assumption or through inference. Writers call it variously the 'immediately known,' 'the content of simple apprehension,' 'the given,' 'sense impressions,' 'psychical fact' or 'psychical matter of fact,' 'immediate experience,' 'data of experience,' 'pure experience,' or, simply, 'experience.'

Many of these terms imply a solution of the problem at issue between realism and idealism, and should therefore seem a begging of the question to any metaphysician who regards the notion for which they stand as logically precedent to that problem. Still more objectionable must their idealistic bias seem to a realist of the present-day type, who wishes to emphasize that that of which we are immediately aware is neither mental nor non-mental, but logically precedent, or generic, to both. Hence a neutral term should be chosen. The word 'fact' or 'the factual' seems truly neutral; and usage permits us to employ it with this meaning.

The problem of this paper is: Are there judgments of which 'the factual' forms the complete warrant; and, if so, how are these judgments related to the remainder of our knowledge?²

¹ Read before the American Philosophical Association at the Cornell meeting, December 27, 1907.

² Some objections to the following argument may be forestalled by a brief statement of the premises upon which it rests. It is not intended in any way to take issue for or against the views of the nature of truth held by Mr. Joachim (*The Nature of Truth*, Oxford, 1906), by Professor Dewey (*Journal of Phil., Psych., and Sci. Methods*, 1907), or by Mr. Russell (*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, N. S., Vol. VII); especially not, for my own conviction is that these antagonistic views can be reconciled, that each author is facing a different problem and of course offers a different solution. The type of knowledge with which this paper deals, is that of the special sciences and that of formal logic, the complete system of true propositions.

Man gains possession of parts of this system by inference; and I believe with Mr. Russell (*Principles of Mathematics*, p. 11) that all inference is deduction. The system is, from the human point of view, a conclusion following from premises. If we think of it in the abstract, quite apart from human inference (*sub specie aeternitatis*), we may say with the logicians, 'any true proposition is implied by every proposition,'

Many contemporary philosophers have held that all judgments are universal in the sense that they are subject to correction by other judgments. Still logic tells us that there are judgments which differ from one another in the degree to which they are thus subject to correction ; for in the square of opposition *I* is always true when *A* is, and can be true when *A* is false, that is, *I* is more easily proved true, or is proved false with greater difficulty than is *A*. All of which indicates that the more particular our judgments are, the less are they subject to correction by other judgments. This difference we can make the basis of a division of all judgments into two conceivable classes, the universal and the absolutely, or completely, particular. By the former class, we mean all judgments that are subject to correction or proof through other judgments. By the latter class, we mean those judgments which are not subject either to proof or to disproof through other judgments. As a mere working definition, the second is quite legitimate, even though it should prove true that there are no members of the class defined. At least, it is legitimate unless we deliberately beg the question at issue by so defining judgment that our class becomes a mere contradiction in terms ; and, even in this case, we should have to make room for our notion of an absolutely particular judgment by inventing for it some other name.

However, the absolutely particular judgment, if there be any such, must have its warrant. Where can this be found ? *In the factual.* In short, if there are members of this class of judgments, we may define the factual more precisely than we have already done, as *that which completely warrants an absolutely particular judgment.* The factual would then be indeed an absolute starting-point for knowledge, and we should be able to define it as a purely logical notion, and therefore as free from all metaphysical presuppositions other than those of pure logic.

Are there such judgments ? This question is part of the in short, any proposition is a premise of any true proposition ; but we are not dealing with it thus abstracted. For man it truly has premises, and these premises play a very important rôle.

I find that in the current number of *Mind* (January, 1908) Professor Stout has defended, from a somewhat different standpoint, the main thesis of this paper.

larger question : Are there judgments that are always premises, in other words, that are never conclusions from other judgments used as premises? Thus, if by 'primary judgment' we mean any judgment that is not an inference from some other judgment, or that has no other judgment as a premise, and if by 'secondary judgments' we mean those judgments which are conclusions from premises, the question may be worded : Are there primary judgments or are all judgments secondary? There are three conceivable types of primary judgments : First, axioms, or judgments that we assume and have no expectation of ever being able either to prove or to disprove ; second, absolutely particular judgments, as just defined ; and third, a class of judgments that are temporarily at least primary, a class of judgments that are mere assumptions for which we have as yet no proof, but for which we are theoretically able to get proof. In short, our third class is that of all complete logical leaps, or the class of pure inductive inferences.

Now we are forced to hold either that human knowledge is one enormous vicious circle or that there are primary judgments ; and, as far as I know, all philosophers choose the latter alternative. Even those who insist most upon the interdependence of our judgments are loudest in asserting the axiomatic character of the principles of logic, *e. g.*, the principle of contradiction. Yet to admit the existence of one primary judgment as premise is really to give up the fight, for if there can be one, there is no *a priori* objection to there being more. Thus, to avoid concluding that knowledge is a vicious circle, we now have to admit that it depends upon premises which are primary ; for we have admitted that there is really such a relation as that between an absolute premise and its conclusion, and therefore that all knowledge can be tested by the standard of this relation. In short, all knowledge can be regarded as a deduction from premises of some sort. Therefore, if the principles of logic are alone infallible primary judgments, we must conclude that, as far as knowledge is not a deduction from these premises, it is a deduction from mere assumptions. In any case, unless we are ready to assert of all our knowledge what the philosophical

mathematicians of the Peano school assert of mathematics, our secondary judgments must have more than merely axioms as premises. Evidently all admit that they have.

Are these premises merely logical leaps? Such ought to be the doctrine of those who find in the principles of logic our sole ultimate test of truth. Our judgments are pure guesses except in as far as their consilience, taken together with their increasing number, raises their degree of probability.

Is this extreme doctrine tenable? That there are logical leaps in our knowledge is surely true, for the whole field of inductive inference seems populated with them; and it is true also that in their case the principles of logic are the sole power making for law and order. Still it is just this complete dependence upon the principles of logic that forms an overwhelming objection to the extreme doctrine. By what miracle has mere guess given us a body of knowledge with as much internal consilience as our sciences have? Surely we are arguing against a man of straw, for the views of no philosopher are consistent with any such doctrine. That what we see or hear has something to do with our judgments, is admitted by all; but all do not see the consequence of this admission. If what we see and hear has anything whatsoever to do with our judgments, logic knows of but one influence this factual can have. It must be other than psychological. It must be the influence a premise has upon a conclusion.

And yet, with most the difficulty of admitting the existence of absolutely particular judgments does not lie here. Bradley tells us that without ideas there can be no judgments, and ideas are universals. Moreover, we can raise the further objection: none of our judgments used in daily life and in science is thus particular. The moment we use words, we are employing a medium of expression that has to be universal to be intelligible. Again, all our judgments, even our perceptions, are logically complex; and it is of course a psychological impossibility under usual circumstances for us to apprehend any content without interpreting it in terms of past experience. That is, our actual judgments are not primary, but secondary to a high degree. This, however, is not a valid objection against the logical existence of absolutely par-

ticular judgments, even though it shows that psychologically they do not exist or at least do not exist frequently. True, we cannot isolate these judgments from their complex logical setting and above all we cannot express them verbally.¹

Their logical presence as premises is none the less manifest. It is itself a logical fact of which our theory of judgment must take cognizance. In short, it is logically precedent to every theory of judgment, not the reverse. Therefore, if it conflicts with any one's definition of judgment, the fault lies with the definition.

If judgment be defined as 'an awareness of a relation between terms,' we certainly have judgments with full factual warrant; for we can discern within the factual some terms and some relations without in any logical sense going beyond it for information. Indeed, every chapter on the psychology of analysis and discrimination is but the story of how we gain those elements of our complex knowledge which come directly from immediate experience and from no other source, and which are at the same time fully warranted by the facts.

Still the objection will be raised: Does not the doctrine asserting the existence of such judgments deny the complete coherence of reality? Or, expressed in terms of logic, Does it not take these judgments out from under the rule of the principle of contradiction?

Precisely what is meant by the proposition, 'reality is coherent,' is not always made clear.² If we mean that no true propo-

¹ Here, doubtless, the reader will ask for an example. As already stated, to put an example in words is to assert more than the factual judgment; for it brings in an 'apprecient character,' as Joachim calls it. Still our verbal judgments cannot but make clear what is meant. 'Red is different from green.' 'A is bigger than B.' 'I prefer this to that.' 'This pain is severe.' 'It seems colder to-day.' If I mistake not, these judgments are quite the same as those Meinong calls *a priori* and that form the class he names 'Soseinsurteile.' Cf. Meinong, *Über die Erfahrungsgrundlagen unseres Wissens*, 1^{ter} Abschnitt.

² I expect that Mr. Joachim will reply to Professor Stout (*op. cit.*) that Professor Stout has misunderstood what he means by the coherence notion of truth. If Professor Taylor's account of it (*Metaphysics*, Book I, chap. ii) be acceptable to Mr. Joachim, I fail to see why he ought to oppose Professor Stout's thesis. A completely coherent knowledge or experience would unite in itself the factual judgment as well as the system of judgments we call abstract science by reaching a higher unity (cf. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 179-182). There appear to be three notions of

sitions contradict one another, the doctrine does not call this in question. If we mean that all existential propositions imply one another, this again, if I mistake not, is not called in question, for I am convinced that no factual judgment is an existential judgment. If we mean, however, that any true proposition whatsoever is implied by every other proposition, this may be true for the complete system of abstract science, but it is not true in actual human knowledge. If it is, of course, there are no factual judgments.

All of this can be beautifully illustrated by the history of mathematics. How different was the actual historical origin of the teachings of that science from the few ultimate premises upon which Peano and his school would to-day base them! That mathematics was of empirical origin is beyond question. That mathematics can be deduced from a few ultimate propositions of logic is to-day ably maintained. Are these two propositions contradictory? By no means. In short, the origin of any part of man's knowledge is one matter; the reformulation of that knowledge as an abstract symbolic system of truth is quite a different matter. In the one case, we are dealing with discovery and verification; in the other, with formulation.

Returning then to the objection under consideration, we may say: In the discovery of truth man uses factual judgments as premises and these premises are absolute starting-points, whereas

knowledge that, when confused, give rise to mistaken controversy. First, there is the notion of knowledge as actually existing in the minds and lives of men. Second, there are the systems of abstract symbolic knowledge, such as mathematics and the natural sciences. Third, there is the notion of knowledge in its ideal form, knowledge with all its problems solved, with all its doctrines *self-evident*, with all its abstract and symbolic character done away, an immediate experience of the world total. In the first, we have the favorite field of the pragmatist; in the second, we have that of Mr. Russell and Mr. G. E. Moore; and in the third, we have that of Messrs. Bradley, Taylor, and Joachim. Why need any of these notions contradict the others? Of course they do contradict, if they are definitions of the *same term*; and of course recent controversy has thus interpreted them. But are they? It seems to me that a careful, open minded, friendly rereading of the several authors with this question in mind will lead to the answer, No. One thing at least is clear, each party feels itself misunderstood by the other. In the objection to factual judgments mentioned above, Professor Stout evidently feels that Mr. Bradley and Mr. Joachim are his opponents. I feel that perhaps Mr. Russell, Mr. G. E. Moore, and the symbolic logicians are the ones that may have to be won over.

in the ideal or complete system of abstract science, or formulated truth, the logician may regard all propositions as so completely interrelated materially that 'any false proposition implies every proposition and any true proposition is implied by every proposition.'

There will be the further objection: Do we not predict the factual, and is not the fulfillment of such predictions precisely what we mean by the verification of an inductive inference? Thus, in the famous case of the discovery of the planet Neptune, was not the vision of the star predicted? Yes and no, for the logical process meant is more complicated than the question implies. Factual judgments imply other propositions, and the implications of one factual judgment have to be consistent with the implications of another factual judgment. In short, to verify inductions does not mean to show that the propositions inferred in part from one or more factual judgments imply other factual judgments. This widespread error in popular logic is due to confusing two quite different things: first, the prediction that we shall see this or that under specified conditions, in short, an existential judgment; and second, the factual judgments which we shall be able to pass if we do see as predicted.

Thus the foregoing doctrine does not imply that, if two factual judgments contradict one another, they might still both be true. On the contrary, it implies that two factual judgments cannot contradict one another. Can they not do so indirectly, however, by the one implying the contradictory of what the other implies? No, because what would in that case be called in question is not the factual propositions but the inferences from them. For example, is not this precisely the logical treatment we give illusions, or images in a mirror? When inconsistency arises, we do not question what we saw but the inference from what we saw.

Finally, we may be asked: Do not factual judgments contradict one another in those cases of hesitancy and change of opinion where, for example, we are trying to decide which of two objects looks the larger, or seems the heavier, or which of two colors is the brighter or is nearer in hue to a third color? First, we should note in these cases that the factual content is changing from instant to instant. Hence, when we study these cases from

the standpoint of logic, we find something quite complicated. Second, our decision after such moments is often determined by factors that make it not a factual judgment but a logical leap; for often we give our decision though we know that we lack warrant. Such cases seem, therefore, rather to show that the conditions under which we can get full factual warrant have a bounding zone where the mind is at a loss whether or not it has full warrant. This might well be a serious source of error, were it not that the mind is able to tell when it is unquestionably in the field where full warrant is to be got.

What picture, then, have we of knowledge in the actual making, looking at it through the spectacles of logic? Our premises are in part some factual judgment and in part various assumptions, or logical leaps in the form of mental imagery, feelings of tentative reaction or of any other kind, all of which leads to inferences, let these inferences be what they may psychologically, let them be habitual reactions or mental states of a highly cognitive character. Logically, part of our premises have their warrant immediately; the others and the inferences must, however, await their proof. Here the work of the principle of contradiction begins. It forms our protection against assuming premises that the data in hand contradict, let these data be, looked at psychologically, merely inhibitory reactions or again images or feelings roused by association. Likewise it protects us against false inferences by the presence of similar data. Put in terms of logic, the principle of contradiction protects us against assuming premises or making inductions that previously accepted propositions contradict. In the enormous mass of tentative knowledge which we have to accept as the basis of conduct, it is our protector; but fortunately some elements of our knowledge are infallible and do not have to go through this process of refinement. Psychologically speaking, this infallible knowledge grows as analysis and discrimination grow; and the percepts, the thoughts, feelings, and reactions that are aroused along with it by associative processes become more important and of wider range. Logically speaking, the factual that we apprehend keeps changing, and its elements, namely, its terms

and relations, become more and more also terms of other and increasingly important premises. Thus the implications of both sets of premises constitute a larger, more consilient, more enduring, and more successful system of judgments.¹

Our results and their important bearings and implications may be summed up as follows. There are scattered through human knowledge numerous, if not numberless, infallible propositions. We have called them judgments having full factual warrant. In the first place, pure mathematics contains many of these judgments, even though it be true that this science is entirely deductive, for the process of deduction itself involves factual judgments. Besides mathematics there are numerous judgments that also approach the pure factual judgment and that could perhaps be brought together in a science.² As in mathematics, so in their case, the noticeable characteristic of these judgments is that they do not assert of their terms *any existential* or any causal relation. In fact, this seems to be the great dividing line. The judgments that do assert these relations are secondary, and depend logically in part upon some inductive leap as premise.

Second, Mr. Bradley and Professor Dewey speak of the inner discrepancy of the factual, which causes us to go beyond the facts and find a larger system of reality into which to fit them. Literally the facts are not discrepant and cannot be, nor are facts contradictory. We should rather say, the presence, along with purely factual premises, of other premises, especially of those which we have called logical leaps, implies a larger system than the mere factual.

Third, our results, if correct, have an important bearing upon the theory of judgment. We have been dealing with judgment in its logically simplest form, a mere awareness of relationship between terms without either these terms or relations involving

¹ This account contradicts in no way, if I mistake not, the admirable account of knowing given by Professor Dewey (*Journal of Phil., Psych., and Sci. Methods*, Vol. IV, p. 12). What I am here trying to state is the way in which the actual developing cognition looks, if your standpoint be that of deductive logic. Of course, if you deny the right thus to regard it, or if your own standpoint is another one, such an account seems preposterous.

² Meinong's *Gegenstandstheorie*.

logical presuppositions. The familiar judgments that are usually taken as examples are in comparison highly complex, and therefore are analyzable into many judgments. Moreover, one of their main features is, as has been often pointed out, an element in them, perhaps best called 'assertion,' that constitutes them members of the larger system of truth. In short, if we define judgment as 'an awareness of a relation between terms,' these complex judgments involve not one relationship but many, and ought not, in their complex form, to be made the basis of our definition of the nature of judgment. Finally, if we have limited the scope of the principle of contradiction by withdrawing it as a criterion of the truth of the factual judgments, we have at the same time emphasized its power elsewhere, for we have implied that elsewhere consilience between judgments is the sole and complete test of truth.

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PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE (1907).

THE past year, while fertile in the production of new works, has been a sad one for philosophers.

We have had two great sorrows. M. O. Hamelin, professor at the Sorbonne, had just finished his fine book, the *Essai sur les éléments principaux de la représentation*, which I shall speak of later in some detail, and, while passing his vacation at the seashore, met his death there in the effort to save two drowning persons. This decease, although heroic, has been a great grief to his colleagues. Since the time that the union of the École Normale with the Sorbonne had brought him among us, we had been able to estimate at their real value not only the strength of his mind, the singular extent and precision of his erudition, but also his constant preoccupation with the interests of philosophic science, his devotion to the students whom he guided, and his obliging kindness to all those who sought the assistance of his knowledge. He was still in the full strength of his years, and his loss to French philosophy has been as grave as it was unexpected.

Another of our best men has also just left us, — Victor Brochard, likewise professor at the Sorbonne, and a member of the Institute, well known by his vigorous works *L'erreur* and *Les sceptiques grecs*. Although he was not yet sixty years of age, we had been constrained to expect this outcome at any moment. Twenty years ago he had been attacked by a cruel disease of the nervous system, which, as it grew more severe, had made him at first almost paralytic, then blind, and which in addition caused severe and almost constant pain throughout his whole body. Unaided by any religious belief, he held out bravely in this almost intolerable situation, thanks to his singular strength of soul, until his last day, and did not cease to fulfill exactly all the duties of his position. With the aid of a secretary who read for him, and wrote at his dictation, he gave his course in the history of Greek philosophy, learning by heart the

texts and references which he wished to cite ; he corrected the examination papers, he read the works offered for the judgment of the Academy, and made it a point of honor not to give an hour less to work than if he had enjoyed perfect health. Every evening he received his friends, whose duty and pleasure it was to come to pass a few moments with him. One never heard him complain, and the ease of his conversation might have made one believe that he did not suffer, if from time to time a momentary contraction of his face or a sudden movement of his body had not betrayed to those who knew him a pang of internal pain. He died in a few hours, without feebleness or decay. A few months before, speaking at the Institute of the case of Helen Keller, he expressed his conviction that "the mind retains all its powers even in a body which is infirm and deprived of the most useful of the senses." He himself was an almost incredible example of what moral energy and will can accomplish ; the close of his life was really a philosophic achievement.

But he himself, if he were able to read this letter, would reproach me for dwelling too long upon a man, and require me to go on to ideas. I am about to do so ; and I shall dwell especially upon two phases of the philosophic movement of this year. The one is the philosophy of the sciences, and especially the natural sciences, as chiefly represented by the recent work of M. Bergson, *L'evolution créatrice* ; and the other, that classic rationalism of which the work of M. Hamelin, already cited, is a characteristic type.

I shall then give way to M. Edouard Le Roy, the well known author of *Dogme et critique*, whom I have requested to analyze here the contemporary activity of the group of Catholic philosophers *cujus pars magna fuit*. A review of French philosophy in the year 1907 would not be complete if it did not include that remarkable movement of thought to which the condemnation of "Modernism" by the Encyclical *Pascendi dominici gregis* has recently given a sort of popularity. It seemed to me that I could adopt no better plan for giving you an account of this, than to ask it from a man who is well known not only by the part which he has taken in this movement, but by his works in pure

philosophy, of which I have already had occasion to speak in these pages.¹

I.

Philosophy in the Universities.

The book of M. Bergson, personal as it is, and, even in connection with his personality, original, nevertheless takes its place in a noticeable way in a general movement which has shown itself during the past year under many forms,— the attempt to establish a philosophy of what we call the 'natural sciences.'²

A precedent had been given by the mathematicians and the physicists. In their case, the period of analysis had been followed by that movement of synthetic thought of which M. Couturat was one of the chief representatives in France, and which received its strongest impulse from the publication of the celebrated works of M. H. Poincaré. This work is still going on, but chiefly as one of pedagogical reform. Its purpose is to replace, even in the elementary teaching of geometry, the abstract and static method found in the Elements of Euclid, and especially in Legendre, by the natural and dynamic method which is advocated by M. Meray, professor at the University of Dijon, and which, if one wishes to go further back, may be connected with the ideas of Sophus Lie, Ampère, and Colonel Mannheim. Thus, for example, parallel lines are no longer defined by the attribute of being in the same plane and never meeting, but by that of being derived from one another by *translation* (which is the gliding of a mobile plane over a fixed plane, in such a way that a straight line of the

¹ "Philosophy in France," PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, July, 1905, Vol. XIV, p. 429; *ibid.*, May, 1906, Vol. XV, p. 241, etc. — See especially the articles published by M. Le Roy in *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, and in the *Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne*.

² By this is meant in France all the science of nature, except physics and chemistry. The expression comes from the old expression 'natural history,' in which the significant word was 'history,' and which was accordingly opposed to 'natural philosophy.' But when, about 1840, biology began to be no longer descriptive, but explanatory, the workers in it were no longer willing to accept the name 'history.' They therefore substituted that of 'science'; and as for the rest the matter of their study remained the same, it came to pass that the term 'natural sciences' was applied to biology, geology, paleontology, and their companion subjects. Possibly the change was also facilitated by the fact that we are inclined to think of nature as a source of life, and that, therefore, the word spontaneously called up biological ideas.

first plane constantly coincides with a straight line of the second). Beginning with this, *rotations* are next defined, and their *homothetic relations*, all of which are operations characterized by the fact that they form *groups*. This notion of 'group,' which plays such a large part in the higher mathematics, is thus acquired at the outset by pupils who are studying geometry, and at the same time this science, without losing any of the rigor of its logic, is reduced to the actual fundamental operation from which it is psychologically derived, that is, the notion of the displacement of a rigid figure without alteration. This method is in full use at the present time in the classes in mathematics. Its most active propagandist, M. Bourlet, professor at the Academy of Arts and Trades, has made a report on the subject to the Philosophical Society,¹ which was heard by a large audience, and will certainly assist in the spread of the interesting reform.

I return to the naturalists. In spite of the publication of several interesting works, which I have cited in my former articles, they had been left behind on the whole by the philosophic movement among the physicists and the mathematicians. To-day this is no longer the case. The past year has seen the appearance, in the field of botany, of a remarkable work by M. G. Bonnier, Member of the Institute and professor at the Sorbonne, which is entitled *Le monde végétal*, and which is both an historical description and a synthetic outline of the truths already gained, and the theories at present under discussion, concerning the life of plants. In zoölogy, M. Depéret, Dean of the Faculty at Lyons, has published a constructive work entitled *Les transformations du règne animal*. In the province of geology, M. de Lauenay, professor at the School of Mines, has published an *Histoire de la terre* which sums up in three hundred pages the leading ideas of geological method and its principal results. Finally, that unwearied laborer M. Le Dantec has given us a new volume, perhaps the best, and certainly one of the most interesting, of those he has written: *Éléments de philosophie biologique*. I mention it only in passing, as it appeared in New York² at the

¹ Meeting of March 21, 1907. Published in the *Bulletin* of the Society, July, 1907.

² Under the title, *The Nature and Origin of Life*, in the series "The New Knowledge," published by A. S. Barnes and Co.

same time as at Paris. You will have no difficulty in forming your own judgment of the ingeniousness, and especially the strength, of its systematization, in which I know no other technical work in biology which can be compared with it.

These are the books. It would be an endless task to attempt the enumeration of all the articles in the reviews and all the papers submitted to learned societies which have shown the interest of the scholarly public in the philosophic problems of life.

We have recently had a very striking proof of this general attention to biological, and especially biogenetic, problems. It happened that a scientist had occasion to repeat,— without, after all, making any great changes in them,— the already old experiments of Traube on the apparent vegetable growths obtained by certain chemical reactions. For example, when a crystal of metallic salt is put into a weak solution of silicate of soda, it is known that a semi-permeable membrane is formed, enveloping a drop of concentrated solution, which increases in size by endosmosis, and which sprouts, so to speak, in fair imitation of the form of certain sea weeds. The half-informed public were astonished and deeply interested by these experiments for several months. The journals announced that the composition of life had at last been achieved, and that henceforth we would be able to manufacture plants, and later on animals, *in vitro*. The energetic protest of several more sober-minded scientists was necessary to put matters in order, and show that this enthusiasm was premature.

The environment in which the work of M. Bergson, *L'évolution créatrice*, has appeared, being so favorable, it is not surprising that the breadth of positive knowledge utilized in it, the penetrating charm of its style, the richness of its imaginative quality, and the admirable ingeniousness of its thought, added to the very real interest in the questions discussed, have brought it in less than six months to its third edition, — a success which I feel sure has no precedent among metaphysical works.

Its dominant idea is as follows: The essence of all things is mind, or, as M. Bergson says, broadening considerably the meaning of the word, 'consciousness'; not the logical understand-

ing, which is only one of its special functions particularly adapted to the knowledge of spatial movement, but mind as a whole, which is wider than the understanding, and contains, nourishes, and envelops it. Accordingly, as Schopenhauer had already profoundly said, all the force of what we think out conceptually or analytically resides in that intuitive thought which is neither concept nor judgment. By it we get at the inner side of things, their real being which is akin to ours. The true artist's way of thinking and especially of feeling is at bottom the same as that of the metaphysician. Instead of looking at things from without and in succession, he penetrates to their inner truth and comprehends their unity in a single glance.

Thought, in this broad sense, to which we owe our faculty of knowledge, is also something more. It is creative and life-giving. "When we reduce our being to our will, and our will itself to the impulse which it prolongs, we comprehend, we feel that reality is a perpetual growth, a never ending creation."¹ Accordingly, understanding proper, which is analytic and discursive, and which can place itself in immediate touch with spatial and mechanical reality, can never adequately apprehend life. All its constructions in biology are necessarily inadequate and approximate, like the imperfect procedure in the teaching of drawing which replaces the curves of the face and body by a network of straight lines which mark out their general outline, but break up their continuity.²

You wish to comprehend life, and your first attempt is to reduce it to mechanical terms. But it transcends them on every side. How are 'analogous' organs created by parts of the body which have, genetically considered, nothing in common, such as the eye of a pecten and that of a dog? It is improbable that accidental or disorderly variations could produce such concordant results, even with the aid of selection. The whole process goes on as though life manufactured certain instruments of the same kind,

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 260.

² It is somewhat remarkable that at this very time a reform in the same direction is going on in France in the teaching of drawing, which aims to substitute the method of tracing curves in a single movement (Ravaisson's Method, adopted and defended by M. Quénioux) for the method of geometrical schemas (called Guillaume's Method).

though by differing means, and in divergent lines of evolution. Only a purposive principle could arrive at such similar results by roads which are so different. "Whether we will or no, we are forced to have recourse to an inner directive principle to obtain this convergence of effects."¹

On the other hand, however, can we be teleologists in the ordinary meaning of the words? That would involve comparing the work of nature to that of the artisan who conceives a plan, and then puts together parts for the sake of realizing the design present to his mind. Besides the impossibility of conceding to the animal, and especially to the plant, these human methods of an outlined plan and an architectural construction, all that we know of the development of life is opposed to such a conception. Moreover, has it ever been able to maintain itself consistently in the face of the facts? It would seem that the idea of making the entire flora and fauna a series of rough draughts of man, who would thus be the ultimate artistic work for which Nature or the Creator was practicing, is at present quite completely abandoned.

One possibility remains: Life may be a force, an impulse *sui generis*, for which mechanism and purposiveness are only imperfect descriptions, obviously borrowed from our most usual modes of action. Renewing the beautiful ancient doctrine of the occultists concerning the 'wave of life,' M. Bergson thinks of the principle of evolution as a powerful and indeterminate impulse, superior to individuals, and animating them for a moment without ever exhausting itself in them.

"We must no longer speak of life in general as if it were an abstraction, or a mere rubric under which all living beings are enrolled. At a certain time, in certain points of space, a very visible current originated. This current of life, traversing the bodies which it has successively organized, passing from generation to generation, has divided itself among species and dispersed itself among individuals without losing anything of its force."²

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 28. We are concerned, to be sure, with a limited force, one which is, so to speak, given as an energy which exhausts itself in this or the other aggregate, although it persists as a whole. "The impulse is finite, it was given once for all; it cannot overcome all obstacles" (p. 276). "Everything seems to indicate that this force is finite, that it exhausts itself quite rapidly in its manifestations" (p. 154).

“If purpose is present in the world of life, it includes the whole of life in a single indivisible embrace.”¹

This is the secret of those extraordinary and almost incredible adaptations which connect one species with another. They seem incomprehensible to us because we have split up reality into fragments, because we involuntarily suppose that the instinctive mode of knowledge is the same as that of the reflective understanding. “This would not be the case if we should suppose that there is a *sympathy* (in the etymological meaning of the word) between the sphex and its victim, which informs it from within, so to say, of the vulnerability of the caterpillar. This sense of vulnerability may owe nothing to external perception, and may be simply the result of juxtaposition of the sphex and the caterpillar, no longer thought of as two organisms, but as two activities. It would express in concrete form the relation of one to the other. It is true that a scientific theory cannot make use of considerations of this sort. It cannot make action precede organization, or sympathy precede perception and consciousness. But, I must repeat, either philosophy has nothing to do with this subject or else its work commences where that of science ends.”²

We return, then, to our starting point. From this theory of life is derived a theory of knowledge which completes it, and which, by a circle in the reasoning, — though not a vicious circle, — justifies the spontaneous attitude of mind which is the necessary beginning of science. The Absolute, that being, or better, that primitive impulse which is essentially action and freedom, has developed in two divergent ways; the one is that of instinct, the other that of intelligence. The highest realization of the first is to be seen in bees and ants; the *only* realization of the second is found in man, who doubtless belongs to the animal series, but to a privileged branch of it. “The human brain, like every other brain, is constructed for the purpose of supplying motor mechanisms and of allowing us to choose which of them we shall set in motion at any given moment. But it differs from other brains in the fact that it can furnish . . . an indefinite number of such

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 47.

² *Ibid.*, p. 188.

mechanisms. Now the limited is as far removed from the unlimited as the closed is from the open. This is not a difference in degree, but in kind."¹ Everywhere, save in the case of man, the vital impulse has congealed in the forms and mechanisms which it has prepared in order to act. In us alone, the effort of life has overcome its obstacles, mind triumphs over mechanism, and makes use of it for its own ends. However, we have lost much as well as gained much. To attain the power of free action which is given us by reflective thought, it has been necessary to sacrifice instinct and intuition. The human intellect finds itself limited almost exclusively to the comprehension of lifeless matter; it conceives it clearly, it deals with it readily, and through it it possesses a power which is unbounded. But it retains only in an extremely feeble degree that direct intuition of living reality which the animal possesses in such perfection. Yet it does retain a little of it, and we perceive its existence in our unreflective feelings of attraction and aversion, and in those obscure movements of the mind, which acquaint us with things of which we can have no logical knowledge, — for example, in that profound instinct which will always prevent us from thinking of our fellows as the images of a dream. *The revival of this faint and flickering light is the task to which philosophy should devote itself.*

Science continues the work of reflective interpretation which has freed us by giving us a knowledge of the conditions of our action. Intuition brings us revelations which are very different. It alone makes us feel what the nature of our personality and of our liberty is; it alone can reveal to us our origin, the unity of life in all its manifestations, the lofty place we hold in nature, perhaps even our destiny as individuals and the immortality of our souls, of which a powerful instinct assures us.

M. Hamelin's book, *Essai sur les éléments principaux de la représentation*, seems at first glance quite opposed to the preceding. It represents the most schematic and condensed form of that type of philosophy which has prevailed in academic teaching since the fall of the eclecticism of Cousin until recent years. It

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 286.

would characterize it exactly, I think, to say that it represents the tradition of Kant and Hegel, as modified by Renouvier's doctrine of a moral belief in the personality of God and in the freedom of the human will.

Its method is entirely intellectual, and, as the author himself says, perhaps with a smile, "ultra-abstract." Not only does it exclude every appeal to experience and to brute fact, but it even rejects all documentary apparatus. Allusions to the teaching of some philosopher, or even of some scientist are frequently to be met in these compact chapters, with their few paragraphs and their spaced divisions; but (save for a single occasion, which will be mentioned presently) not one footnote or bibliographical reference appears to adulterate the logical purity of the analysis, or to interrupt the slow and continuous advance of the argument. This advance is through a synthetic dialectic, which rises in gradual and serried transitions from those ideas which are the most abstract, and therefore the poorest in content, to those which are the most concrete and therefore the fullest; and it should be understood that the latter are not ideas of particular objects, but of that reality which potentially contains them all, that is to say, Absolute and Personal Mind, or God.

The aim of this essay is the "synthetic construction of representation." Its method is simple and almost mechanical in its regularity. The most elementary and abstract concept to be found is first sought for, and its implications are deduced. What is to be understood here by 'implication'? The whole argument turns on this. Logical implication, in the usual sense of syllogistic logic, is not what is meant; still less that of associated ideas, as in the psychological meaning of the word. Yet in one sense this implication shares both the logical and the psychological character. It is precisely the fact that a concept cannot be thought in our mind without our thinking of another concept which is its correlative. Thus, to begin at the beginning, the simplest concept which analysis could furnish us would be that of pure *Being*; but this concept *means nothing* apart from that of Non-Being, and the converse statement is also true. "To be sure, being excludes non-being, and non-being excludes being, but it is impos-

sible to discover any meaning in either one save this function of excluding its opposite."¹ The two imply each other, therefore, and also, by the same logico-psychological principle, imply an idea without which they would be nothing, that is, without which, they would be meaningless words. This idea is that of *Relation*, which is itself to be the basis of all the subsequent synthesis. For by the same principle of "inadequacy"² Relation produces *Number*, which is its antithesis, and *Time*, which is the synthesis of the first two terms, since one cannot enumerate without forming a single, simple irreversible series, which is the proper notion of time. And if we are compelled to think it, it *is*, for it is in this sense a necessary form of our representation. Time in its turn produces *Space*, for unity, succession, and irreversibility have no meaning except as they are opposed to their contraries, and we are consequently obliged to think of a quantity whose parts are simultaneous, reversible in order, and multiple in the series which they compose, — all of which are characteristic properties of our idea of Space. But the connection of time and space is posited in its turn by the presence of these two terms as correlatives in our thought; and everyone will acknowledge that this synthesis is *Motion*. Thus a second triad is finished.

The third is as follows: *Motion*, by the same mechanism, implies *Quality*, — not the Kantian quality, which is merely a logical character, but the quality of the physicist, the nature of which is of more significance than its degree; for there cannot be motion without something which moves.

And, on the other hand, the relation of motion to quality produces a synthesis which is *Change*. But change implies *Specification*. For the first of these two processes, the essence of which lies in the disappearance (at least, the relative disappearance) of a

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 1.

² "We took our departure from the inferior determinations of being, from determinations which make up the essence of the matter; but as our method is the contrary of the deductive or analytic method, our principle of explanation has always been the inadequacy of the inferior elements, rather than their adequacy. Each of these elements has seemed to us unable to exist except by the support of something higher" (p. 451). "Unless we abandon the method we have followed, we must find in causality a point of connection with finality, and, under the form of deficiency, an indication of its essence" (p. 296).

given quality, can have no meaning save as it is distinguished from the inverse process, the essence of which would consequently be the fixity of the qualitative state taken as a starting point. Every change presupposes a kind, and a difference in this kind. And, on the other hand, the relation of change to specification, which forms the transition from identity to difference, and the implication of identity in difference, is mechanical determination or *Causality*, the last term of this fourth triad.

And, lastly, the final opposition and the final synthesis are established, starting with causality. From the idea of a haphazard result, merely fortuitous, such as is that of an effect of a bare cause, we get by antithesis that of order, of goodness, of end. *Purpose* thus appears to supply a deficiency which is inevitably indicated by the idea of causality. It is then that we reach the conclusion of this gigantic sorites, if the name may be applied to a mode of reasoning which has nothing in common with formal deduction. Causality and finality presuppose a form of being, which, though in itself neither thing nor being (since every synthesis is a relation), is nevertheless a sufficient principle of action and its modes. To set these conditions is to define something which is in process of becoming, whose essence lies in the actualization of certain possibilities which are at first contained in it potentially and along with their contraries. This is precisely what philosophers mean in speaking of *Consciousness* or of *Personality*.

Such is the 'keystone' of the entire argument, the last of the ideas postulated, step by step, by the pure idea of being or of relation, and which itself postulates nothing further; for it is the concrete, which is psychologico-logically adequate both to itself and to the mind of the philosopher, which is partially identical with it. And as one cannot make consciousness the foundation of all being, without at the same time equating this consciousness to the totality of things, it follows that true personality is a consciousness which, like the Leibnizian monad, rightly involves the whole of reality; and, like it, it consequently implies God. "Existence alone, taken in the absolute sense, the universe with its organization, so bewilderingly vast and profound, — these are

prodigious burdens. God is not too great for their support. If, then, we are able to transcend ourselves ever so little, and perceive a means of intercommunication between beings, we shall affirm the separate existence of that Being which we do not, it is true, directly apprehend, but with which, as a support for all other beings, our reason cannot dispense."

My chief aim in this summary review has been to indicate the general spirit and method of this book. One has the feeling that the whole of the ingenious and subtle dialectic is attracted by the idea of the supreme Spirit, as if by the pole of a magnet from which it hangs suspended. But in thus presenting the framework of the book, I have neglected what is certainly its principal charm. In this, as in other points, reminding one of Hegel, M. Hamelin adds to each of the fundamental theses just analyzed, copious and varied 'elucidations,' which form an admirable collection of explanations of the special questions raised by his general theory. For example, in the chapter, "Time, Space, Motion," are to be found acute studies on non-Euclidean spaces and the postulates of geometry; in the chapter, "Change, Specification, Causality," remarks on the aim and methods of classification which might be profitably read by a naturalist,¹ and also on transformism, on duration, on chance, on teleology, on external perception. I shall not enter upon the analysis of these dissertations, to which I presume a special notice will be devoted in this REVIEW; but it would be impossible to speak even in a general way of the *Essai sur les éléments principaux de la représentation* without mentioning this rich series of monographic studies.

On first thought, the position of this work would seem to be the antipodes of that of *L'évolution créatrice*. The latter represents the most absolute voluntarism, the former the method of pure intellectualism. On the one side is an almost exclusive attachment to empirical data and facts, to the observations of the biologist and psychologist; on the other is a combination of concepts completely abstract, in which the author makes a point of not knowing whether a museum or a laboratory exist. A

¹ Here, again, one sees the importance of biological questions for all philosophers at the present time.

conception of metaphysic which almost identifies it with art is opposed to one which regards it as the necessary development of the Idea. Yet in spite of this it is singular to see in how many passages the two books bear the impress of the same intellectual environment, and disclose themselves as contemporaries. There is, in the first place, a war against the 'philosophy of things,' against the idea of substance, of reality as quite finished, and subsisting in the mode of the old essences. Everything is becoming, moving; more than this, everything is in process of eternal creation, and the past is not big with the future.

Both works, though from different reasons, base their whole conception of human life on a philosophy of freedom; both reject with equal ardor, though in ways quite different, the scientific monism which flourished twenty years ago, and criticise quite severely evolutionistic mechanism, that doctrine which attempts to explain life as a simple effect of the 'conditions of existence.' Both show the same sympathy for Lamarckism as against Darwinism, the same belief in the inexhaustibility of organic phenomena, the same conception of life as an expansive force "which awaits only the absence of hindrances in order to burst forth."¹ In spite of this, both also reject the classic doctrine of final causes, which would make finality a tendency towards an end fixed in advance and, in so far, already real. It would be difficult to say in which of the two books belongs the following passage: "Finality is not conformity with the idea, but an organization which invents itself, a plan which realizes itself."²

Another point of resemblance appears in the idealism which identifies being and representation, and thus places reality again among the objects of perception. "There is a close analogy," says M. Hamelin himself (in the only note of his lengthy work), "between my notion of the relation of the physical to the mental and the theory of M. Bergson on the same subject." At the same time, the usual opposition of thought to action has no value for either writer except as a temporary classification. "Consciousness is above every action, or it is more than action."³ A

¹ Hamelin, *op. cit.*, p. 280.

² *Ibid.*, p. 324.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 345.

great divergence no doubt appears, from this point onward, as to the power of understanding and of logical thought ; but any truth becomes false if exaggerated. I have spoken of similarities and of apparent kinship, not of identity of thought. Yet the works share another tendency, perhaps the most characteristic of all, — that towards the religious ideas of the soul, of creation, and of a personal God.

M. Bergson is obviously attracted by the traditional spiritualism. He interposes between animals and men a difference not only of degree but of nature ;¹ he invites us to have confidence in our instinct of immortality,² since instinct is not only a faculty of action, but also one of knowledge, and, strictly speaking, even the only faculty which brings us into contact with reality ;³ he connects his conception of life with that of an Absolute, psychical in nature, who is and lives in us, and shares duration with us, although He is infinitely more concentrated and self-collected. On the other hand, M. Hamelin ends his argument with the idea of a personal God, which is not only the completion of his edifice but almost its keystone. He believes in "the separate existence of that being, which we do not, it is true, directly apprehend, but with which, as a support for all other beings, our reason cannot dispense."⁴ This being is not only absolute Mind, as follows from its very definition, but also perfect goodness ; and it is in virtue of this quality that it is really Creator, since it has made possible the welfare of humanity. We, being free, take possession of what is determined, on the single condition of studying and understanding it. All the natural forces of which we have need will probably allow themselves to be subdued, "so that the final success of the enterprise in which humanity is laboring will be assured, that is to say, the full and complete expansion of human personality will be attained."⁵

Theism, says M. Hamelin, is not a fashionable doctrine. This was true twenty years ago. Is it still true to-day ? He himself

¹ *L'evolution créatrice*, p. 286.

² *Ibid.*, p. 291.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 323.

⁴ *Essai*, p. 458.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 460.

reminds us that fashion is changeable, and that the idea of God, which had been made a hindrance to the most legitimate aspirations of mankind, may well gain favor anew, if no longer used against science or justice. It would not be the first instance of great works in philosophy bringing to light the first symptoms of a latent transformation.

ANDRÉ LALANDE.

II.

Philosophy of Religion.

Everyone knows, and a simple reading of the book-notices in the Reviews would suffice to show, that a wide and deep movement of religious thought is going on in the world, and that it has resulted in a real renaissance of theological studies in the broadest and also the most precise meaning of the name. All those questions which once aroused passionate interest during Christian Antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the Reformation Epoch, which continued, in connection with Jansenism, to agitate the seventeenth century, but which the nineteenth century neglected, as though it considered them definitively out of date and dead, are resuming an intense life, and reappearing in the foreground of the absorbing questions of our time. Moreover, they are treated in the spirit of free investigation, and with such objectivity as to compel the attention even of those who are not inspired by attachment to any creed. It is as though a lost province had been reconquered by speculative philosophy.

This work of renewal is going on almost everywhere. It began about twenty years ago, but I shall deal with it in France only, and during its most recent period. This restriction is sufficient explanation for the fact that my citations are limited to works inspired by Catholicism; for the thought of French Protestantism, which yesterday was agleam with the brilliancy of which Sabatier and Réville were familiar examples, seems at present less fertile and less new. The dominant ideas of the present day are not from it.

Some general remarks will be useful before discussing the works in detail. The breadth and extent of the movement under consideration are no more deniable than its existence. What

other proofs need be cited besides the complete renewal during the past twenty years of the Catholic book-trade, the multiplication and growing success of special reviews (eleven among which, counting the better ones only, were founded from 1892 to 1907), the sudden and profound change in the teaching of the seminaries and of the independent universities, and finally, the agitation shown quite recently by the official hierarchy of the Church? The progress which is being made is not the deed of a few isolated thinkers. It has its source among the great masses of the people and is supported by them, it answers to a need which they feel, and finds innumerable auxiliaries in their hearts; and the rising generation seems to promise laborers in even greater numbers. Besides this, the field of effort is not confined; history, exegesis, apologetics, and theology all march abreast. The most fundamental problems, touching the very sources of Christianity, are broached one after the other; and a convergence both in method and results is seen on all sides, all the more significant because it is spontaneous. The guiding spirit of the great movement is one of synthesis. At once critical and religious, practical and metaphysical, wishing to be the one as completely as the other, without attenuations or compromises, it strives for conciliation not through some more or less clever artifice in equilibrium, but by the very attempt to get at the bottom of opposing tendencies. Speculations in the air, with no foundation in exact erudition, are more and more distrusted. Men are anxious to observe facts scrupulously, and to seize them in the precise shading of their specific peculiarities. No reduction to some preconceived type of explanation is decided on *a priori*. Yet at the same time philosophy and metaphysics are not neglected. Research may be just beginning, the data still in process of collection, but the goal aimed at is that of an *intelligible* synthesis. Only, the attempt is not to construct some new system all at once after the ancient model. Truth is expected only as the result of common study, of free collaboration, of gradual and collective progress, and not from the divination of some man of genius, finishing everything by himself, and, as it were, by a *coup d'état*. Besides, the most remarkable characteristic of the new move-

ment is its autonomy. It is a crisis perhaps, in consequence of this, but one of growth and not of dissolution, above all a religious rebirth, a sort of 'revival,' rather than an offshoot of rationalism. It is the authentic product and assertion of a faith which means to live and grow without shutting itself off from reason and without anathematizing modern thought. This is a change in attitude indeed worthy of notice! The aim is no longer to confine all efforts, as before, to the defense of the faith against the assaults of criticism regarded as an enemy; it is rather to employ criticism to deepen faith, and faith to complete criticism, thus vivifying each by the other without ignoring in any way the specific nature of either.¹

The movement began with an examination of the historic sources of faith, as was most natural. Christian doctrine has an essentially historic character, and its connection with certain historic facts is so essential that although one may have a purely speculative philosophy of religion, it would no longer be really Christianity. The ideas of 'Scripture' and 'Tradition' are fundamental in all theology properly so called. It was necessary to begin, therefore, by a critical revision of the past, — of documents, institutions, and beliefs; and this was the course adopted, the labor being entirely one of research, and independent of any particular philosophic prepossession.

Church History was at first studied, renovated from top to bottom, and disembarassed of the legends which deformed it. The name of Mgr. Duchesne is dominant in this phase of the task. It is needless to insist on the sagacity of his criticism and the solidity of his erudition, for the work of this learned prelate may be now regarded as classic. Its results are summed up by the author himself in the great work which he is now publishing, a second volume of which appeared in the course of last year. This *Histoire ancienne de l'Église* brings our knowledge of Christian origins to a focus in admirable fashion, and though in discreet and prudent form, yet with perfect clearness to the reader

¹ For the general characteristics of the movement under discussion, the inquiry of Dr. Rifaux, — *Les conditions du retour au catholicisme*, Paris, Plon, 1907, a document which is worthy of attention, — may be usefully consulted.

of insight, is pregnant with many consequences in the field of doctrine.

However, Mgr. Duchesne, though he "does not neglect the theologians and their activity," but on the contrary gives them a large place in chapters rich in material for the history of theology, is nevertheless unwilling to "be absorbed in the contemplation of their quarrels." Other thinkers have devoted themselves more particularly to the history of dogma, a science the very name of which is a program and a lesson, almost a manifesto. They are working efficiently in the renovation of the traditional sources of theology. Among them I will name only Abbé Turmel, who has written on the history of angelology, on eschatology in the fourth century, on the dogmas of original sin and of the descent into hell, and on the history of positive theology. His latest contribution is a series of articles on the origin of the papacy and of the pontifical power, published in the *Revue catholique des Eglises*, and soon to be collected into a volume. M. Turmel is, I may add, not at all a lonely figure. Studies in patrology are appearing on every side. Important collections of texts (*Collection Hemmer et Lejay*, published by Picard) and of monographs (*Collection la pensée chrétienne*, published by Bloud) are in course of publication. In brief, our knowledge of ancient Christian literature begins to be really critical.¹

The reformation of biblical exegesis was a more difficult task, considering the gravity of its results and their intimate and direct connection with theology itself. It has in consequence remained under debate since 1892, and still arouses much opposition. Nevertheless, it can at present be regarded as virtually accomplished. I must confine myself in these pages to the statement of the fact. As far as the Old Testament is concerned, criticism has won the day. But the scientific study of the New Testament, in spite of the immense progress it has made, is still the subject of endless disputes. As I write these lines, M. Loisy has just brought out an important work in two large volumes, entitled

¹ A gap must nevertheless be indicated. The great thinkers of the Middle Ages have as yet scarcely been studied at all from a really historical and critical point of view. Up to the present the methods of polemics or of apologetics have been too prevalent in this field.

Les évangiles synoptiques, which will no doubt cause much excitement, and provoke copious and heated controversies.

The chief result of these works on historical subjects, from our present point of view, has been the precise determination of the real elements entering into the problems which speculative theology must attempt to solve. They have led especially to a remodeling of the notions of 'tradition' and 'revelation,' which has given them a content which is positive and also intelligible. Certain philosophers were too inclined to content themselves with pure speculation in religious matters, as though the questions for solution could even be formulated independently of history. Criticism appeared at an opportune moment to remind these excessive idealists of the rights of positive research.

But the opposite excess should also be avoided. There have been historians who seemed to reduce theology to a mere history of doctrines. According to them, it would seem that once the letter and the concatenation of the opinions of past ages were known, nothing would be left to do. This also is an error. The problems of religion remain real and living problems, which every age must deal with anew for itself; and psychology, as well as history, has a share in determining their data.

Under the impulse and influence of Mr. William James, the psychology of religion, treated from this recent point of view, has developed remarkably within the last few years. It could almost be said to have made itself a positive science. As an example connected with the movement here analyzed, I will cite the fine articles of M. de Montmorand on the orthodox mystics, first published in the *Revue Philosophique*, but soon to reappear, expanded and completed, in book form. But it would not be enough to study cases more or less extraordinary. It is also necessary, perhaps more than anything else, to examine the religious life in its normal condition. Here one is confronted by the Church; by dogma, public worship, sacraments, and hierarchy, all regarded as products, means, conditions, and guides of collective religious experience as it is regularly organized. It is to this side of the question that the *Revue Catholique des Églises*, whose activity during the past year continued unabated, devotes

itself. Among the articles recently published by it, I would especially call attention to those of MM. Chevalier and Wilbois on the Churches of England and of Russia.¹ In this same class of researches the numerous biographical and critical studies of great religious thinkers of modern times, and of precursors of the present movement, may also be enumerated: M. Margival has written on Richard Simon, M. Giraud on Pascal, MM. Boutard and Maréchal on Lamennais, M. Brémond on Newman,² M. Goyau on Catholicism in Germany during the nineteenth century, etc.

It is time, however, to turn to the philosophy of religion proper. The careful investigation of the data furnished by psychology and history, which paves the way for the solution of its problems, is not the whole of it. The problems themselves must finally be discussed: the problem of faith, the problem of dogma, the problem of the church. What is the present state of these problems, and what are the chief tendencies in their discussion?

Of scholastic philosophy I shall make only commemorative mention. Leo XIII, as is well known, dreamed of reviving it. This was, however, but a dream, and to-day no one can hide from himself the fact that it has ended in complete defeat. In vain have the writings commenting on St. Thomas been multiplied; philosophers have remained indifferent, and the scholastics are read only by one another. To-day, any real study of mediæval philosophy must be historical, a fact which as yet very few can recognize. Nevertheless, mention should be made of an interesting attempt by Father Sertillanges to give breadth and flexibility to Thomism by modernizing it. This attempt, however (as found in certain articles in the *Revue de Philosophie* on the notion of God), is as yet only a brilliant sketch, and is besides restricted to a special point, that in which St. Thomas has been

¹ M. Wilbois has collected his articles into a volume, *L'avenir de l'Église russe*, Paris, Bloud, 1907.

² A volume could be made of nothing but the bibliography of recent publications concerning Newman. I will mention only, during the past year, a series of articles by M. Baudin, in the *Revue de Philosophie*, entitled "Philosophie de la foi chez Newman." A reply to these articles, by M. Dimnet, has appeared in the *Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne*.

most inspired by the Neo-Platonic mystics, and especially by the pseudo-Dionysius.

The living philosophy of religion of the present has its face set in quite a different direction than Scholasticism. It calls itself a 'philosophy of action,' and its aim is to discover, by means of an exhaustive analysis, the conditions which moral action requires and the needs which it implies. Ollé-Laprune was the first to forecast it, very vaguely it is true. M. Maurice Blondel became its real founder a little later. After him Father Laberthonnière developed and clarified it effectively, while applying it more to theology proper and to apologetics than M. Blondel himself had done. During the past year Father Laberthonnière has continued his activity by articles published in the *Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne*, without, however, adding anything substantially new on the question as to what is contained in his *Essais de philosophie religieuse*. For my own part, I have labored at the same task, though in a different way, drawing especial inspiration from the original and fertile ideas of M. Bergson. It will be enough to cite in this connection a dissertation in the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, in which I have attempted to state "how the problem of God presents itself." There is a common element in these various attempts, and a statement of it may serve to characterize the present tendency of religious thought in the field of philosophy:

I. The criticism of intellectualism has been undertaken, from the points of view of common sense, of science, of metaphysics, and of faith, and has been carried very far. But the conclusion in view is not some irrationalism or other, as contradictory in theory as it is unrealizable in practice. Its aim is to demonstrate the insufficiency of thought when merely dialectic and geometric, and the preëminent function of intuition, that is, of that profound creative thought which directs invention of every sort, and which is rather action than discourse.

II. Pragmatism takes the place of intellectualism, — these two words denoting attitudes of mind rather than systems. It is, however, essential to understand the precise sense in which pragmatism is used. The question is not one of being interested

in the practical outcome of ideas rather than in their value for thought, or in the utility of doctrines rather than in their truth. Truth is still sought for, and regarded as attainable; only it is thought that the test of practical outcome is a necessary means of verification, and truth is represented above all as a growth, a convergence, rather than a static limit.

III. The apologetics which has its source in these views should be conceived as one of living experience, and not of abstract reasoning. To show to the soul which ignores it the germ of faith which is already alive within it by the very fact of its life; to make it become completely conscious of its real condition, and then to guide it towards an increasing faith, and teach it to enter upon that living experience which is alone decisive,— these are the tasks of an apologetics as thus conceived.

However, all the speculations thus far outlined are but prefaces. One could not always rest satisfied with them, however necessary it was at first to follow their development. The time has now come to attack the real task, which is the remodeling of dogmatic theology. The two currents of religious thought, the historic and the philosophic, which until now have followed independent courses, must be united. Some indication must be given of how to answer the fundamental objections of modern thought to the idea of dogma, and how to accomplish a conciliation which shall not neglect or sacrifice anything either of reason or of faith. A means must be shown to renew in the twentieth century the fertile labors of the thirteenth, by adapting traditional dogma to the present state of thought. The immutability of this dogma must accordingly be reconciled with its evolution, and the possible universality of the faith with the necessarily esoteric character of theology. This is the program the first steps in whose realization I have attempted to outline in my volume, *Dogme et critique*.¹ This work, the outcome of an earlier article published in the *Quinzaine* in 1905, under the title *Qu'est-ce qu'un dogme?* is simply a beginning which in no way pretends to be definitive or complete. Its aim was to open questions, not to close them.

¹ To this volume is appended an *Essai sur la notion de miracle*, published in the *Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne*, the articles on the problem of God previously cited, and a brief note inserted in the *Revue du Clergé Français* in October, 1907.

In this it was successful, for it was the starting point of a very wide controversy, which is still going on, and which, I think, will have some real results. In connection with it, I will mention here only a book by Father Allo, *Foi et systèmes*, which has just appeared in the Librairie Bloud, and a series of articles in the *Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne*, entitled "Dogme et Théologie," in which Father Laberthonnière defends vigorously a point of view differing from mine. It is permissible to think that the truth which will at last disclose itself will contain something of each of these conceptions, and bring together what is best in all of them.

But I must hasten towards my conclusion. The movement of religious renovation has not been confined to merely theoretical questions. Two recent works show a different interest, although one in perfect harmony with those just analyzed: *Morale et société*, by M. Fonsegrive, and *La crise morale des temps nouveaux*, by M. Bureau. To these over-brief references, I wish to add a word on one more book, also published this year, *Le catholicisme et la société*, by MM. Legendre and Chevalier. It is preceded by a masterly preface by Father Laberthonnière, discussing the problem of authority in the Church, and it contains a broad statement and solution, based on a thoughtful review of the historical facts, of the question of the relations of Church and State, at present such a burning one in France. In conclusion, as discussing an analogous subject, I may mention a very remarkable collection of studies relating to the reconstruction of Christendom by uniting the separated Churches. The *Revue Catholique des Églises* has made itself the centre and organ of this movement, and its classic origins have recently been set forth by M. Baruzi in his suggestive and novel book, *Leibniz et l'organisation religieuse de la terre*.

And now, as I am about to finish this rapid review, I cannot leave entirely unmentioned the recent acts by which the authority of Rome has attempted to intervene in the discussions now in progress, and especially the Encyclical *Pascendi dominici gregis*, which has already aroused so many controversies. To be frank, a document of this sort scarcely lends itself to discussion, for

many reasons which it will not be difficult to guess. It cannot be asserted to belong in any sense to the literature of philosophy. But a word of explanation is required for the attitude towards it taken by those whom it calls "Modernists," and who are precisely the authors whose works have just been enumerated. It is needless to dwell upon the fact that they have never taken the name of "Modernists." This barbarism has always seemed to them, and still seems, devoid of sense ; created for polemic needs, inappropriate to the pacific and sincere search for truth, it belongs to the vocabulary of the journalist, not to that of the philosopher. Two additional remarks occur to me. In the first place, the encyclical singularly misrepresents the opinions which it reproves. In the second, it builds a system which has never been professed by anyone, and it is only this system that it has itself created which is condemned. Accordingly, the pretended "Modernists" may be saddened by the tone which it was believed necessary to adopt in addressing them ; but it neither disturbs them, nor causes them to rebel, nor checks their labors. And they do not even feel that it is at all difficult to reconcile the continuation of their work with their resolution to observe obedience to the full and legitimate extent required by their Catholicism.

EDOUARD LE ROY.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

Völkerpsychologie: Eine Untersuchung der Entwicklungsgesetze von Sprache, Mythos und Sitte. Zweiter Band: Mythos und Religion. Zweiter Teil. Von WILHELM WUNDT. Leipzig, Wilhelm Engelmann, 1906. — pp. 481.

The first part of the second volume of Wundt's *Völkerpsychologie*, it may be remembered, was a treatise on the psychology of imagination (*Phantasie*) which developed the general principles to be followed in the interpretation of the products of the mythological imagination, the phenomena now to be considered in detail. This second part consists of a single 'chapter' (Chap. IV) of nearly 500 pages dealing with primitive ideas of the soul. Under this general heading, Wundt treats of the origin, forms, and modifications of these ideas, and of the beliefs and cults expressing them, including such topics as animism, witchcraft, fetichism, totemism, tabu, atoning sacrifice, ancestor worship, and the belief in demons. The discussion is carried to the point where, with the demons of the sky having personal character, belief in demons passes over into belief in gods. The subject is profoundly interesting, and the treatment, it needs scarcely be remarked, masterly. Into a region peculiarly perplexing, where so much appears chaotic, doubtful, and inexplicable, Wundt has gone with a scientific equipment which, it is not too much to say, no other explorer in this region has ever possessed before, and he has constructed a map of it which, while contradicting the findings of other investigators at too many points to be indisputable in all details, bears the marks in its main outlines of a sound scientific construction.

It is insisted, to begin with, that we must recognize not one, but two distinct primitive conceptions of the soul, not only that of the 'free' soul, the independent psyche, but also that of the complex of psychic functions 'bound' to the living body. The latter, indeed, is taken to be the more primitive, as being due to the most obvious associations. This 'bound' soul appears in two main forms according as the living body as a whole or, by a more restricted association, certain preferred parts (kidneys, blood, excrements, nails, hair, the glance of the eye, etc.) are regarded as its bearers. The 'free' soul, though no less corporeal, has a different origin. Of its two main forms, that of the soul as breath arises chiefly from observing the cessation of the vital

functions with the last expiration of the breath, while that of the soul as phantom or shade is derived from such phenomena as the images seen in dreams. In early thought these different ideas coexist, are variously combined, undergo manifold modifications, and give rise to numerous forms of myth. That the soul should be conceived as incorporated in worms, snakes, and other creeping things, and in fishes, birds, and trees; that magical powers should be ascribed to the breath, — a fact suggesting that the idea of a transfusion of soul was the probable origin of the kiss;¹ that visions and ecstasies should lead to the conception of the soul as something separable from the body; that belief in spirits and demons should be largely influenced by nightmarish dreams, — all this, and more, is here skilfully explained by the associations that enter into the affectively colored mythological apperception.

The mythology of the soul is represented, with certain reservations, as developing through three main stages: (1) animism; (2) animalism (totemism) and manism (ancestor worship); and (3) demon worship. Under animism Wundt includes the simplest, most primitive soul-myths and the connected simplest forms of magic. They are based on ideas of the undivided body-soul and of the phantom soul. At this stage, it is held, we have no myths based on ideas of distinct bodily organ souls or of the soul as breath, these ideas being as yet undeveloped; this is explained by the somewhat incredible assumption that men had either not yet noticed or had failed to be impressed by the fact that the heart stops beating and that respiration ceases with the extinction of life (p. 155). However, ideas are not wanting of the concentration of psychic energy in the blood, kidneys, etc., and it is in the belief that this energy may be physically appropriated that Wundt finds the probable origin, though not the only persisting motive, of cannibalism. Ideas of the phantom soul, again, are the source of the most primitive rites connected with the disposition of the dead, in which the primary object is not cultus of the dead, but protection of the living. Wundt admits that primitive animism, in the sense defined, is something of an abstraction; but he regards this type of belief as primary because, starting with it, we can give a psychological explanation both of animism itself and of the transition from it to totemism, etc., whereas, if we make the latter primary, the phenomena become unintelligible. From the same point of view, he criticises the animistic hypothesis as commonly held, in

¹ Cf. for a highly sublimated form of this idea the verses ascribed to Plato: "Kissing I had my soul upon my lips; my soul was passing from me to my love."

that it takes as original what is psychologically explicable only as the product of later reflection, namely, that the soul is a separable entity ; and he criticises it as a general mythological hypothesis, in that it unwarrantably assumes that nature-myths are derived from soul-myths. He further criticises the 'preanimistic' hypothesis of Marett which derives soul-myths, nature-myths and religion from a primitive vague supernaturalism, in which ideas of the general animation and magical interrelation of objects spring from a supposed primitive feeling of awe, as virtually making belief in demons and magic precede beliefs about the soul.

The origin of witchcraft and magic is ascribed to the demand for an explanation of such phenomena as sickness, death, and misfortune, when occurring under circumstances that preclude their being taken as matters of course ; the savage makes no demand for a general causal explanation. Nature-myths being still undeveloped, the only possible explanation in such cases is in that form of causal agency with which alone the savage is familiar, the human will. All the varieties of primitive witchcraft are readily connected with primitive ideas of the soul, particularly of the body-soul in the kidneys and generative organs and in the outstreaming glance of the eye, and of the free-roaming phantom soul. Its development is traced from its direct into two indirect forms, the 'symbolic' and the 'magical,' corresponding roughly to Frazer's distinctions of imitative and sympathetic magic.

Based fundamentally on ideas of witchcraft, and thus an outgrowth of animism, is the most primitive of cults, fetichism, connected with which is the use of amulets and talismans. Although often appearing mingled with forms of a more developed mythology and, again, as a lapse from higher forms, Wundt has no hesitation in assigning to fetichism its place as a form of primitive animism marking the transition from belief in souls to belief in spirits and demons. To appeal to it as evidence of the existence of 'peoples without religion' or, on the other hand, as evidence of degradation from an original monotheism, is in his view to ignore the most general psychological laws of evolution. Fetichism is the germ out of which, eventually, religion is developed ; but before we reach religion proper, we have to pass through intermediate forms of mythology, and first of all beliefs in spirits and demons, for which fetichism as a private cult, whose particular object is not thought as the seat of any definite individual soul, prepares the way.

Coming to the next stage of the development, Wundt finds that

the worship of animals precedes that of man and is connected originally with the belief that man is descended from animals. Where the animal cultus is a dominating element in primitive mythology, this belief is, as a rule, to the effect that the tribe originated in some definite animal. This 'totemism' gives rise, through manifold associations and the assimilation of further elements, to customs of tabu and rites of sacrifice, and finally, through connection with the animal ancestors, to the worship of ancestors and anthropogonic myths, culminating in ideals of the gods. One of the most noteworthy points in Wundt's whole treatment is his theory of the first step in this process, the origin of totemism. The phenomena are notoriously complicated, and for this reason the various theories proposed by Spencer, Lubbock, Lang, Frazer, and others are all open to more or less serious criticism. Here, if anywhere, the clue must be sought in psychology. Wundt goes straight to the heart of the matter when, abstracting from the myths and ceremonies that may plausibly be regarded as secondary, he observes that totemism, as it appears under relatively original conditions, exhibits two especially prominent characteristics: (1) the original totems are animals, in all probability animals such as birds, lizards, crocodiles, and snakes, which are pre-eminently regarded as incarnations of souls; (2) these original totems are at one and the same time souls of ancestors and guardian demons. With this the theory is advanced that totemism is developed from animism. The original totem, it is held, is the form into which, through direct or mediate association, the body-soul or breath-soul is apperceived as passing. Thus in the first instance the worms of the decaying body are apperceived as continuing the life of the dead man; his life passes into them. Hence by association the identification of the soul with creeping things, such as snakes, lizards, etc. Similarly of the association of the breath-soul and birds. But if the soul of the dead man thus appears in animal form, it must, to primitive thinking, have originally been an animal, and the association which attaches the soul of the man just dead to an ancestor in the indefinite past transforms the soul-animal into an animal ancestor. From this numerous myths are developed. To the idea of the animal ancestor are transferred the motives already attaching to the primary soul-animal, the wish to appropriate the energies of the dead man combined with fear of his demonic power. Hence the many food regulations connected with the totem, hence the systems of tabu; hence too, later, the sacred animal and the sacrifice. Finally, from the idea of the ancestor totem is naturally developed that of the

guardian demon. Totemism, with its worship of animal ancestors, influences and is in turn influenced by the development of the social organization, which in the first instance made it possible. Wundt leaves the reader to conjecture how animals not originally soul-animals came to be selected as totems.

The transition from totemism to ancestor-worship is obscured by the mingling with its many motives of nature-myths and poetic fictions. One feature of primitive folk-lore, however, is conspicuous, the naturalness to the savage mind of the coalescence of man and animal and of the generation of the one from the other. Eliminating later additions, Wundt finds anthropogonic myths of totemistic character in which (1) the human ancestor is directly referred to a totem, (2) the tribal ancestors are demonic beings, half animal, half human, gradually or suddenly metamorphosed into men, and (3) they are originally men, founders of the tribe and the inventors of its totem. Myths of the second and third type are oftenest combined with nature-myths; the metamorphosis myths are the most influential. In these mixed forms, to which fantastic dreams (and monstrous births?) contribute, totemism reaches beyond itself: it is no longer an animal that is the ancestor of men, but man in the process of becoming. Nature-myths, in another direction, develop these mixed beings into animal gods. Manism, the worship of ancestors, does not arise directly out of totemism. In the strict sense, it is relatively rare, while cultus of the dead and of souls is universal. In China and Japan its development has been favored by relative isolation and a sense for historical tradition. It is only one of the forms derived from totemism containing elements of animism and nature-myths.

Before reaching this stage, Wundt treats of other derivatives of totemism, particularly of tabu and sacrifice. Tabu, he thinks, originated in the feeling of aversion aroused by certain animals, by corpses, forms of sickness, uncanny places, etc., united with fear of demonic powers. Established as tribal custom, the institutions of tabu convert the coercion of this fear into the constraint of custom, tradition, and finally of law. Ideas of tabu are intimately connected with those of magic; the purifications and propitiatory sacrifices following its violations are of the nature of a counter-magic. Here is the origin of the later religious ideas and emotions relative to the holy and the unclean.

In his theory of sacrifice, accordingly, Wundt rejects the common notion that sacrifices originated in the idea of a gift to win the favor of the god, and only later assimilated ideas of magic. Robertson Smith's theory that they are based on the idea of a union with the

superior power by sharing with it the sacrificial meal, rightly emphasizes certain facts, but is not sufficiently comprehensive. They arise in fact, Wundt holds, from a variety of motives, principally three: (1) motives of magic, (2) fear of demons, (3) motives of atonement. In different sacrificial rites these motives are differently combined, but in all sacrificial rites the primary genetic motive is found in ideas of magic, and this, though thrust into the background by other concurrent motives later on, never entirely disappears. A similar account is given of the origin of asceticism; it is not the product of philosophical reflection, nor does it first appear in the higher form of religion; it appears in renunciation of the flesh of the totem through fear of the ancestral spirit incarnated therein, and in the self-mortifications practised in connection with savage funeral rites, where the torn-out hair, cut-off finger, etc., are offered to the dead as parts of one's own soul, to reconcile the spirit of the dead and to secure the survivors from its vengeance (p. 345). Taking up the subject again in connection with the discussion of the offerings made to the demons of vegetation, Wundt assigns the different forms of sacrifice to a three-fold origin, — to funeral ceremonies, to ideas of tabu, and to the cultus of the demons of vegetation. In the first, the essential idea of the offering is to avert harm from the living; in the second, the desire for purification and atonement gives rise to the atoning sacrifice; in the third, the motive to propitiate the demonic powers seen in offerings to the dead appears at a higher stage and we have the prayer- and thank-offering. As the latter turns ever more and more to the celestial demons of vegetation and develops richer liturgical forms, it tends to exalt the celestial demons to the rank of celestial gods, the further development being conditioned on considerations of nature-myths and the religious ideas therewith connected (p. 449).

The third and last main stage in the evolution of mythology from belief in souls is the belief in demons. Ideas of demons may arise directly from ideas of souls, or independently. Most of the special ideas of demons are of the latter sort. But in either case the conception of demons has its roots in conceptions of the soul, from which it arises by fusion with ideas of magic. It is an essential attribute of the demon to work magically; the soul begins to be a demon when it produces magical effects. Thus there is nothing of the demonic when the soul passes into a breath, a worm, or a bird, or when it is transfused into another man; but the phantom soul appearing in dreams is at the point of becoming a demon, and the spirit of the dead that roams in the house is one. The conception of the demon undergoes

modification in two directions: in the first, it is taken back to its starting-point and becomes a power in the soul; in the second, it is expanded into the illimitable and becomes the divine power controlling nature and human life. The principal forms assumed by the demons of mythology are: (1) spook-demons, including spirits or ghosts and nature-demons, — spirits of the house, earth, air, and water; (2) demons of disease and madness, with which is connected the belief in witches and witchcraft; (3) demons of vegetation; (4) guardian demons of places, classes, and occupations; and (5) celestial demons of the sky. The last are so intimately combined with nature-myths and tend to exhibit such well-defined personal characteristics, that their consideration is postponed. Of the rest the most interesting in many respects are the demons of vegetation. With them we have the first definite cultural advance at this stage of belief. This has been already indicated by what has been said concerning the ideas of sacrifice connected with them. They differ from all other souls, spirits, or demons by their relation to experiences of common needs and the impulse to secure satisfaction by common cults and common work; the common activities of ploughing, sowing, and reaping are so interpenetrated with cultus-ceremonies, that the work itself becomes a cultus and the cultus a work as necessary to the security of the common life as the actual cultivation of the fields. Wundt derives these vegetation demons from a limitation, under the influence of common work, of the more original totemistic guardian demons, distributed over the animal and vegetable world (p. 421). Speaking of the guardian demons of the next, fourth, class, Wundt raises the question whether their cultus does not have essentially the character of a religion. He answers in the affirmative; here, as in customs of tabu and in the vegetation-cults, we have, he says, significant beginnings of a religious development. But if the question is asked whether these demons do not have the character of gods, we must give, he thinks, a different answer. There are undoubted analogies between these guardian demons and gods, but while both possess superhuman power, the former lack the personality and transcendent existence which belong to the latter. The conception of religion and the conception of God are not, therefore, coincident. The development of religion is not a logical process, least of all a progressive induction or subsumption, but a psychological synthesis to which numerous elements of diverse origin contribute (p. 468).

The above must suffice to indicate Wundt's general point of view and the wealth of mythological material he has brought under its survey. The unity of principles exhibited amid the complexity of

the facts is most impressive. We have here the beginnings of a truly genetic treatment of human culture in its psychological aspects. Wundt has traced to their roots in primitive animism some of the finest products of our civilization as well as many of the persistent superstitions that survive to remind us of their origin. He has explained how animism itself arose, and how animistic ideas develop into customs and myths, influencing and being influenced by the emotional reactions associating and interpreting the elements presented by experience in accordance with definite psychological laws. Some, perhaps, may find in his treatment a tendency to over-simplification. Yet Wundt persistently opposes this tendency, refusing, for instance, to recognize only one source of soul-myths and accepting an independent origin of nature-myths. And he nowhere operates with the bare psychological abstraction of a 'savage mind.' His psychological principles are such as appear under different conditions in all stages of mental evolution. Whether or not he has everywhere taken full account of all the facts, is for the expert students of comparative mythology to say. Accepting, however, the facts as he states them, it is easy to believe that the development took place essentially as he describes it. Mythology is not an exact science, and sometime, no doubt, when we have more data and psychology is more advanced, the work will be done over again and the results will be surer; but it is safe to say that it will require another Wundt to do it and probably another generation.

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Studies in Humanism. By F. C. S. SCHILLER. London, Macmillan & Co.; New York, The Macmillan Co, 1907. — pp. xv, 492.

The nucleus of this volume consists of papers already published in various journals. But so much has been added in the way of new papers and extensions of the old ones, that, according to the preface, "not more than one third, and that the less constructive part, can be said to have been in print before." The papers all relate in one way or another to the subjects of Pragmatism and Humanism. They may, however, be conveniently divided into groups according to the aspects of their common subject-matter which they respectively emphasize. (1) Perhaps the most important group is composed of the papers in which Mr. Schiller expounds the epistemological significance of Pragmatism and Humanism as methods, this being the aspect of these doctrines in which he himself is primarily interested. But he also

deals in some of the papers, though much more briefly and tentatively, with (2) the metaphysical significance of Pragmatism and Humanism. (3) In another large group, he criticises the opposed doctrines of Intellectualism and Absolutism, partly in a more general way, partly in controversy with individual representatives of the school which upholds these doctrines, such as Bradley, Joachim, and Taylor. (4) In one essay and two dialogues, he attempts to defend Protagoras, as the first Humanist, against Plato, the originator of the intellectualist errors by which philosophy has ever since been misled. And finally (5) we may regard three of the papers as showing how Pragmatism may be applied to illuminate such subjects as the nature of religious faith, the freedom of the will, and the more technical question of the relation of logic to psychology.

Mr. Schiller's method, he explains, is largely controversial, and he can hardly be blamed for adopting what is, as he says, the natural method for the exponents of a new doctrine to use in bringing out the advantages of their doctrine over the old one. At the same time such a method has serious drawbacks; not the least serious of which is, that it leads to an undue exaggeration of the novelty of the new doctrine, and a corresponding failure to do justice to the real, and perhaps more important, truth contained in the old. I cannot but think that this drawback is conspicuously illustrated in a number of Mr. Schiller's essays. And I am quite content to appeal against himself to his own pragmatic standard. For surely a pragmatic method, if any, should be comprehensive. Pragmatism, at least, should be able to appreciate the contention that no doctrine, widely diffused and persistently held, is likely to be devoid of a very considerable measure of humanistic value and pragmatic truth. Now Mr. Schiller holds that the intellectualist doctrine of an absolute truth and an absolute reality is one which, in various forms, has maintained its sway over the philosophical world almost uninterruptedly from the time of Plato's criticism of Protagoras to our own day. In all probability, therefore, it must respond to a profound intellectual need of our nature. Yet we find Mr. Schiller himself saying (p. 275) that if a tithe of what he has now and formerly "had to urge against the Absolute be well founded, Absolutism must be one of the most gratuitously absurd philosophies which has ever been entertained." "If so," he very properly goes on to ask, "how comes it that men professedly . . . pledged to the pursuit of pure unadulterated truth can be found by the dozen to adhere to so indefensible a superstition?" His answer is, that the motives of the doctrine of Absolutism are derived

from the sphere of the feelings rather than from that of reason ; that Absolutism is at bottom a religious creed rather than a philosophy. And, going on to inquire into the psychological motives that explain such a creed, he suggests the following as "the more important and reputable." "(1) It is decidedly flattering to one's spiritual pride to feel oneself a 'part' or 'manifestation' . . . of the Absolute Mind. . . . (2) There is a strange delight in wide generalization merely as such. . . . (3) The thought of an Absolute Unity is cherished as a guarantee of cosmic stability" (pp. 289-90). Surely, from Mr. Schiller's own pragmatic point of view, this is a very superficial sort of criticism. I think it is a pity that this essay on "Absolutism and Religion," and still more the two preceding ones, were included in the volume at all.

The drawbacks of the controversial method are also illustrated in the essays in which individual representatives of Absolutism are criticised. I do not deny that in his criticisms of Mr. Joachim and Professor Taylor, Mr. Schiller makes good points. Yet one remains very doubtful how far he has felt the pressure of the problems they are trying, however imperfectly, to solve. And when it comes to Mr. Bradley, one feels that there is so much misunderstanding on both sides as to deprive the discussion of all direct value.

It is unfortunate, I think, for Mr. Schiller's own cause that, as he explains in the preface, he has not been able to undertake the composition of a continuous treatise. The positive and independent development of a theory is often far more persuasive than the method which Mr. Schiller actually adopts. But, apart from this, I believe that the necessity for completeness of treatment and for careful qualification in statement, which the composition of such a treatise imposes, would have shown that, — as regards at least the epistemological aspect of Pragmatism and Humanism, — his views are far less radically opposed to those of the so-called 'intellectualists' than he supposes. For my own part (perhaps because I have not been prejudiced by a previous study of the recent polemical discussions), I have failed to discover that the supposed radical opposition has, in the sphere of epistemology, any real existence. Mr. Schiller's 'intellectualist' seems to me to be quite as mythical as he would doubtless affirm Mr. Bradley's pragmatist to be. When I read the general definition of Pragmatism at the beginning of the first essay, I thought at first that the doctrine certainly had a paradoxical appearance, and would need a good deal of defending, if put forward as a general method of dealing with all knowledge. For, according to this defi-

dition, the doctrine affirms not only that the truth of all assertions is to be determined by their consequences, but also that these consequences must be (1) practical, and (2) good. But when I read on, and saw how very widely Mr. Schiller interprets the notions of 'practical' and 'good,' my difficulty in accepting the doctrine disappeared. "All consequences," he says, "are practical sooner or later, in the sense of affecting our action. Even where they do not immediately alter the course of events, they alter our own nature, and cause its actions to be different, and thus lead to different operations on the world" (p. 6). Again, whatever satisfies the interest or purpose, which led to the making of an assertion, is good; whatever thwarts it, is bad. Now, so far as these interpretations go, it is obvious, that, without ever leaving what is ordinarily regarded as the domain of purely theoretical truth at all, an assertion may be seen to have consequences, which are both practical and good, and which therefore suffice to bring the assertion under the pragmatic test. For all new insight, however theoretical, alters at least our cognitive nature, and affects our subsequent cognitive activity; and the interest which is satisfied may also, of course, be a theoretical or scientific interest. We must certainly agree, therefore, that the pragmatic principle "ought to be regarded as the greatest truism," though it may be valuable enough for all that. Mr. Schiller adds (p. 5) that Intellectualism has been pleased to take it as the greatest paradox. If so, there has surely been much needless misunderstanding. I question, however, whether the misunderstanding has been all on the Intellectualist's side. Mr. Schiller goes on to urge, in a summary but interesting and effective argument, that we cannot ignore the purposive character of actual knowing, the dependence of all meaning and truth on the application of what is asserted. Now of course intellectualists may not have urged this argument in the same way as Mr. Schiller has done, and I fully admit that there is much that is most valuable and important in his way of working it out both here and in other essays. But surely the general contention, that every truth is qualified and affected by its context, is one which is quite as characteristic of 'intellectualism' as it can possibly be of pragmatism. Mr. Schiller, in fact, himself recognizes this in a later essay. "That context is of logical importance is," he says, "in a manner recognized" (p. 86). "But," he adds, "this recognition takes the form of asserting that the meaning (and truth) of an assertion depends on the totality of knowledge; and this at once rules out *human* knowledge. For as we cannot know this totality, if meaning depends on this, it is

impossible." But the intellectualist who says that meaning depends on the totality of knowledge, means of course (and probably says) that it *ultimately* depends on nothing less than this, just as the pragmatist might say that meaning ultimately depends on the totality of consequences. And equally, of course, the intellectualist will say, that, *short of this totality*, meaning depends on *what is actually known*, just as for the pragmatist it depends on *consequences that have actually shown themselves*. I cannot see that there is here any such radical opposition between the two views of knowledge as Mr. Schiller supposes.

Nor, again, can I see that any one need object to Humanism as Mr. Schiller defines it. "It is merely the perception," he says, "that the philosophic problem concerns human beings striving to comprehend a world of human experience by the resources of human minds" (p. 12). One must certainly agree that "not even Pragmatism could be simpler or nearer to an obvious truism of cognitive method." But why, then, should it be supposed that any one really denies such a contention? To emphasize one aspect of knowledge is not necessarily to deny another. But Mr. Schiller not merely seems to take for granted that Humanism is denied where it is not asserted; he even fails to recognize its presence where it is asserted in a far stronger form than he ever commits himself to. Speaking of "the Hegelian theory of knowledge and reality," he says that "it has wilfully . . . abstracted from humanity. Instead of conceiving God as incarnating himself in man, it has sought God by disavowing and belittling man" (p. 108). If we may suppose that Hegel himself is included in this censure, it surely shows a strange misconception on Mr. Schiller's part. One has been accustomed to hear Hegel charged with the diametrically opposite heresies of deifying humanity and conceiving God as existing nowhere else than in His human incarnation. And it might surely have been remembered that Feuerbach too was a Hegelian.

If Mr. Schiller had been content to urge that, in spite of a nominal admission of the truths insisted on by Pragmatism and Humanism, philosophers are too apt to lose sight of these truths, too ready to abstract from actual human knowledge and talk of thought or knowledge as if it were a thing on its own account, one might very well have agreed with him. I agree with him, for instance, as will appear later, in thinking that the ordinary view of the distinction between logic and psychology is quite erroneous and untenable. And in so far as the pragmatist or humanist recalls attention to an aspect of knowledge in which it *must* be viewed if it is to be fully understood, and which

at the same time is apt to be neglected, he is, of course, doing a good work. But he is not therefore entitled to assert that the aspect of knowledge in which it is viewed as a process of the individual mind is its only or all-inclusive aspect, or to assume that the intellectualist's conception of knowledge, as the apprehension of a transcendent or super-individual reality, must, so far as it is true at all, simply fall within the former view. To defend such a claim, Pragmatism or Humanism would have to pass from epistemology to metaphysics. Meantime I see no reason why in epistemology the intellectualist should not recognize all the positive truth that the pragmatist or humanist contends for. If there is a difficulty in uniting the two conceptions of knowledge, as on the one hand actively 'made' by the individual mind, and on the other passively received by the same from a transcendent reality, the difficulty, such as it is, is one which arises from the nature, not of intellectualism, but of knowledge itself.

When the pragmatist takes up a revolutionary attitude towards all previous logic, and insists on the exclusive truth of his own point of view, he seems to me to resemble too much the modern evolutionist ethics which thinks that everything is turned upside down by the discovery that man is after all an animal. No doubt ethics may in the past have paid too little heed to the biological aspect of human conduct, but this biological aspect is not the only aspect of conduct, nor even the most important. I do not mean to suggest that the pragmatist's exaggeration of his own view of knowledge is so gross as the evolutionist's exaggeration of the biological view of conduct. And yet Mr. Schiller's zeal betrays him at times into exaggeration which it would be hard to surpass, as when he undertakes to exhibit Plato's "victory over Protagoras as the great clog upon science, his failure to give a true account of the function of the Concept and of the nature of Truth, as the secret canker vitiating all philosophy, and a return to the frankly human view of knowledge advocated by Protagoras as the surest guarantee of philosophic progress" (p. 25). Surely, if Plato's victory was so lasting and decisive, pragmatism itself would suggest that this can hardly be the truth about it. We must go back, we are told, "from Plato to Protagoras." At all events, if we did, we should speedily have to go forward again to Plato, and to try to re-discover the truth of his "conceptual realism," a truth which the pragmatist's "recognition of the functional and instrumental nature of the concept" (p. 64) can hardly be taken to supersede.

Mr. Schiller disclaims for himself any pretension to formulate a pragmatic or humanistic metaphysic (p. 16, note). The suggestions

which he does offer in several of these papers towards such a metaphysic are to be regarded as tentative. And it is perhaps to this very fact, that he has not yet fully thought out the metaphysical implications of his epistemology, that we may attribute the exaggerated and exclusive claims which he puts forward for the pragmatic view of knowledge. For, if he had done so, he could hardly have failed to come upon just those metaphysical problems with which he regards intellectualists as mistakenly and gratuitously puzzling themselves. He does indeed approach them, but hardly near enough to realize their true proportions.

Nothing, I think, could more clearly indicate Mr. Schiller's failure to grasp the real meaning of the metaphysical problem which his theory of knowledge, like any other, has to answer, than the persistence with which he confuses reality with our knowledge of it. This confusion, in fact, is perversely esteemed as a virtue of the immanent theory of reality and truth. In an intellectualist, with his conception of a divine mind for which knowledge and reality are one, this might be intelligible. But in a pragmatist it is hard to understand. Realism seems so obviously the natural counterpart of pragmatism. For the pragmatist or humanist is concerned, as he himself assures us, only with the actual and finite knowing of the human mind. Now surely it is plain that, *for actual, finite, growing knowledge*, the distinction between knowledge and a reality that exists apart from knowledge, is quite fundamental. We cannot proceed one step in interpreting the growth of knowledge without it. There is no question here of metaphysical chasms or dualisms. It is a question only of expressing the simplest facts of the growth of knowledge in intelligible terms. And surely no such expression of them is possible at all, if we are not to distinguish between the reality which already exists for us to know and the knowledge of it which we are going to acquire. Now Mr. Schiller does talk of a "primary reality." He tells us that we may call this reality "in a sense 'independent,'" if that is any comfort to us. "For it is certainly not 'made' by us, but 'found.'" "It is the starting-point, and final touchstone, of all our theories *about* reality, which have for their aim its transformation. . . . But, as it stands, we find it most unsatisfactory and set to work to remake it and unmake it. And it cannot possibly be taken as 'real fact' or 'true reality.' For, as immediately experienced, it is a meaningless chaos, merely the raw material of a cosmos, the stuff out of which real fact is made. Thus the need of operating on it is the real justification of our cognitive procedures" (p. 187). Surely it

must be clear to any impartial reader that Mr. Schiller is here speaking, not of *reality as such* at all, but of our first (or, at any rate, our immediate) *experience of reality*. I suppose Mr. Schiller himself would at once repudiate the notion of 'reality as such,' and say that the only reality with which he is concerned is reality as it exists *for us*, — though 'reality as it exists for us' is only another way of saying 'our knowledge of reality.' And if one pointed out, that in our first or immediate experience of reality, reality is present only in its most superficial aspect, he would of course agree, and point to his own distinction of 'primary' from 'true' reality. Has he not said expressly that "initial reality would be *sheer potentiality*, the mere *ἔλξη* of what was destined to develop into true reality" (p. 433), and that "truth and reality in the fullest sense are not fixed foundations, but ends to be achieved" (p. 432)? If Mr. Schiller cannot see that reality is *not* "an end to be achieved" in the sense in which *knowledge of reality* is so, further discussion would be wasted. What one may, perhaps, more profitably remark is, that, until he does see this, his own criticism of Intellectualism and Absolutism is condemned to be a perpetual *petitio principii*. I daresay he would at once retort the charge. But, if so, the retort would, in my opinion, be rather ineffective for this reason, that, whereas the intellectualist or absolutist can, as I think, embrace all that is positive in Mr. Schiller's epistemology, Mr. Schiller, on the other hand, seems unable to find any philosophical truth worth mentioning in his opponent's metaphysics.

The essays which I classified as applications of Pragmatism are of different degrees of merit. That on "Faith, Reason, and Religion" seems to me to possess very little. Mr. Schiller does not resist the temptation which seems to beset philosophers of all schools to dogmatize in the most *a priori* and irresponsible fashion on matters of religion. His particular temptation is to interpret religious faith on the analogy of the pragmatic theory of scientific postulates. He allows certainly that there is a marked difference between the cases of science and religion, but how much the difference means to him may be judged from the fact that he takes it upon himself to inform theologians that they "might often with advantage take lessons from the scientists in the proper use of faith" (p. 366).

The essay on "Freedom" is of very different quality. It presents the case for Indeterminism with much breadth and ability, and contains the most ingenious attempt I know to reconcile the reality of (indeterministic) free choice with the scientific assumption of mental determination. Mr. Schiller points out that in a case of free choice

both alternatives must appeal to the agent ; both, therefore, will seem to spring from his character. Consequently "whichever of the alternatives is chosen, it will appear to be rationally connected with the antecedent circumstances" (p. 404). And, *once the choice has been made*, it will seem accordingly to have all the necessity that science requires. "After the event the determinist is in the position to argue 'heads I win, tails you lose' ; whatever the issue, he can claim it as a confirmation of his view." Ingenious as this argument is, it may, I think, be seen clearly enough to be fallacious. Mr. Schiller neglects to observe the fact that the alternatives are modified by deliberation. Apart from any theory of scientific determinism, it seems evident that, if the agent has not yet decided which alternative to adopt, he will turn both alternatives over in his mind, and it is only when one of them begins to seem definitely *more* desirable than the other that he will decide ; until then (or so long as his patience holds out) he will continue to deliberate. Hence the appearance of an equal eligibility in *both* alternatives becomes illusory, *when such equality is attributed to the moment of choice*. If it persisted there, freedom would be reduced to arbitrariness.

The paper which has interested me personally more than any other is that in which Mr. Schiller discusses the relations of Logic and Psychology, and protests against that artificial and utterly indefensible distinction between their respective provinces which still maintains its place in our text-books. With this protest I entirely agree, and my only complaint would be that Mr. Schiller does not carry his own truer view to its logical completion. He quotes from recent writers such typical utterances as these. "The Psychologist . . . knows nothing of the truth or falsity of judgments." "That certain of the mental processes which it studies have the further character of being true or false, is, for psychology, an accident." Mr. Schiller rightly characterizes as monstrous this assumption that psychology is wilfully to blind itself to the most obvious and essential feature of its subject-matter. And, in point of fact, whatever psychologists may say in the introductions to their Text-books, no one of them does, or could, deal with cognition on any such terms. There are not two kinds of thinking, one for the psychologist to discuss, and another for the logician. What sort of explanation, therefore, the psychologist could be supposed to give of the process of knowledge, if he deliberately left out the distinction between truth and error, one is at a loss to conjecture. As soon as we recognize the obvious fact that it is one and the same process of thinking with which both logic and psychology deal, the

notion of any distinction of principle between these two sciences, — so far at any rate as thinking, and pure psychology, are concerned, — must be abandoned. For this reason I hardly like the limitation which Mr. Schiller himself would impose upon Psychology. "Having a merely descriptive purpose," he says, Psychology "is content to record all values merely as made, and as facts" (p. 76). I do not see how psychology can be content to record values merely as facts, if it is to describe, *e. g.*, a process of moral development; for this essentially depends upon a progressive *appreciation* of values, an appreciation which can be truly described only by one who takes the point of view of value, and shows how the values in question are related to each other *as such* for the agent. It seems to me that the distinction between Logic and Psychology, — so far, at any rate, as thinking is concerned, — is merely one of convenience. Logic deals more with the systematic thinking of science, Psychology more with the simpler processes of ordinary thought. From this point of view the abstraction which Logic makes from the personality of the knower becomes at once explicable and harmless: it is the kind of abstraction which Pragmatism itself would dictate.

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Structure and Growth of the Mind. By W. MITCHELL. London, Macmillan & Co., 1907. — pp. xxxv, 512.

This work, arranged in lecture-form, and modestly described by the author as a text-book for the university student, is undoubtedly one of the most important philosophical publications of recent years. With originality of conception, and with a surprisingly complete knowledge of the relevant literature (in physiology and biology as well as in philosophy proper), Mr. Mitchell treats in a most illuminating manner the problems which lie on the border line between psychology and metaphysics. The book is equally remarkable for the wealth of its detail, and for the thoroughness of its development of general principles. There is a ripe maturity of thought, and a firm grasp upon the essentials of the subject.

Unfortunately, Mr. Mitchell has adopted a form of exposition which is likely to prevent his work receiving the attention which it deserves. Had the book been condensed to half its present size, and written as an independent contribution to current literature, it would have gained both in effectiveness and in value. Mr. Mitchell never fails to illumine any topic with which he may deal, but the constant digres-

sions into detailed treatment of side-issues, evidently introduced for text-book purposes, strain the interest and obscure the line of central argument. The book is much too difficult to prove a satisfactory class text-book, and it is much too diffuse for the general reader. But it is the very excellence of the book which suggests these criticisms. For it seems likely that these really superficial defects will keep many from reading what would be certain greatly to profit them. I have myself found considerable difficulty in tracing out the author's general plan, and in focusing to a definite view the central conceptions upon which the work as a whole rests. These, when discovered, are found, I think, to be clear, precise, and consistently developed, but their discovery requires greater effort than the writer is at all justified in demanding from his readers.

A quotation from Mr. Mitchell's preface will best indicate the plan and general scope of the volume. "This book does not take the place of any of the text-books in psychology. It deals with what may be called introduction to psychology, and with psychology as introduction to those other studies. . . . I have retained the lecture form, but the lectures are meant for reading and not for hearing. The five lectures forming the first part of the book deal with the various explanations of experience and the mind. . . . The eleven lectures that follow are divided into two parts. One part consists of three lectures concerned with sympathetic and æsthetic intelligence. The other, consisting of eight lectures, follows the general development of intelligence, but especially as regards knowledge and conduct. . . . The fourth and last part consists of two lectures, of which one deals with the extension of the direct explanation, . . . while the final lecture is devoted to the indirect or physiological explanation" (pp. ix, x).

From the great variety of topics upon which Mr. Mitchell dwells I select for special consideration the two closely connected problems which come up for treatment in one or other aspect in every lecture, — the nature and forms of mental growth, and the consequent relation of conscious experience to its non-experienced mental conditions.

Mr. Mitchell vigorously attacks that biological view of consciousness which is so prominent in treatises on genetic psychology, — the view that consciousness is an instrument for securing adaptation of the organism to its physical and social environment, and that its function is therefore essentially practical. On such a view the inner life is subordinated to its outer manifestations. The adaptation may be satisfactorily secured through the development of instinctive reactions, with resulting impoverishment of the conscious life.

Mr. Mitchell meets this view on its own ground by an excellent analysis of the nature and function of habit. Those who interpret consciousness biologically do not exaggerate the extent to which the conscious life develops by transforming itself into instinctive reaction, and through the accumulation of automatisms, bodily and mental. But they have failed to realize the counter-truth, that such displacement of conscious experience is for the sake of its own inherent ends, being the *conditio sine qua non* of its further extension and enrichment. Habits are formed in the service of general dexterities; and such dexterities by economizing effort and multiplying power yield an added intensity and a progressive complexity to the inner life. In one respect only, as Mr. Mitchell points out (p. 87), does consciousness in becoming habitual eliminate itself. The interest of an experience is more or less dependent on its novelty. What we do habitually we do without the same keenness of desire. But against this loss there is a twofold gain. The required effort diminishes equally with the interest; and the loss of the old satisfaction leads through ennui to the development of the higher and more purely contemplative needs.

It is worth observing, in this connection, that on such an interpretation of conscious growth, the purely biological view cannot legitimately be applied even to the lower animals. For if it should be admitted, as Mr. Mitchell seems inclined to do (p. 39), that ants and bees are in great part mere automata, it would be difficult to prove that human consciousness may not be destined to a similar eclipse. If the idealist view cannot be defended all along the line, the exceptions must weaken its general force. The growth towards enrichment of human experience may only be an accidental present tendency. Nor can any difference in treatment be based on an assumed fundamental distinction between inherited and acquired faculties. In applying any such distinction we must, as Mr. Mitchell maintains, "remember two things: first, that we acquire no faculty which we have not inherited the faculty to acquire, and, secondly, that beginning with faculties which need no learning, there is an infinitely graded series up to those which need years to complete, or may never suffer themselves to be completed" (p. 125). "The higher the species, the greater the inherited powers of learning, and the less the finished education" (p. 124). Either, then, we nullify the argument by placing ants, spite of their complex industrial and social life, low in the scale, or we ascribe to them a progressive individual experience, akin to that of man. Mr. Mitchell may possibly reply that his analysis of the nature and

function of habit applies only to the *de facto* development of human experience in the past. For in another connection (p. 115) we find the statement that "we have to follow the growth because we can never say why the mind must grow, but only how it does." This important limitation to the generalizations reached is, however, passed over without explicit recognition.

But the problem of mental growth has a much wider bearing. When we pass from the motor automatisms to the more purely mental reactions, we are faced by the fundamental distinction between faculty and experience, that is to say, between experience and its non-experienced mental conditions. "In accounting either for the forming or for the effect of an experience, no matter what it is, we have to introduce and specify a working of the mind or brain that is no part of experience" (p. 32). And for that reason it is "a quite needless penance" to avoid the word 'faculty.' For even while we avoid the term, we must perforce employ its synonyms, such as 'power' or 'disposition.' A mental faculty is "a power to achieve experience by means that we do not experience" (p. 119). It is never a conscious faculty, but only a faculty to which consciousness is due (p. 121). And as the self consists of those mental powers which we infer from the unified structure of experience, the same exactly is true of the mind as a whole. Nothing but confusion results from ignoring, — as present-day psychologists frequently do, — "the difference between our self with its faculties on the one hand, and our experience of self and them on the other. . . . Though all experience is experience of our self and them, and is their work, neither it nor any faculty is ever an experience. . . . The nature of self and faculty has always to be inferred" (p. 81). "Neither the self nor any of its faculties is an experience. It would be absurd, of course, to suppose them anything so evanescent; . . . the self is known, as we know anything, from what it does" (p. 113).

The assertion so constantly made by present-day writers, that nothing exists for us save experience, can by no means be justified. Conscious experience in its very nature implies the existence of what can never by any possibility be itself experienced. Experience is always experience of objects. "The experience of sensation is experience of objects, *e. g.*, of cold, or sweet, or a pain, or sound" (p. 57). But "to have an object-experience is also to have a subject-experience; it is to differentiate the object as we think it from our thinking it, our interest in it, and our dealing with it. These are our subject-experience." This distinction can also be expressed as a division into

process and product (p. 62). My perception of a room can be analyzed into a course of perceiving and the room as I perceive it. The perception has its own attributes, the room itself has quite other attributes. So far every one will more or less agree. These are differences which cannot be ignored. But though "everyone sees the importance of distinguishing between a thought and its real object, the importance is not so apparent of distinguishing within a thought between the thinking and what is thought" (p. 64).¹ Yet it is just this distinction which renders the assumption of a non-experienced self endowed with non-experienced powers or faculties unavoidable. Since this self and these powers condition experience at every moment in the most various ways, they do not fall outside the field of scientific knowledge. But that does not justify us in equating them with the conscious experience itself. The simplest instance of this is the power of association. "Internal connections belong to the experience, and give it coherence; but the mechanical or merely associative connection gives only cohesion. It is not a part of the experience, but simply a tendency to bring thoughts which, on investigation, we can trace to old associations" (p. 84). The same is true of any mental power, whether inherited or acquired. "It is a power to achieve experience by means that we do not experience."

A similar analysis must be made of object-experience. It, too, is universally conditioned by the non-experienceable. This, however, is a point upon which Mr. Mitchell's utterances are all too brief and somewhat cryptic (cf. p. 23). The illustration employed on p. 118 can only increase the reader's bewilderment. "It is not the color, you may say, but the factors into which physics analyzes light and its source, that are the cause [of our sensation]; we only say it is the color till we know better. The same is to be said when we regard mental faculties like reason or sympathy as cause of our experience of thinking or pity. It is not wrong, but it explains nothing. As it is the color, so it is these faculties that we have to explain. And the explanation of a faculty consists in analyzing it not into anything that we experience in it, but into the conditions of the experience after which it is named. These conditions, of course, are also faculties of the mind, just as the orange has invisible powers that account for its color." This question of the relation of experience to the world apprehended is, I think, the one fundamental problem upon which Mr. Mitchell speaks with an uncertain voice. His attitude seems con-

¹ There are obvious ambiguities in Mr. Mitchell's terminology, and these probably indicate some lack of clearness in the underlying views. The main argument seems, however, to be, on the whole, unaffected by them.

stantly to alternate between subjectivism and some form of objective idealism.

Into Mr. Mitchell's excellent account of the manner and degree in which explanation by faculties is legitimate and indispensable in psychology, I cannot enter at any length. In adjusting the claims of the physical, of the organized faculties of the mind, and of experience itself, to be the causes of experience, he starts from the position that all experience is reaction on an occasion. When the occasion is purely physical, the reaction is instinctive and generates sensation. Experience, as in pain or hope, or when a word suggests its meaning, itself acts as occasion of further experience. In every such case, however, in addition to the occasion, whether physical or mental, there is another factor in the cause; and it is never another experience, but the self specified as this or that faculty. Everything in an experience that is not occasion must be regarded as the result of reaction, and therefore as due to faculty. No experience can develop itself.

Most of Mr. Mitchell's readers will probably feel that the best argument for this faculty-view lies in the success with which he himself applies it in the interpretation of the growth of experience, alike in the intellectual, the moral, and the æsthetic spheres. In his hands it is very far removed from a merely verbal explanation, and inspires rather than limits the demand for thoroughgoing analysis. It contrasts most favorably with the flagrant inadequacy of the mechanical views which still dominate the majority of modern treatises on psychology.

On one point, however, Mr. Mitchell seems to lie open to criticism. Unconscious faculties are not, as he justly maintains, simply mental processes stripped of consciousness, or placed in a separate consciousness below the threshold of our main consciousness. His standpoint also enables him to interpret many of those experiences which have been so fancifully taken by Hamilton and others as proving the existence of the subconscious. But surely in other and better established phenomena there is overwhelming evidence in support of the existence of mental processes which, though identical in general nature with our conscious processes, function independently. When this is recognized, the dividing of the products of mental activity between developed faculties and specialized subconscious processes may not in all cases be very easily made. Mr. Mitchell, to judge from the few passages in which he mentions the subconscious (pp. 46 and 354), seriously underestimates the extent and force of the evidence which can be offered in its support. That, however, is, as regards the main

issue, a comparatively minor point. Ultimately the subconscious processes, if recognized, would have to be treated from the same standpoint as those of the conscious self, and will therefore support any faculty-theory which can be shown to be required in the interpretation of experience in its more familiar forms.

Mr. Mitchell, in tracing the growth of mind, emphasizes two main points: (1) that crude experience, experience in its lower and animal forms, is not chaotic; and (2) that experience in its development does not merely omit differences found on the lower grades but transforms the laborious methods of lower experience by economizing according to higher principles. The first point, though frequently overlooked, is easily established. When there is no feeling of connection, the distinctions are absent as well; and whenever difference is felt, there, too, connection is experienced. "A primitive mind with all its senses in action has a thought so meagre that it would bewilder you and me, if we were not falling asleep, for we should not be satisfied in it. But the thoughts of animal and infant are no more bewildering and unsatisfactory to them than ours to us. So also what is simple common sense, and enough to satisfy us, a man of science may call inconceivable, because it will not fit with his fuller knowledge" (p. 14).

The all-important factor in the growth of experience is the development of faculties whereby what is essential for effective reaction is taken for granted. "We are as unconscious of how, and with what, we identify, as of how we remember" (p. 120). Though all thinking, even the creative work of genius, is selecting, "we do not have to recall our past experience in order to make the selection; we are not aware of rejecting anything, or of selecting from anything. We direct the course with no more need to think of the means than in carrying out any course of physical action" (p. 88). "Instead of a revival of past experience we have a result of it; instead of a forecast, or expectation of definite objects, we have a definite expectation determining the course of our thought, and the end that will satisfy it" (p. 369). This 'taking for granted' assumes many forms, appearing as instinct, as acquired dexterity, as expectation, as persistent curiosity. The 'stupidity' of animals, their apparently absolute incapacity to be educated beyond a certain point, seems to depend chiefly upon the fact that, though we can vary their experiences, we cannot create in them the curiosity or expectation which is necessary before they can profit by such experiences. "Surprising though it may seem, it is harder to draw a line anywhere above our point of

departure from perception than at it ; and, as the deepest line is certainly drawn between brute and human intelligence, it is as easy to deny as to assert that animals reach the conceptual level at all, though the ascent to it is so gradual. It is possible that they never take an interest in the connections of things, never feel the need nor seek the satisfaction of grasping them " (p. 311).

Such, briefly and inadequately sketched, are the main outlines of this very elaborate work. I may repeat, in conclusion, that though Mr. Mitchell demands considerable mental exertion from those who would profit by the reading of his book, all such efforts are most amply and generously repaid.

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NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

La théorie de la physique chez les physiciens contemporains. Par ABEL REY. Paris, F. Alcan, 1907. — pp. v, 412.

According to M. Rey, the opinion is wide-spread among philosophers, that physical science has been conclusively shown to be wholly arbitrary and conventional and without claim to real objectivity ; and that this has been admitted and even proclaimed by the foremost physicists of the present day. The work before us is the result of an inquiry into the actual opinions of physicists in this matter. It is described by the author as a contribution to the history of the scientific spirit ; that is to say, "of the atmosphere in which science has been created and developed."

Contemporary physicists are divided into three schools, according to their relation to the mechanical theory of the universe which held sway up to the middle of the nineteenth century. As the defects of the traditional 'mechanism' became manifest, it has been rejected outright by some (Rankine, Mach, Ostwald, Duhem), viewed with non-committal suspicion by others (Poincaré), and amended and developed in its own spirit by still others (Helmholtz, Maxwell, Lord Kelvin). The fundamental and characteristic opinions of the three schools are expounded by M. Rey with the utmost impartiality and without effort at criticism. His personal inclination toward a mechanical theory is, however, sufficiently indicated in the remark that the vast majority of experimental physicists belong to the "continuators of mechanism" ; and that the opponents of mechanism have been, for the most part, rather mathematicians than physicists, — men whose habitual employment with mere concepts has lessened their appreciation for the concrete material of physical science.

The net result of M. Rey's inquiry is that physicists of all three schools agree in claiming for their science the highest degree of objectivity possible to human knowledge. Though men like Mach and Duhem may emphasize the independent activity of reason, as it brings the data of experience into harmony with its peculiar standards of 'economy' or 'coherence' ; nevertheless all alike agree that in the brute facts of observation themselves the activity of reason finds an absolute limit to its caprice. Furthermore, the objectivity which is claimed for physics is on all hands described as purely empirical ; there is no metaphysical pretence of ability to reconstruct the universe as it really is. The older mechanism was, indeed, very largely metaphysical ; but the new is at least as phenomenalistic as the rival schools. The legitimate scope of hypothesis is by all schools admitted to be enormous, and, moreover, increasingly great as one ascends from the data of experience to higher and higher generalizations.

The elements employed in explanation have no finality ; they are elementary only with respect to existing modes of analysis. If an atomism, for example, be embraced, the atoms are not conceived as absolutely irreducible and unchangeable ; they are but unaffected by any of the processes of which science has yet taken cognizance. If truth is claimed for any proposition of science, that does not mean that it is thought to be incapable of modification. In the future development of science, the axioms of to-day will no doubt become mere special cases of more comprehensive laws, within which the limits of their application will have become manifest. It is, however, insisted that the progress of science is, indeed, a development ; that the truth of to-day is not set aside by the truth of to-morrow, but carried up and incorporated in it. It is this insistence upon the historical continuity of physics, that takes away from the theories of Mach and Duhem, in particular, practically all the arbitrariness which has ignorantly been ascribed to them.

It will be seen even from this imperfect summary, that M. Rey's volume contains a good deal of healthy common-sense ; though one may suspect that the scepticism which the author so earnestly combats is not so widespread as he imagines. Men, for example, who proclaim that the propositions of physical science have no validity beyond their practical serviceableness in directing conduct and ministering to the satisfaction of human needs, are less often denying the objective truth of physics, than asserting a positive theory as to the nature of objectivity and of truth. The author's own epistemology, of which a sketch is given at the end of the volume, appears to be of a rather shallow species of evolutionism ; but as he informs us that the present volume is only an introduction to a far more comprehensive philosophical work, we should, perhaps, refrain from a premature judgment. Judging, however, from what we have before us, we should surmise that one half of the difficulties of epistemology are to be solved by the principle, that the sensation is intrinsically a relation, and knowledge a system of relations of relations ; while the other half are to be disposed of by the discovery, that the categories of reason are instincts which have been acquired by the adaptation of the psychophysical organism to its environment.

Whatever may be its underlying defects, the work is certainly the outcome of laborious and careful scholarship, and cannot fail to be useful. To those who may contemplate referring to it for the sake of its presentation of contemporary physical theories, the warning may be given that the author's purpose has led him to emphasize very strongly the common features of these theories.

THEODORE DE LAGUNA.

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Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. New Series, Vol. VII. Containing the Papers read before the Society during the Twenty-eighth Session, 1906-1907. London, Williams and Norgate, 1907. — pp. 244.

In the first paper of the *Proceedings*, Dr. Rashdall performs an act of historical justice in behalf of Nicholas de Ultricurria, a disputant of the fourteenth century, condemned by the Church, and, as a consequence, almost entirely neglected by the historians of philosophy. Dr. Rashdall suggests that Nicholas anticipated the main theses of Berkeley and Hume; and he presents in support of this the thirty-two propositions of the first "list of errors" which Nicholas was compelled to retract. One reads these "errors" with admiration for the courageous thoroughness of their scepticism; and yet one is, in the end, inclined to agree with Dr. Rashdall, that Nicholas was sceptical of reason only to be surer of faith; "he is nearer to the position of Mr. Balfour than to that of either Hume or Berkeley" (p. 24). In the second paper, "On the Nature of Truth," Hon. Bertrand Russell writes a keen criticism of "logical Monism," the view that only the whole of truth is wholly true, pointing out that the doctrine rests upon the erroneous axiom that relations are grounded in the nature of their terms. Rejecting the axiom, he proceeds to offer two theories of truth, either of which provides for the fact of many truths that are *wholly* true. An important point in the constructive argument is the distinction which Mr. Russell is enabled to make between perception and judgment, intuitive and discursive knowledge. The paper shows all the subtlety of Mr. Russell's analytic power. Mr. T. Percy Nunn, in the third paper, writes on "Causal Explanation." He attempts to answer the question, What is the relation of cause, as an explanatory notion, to the data which it is supposed to explain? In the fourth part of his paper, he discusses with some pertinence the bearing of Professor Loeb's theory of "tropisms" upon the problem of causal explanation. Miss E. E. Constance Jones follows with a lucid and interesting paper in which she makes a plea for a more careful analysis of the terms Identity and Difference, and proceeds in a preliminary way to make such an analysis. The strength of the paper lies in its well-defended conclusion that logical doctrine may not be built up out of concepts, that there are forms of logical synthesis (of unity and difference) that are elementary and simple. In "Hume and Humanism," Dr. Schiller points out that all attempts to classify Humanism as Humism fundamentally mistake the character of the former doctrine. Humanism does not accept Hume's psychology, with its associationism and sensationalism, nor his criticism of causality and denial of activity. It is not naturalistic and not deterministic. The bulk of the paper is a brilliant refutation of Hume's denial of activity. In terms of its acceptance of activity, Dr. Schiller vindicates Humanism's right to fundamental disagreement with Hume. In the end, he tries to turn the tables on the rationalists by showing *their* agreement with Hume. The longest paper of the series, on "Fact, Idea, and Emotion," by Dr. Shadworth H.

Hodgson, contains much that is suggestive and important. The paper, however, is unfortunately marred by lack of unity. Dr. Hodgson says many things by the way, covering very nearly the whole field of philosophy, but one is not quite sure of the immediate connection with the matter in hand. The introductory paragraph, in which the writer reduces the conceptions, Substance and its Attribute, Agent and its Action, Cause and its Effect, to the conceptions *What is* and its *Real Condition or Conditions*, promises a clearing away of debris which, in the end, is not accomplished. The seventh paper of the volume, by Mr. A. T. Shearman, is entitled "Intuition." It is an attempt, first, to determine the position of intuition in philosophy. The author argues that it is because every philosopher employs intuition at the outset that there have been and are so many differences between thought-systems. He therefore asks that philosophy abandon the individualistic course which it has pursued for three thousand years, and adopt a coöperative method of attaining truth. The argument, suggestive in many respects, is unfortunately marred by the absence of any clear statement of what the author means by intuition. The second part of the paper is occupied with an attempt to discover what are "the grounds of our knowledge of that which it is sometimes affirmed has a consciousness of 'self as self.' " The author contends that there cannot be a direct cognition of the subjective self, the cognition being, rather, a result of constructive imagination. Mr. Benjamin Dumville, in the final paper of the volume, on "Philosophy and Education," pleads for a philosophical direction of education. He shows clearly the hap-hazard results of empirical compromise; and although he is well aware that philosophy has, as yet, no single and unambiguous message, he feels that she may gain by advancing boldly into the enemy's country of the practical. The paper is clear and scholarly and makes good its contention.

The volume as a whole is a notable one, so richly packed with its material of first-hand thought that its modest size quite belies it.

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Essai sur les éléments principaux de la représentation. O. HAMELIN.
(Bibliothèque de Philosophie Contemporaine.) Paris, F. Alcan, 1907. —
pp. 476.

This work is a contribution to Neo-criticism, and is, in fact, a reshaping of the categories of Ch. Renouvier. Renouvier, however, 'posited' the categories, or, as M. Hamelin calls them, "the principal elements of representation," without 'deducing' them, whereas our author, dissatisfied both with Kant's and with Renouvier's solution of the problem, makes a bolder attempt. His method is that of Synthesis; for pure analysis, he contends, leads us nowhere. Thus, in order to find a real connecting bond between objects and the mind's workings, he studied next the Hegelian method. With that, too, he was dissatisfied, for he could not bring himself to adopt the principle of Contradiction as the central motive of

a synthesis. Searching, accordingly, for a dialectical procedure which did not base itself primarily on the principle of Contradiction, he found this in a modification of the Hegelian method. By considering the world as the exclusive work of thought, as a living dialectic, he found both in Kant and in Renouvier indications of the desired result.

We all admit as a fundamental fact, urges our author, that everything has its opposite; that everything 'posited' excludes an 'op-posed'; so, every Thesis leads to an Antithesis. This fundamental fact, moreover, is supplemented by another, equally important, for the two moments have no meaning one apart from the other; that is to say, they must be given together, they are two portions of a whole. Hence, to the first two moments that we find in every notion we must add a third, Synthesis. In these three phases, — Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis, — we have the simplest law of Being. And thus, by emphasizing the fact that the opposition which exists between Thesis and Antithesis is one not of Contradiction but of 'Correlation,' as M. Hamelin calls it, and by making 'Correlation' his central key-word, he not merely 'deduces' each category by itself as an isolated unit, but links them with each other in a progressive chain of complexity. And what, pray, is the basic principle in this linkage of the categories? The answer to this question presents to us one of the most novel features of the 'deduction'; for the author, after much deliberation, concludes that the categories must be arranged in a series of triads.

The detailed examination and serialization of the "elements of representation" constitute the bulk of the book, the five chapters of which deal respectively with the five triads of categories in an ascending scale of particularity. The interlinked triads run as follows: (1) Relation, Number, Time; (2) Time, Space, Motion; (3) Motion, Quality, Alteration; (4) Alteration, Specification, Causality; (5) Causality, Finality, Personality. Apparently, in order to constitute "the living whole of a synthetic dialectic," some of the categories must perform a double function, — they must appear as the last moments of one triad and as the first moments of the triad immediately following. Furthermore, each of the fifteen categories is neatly subdivided into three 'moments.' Number, for example, the second 'element' in the chain, "comprehends Unity, Plurality, Totality," Totality being not the reconciliation of a contradiction, but the synthetic Correlative of Unity and Plurality.

By thus conceiving the world as essentially a manifold of 'Rappports,' M. Hamelin agrees with Renouvier in substituting Relation for Substance; Relation, however, constituted as it is by its three moments, Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis, becomes for M. Hamelin merely the first link in the chain of categories, in which Number, as the Antithesis of Relation [!], comes second, and is in its turn followed by the remaining 'principal elements.'

One might readily ask: What is this method of Correlation? Why, *e. g.*, does Number appear as the correlative of Relation, or Quality as that of Motion? Why, again, should each category be composed of

exactly three 'moments'? Wherein is this method essentially superior to the traditional Hegelian Trinity? The answer is that a 'synthetic deduction' covers a multitude of sins, and that if we dare refer these 'deducing' philosophers to recent solid contributions to the subject, — to the works of Peano, Frege, and Bertrand Russell, to mention no others, — we shall be scoffed at as a 'mere' logician, or worse still, as a 'merely mathematical' logician. However, the results obtained by the despised 'mathematical logicians' render such crudities as the 'Synthetic Method of Correlation' quite superfluous.

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Le problème de la conscience. By B. D. DRAGHICESCO. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1907. — pp. ix, 244.

M. Draghicesco holds that consciousness is social in its origin and nature; that it is a new quality added to the human organism in consequence of his existence in a social environment; that it arises only in society; that it changes with changes in society: in fact, that it is simply the focus in which inter-individual relations intertwine and concentrate themselves. Psychologists should, then, abandon the study of the individual and study consciousness by analyzing these inter-individual relations. Sociology rather than psychology is fitted to be the basal mental science, for it, like chemistry and biology, has (1) an irreducible unit, the primitive social group or the conscious man who is equivalent to it; (2) a morphology, the structure, the constitution of society; and (3) an irreducible quality, consciousness. He does not find these three requisites in psychology, which should therefore be regarded as dependent on sociology.

Individual psychology is, in his opinion, impossible. It has never discovered a psychological law, properly so called, nothing on which predictions can be based; and this holds equally of the introspective, physiological, and objective methods.

Furthermore, objective sociology is impossible; the individual and the subjective cannot be wholly disregarded; psychology cannot be eliminated. Again, statistics can give no laws except where the facts are regular, and law furnishes only empirical, approximate rules. A social psychology is what is demanded, but its laws cannot be natural laws; they must be imperatives, not indicative statements. Society is still too recent and too chaotic a phenomenon to permit of the discovery of laws; the facts are still in a state of flux; permanent forms have not yet appeared; regularity has not yet been established; laws can be stated only in terms of what ought to be. Psychology and sociology thus meet on the field of ethics. Kant's categorical imperative is a type. To reach natural laws, imperatives must be enforced to the exclusion of all exceptions. Not a passive, contemplative method, but an active one is required, like that of democracy and socialism. The principle of the majority in universal suffrage annuls disagreeing cases. To this add propaganda, and the means for establishing

social laws are before us. Through such methods only can the establishment of stable society, which should in the end be a universal society, be made possible. Social science and social art are not at present separable. A social law is a plan of conduct.

Toward the close of the book the author discusses the relation of science and faith. Science has opposed belief in freedom, immortality, and God ; but as science increases, obstacles to freedom are removed, and when science becomes complete, the will will be entirely free. Completed science and completed evolution will also make physical immortality possible ; hence also psychical immortality ; it will make man omniscient, omnipotent, and eternal, and as a corollary perfect and good ; God is the anticipated image of man arrived at the end of his evolution.

The final chapter considers the legislative force of consciousness. Societies, as they increase, enrich the content of consciousness, which itself increases and develops new traits ; these become decrees and laws imposed on society ; it is in consciousness that the outlines of a new form of society are first sketched. In epochs of social integration consciousness manifests exceptional legislative force. Christianity in the Roman Empire illustrates this. Present tendencies are to Christian mysticism, or by way of socialism to moral Christianity.

This hasty sketch of the book contains, I think, the principal points and suggests the main arguments. The defects are so obvious that criticism would be superfluous.

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Elements of Psychology. By SIDNEY HERBERT MELLONE and MARGARET DRUMMOND. Edinburgh and London, William Blackwood and Sons, 1907. — pp. xv, 483.

The availability of an elementary text will depend largely, and in psychology more than in most subjects, upon the taste and point of view of the teacher. And American texts, as distinguished from English, are marked generally by an effort to attract and also by a disposition to restrict discussion to limits of the obvious. In this respect, the book before us is English. It has no great liveliness of style, makes no special effort to compel the unwilling, and, while plain and direct and near to common sense, needs to be read with attention. But one who thinks that even an elementary text should presuppose a certain intellectual responsibility on the part of the student will find the book worthy of notice, — especially if he is interested in presenting the subject from the 'apperceptual' standpoint. It is more detailed than Stout's *Groundwork*, more manageable than his *Manual*. It is well constructed as a whole, and each chapter has its problem and scope quite clearly defined. It makes a radical departure from the usual order by beginning the analysis of detail with mental activity, or will, and passing from will through feeling, emotion, and pleasure-pain to cognition. In this it is true to the apperceptual stand-

point and at the same time offers the logical method of approach to present conceptions in psychology. In this also it nearly achieves the still more desirable result of presenting the subject throughout in what, from the genetic standpoint, should be the truly logical as well as pedagogical order of a regular progress from the more general aspects to the more detailed. I say 'nearly,' because, in placing sensation before perception, and these before memory, imagination, and conception, the authors have departed from this order, and give evidence of a lingering infection of the very unapperceptual notion, from which Professor James tried, not quite successfully, to escape, that sensation somehow constitutes the antecedent material, or elements, of all thought.

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Six Radical Thinkers: Bentham, J. S. Mill, Cobden, Carlyle, Mazzini, T. H. Green. By JOHN MCCUNN. London, Edward Arnold; New York, Longmans, Green, & Co., 1907. — pp. 268.

Professor McCunn's six essays are in the main expository. The style is forceful and clear, and the crisp, short sentences enforce attention from beginning to end. Equally helpful to the reader is the author's manner of seizing upon certain sharply contrasted features in each of the six radical systems, features which, because antithetical, one would scarcely expect to find side by side in a single political philosophy. There is the contrast between Bentham as "the most subversive critic that English law and lawyers have ever had to encounter" (p. 4), and as the man to whose influence can be traced every reform effected since his day; between Mill's optimism, on the one hand, and, on the other, his low estimate of men, the "common, uncultivated herd," and his belief that "divine goodness and divine omnipotence sunder before the force of hostile facts" (p. 41); between Cobden the intensely practical man and Cobden the thinker who "lifts up current controversies into the region of principles" (p. 91); between Carlyle's radicalism and his "disbelief, derision, and denunciation of democracy" (p. 145); and, finally, the contrast between Green's radicalism and a conservatism which seems more "akin to quietism than to radicalism" (p. 229).

The titles of the six chapters really furnish a key to the author's interpretation of the radical systems dealt with: "Bentham and His Philosophy of Reform"; "The Utilitarian Optimism of J. S. Mill"; "The Commercial Radicalism of Cobden"; "The Anti-Democratic Radicalism of Carlyle"; "The Religious Radicalism of Mazzini"; "The Political Idealism of T. H. Green." Besides the general character of interpretation indicated by these titles, mention should also be made of excellent critical discussions of Bentham's attempt to reconcile inequality and the utilitarian formula; of Mill's *On Liberty*; of the Free Trade movement; and of the results to be achieved by an alliance between religion and the democratic spirit.

Of the writers treated in this book T. H. Green is the one with whom

Professor McCunn appears to be most thoroughly in sympathy. In chapter vi there is scarcely one word of dissent, nothing but ardent appreciation and lucid exposition. Green's radicalism is declared to be the result of an application to politics of his idealistic philosophy; and its insistence upon the preëminent worth and dignity of persons is the natural consequence of a philosophy which sees even in the slave and savage a reproduction of the divine consciousness.

M. STEWART MACDONALD.

UNIVERSITY OF NEW BRUNSWICK.

Kant, Goethe, und Schiller: Gesammelte Aufsätze. VON KARL VORLÄNDER. Leipzig, Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1907. — pp. xiv, 294.

The essays collected under the above caption are substantially reprints of articles previously published by Vorländer in *Philosophische Monatshefte* (1894) and in *Kantstudien* (1897, 1898). The first part of the book (pp. 1-118), on "Schiller and Kant," is somewhat arbitrarily divided into an historical and a systematic or critical portion, the author undertaking in the historical part to ascertain, by a careful and somewhat extended examination of the epistolary evidence, the personal attitude of Schiller to Kant and the Critical Philosophy, and in the systematic part to state Schiller's more strictly theoretical position towards the ethical philosophy, particularly, of the master. The material offered, though thoroughly worked out and agreeably presented (if one can assimilate the author's rationalistic pedantry), can hardly be said to contribute materially to the solution of the vexing problem of the philosophical relation of Schiller and Kant. The author maintains the moderate position, made orthodox by the thorough discussions of Tomaschek, Ueberweg, Drobisch, and Trœsten, that Schiller does not at any time depart seriously from the main doctrine of the Kantian ethics, and that the so-called æsthetic development which Schiller is supposed to have given the Kantian ethics is only a logical development of ideas implicitly contained, or even frankly espoused, in the Kantian writings themselves.

Though Goethe cannot in any sense be called a Kantian, the author in the second part of the book, "Goethe and Kant" (pp. 119-260), undertakes the difficult task of tracing out the various conceptions in Goethe's writings which are directly or indirectly due to Kant. These are noticeable, particularly, in Goethe's æsthetic and scientific views, but later also in his more strictly philosophical and ethical thought (teleology, subject-object, psychical spontaneity, idea, duty, categorical imperative, etc.).

The book is almost entirely free from mechanical defects of every kind, and is, externally, a handsome example of the book-maker's art. There is an appendix of a miscellaneous and bibliographical character, and an index of names.

E. C. WILM.

WASHBURN COLLEGE.

The following books also have been received :

- Thought and Things: A Study of the Development and Meaning of Thought, or Genetic Logic.* By JAMES MARK BALDWIN. Vol. II. Experimental Logic, or Genetic Theory of Thought. London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd.; New York, The Macmillan Co., 1908. — pp. xv, 436. 10s. 6d.
- The Works of Aristotle.* Translated into English under the editorship of J. A. SMITH and W. D. ROSS. Part I: *The Parva Naturalia.* By J. I. BEARE and G. R. T. ROSS. Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1908. — pp. 436a-480b and index. 3s. 6d.
- Modern Classical Philosophers: Selections Illustrating Modern Philosophy from Bruno to Spencer.* Compiled by BENJAMIN RAND. Boston and New York, Houghton, Mifflin, and Co., 1908. — pp. xiii, 740. \$2.50.
- Attention.* By W. B. PILLSBURY. London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd.; New York, The Macmillan Co., 1908. — pp. xi, 346. 10s. 6d.
- The Æsthetic Experience: Its Nature and Function in Epistemology.* By WILLIAM DAVIS FURRY. (Philosophical Monographs, Vol. I, No. 1.) The Review Publishing Co., Baltimore, Md., 1908. — pp. xv, 155.
- The Will to Believe as a Basis for the Defense of Religious Faith: A Critical Study.* By ETTIE STETTMEIER. (Archives of Philosophy, No. 2, edited by FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE.) New York, The Science Press, 1907. — pp. vi, 97.
- The Religion of the Post-Exilic Prophets.* By W. H. BENNETT. Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark; imported by Charles Scribner's Sons, 1907. — pp. xii, 396. \$2.00.
- Sermons in Syntax: or Studies in the Hebrew Text.* By JOHN ADAMS. Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark; imported by Charles Scribner's Sons, 1908. — pp. xi, 228. \$1.50.
- The Riddle of Personality.* By H. ADDINGTON BRUCE. New York, Mofat, Yard, & Co., 1908. — pp. xiii, 247. \$1.50.
- A Mind That Found Itself: An Autobiography.* By CLIFFORD WHITTINGHAM BEERS. New York, London, Bombay, and Calcutta, Longmans, Green, and Co., 1908. — pp. xi, 363. \$1.50.
- Value and Distribution.* By HERBERT JOSEPH DAVENPORT. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1908. — pp. xi, 582. \$3.50.
- Emancipation: An Introduction to the System of Progressive Government.* By NORBERT LAFAYETTE-SAVAY. New York, The Knickerbocker Press, 1908. — pp. iv, 161.
- No Struggle for Existence, No Natural Selection: A Critical Examination of the Fundamental Principles of the Darwinian Theory.* By GEORGE PAULIN. Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark; imported by Charles Scribner's Sons, 1908. — pp. xxi, 261. 5s.

- A Scrap-Book of Elementary Mathematics: Notes, Recreations, Essays.* By WILLIAM F. WHITE. Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Co., 1908. — pp. 248.
- Entwicklungswerttheorie, Entwicklungsökonomie, Menschenökonomie.* Eine Programmschrift von RUDOLF GOLDSCHIED. Leipzig, Verlag von Dr. Werner Klinkhardt, 1908. — pp. xxxvi, 218. 5 M.
- Über den Mechanismus des geistigen Lebens.* Von RICHARD WAHLE. Wien und Leipzig, Wilhelm Braumüller, 1906. — pp. vi, 573. M. 10.
- Croyance religieuse et croyance intellectuelle.* Par OSSIP-LOURIE. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1908. — pp. 175. 2 fr. 50.
- L'idéal moderne.* Par PAUL GAULTIER. Paris, Hachette et Cie., 1908. — pp. 358. 3 fr. 50.
- Identité et réalité.* Par ÉMILE MEYERSON. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1908. — pp. vii, 432. 7 fr. 50.
- La philosophie de Newton.* Par LÉON BLOCH. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1908. — pp. 643. 10 fr.
- La théorie platonicienne des idées et des nombres d'après Aristote: Étude historique et critique.* Par LÉON ROBIN. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1908. — pp. xvii, 702. 12 fr. 50.
- La théorie platonicienne de l'amour.* Par LÉON ROBIN. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1908. — pp. 229. 3 fr. 75.
- Le journal philosophique de Berkeley (Commonplace Book): Étude et traduction.* Par RAYMOND GOURG. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1908. — pp. xiii, 168. 4 fr.
- William Godwin (1756-1836): Sa vie, ses œuvres principales, La "Justice politique."* Par RAYMOND GOURG. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1908. — pp. xvi, 320. 6 fr.
- Psychologie d'une religion.* Par REVAULT D'ALLONNES. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1908. — pp. 291. 5 fr.
- Essais sur le régime des castes.* Par C. BOUGLÉ. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1908. — pp. xii, 279. 5 fr.
- Giordano Bruno, Opere Italiane. II. Dialoghi morali.* Nuovamente ristampati con note da GIOVANNI GENTILE. Bari, Gius. Laterza & Figli, 1908. — pp. xix, 512. L. 7.
- F. G. G. Schelling, Sistema dell'idealismo trascendentale.* Tradotto da MICHELE LOSACCO. Bari, Gius. Laterza & Figli, 1908. — pp. xi, 319. L. 6.

SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mt.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scolastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I. Abtl.*: *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*.—Other titles are self-explanatory.]

LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS.

Naïves und wissenschaftliches Weltbild. VITALIS NORSTRÖM. *Ar. f. sys. Ph.*, XIII, 4, pp. 491-510.

The purpose of the present article is to direct attention to the discrepancy existing between the realm of science and the world of common sense, and to discuss in a general way the relation between the two. Is one justified in saying that the world of science is the real world, while the realm of immediate experience is mere appearance? This question states the problem of the article, and the logical drift of the discussion is towards a negative answer. Nature cannot be conceived as the original of which science is a copy. On the contrary, there is a quite evident disparity between the truth of science and the concrete data, so-called, of sense-perception; for science finds its truth, not in actuality, but in universal validity. Still the opposition is not complete. After all, science is only the result of the subject's reaction to the actual from a specific standpoint determined by definite interests. Thus actuality and knowledge find their synthesis in the one subject of which both are possessions. Science is not the whole truth, but a method of dealing with the given aspect of experience; the experience of the subject is the ultimate synthesis, and includes within itself both actuality and knowledge. The author promises further to develop this position in a later article.

G. W. CUNNINGHAM.

Entwicklungslehre: Entwurf einer neuen Weltanschauung. OSCAR LJUNGSTRÖM. *Ar. f. sys. Ph.*, XIII, 4, pp. 474-490.

As the title indicates, this article is an attempt on the part of the author to state in outline a new theory of development. He criticises the theory

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sensible phenomena find expression in mathematical language through the intervention of extension. Observation of variation is by means of movement on graduated scales of measurement; vision, then, is all-important in measuring variation. The foundation of scientific work is the assumption of a universal mechanism, impersonal and non-specific. This is the basis of the theory of the conservation of energy. And here arises a philosophical consideration: Energy, as it is exactly and universally conserved, must be an absolute entity; yet, if the theory is to be of general use in science, man must be conceived as cognizant of all transformations in which energy is implicated. Hence energy is either postulated merely for practical use and convenience in science, or man has full knowledge of an absolute entity. The latter alternative is obviously absurd; the former needs further investigation. Energy, etymologically, means 'capacity for work.' The notion of energy precedes mathematical formulation in the psychological conception of effort. Changes in inert masses are referred to agents (forces) capable of producing them, and we have the dualism of the active self and passive non-self that is further developed in the principle of inertia of matter. This principle holds that 'a body cannot, of itself, change its state of motion or of rest'; and further that, 'without the action of forces, the inertia of a moving body is maintained in uniform and rectilinear motion.' This latter formulation must be a conventional postulate, for such motion is inconceivable except ideally. Even with reference to the inertia of the quiescent body, the principle falls short, in that it tacitly omits the ever-present force of gravitation in its statement. Again, when we turn to the measurement of energy, further conventional conceptions are unearthed. Energy is measured as the product of the mass of the inert body into the acceleration which alone manifests the action of the force. But note the arbitrary features involved in the notion of force. The straight line, purely on account of popular prejudice, creeps in as a necessary adjunct to the notion of force, — *cf.* the resolution of concurring forces. Very manifestly, force is but a mathematical convenience, a conception based on the psychological notion of effort, and not an absolute entity. Now examine anew the theory of the conservation of energy, built up on the conventional foundation above considered. Shall we condemn it because of these arbitrary elements? No, not any more than we condemn science in general because of its traditional basis, or look askance on the compass and sextant because they have evolved from the ship's 'log.' Conservation of energy, regarded on the side of inertia as the equilibrium of action and reaction, exhibits the universal interrelation of phenomena, the eternal underlying unity of the world. Energy, in its exact conservation, furnishes the constant, the impersonal fixed point of reference, that true science must have in the world of change.

R. Y. HOFFMAN.

The Doctrine of the Eject. GEORGE STUART FULLERTON. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., IV, 19, pp. 505-510; 21, pp. 561-567; 23, pp. 617-623.

Solipsism is an unnatural doctrine; plain men and philosophers alike reject it. The real question is, How do we know the existence of other minds? The common sense doctrine of the eject holds that it is only through analogy, and this view psychology endorses. It is objected that the child accepts the existence of other minds before it is conscious of the inference. The fact that it associates pleasure or pain with material things other than its own body does not mean, however, that it has a direct knowledge of another's pleasure or pain; it may not have even an indirect knowledge of such states. We do not find immediate knowledge of other minds in early mental life; the distinction between the thoughts of the self and of others is a gradual growth, which finally becomes clear through inference. Taylor objects, in his *Elements of Metaphysics*, that one term of the analogy, knowledge of one's own physical structure, is absent. It may be answered that men draw the inference from what they know of themselves, not from what they do not know. Though Taylor holds in general that we know other minds immediately, he is frequently compelled to abandon this theory and accept the doctrine of analogy. Strong, in *Why the Mind Has a Body*, holds that the argument from analogy is imperfect, for it cannot be verified as can the inductive argument in physical science. But neither can the doubt be verified. Moreover, an inference in physical science, so long as it remains an inference, is only verifiable, not verified. Our inferences may be rational, though not the same as the inductive inference. Strong holds, however, that instinct furnishes a basis for the inference and so supplements the analogy. If he means by this that instinct assures us that other minds exist, it is disproved by the fact that where the analogy fades out our inferences fall away; if he means that instinct tells us that the argument from analogy is valid, it may be objected that the word 'instinct' cannot properly be used in this way. Though this paper has presented the view that two consciousnesses are always mutually ejective; yet, as in the individual's knowledge of his own past life, what has been known as eject may become known as object, so in numerous cases the existence of other consciousnesses seems to be directly verifiable.

C. H. WILLIAMS.

The New Realism. JOHN E. BOODIN. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., IV, 20, pp. 533-542.

Realism maintains the existence of reals beyond the apperceptive unity of individual consciousness. These reals can make a difference to that consciousness so as to be known. Idealism must hold that there is only one unity of consciousness, and that, therefore, the relation to reality is a perspicuous relation. The fallacy that only like can act upon like has been assumed by metaphysical idealism and materialism alike. The merit

of idealism is that it has shown that the universe must be differentiated with reference to our purposive attitudes; its weakness lies in its attempt to reduce nature to reflective experience. Materialism has been right in applying mechanical categories to part of reality, but dogmatic in applying them to institutional reality as well. A second fallacy is the assumption that what is not stuff cannot be real. But real objects are never constituted by sense-perception; they must be known through our purposive attitudes, or conceptual constructions. 'Possible' perception must be invoked to complete the empirical idealist's reality; and 'possible' is not a category of perception. The author does not maintain, however, that reality must be conceptual, but that it is only 'really' knowable in so far as it is conceptual. The reals beyond our consciousness are objects of thought or purposive will, not of sense. Perceptual qualities have no reality except as relations to conscious energetic centres or purposive wills. They cannot interact, as they are the functional connections of energetic centres when a conscious will is part of the complex. The noumenal world must be differentiated according to our purpose into stuff and non-stuff. Stuff can be graded into types which we can acknowledge as purposive in their own right, and those which we acknowledge as existing, but whose inwardness escapes us. The former constitute the realm of idealism, the latter of materialism. Our conceptual structures should be regarded as copies or as tools with reference to the larger world, according as we make reality that of other purposive structures, or infra-reflective. Since the author acknowledges different kinds and grades of energetic centres, his theory, as regards the stuff character of reality, is pluralistic. The theory also insists upon non-stuff dimensions of reality, which also are noumena, differing from stuff types in that they are perceptually continuous with our psychophysical organism. They cannot appear as phenomena, but must be acknowledged for the realization of our purposes.

F. A. PEEK.

PSYCHOLOGY.

Das Gesetz von der Erhaltung der Energie und die Annahme einer Wechselwirkung zwischen Leib und Seele. ERICH BECHER. *Z. f. Psych.*, XLV, 2, pp. 81-122.

The law of the conservation of energy is now so generally recognized as a well-working hypothesis that the upholders of the theory of interaction are trying to reconcile their view concerning the relation of mind and body with this hypothesis. This reconciliation has taken on three forms. The first is represented by H. Schwarz and especially L. Busse, who with Wundt differentiates the law of the conservation of energy into the principle of equivalence and the principle of constancy. The latter presupposes that the universe is a closed mechanical system, which the interactionists are not willing to grant. Busse maintains that the former principle holds true only in purely mechanical events and cannot be applied where psychological causes and effects are involved. To this Becher emphatically objects

and quotes the investigations of Lavoisier and Laplace, of Despretz and Dulong, of Gavarret, and in particular those of M. Rubner on "The Sources of Animal Heat" and of W. O. Atwater on the same topic with regard to man. Their results have established beyond all doubt the fact of the conservation of energy in animal and human organisms. The second kind of reconciliation assumes, besides the physical energy, a sort of psychical energy, and maintains that the law of the conservation of energy holds true for the sum of both together. Such a view is taken by v. Grot, Ostwald, and Külpe, while Stumpf, Erhart, and perhaps Ladd hold it plausible. Now the law of the conservation of energy resulted from a purely mechanical conception of the universe, and hence the attempt to subsume the psychical events under the term energy comes dangerously close to materialism. Busse's objections to this kind of interactionism are not weighty enough for our author. Becher's own arguments against the assumption of a psychical energy are based upon Atwater's calorimetrical investigations, which have shown that the physical energy supplied to and given out by a human organism remains always in a state of equilibrium. Now if there were a psychical energy which was constantly changing into or arising from physical energy, we should have to assume that there is always as much physical energy absorbed into psychical energy as there is psychical energy changing back into physical energy. Besides, these mutual transformations must be of such short duration and so well balanced as to be beyond human observation. But such assumptions are too artificial and improbable to deserve serious consideration. The third method of reconciliation emphasizes the fact that the law of the conservation of energy does not at all determine unequivocally the temporal course of a physical event, but must be crossed by other natural laws whose validity for brain processes has not been proved. Hence there is a possibility in the case of psychical events that the mind takes their place, and, in coöperation with the law of the conservation of energy, determines the course of our mental life. But then the interactionist must confine the mind's influence to certain limiting cases only, and cannot give any satisfactory explanation of such accidental or fortuitous selections. However, this last form of the interaction theory, which assumes that any cause may have a double effect, a physical and a psychical one, and that any effect may similarly have a double cause, is perhaps most closely related to the theory of psychophysical parallelism. The author finally discusses a hypothesis which views the influence of the mind on the body as a kind of process of releasing (*Auslösungsprozess*) and which is held by Rehmke and Wentscher. Such a view cannot be brought into harmony with the law of the conservation of energy. Supposing a certain system of relatively high potential energy to be in a state of unstable equilibrium, then a relatively small addition of new energy would destroy the equilibrium and change some of the potential energy into kinetic energy. Now if mental life consists in the releasing of kinetic energy, then this must be due in the

last analysis to an addition of some new energy whose origin cannot be accounted for. Attempts to avoid this conclusion lead to fortuitous artificialities similar to those mentioned above. Hence, as the final result of this critical review of the interactionist hypotheses, our author reaches the conclusion that the law of the conservation of energy is in harmony only with the theory of psychophysical parallelism.

L. R. GEISSLER.

ETHICS.

Determinismus in der Erziehung. ERNST VOWINCKEL. Ar. f. sys. Ph., XIII, 4, pp. 429-456.

Among the many principles of education and the manifold forms of the practical application of these principles, two theories with their attendant methods are especially prominent. The one is an ethical theory of free will based upon theological considerations; the other is a kind of æsthetic theory, which maintains determined development and justifies its claims by the principles and from the standpoint of the natural sciences. The aim of the present article is to exhibit the inadequacy of these two theories as pedagogical principles, and to establish a mediating type of theory between them. The theological-ethical theory logically leads to nothing new in education, its end being the attempted justification of a revered tradition to which initiative is subordinated. The scientific-æsthetic theory also destroys initiative by making of man a machine-like automaton, and it logically leads towards a complete neglect of history and its lessons. Both theories equally deny freedom, which forever remains an insoluble problem from the one-sided standpoint of either Determinism or Indeterminism. Both series leave no room for the appearance in the process of development of that most significant and unique somewhat called the mystery of personality. And it is upon this conception of personality that the true type of educational theory must be founded; for the aim and goal of education is the formation of personality. The last few pages of the article the author devotes to a discussion of the structure of the type of theory whose starting-point is this presupposition.

G. W. CUNNINGHAM.

Morale et raison. D. PARODI. Rev. Ph., XXXII, 10, pp. 383-411.

Contemporary sociology is inclined to reduce ethics to a science of customs. It condemns utilitarian and metaphysical ethics alike as purely arbitrary, and considers itself alone as capable of establishing morality on a positive basis. Yet is there a real contradiction between positivism and rationalism in matters of conduct? The *Études de morale positive*, by Gustave Belot, is an important contribution to the subject, aiming to present an ethical view-point which would combine realism and rationalism, without the sacrifice of either. Belot regards metaphysics as powerless before the problem of morality, and holds that Kant had a right to base a general logic of action upon his Critique of Practical Reason, but not

an ethical system. Science has not succeeded any better in dealing with the problem alone; the purely sociological view of morality is open to criticism even more than the purely metaphysical view. From its standpoint, ethics becomes a mere science of customs. But society is not of a fixed nature, capable of being treated thus. Such a science of customs would become the more useless, the more it was perfected. Ethics cannot be reduced to a mere technique: one has not only to discover morality, but also, as it were, to invent it. Belot regards the idea of a science of ends as nonsensical; the ultimate cannot be demonstrated, he argues with Aristotle. The task of ethics is not to assign an arbitrary goal of human conduct; morality does not consist in passive obedience to an external rule of conduct, but in the intelligent acceptance of principles arising from the collective social will. Thus is achieved the union between rationality, which defines the form of morality, and sociality, which defines its content. Positive ethics is thus rational in that it is acceptable to the individual conscience; it is also real, since it coincides with the conclusions of inductive sociology. This standpoint is much more Kantian than Belot thinks. Rules of conduct are presented on the principle of general utility; but they are advocated not, as in the case of Utilitarianism, for the sake of any particular social goal, but because it is *rational* to realize the common means to all the desirable social ends. The one absolute duty consists in one's wish to do one's duty; hence ethics is not a science, but a method. Belot's chief objection to rationalistic ethics is that rationality by itself cannot define the content of morality; it does not go beyond showing the necessity of consistency in one's acts and decisions. But a mere rational coherence is not sufficient as a test of morality. The writer, on the other hand, cannot conceive of acts that are rationally consistent and yet immoral or non-moral. For him the completely rational is *ipso facto* moral. Reason ultimately remains the supreme judge in matters of morality. At times Belot is liable to confuse morality with the practical code of moral customs, a confusion identical with that of the sociological ethics which he is combatting; for ethics is first of all a criticism whereby honest man rationally seeks to justify the acceptance of a system of socially useful conduct. The two elements in Belot's ethics which at first sight seem to make his position dualistic, are really two aspects of the same standpoint. Objectively, morality is the observance of certain rules of conduct, without which social life and civilization, and with these conscience and reason, would be impossible. Subjectively, morality is the ensemble of principles which reason accepts in its rational justification of its own consistency of action.

R. A. TSANOFF.

On Certain Alleged Defects in the Christian Morality. JAMES SETH.
The Hibbert Journal, VI, 1, pp. 101-117.

The Christian ideal has lately been subjected to unsparing criticism by a so-called 'healthy-minded Paganism.' This criticism falls under three

heads : (1) The morality of Christianity is merely negative and ascetic ; (2) it is inimical to progress, as its aim is to do away with the struggle of the strong with the weak, and the consequent victory of the fit over the unfit ; (3) it is essentially anarchistic and anti-political, as its fundamental principle of the non-resistance of evil implies the dissolution of the state. The author replies to these criticisms that the morality thus attacked is not Christian morality. In the first place, true Christian asceticism does not regard earthly goods as evil ; it insists only that they must be subordinated to righteousness as the only absolute good. Christ is so preoccupied with the problem of righteousness that he ignores the other problems of human life ; but this is not to deny that they exist and must be solved. And we must admit that spiritual well-being is the supreme end of life. Moreover, even were there any of this supposed tendency to asceticism in the Christian ideal, it would be corrected by the altruism, and consequent practicalism, of that ideal. As to the second objection, which is that of Nietzsche's 'slave-morality,' the answer is that, while the Christian ideal is certainly democratic, breaking down the distinction between the many and the few, it is just for this reason aristocratic in the true sense. It sees in all the possibilities which the best Pagan insight discovered only in the few. Physiological fitness is not equivalent to ethical fitness ; nor has Christian virtue been lacking in virile and heroic qualities. Coming to the third objection, it cannot be questioned that Christ intended to substitute a new humanitarianism for the older exclusive patriotism. But this subordination of the political to the ethical point of view does not imply the invalidating of the former. Born in a petty state, preoccupied with a supreme problem, he may have failed to realize the ethical importance of the State, but he did not oppose it. As to the precept of non-resistance, three things should be noticed : first, it was given as a principle, not a rule, of conduct ; secondly, its obvious application is not to the public, but to the private life of the individual ; and finally, that Christ is here describing the ideal life, and legislating for it. In conclusion, it is pointed out that all these criticisms rest upon the same fundamental misunderstanding of the ethical teaching of Jesus. They all regard it as a code of rules. But Christ enunciated principles rather than rules ; it is Christianity as a spirit and a point of view with which we must come to terms if we would rightly appreciate its ethical significance. Christian morality is the fulfilment, rather than the negation, of Pagan morality, a truth too often denied, both by its defenders and by its critics.

E. H. HOLLANDS.

Has Sociology a Moral Basis? F. CARREL. Int. J. E., XVII, 4, pp. 448-454.

If sociology has a moral purpose, it is a branch of morals. It has such a purpose, as is shown, *e. g.*, by eugenics, which seeks to create a new moral sanction. Moreover, morals all through history have evolved new forms. Sociology cannot be the foundation of ethics, for the latter came

first. As society became more complex, ethics remained concerned primarily with the relation of man to man, while sociology branched off to consider the relation of man to the group. The fineness of the distinction shows that the two are one ; or, if they are two, ethics includes social ethics, and sociology is merely statistical. Thus what we call sociology is a bipartite science, one part a branch of morals, the other independent ; and it is vain to attempt to substitute it for morals in general.

C. H. WILLIAMS.

The Social Ideal. I. W. HOWERTH. *Int. J. E.*, XVIII, 2, pp. 205-220.

The construction or projection of a social ideal is not a matter of foreseeing the course of the unconscious evolution of society. The ideals of society hitherto constructed have been too largely the work of the imagination. What we need is an ideal scientifically conceived in harmony with existing facts and forces, and hence possible of attainment. There are three constituent elements of the highest realizable ideal of human life : social intelligence, social economy, voluntary coöperation. According to Henry George, social intelligence is that consensus of individual intelligence which forms a public opinion, a public consciousness, and a public will, and is manifested in law, institutions, and administration. Social intelligence, notwithstanding its present rudimentary condition, is the primary element in a rational social ideal. The formation of this intelligence is not only natural, but artificial as well. If the ideal were already realized, social activities would exemplify the law of the economy of force. This raises the question as to what is properly a social task. There is a limit beyond which social organization may not go without defeating its own purpose. In attempting to determine the ideal form or method of social organization, four methods suggest themselves : government by an autocrat, by the state (in the restricted sense), by private individuals acting in their own interests, by society itself. The first method must be dismissed, since an ideal leader, or a succession of such leaders, could not be secured, and the people in any case would be deprived of the greatest opportunities of self-development. Similar objections could be made to the second and third methods. In democracy, however, the ideal becomes progressively realized as intelligence and economy approach perfection. In this organization, coöperation for the public good must become both conscious and voluntary. The good of each, while subordinate to, is yet realized in, the good of all. Whatever tends to increase popular participation in government is, so far, justified in principle.

F. A. PEEK.

NOTES.

Eduard Zeller, the distinguished theologian and historian of philosophy, died on the 19th of March. He was born on January the 22d, 1814, in Kleinbottwar, Wurtemberg. At the age of 26 he became privatdocent in the University of Tübingen, and lectured there on theology until 1847, when he was called to Bern as professor of theology. In 1849 he was called to a professorship in the Theological Faculty at Marburg, where he was transferred to the Philosophical Faculty because of objection to his radical views. In 1862 he was made professor of philosophy in Heidelberg, and in 1872 he was called to Berlin, where he taught until his retirement in 1894. In 1895 he went to Stuttgart, where he spent the remaining years of his life. His long career was spent in the stillness and retirement of academic work. His biography is the history of his studies. While his interests were very wide, his activity was almost entirely theoretical and critical. He had an extraordinary genius for scholarship; his learning was prodigious, accurate, and logically organized. His writing on any given subject is practically exhaustive and is conspicuous for cogency and clarity. Among the historians of Greek philosophy, ancient or modern, he was *facile princeps*, and this is due to the soberness and objectivity of his judgment as well as to his absolute mastery of minutiae. His genius lay not so much in philosophical construction as in the reconstruction of the past; not so much in system-building as in historical constructive criticism. The range of his activity can best be indicated by citation of his works: 1839, *Platonische Studien*; 1842, *Theologische Jahrbücher*, which he founded and later edited in conjunction with Ferdinand Christian Baur; 1844-1852, *Philosophie der Griechen*, 3 vols.; 3d and 4th ed., 1879-1903, 6 vols.; 1847, *Geschichte der christlichen Kirche*; 1853, *Das theologische System Zwinglis*; 1854, *Die Apostelgeschichte kritisch untersucht*; 1865-1884, *Essays* on theological and philosophical subjects, 3 vols.; 1872, *Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie*; 1874, *David Friedrich Strauss*; 1872, *Staat und Kirche*; 1874, *Strauss' Gedichte*; 1883, *Grundriss der Geschichte der griechen Philosophie*; 7th ed., 1905; 1886, *Friedrich der Grosse als Philosoph*; 1895, *Strauss' Briefe*. In 1868 he was made honorary Doctor of Theology (Heidelberg), in 1872 Privy Councillor of Baden, in 1876 Privy Councillor of Prussia, in 1877 honorary Doctor of Jurisprudence (Tübingen), 1886 honorary Doctor of Medicine (Marburg), in 1894, on his retirement from Berlin, Privy Councillor of Prussia with the title of Excellency. Besides these distinctions, he was honored by membership in many Orders and by other external marks of Germany's appreciation of his achievements as savant and historian.

Professor James Ward delivered the last four of the first series of Gifford Lectures for the session of 1907-8 at the University of St. Andrews, February 8-14. The subjects were: "The Pluralism of Hegel," "The Hegelian Unity," "The Limits of Pluralism," and "Difficulties in Pluralism."

At the recent meeting of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, in Washington, the following officers were elected for 1908: President, Professor J. MacBride Sterrett, George Washington University; Vice-President, Professor Albert Lefevre, University of Virginia; Secretary-Treasurer, Professor Edward F. Buchner, University of Alabama; members of the Council, Professor A. Caswell Ellis, Professor Edgar J. Swift, Dr. William T. Harris, President D. B. Purinton, Professor J. Mark Baldwin, and Mr. Reuben Post Halleck.

Dr. William Alexander Hammond has been appointed Sage Professor of Ancient Philosophy in Cornell University.

Professor E. F. Buchner, of the University of Alabama, has been appointed Professor of Education and Philosophy at Johns Hopkins University. Dr. J. B. Watson, of Chicago University, has been made Professor of Experimental and Comparative Psychology.

Dr. I. Woodbridge Riley has been called to the chair of philosophy at Vassar College.

Professor G. M. Stratton has been appointed Professor of Psychology at the University of California.

The chair of philosophy at the University of Missouri has been filled by the appointment of Professor Arthur O. Lovejoy.

The Philosophical Review will hereafter be published by Messrs. Longmans, Green, and Co.

We give below a list of the articles, etc., in the current philosophical periodicals:

MIND, No. 66: *F. H. Bradley* On Memory and Judgment; *A. H. Lloyd*, Radical Empiricism and Agnosticism; *Mary Hay Wood*, Plato's Psychology in Its Bearing on the Development of Will (Conclusion); *K. J. Spaulding*, On the Sphere and Limit of the Aristotelian Logic; *F. H. Bradley*, On the Ambiguity of Pragmatism; *B. Russell*, Mr. Haldane on Infinity; Critical Notices; New Books; Philosophical Periodicals; Notes, News, and Correspondence.

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, XVIII, 3: *J. S. Mackenzie*, The Problem of Moral Instruction; *Mabel Atkinson*, The Struggle for Existence in Relation to Morals and Religion; *George H. Mead*, The Philosophical Basis of Ethics; *Waldo L. Cook*, Wars and Labor Wars; *A. C. Pigou*, The Ethics of Nietzsche; *H. W. Wright*, Evolution and the Self-Realization Theory; *Ray Madding McConnell*, The Ethics of State Interference in the Domestic Relations; Book Reviews.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, V, 3: *Charles Hughes Johnston*, The

Feeling Problem in Recent Psychological Controversies ; Psychological Literature ; Books Received ; Notes and News.

V, 4: *E. F. Buchner*, Proceedings of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology ; *Robert Morris Ogden*, The Pictorial Representation of Distance ; Psychological Literature ; Books Received ; Notes and News.

THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, II, 3: *C. Shearman*, The Method of 'Right and Wrong Cases' ('Constant Stimuli') without Gauss's Formulæ ; *G. Dawes Hicks* and *W. H. R. Rivers*, The Illusion of Compared Horizontal and Vertical Lines ; *W. H. R. Rivers* and *H. N. Weber*, The Influence of Small Doses of Alcohol on the Capacity for Muscular Work ; *Beatrice Edgell* and *W. Legge Symes*, The Wheatstone-Hipp Chronoscope ; *W. H. Winch*, The Transfer of Improvement in Memory in School-Children ; *E. O. Lewis*, The Effect of Practice on the Perception of the Müller-Lyer Illusion ; *James Fraser*, A New Visual Illusion of Direction ; Proceedings of the British Psychological Society.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, V, 5: *Mary Whiton Calkins*, Psychology as Science of Self: (III) The Description of Consciousness ; *James Bissett Pratt*, Truth and Ideas ; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature ; Journals and New Books ; Notes and News.

V, 6: *Alfred H. Lloyd*, The Meaning of $\sqrt{-1}$; *B. H. Bode*, The Problem of Objectivity ; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature ; Journals and New Books ; Notes and News.

V, 7: *John E. Boodin*, Consciousness and Reality: (1) Negative Definition of Consciousness ; *William James*, "Truth" versus "Truthfulness" ; *Wendell T. Bush*, Provisional and Eternal Truth ; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature ; Journals and New Books ; Notes and News.

KANT-STUDIEN, XIII, 1-2: Nachgelassene Abhandlung von *Adolf Trendelenburg* (eingeführt von *Rudolf Eucken*), Zur Geschichte des Wortes Person ; *Otto Baensch*, Über historische Kausalität ; *Bruno Bauch*, Kant in neuer ultramontan- und liberal-katholischer Beleuchtung ; *Eduard Spranger*, W. v. Humboldt und Kant ; Recensionen ; Selbstanzeigen ; Mitteilungen.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE, XLVI, 6: *Robert Saxinger*, Gefühls-suggestion und Phantasiegefühl ; *Wilhelm Wirth*, Erwiderung gegen K. Marbe ; Literaturbericht.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, XXXIII, 3: *R. de la Grasserie*, Sur l'ensemble de la psychologie linguistique ; *P. Gaultier*, L'indépendance de la morale ; *G. Palante*, Deux types d'immoralisme ; *G.-L. Duprat*, La psychosociologie juridique ; Analyses et comptes rendus ; Revue des périodiques étrangers.

XXXIII, 4: *D. Parodi*, La morale des idées-forces ; *A. Chide*, Pragmatisme et intellectualisme ; *P. Gaultier*, L'indépendance de la morale (Suite et fin) ; *Marie E.-B. Leroy*, La psychologie infantile en 1907 ; *B.*

Bourdon, Sur le temps nécessaire pour nommer les nombres ; Analyses et comptes rendus ; Revue des périodiques étrangers.

REVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE, VIII, 3 : *A.-D. Sertillanges*, L'âme et la vie selon saint Thomas d'Aquin ; *T. Richard*, L'enseignement des écoles et le progrès de la science ; *P. Duhem*, Le mouvement absolu et le mouvement relatif (V) ; *F. Warrain*, La raison pure et les antinomies ; Analyses et comptes rendus ; Périodiques ; L'enseignement philosophique.

VIII, 4 : *J. Gardair*, Fogazzaro et Rosmini ; *L.-M. Billia*, L'objet de la Psychologie ; *E. Peillaube*, L'organisation de la memoire : (III) L'evocation des souvenirs ; *P. Duhem*, Le mouvement absolu et le mouvement relatif (VI) ; Reponse de M. l'abbe Gayraud ; Analyses et comptes rendus ; Periodiques ; L'enseignement philosophique.

REVUE DE METAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE, XVI, 2 : *V. Brochard*, Le Dieu de Spinoza ; *E. Meynial*, Du role de la logique dans la formation scientifique du droit ; *A. Job*, La methode en chimie ; *H. Novero*, La philosophie de Wundt ; Discussions ; *F. Challaye*, La Syndicalisme reformiste ; Supplement.

REVUE NÉO-SCOLASTIQUE, XV, 1 : *Cardinal. Mercier*, Un discours ; *G. Sentroul*, La vérité dans l'art ; *J. Lottin*, La statistique morale et le déterminisme ; *N. Baltasar*, Le problème de Dieu d'après la philosophie nouvelle ; Mélanges et documents ; Bulletin de l'Institut de Philosophie ; Comptes-rendus ; Chronique philosophique ; Ouvrages envoyés à redaction.

JOURNAL DE PSYCHOLOGIE NORMALE ET PATHOLOGIQUE, XV, 2 : *P. Janet*, Le renversement de l'orientation ou l'allochirie des représentations ; *Dr. Pascal*, Les maladies mentales de Robert Schumann ; *Vigoureux* et *Juquelier*, Contribution clinique à l'étude des délires de rêve ; Société de Psychologie ; Notes et discussions ; Bibliographie.

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA E SCIENZE AFFINI, X, 1-2 : *R. Aridgò*, Una pretesa pregiudiziale contro il positivismo ; *G. Marchesini*, Nell'orizzonte dell' "interesse." L'"interesse ideale" ; *E. Troilo*, Le prime affermazioni storiche del positivismo ; *A. Crespi*, Il pensiero filosofico-giuridico di Cesare Beccaria ; *V. Vitali*, Il valore pedagogico del buon umore ; Per l'"anima della scuola" ; Analisi e cenni ; Per l'80.º anniversario di R. Ardigò ; Bolletino bibliografico di filosofia e scienze affini ; Notizie ; Sommari di riviste.

RIVISTA FILOSOFICA, XI, 1 : *N. Fornelli*, Il nuovo individualismo religioso ; *A. Faggi*, La coscienza negli animali ; *A. Levi*, La psicologia della esperienza indifferenziata di James Ward ; *L. Suali*, Un trattato elementare di filosofia indiana (Il Tarkâmrita di Jagadîça) ; *E. Morselli*, Vita morale e vita sociale (continuaz. e fine) ; *R. Mondolfo*, La dottrina della proprietà nel Montesquieu ; Articoli di riviste straniere ; Notizie e pubblicazioni ; Sommari delle riviste straniere ; Libri ricevuti.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

THE TEST OF PRAGMATISM.

IN a recent number of *The Popular Science Monthly*, the Italian pragmatist, Papini, makes the very significant statement that "pragmatism is really less a philosophy than a method of doing without a philosophy." From this point of view, any critique of pragmatism would prove gratuitous. However, the doctrines of pragmatism are regarded in many quarters to-day in a very different light. Its adherents are not satisfied with considering it as a substitute for philosophy, but insist that it merits the name and the rank of the only true philosophy as well.

If pragmatism is to justify itself, it must surely be able to satisfy the test to which it requires all other alleged truth to be subjected. Can it stand its own test? "Whatever works is true." Does pragmatism measure up to this standard? Yes and no. There are so many cases where truth is revealed by the pragmatic test easily and effectually, that it is natural to fall into the error that here is the master-key that will fit all locks. If one is lost in the forest and wishes to find the true trail, if the machine is out of gear and needs adjustment, if the child has a fever and needs an antipyretic, if the safe must be opened and only the true combination will do it, — in all of these and in an innumerable number of similar cases, the criterion of a practical test both discovers and proves the truth in each instance. There has been too great a tendency on the part of many of the advocates of pragmatism, however, to indulge in the method of proof by illustration. The illustrations are for the most part apposite and convincing as regards both the prevalence and the efficiency of the pragmatic method over extensive areas of thought and

practice. But there are also many negative cases where this method proves wholly unsatisfactory. It does not work, and therefore stands condemned out of its own mouth. And it is this feature of pragmatism, its inadequacy, which it is the purpose of this paper to emphasize and prove. This inadequacy is disclosed in the following ways :

1. Pragmatism is inadequate as a working hypothesis.
2. It is inadequate, because in its application we subordinate it to other considerations.
3. It is inadequate, because of the limitation of its alleged creative function.

1. Pragmatism should certainly prove itself as a satisfactory working hypothesis ; applied as a test to the practical affairs of life, we should be able to reach a solution which fits each concrete situation. Professor James has given us a working formula : "The true, to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as the right is only the expedient in the way of our behaving."¹

The expedient as such, however, often suggests a false lead. We cannot identify the expedient with the true any more than we can identify it with the right. Nor can the expedient be made the test either of the right or the true without in turn subjecting the expedient to other very essential considerations. We do not trust ourselves to the guidance of expediency in a wholly unreserved manner. In many cases we find that it is convenient to follow in the way of the expedient, but always with open eyes and open mind, and never with a blind implicit confidence. In this connection, I would draw attention to Professor Dewey's definition of thinking : "It is the whole dynamic experience with its qualitative and pervasive identity of value, and its inner distraction, its elements at odds with each other, its tension against each other, contending each for its proper place and relationship, that generates the thought situation."² And again : "The condition which antecedes and provokes any particular exercise of reflective knowing is always one of discrepancies, struggle, 'col-

¹ *Pragmatism*, p. 222.

² *Studies in Logical Theory*, p. 38.

lision.' This condition is practical, for it involves the habits and interests of the organism, an agent."¹ Let us take this idea, that thinking arises out of a situation involving inner distraction, discrepancies, struggle, collision, and ask ourselves if the test of expediency will assure a complete and satisfactory solution in all such predicaments. Let us take a typical instance of collision and struggle which we all may surely regard as one of the commonplace experiences of our moral life, the struggle between our sense of duty, on the one hand, and that of inclination, on the other. The pragmatic test as to what will most effectively and easily meet the difficulties of the situation which confronts us, we feel is not only inadequate, but also unworthy of our deeper ethical sentiment and conviction. There are cases, and not a few at that, where we not only do not follow the lead of expediency, looking to the possible consequences of our choices, but on the contrary we steadfastly, and somewhat stubbornly it may be, determine our course of action wholly in scorn of consequences.

Of course it is quite possible that there are those who naturally take the point of view of the inimitable Harold Skimpole, who, upon being asked by Mr. Boythorn, "Is there such a thing as principle, Mr. Harold Skimpole?" replied with a crude but nevertheless genuine flavor of pragmatic feeling: "Upon my life, I have not the least idea! I don't know what it is you call by that name, or where it is, or who possesses it. If you possess it, and find it comfortable, I am quite delighted, and congratulate you heartily. But I know nothing about it, I assure you; for I am a mere child, and lay no claim to it, and, I don't want it." The concrete situation which emerges more often in our lives perhaps than any other is the one which presents this collision between policy and principle, between expediency and duty. And whenever this crisis occurs in our experience, the pragmatic test is wholly unavailing. We dare not commit ourselves unreservedly to its control. "Will it work?" or "Will it pay?" are not formulas by which we seek to ease the strain of perplexing moral emergencies.

¹ *Mind*, N. S., No. 63, p. 339.

Professor James qualifies his definition of the true in terms of the expedient to the extent of insisting that the expedient is that which proves to be the expedient in the long run and on the whole.¹

The difficulty with this qualification is that, in the particular situation which confronts us, the idea of the expedient in the long run and on the whole can afford us no assistance whatsoever in reaching a definite and immediate solution of the concrete practical problem at hand. Moreover, the pragmatist insists that it is just this particular concrete situation alone which can give rise to truth in a completely satisfactory manner. If, then, there are certain concrete situations such as I have cited, which not only are not relieved by the test of expediency, but which we instinctively scorn even to approach by that way, we are constrained to conclude that the test of expediency is inadequate at that point especially where we would naturally expect it to be most practically available.

Turning from the expedient "in the way of our behaving" to the expedient "in the way of our thinking," we find that the various elements of knowledge which come before us are not received or rejected as knowledge according to the test of their utility. There are certain truths whose "instrumental value" is entirely concealed. They possess, however, an interest in themselves, and attract our attention more by what they are than by what they can do for us either in our thinking or in our life of action. Again, there are certain elements of knowledge which not only do not show any indications of utility, but, as a matter of fact, do not possess any vestige of utility in themselves; nevertheless they may conserve a useful end by being brought into combination with certain other elements. Darwin has remarked that, according to his observations, utility generally is the result of a number of elements separately useless.²

If the elements which in themselves possess no palpable use are rejected from our body of knowledge by the pragmatic test, then none of the useful combinations, of which they are neces-

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 222.

² *Origin of Species*, sixth edition, pp. 178 f.

sary parts, can ever attain to a realization in our experience. Moreover, the combinations which are often most productive of useful and it may be beneficial results, are those whose various component parts have been gathered from widely different sources. They represent the collaboration of many minds and often the result of several generations of research and speculation. Enough has been said to indicate how impossible it is in certain situations to meet the demand which is urged by Professor James that one should be able to give "truth's cash-value in experiential terms."¹ The fact is that, whenever there is a demand for cash value, then the real value is always subjected to some discounting process. There is always a loss which must be sustained. And a general demand throughout the whole body of our truths for the cash value of each in terms "of directly verifying sensible experiences somewhere," would certainly precipitate a panic in the world of our thinking as surely as would a similar demand in the world of finance. Professor James concedes that all truths which we hold are not subjected to actual verification, but are accredited by other truths within one and the same "credit system." "Truth," he states, "lives, in fact, for the most part on a credit system. Our thoughts and beliefs 'pass,' so long as nothing challenges them, just as bank-notes pass so long as nobody refuses them."² This credit system, however, according to Professor James's account, rests upon no secure foundation. And as proof of this I would cite the following: "For pluralistic pragmatism, truth grows up inside of all the finite experiences. They lean on each other, but the whole of them, if such a whole there be, leans on nothing."³ If such is the credit system of our thinking, are we not laying ourselves open to the charge of 'kiting checks,' to carry out the financial figure which Professor James so appositely uses? When in financial transactions a man maintains his credit in one bank by depositing there a check upon another bank, and that in turn is made good by still another check upon a third bank, and so on within the limit of his daring, 'each leaning

¹ *Pragmatism*, p. 200.

² *Ibid.*, p. 207.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 260.

upon the other but the whole leaning upon nothing,' then he not only runs the risk of the miscarriage of his adventure, but also of fine and imprisonment as well. It is not merely that this scheme has not worked; but in the attempt he has violated a fundamental principle of honesty also. And it is this latter point with which the law is peculiarly concerned. When we trust the credit system of our reasoning by which we pass from one truth to another accredited by it, we are deeply concerned as to whether there is any underlying ground upon which the whole system rests. We too are concerned with principles of procedure, and the necessities of adaptation and of adjustment which must be observed. And it does make a difference to us in our thinking, if the system of knowledge within which we pass from one thought to another has its parts so loosely knit together that it can give no assurance whatsoever of constancy, or of consistency, or of coherency. The idea of "a loose universe," as Professor James styles it, in which all things are possible, and where we may become creators as well as actors, appeals most strongly to our imagination and provokes the spirit of adventure. But does it satisfy certain needs and demands of our logical nature, which cannot be lightly ignored? And this question we will now discuss under the second point of our criticism.

2. The theory of pragmatism is inadequate, because we are constrained to subordinate it to other considerations. There is much talk among pragmatists about purposive thinking, and the insistence that thought is essentially concerned with some problem which must be solved. The line of procedure in thinking is thus declared to be a line directed towards some definite goal. And if the goal is reached, the thought processes are judged to be true. Taking this as the programme of all logical procedure, it nevertheless remains true that in all of our efforts to reach such a goal, we must obey the rules of the game. Amidst the problems of life and of thought, the line of solution is not always a straight line or the line of least resistance. Its course is determined not merely by the end which we desire to reach, but also by certain laws of necessity and consistency which we disregard at our peril. Our reasoning upon the problems which demand

solution has free play and a wide range, but only within the limits which the rules and penalties of the game of thinking prescribe. In searching in our minds for the probable solution of a problem, we do not subject all possible solutions to their several tests. There are often many solutions which are momentarily suggested, but which we reject almost automatically, because we see that they would violate the rules of the game. This selective function of thought prior to any process of actual verification, and indeed in place of it, certainly indicates that in our thinking we recognize some other test of truth than the mere pragmatic standard as to whether it works or not.

To this, no doubt, the pragmatist would rejoin that truth must not only be of such a character that it will fit into the concrete situation of actual facts in a way that can explain them satisfactorily; but also that it will fit into a thought situation in a like satisfactory manner, so as to do no violence to the fundamental laws of our logical nature. Verification of this kind, however, concedes in its very statement the consideration of a higher standard to which the simple pragmatic test must conform. In other words, truth's instrumental value is conditioned and determined both in nature and range by the demands of our reason for coherency and consistency. Professor James is plainly conscious of such a demand when he finds himself constrained to make certain reservations which certainly seem to be of the nature of a most significant concession in this regard. He allows that "our experience is all shot through with regularities. One bit of it can warn us to get ready for another bit, can 'intend' or be 'significant of' that remoter object. The object's advent is the significance's verification. Truth, in these cases, meaning nothing but eventual verification, is manifestly incompatible with waywardness on our part. Woe to him whose beliefs play fast and loose with the order which realities follow in his experience; they will lead him nowhere or else make false connexions."¹ And again: "This need of an eternal moral order is one of the deepest needs of our breast."² "Between the coercions of the sensible

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 205.

² *Ibid.*, p. 106.

order and those of the ideal order, our mind is thus wedged tightly. Our ideas must agree with realities, be such realities concrete or abstract, be they facts or be they principles, under penalty of endless inconsistency and frustration."¹ These statements certainly concede the presence of determining factors in our thinking other than the pragmatic factor of realizing a desired end. If the search for truth must be confined to certain definitely determined limits, then the determining factors which set the boundaries of the area of possible solutions must themselves be regarded as directly affecting the nature of the truth which we are endeavoring to discover. If, in working out practical solutions of the difficulties which the various experiences of life present, we find ourselves under the coercion of an 'ideal order,' or of a 'moral order,' or of a 'sensible order,' then that which determines to any extent the nature of the means to a certain desired end, must surely be regarded as essential a factor as the end itself in the composition of that truth. Considerations such as these do not bear out the idea which the pragmatists are so fond of urging, that we are free lances in the world of our thinking, that the universe is after all but 'loosely constructed,' and that all theories need to be 'unstiffened,' to use a term of Papini's. It would be well for the pragmatist to pause in his efforts to test the products of thought, in order to consider the full significance of the coercion and control to which the processes of thought themselves must be continually subjected.

Professor James allows also that every truth must conform to "the collectivity of experience's demands."² And, in the same vein, he says that he has "insisted on the fact that truth is made largely out of previous truths. Men's beliefs at any time are so much experience funded."³ In this connection we should not overlook a very significant feature of our funded experience as a body of truth, namely, that it is not a mere collection of particular experiences, but a system of coherently connected and interdependent parts so held together as to form the ground of the

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 211.

² *Ibid.*, p. 80.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 224.

necessary and universal relations which we infer from it. Papini insists that the pragmatist's "sympathies will be with the study of the particular instance."¹ The particular instance, however, is always unintelligible unless we are able to interpret it in the light of its universal significance and implication. The particular instance can never become a part of our general body of knowledge unless we submit it to some process of thought transmutation, by which it is refined of its particularity, and of all local and temporal color. Professor Dewey is, I think, conscious of this characteristic of thought, when he says that "thought has a distinctive work to do, one which involves a qualitative transformation of (at least) the relationships of the presented matter; as fast as it accomplishes this work, the subject-matter becomes somehow thought's own. As we have just seen, the data are progressively organized to meet thought's ideal of a complete whole, with its members interconnected according to a determining principle."²

Professor James, moreover, is quite willing to acknowledge that by virtue of the 'law of the kind' we pass from truth to truth without recourse to the test of actual verification. He says: "Another great reason — beside economy of time — for waiving complete verification in the usual business of life is that all things exist in kinds and not singly. Our world is found once for all to have that peculiarity. So that when we have once directly verified our ideas about one specimen of a kind, we consider ourselves free to apply them to other specimens without verification. . . . Relations among purely mental ideas form another sphere where true and false beliefs obtain, and here the beliefs are absolute, or unconditional. . . . The objects here are mental objects. Their relations are perceptually obvious at a glance, and no sense verification is necessary. Moreover, once true, always true, of those same mental objects. Truth here has an 'eternal' character. . . . You are sure to get truth if you can but name the kind rightly, for your mental relations hold good of everything of that kind without exception."³ In this connection

¹ *Popular Science Monthly*, Vol. LXXI, p. 352.

² *Studies in Logical Theory*, p. 65.

³ *Pragmatism*, pp. 208 f.

it would be well to call attention to the reason why we trust ourselves to such processes and constantly employ them in our thinking. It is simply because we recognize in certain ideas and the relations obtaining between them a universal significance and certain necessary implications as well. If we entertain certain ideas, we are forced to accept others which are bound up with them, not merely in anticipation of some subsequent verification, but, on the contrary, with a feeling that any attempt at such verification would be wholly superfluous. Aside from the question as to whether such a procedure is logically warranted or not, the fact that we constantly find ourselves abiding by the results of our reasoning processes with an undisturbed satisfaction, and without the faintest suggestion of the need of verification, is in itself most significant.

Moreover, we are not satisfied with a bare verification of any truth upon which we may have happened blindly to stumble. We are restless in our minds until we come to understand in some way the rationale of the process by which one is able to arrive at the truth in question. As children, we were quite satisfied with the result of the problems upon which we were working, if only we could contrive to get our answers to correspond with those given in our text-book. Later on, however, under the spur of a dawning intellectual curiosity, we were not satisfied with such a test by itself. We came to demand a reason for the validity of the operations themselves, by which we were able to obtain the desired answer; and then we learned to trust implicitly the results of certain operations which had been accredited in reason, where appeal to text-books and their presumably correct answers was no longer possible. Indeed, we found that if we wished to verify the results of certain mathematical and logical processes, the operation consisted in a procedure which simply amounted to the reversal of the original order of these processes, that is, working them backwards, so that the verification in question was in reality a verification of the processes themselves, and only in an indirect manner of the results of the processes. Such a method of procedure rests upon the supposition that, if the processes are true, the result must be true. Our veri-

fiction, then, in cases of this kind, is only a checking up of the processes, and thereby eliminating the possibility of error in them.

We are not satisfied, *e. g.*, with the explanation of the methods of trigonometry, that they are found to work satisfactorily when applied to certain practical problems; we are by no means satisfied with the mere statement that, if we are surveying a field, we will find it convenient to proceed upon the assumption that the sum of the angles of a triangle equals two right angles, but if we are navigating a ship we will be able to verify our work, by appeal to actual distances traversed, only by regarding the sum of the angles of a triangle equal to something more than two right angles. We are not satisfied with the knowledge merely that certain suppositions will work; we wish and we demand to know also why they must work in different ways under differing circumstances. Science would have made but comparatively slow progress, if the pioneers in that field had remained satisfied in their minds with merely asking the question, What ideas are found to work satisfactorily? and had neglected to insist upon that other question as to the underlying reason why they necessarily must work in just that way which seems to be their peculiar way and in no other.

Again, let us regard for a moment the significance of a table of logarithms in this connection. If there is anything in the world which possesses merely 'instrumental' value, it is a table of logarithms. It offers nothing of value in itself. There is no diversion, or comfort, or solace in a table of logarithms. Its value consists solely in what it is able to accomplish; but merely a statement of what it is able to accomplish we refuse absolutely to accept as the validation of the truth of its processes. Our reason demands something more. We wish to know why such a tremendously complicated machinery always produces its results with such a nicety of precision and accuracy. But when we find that this intricate maze of numbers, seemingly unrelated and disconnected, is nevertheless the necessary and natural outcome of the exceedingly simple law of exponential relations, fundamental and universal, then we feel that for the first time we have discovered the truth of the logarithmic relations which is both significant and satisfying.

And in a similar instance, that of any algebraical series, we are not satisfied with the statement that the supposed law of the series is true, because if we put it to the test as regards any specified term, we will find that it works. We demand that our reasoning once for all should swing clear of all hazard of special empirical verification. We wish to be assured that the law of the series will and must hold for any term whatsoever. We are not satisfied when we have tested the law of the binomial theorem, for instance, for a number of terms, however many we may choose at random for our tests ; we insist upon some demonstration that the law in question must hold for all terms and for any power, integral or fractional, positive or negative. In short, the chief aim of all mathematical procedure is to rise from the level of the special case to the higher level of the universal statement, or law. We may define mathematics as that science whose aim is to render special verification superfluous.

It is urged, however, by the pragmatist, as, for instance, by Mr. Schiller in his chapter on "Non-Euclidean Geometry and the Kantian *a priori*," that the very foundations of mathematics are themselves merely hypothetical, and are true only so far as they may be empirically accredited.¹ But all systems of applied mathematics rest primarily upon some system of a pure mathematic, whose relations and implications exert a controlling and determining power, whatever may be the special condition or circumstance to which they may be applied. Mr. Russell has put this very clearly in his *Principles of Mathematics* : "What pure mathematics asserts is merely that the Euclidean propositions follow from the Euclidean axioms, — *i. e.*, it asserts an implication : any space which has such and such properties has also such and such other properties. Thus, as dealt with in pure mathematics, the Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries are equally true ; in each nothing is affirmed except implications. All propositions as to what actually exists, like the space we live in, belong to experimental or empirical science, not to mathematics ; when they belong to applied mathematics, they arise from giving to one or more of the variables in a proposition of pure mathematics some

¹ *Humanism*, p. 85.

constant value satisfying the hypothesis, and thus enabling us, for that value of the variable, actually to assert both hypothesis and consequent instead of asserting merely the implication. We assert always in mathematics that if a certain assertion p is true of any entity x , or of any set of entities $x y z \dots$, then some other assertion q is true of those entities ; but we do not assert either p or q separately of our entities. We assert a relation between the assertions p and q , which I shall call *formal implication*."¹ This point is a very important one, that there are certain necessities of implication not only in mathematical reasoning but in all reasoning generally, with which, we know in advance, all pragmatic tests will have to square. They also enable us to cut out many special efforts at verification, which otherwise would prove most tedious, annoying, and time-consuming. And we trust the results which are determined by the law of implication quite as confidently as we do the actual evidence of their truth directly manifested in our own experience. When it is asserted by the pragmatist that the laws of mathematics or the laws of physical science rest, at the last analysis, upon a hypothetical basis, it would be well for him to inquire somewhat more closely as to the fundamental significance of the hypothetical relation. While it is true that the hypothetical *expresses* a supposition, it does not by any means *rest* upon a supposition. The statement may be qualified, but if it has any force and significance, it must rest upon an unqualified ground. For instance, we may have the hypothetical judgment, "If a man takes a certain specified quantity of arsenic, it will surely kill him." The antecedent must be realized, or the consequent will not follow ; and this is the uncertain and variable element which a judgment expresses. But the ground upon which the very uncertainty itself rests is fixed in the constant and unalterable relations of arsenic to the human system. Unless you had some such constant as this, every problem in life, both theoretical and practical, would be wholly indeterminate.

It is urged, moreover, by the pragmatist that such a hypothesis as that of the all-pervading ether to account for the phenomena of light, electricity, magnetism, etc., is only a convenient way of

¹ Vol. I, p. 5.

representing to our minds in the crude terms which our intellects can grasp certain relations whose nature can at best only be guessed, and must ever remain most inadequately portrayed. I would insist, however, that our received scientific hypotheses are something more than suggestive figures of speech. They are not merely clever allegories. They have some substantial ground in the inherent nature of the phenomena which they profess to explain. The 'ether' hypothesis, for instance, stands upon a very different footing from that of the legal 'fiction' of the personality of a corporation. The personality of a corporation is an idea which works, and so proves itself a most useful way of simplifying certain very complex relationships in the law. Our scientific hypotheses, however, are something more than fictions of this type. We have but to compare the two, to note the obvious difference. The scientific hypothesis arises out of a system, the nature and interconnection of whose parts necessitate certain inevitable implications which determine the character of the hypothesis in question. The hypothesis is not merely the expression of the most convenient way in which we may choose to regard nature, but rather of the way in which we feel nature constrains us to regard her.

There is a compulsion as well as a lead in our thinking. We only see one aspect of truth when we define it, as Professor James does, as the "function of agreeable leading."¹ Certain ideas are compelled and certain others have range only within definitely prescribed limits, and 'agreeable leading,' however agreeable it may be, is not the guide which we can trust with implicit and unreserved confidence.

Our powers of prevision are not only to a great extent ordered by the necessary implications of the reason, but they are also wonderfully quickened by them. Purely theoretical knowledge is often highly suggestive of practical truth of supreme importance. As reason plays about a truth, we find that the truth itself expands while we are contemplating it. The thought necessities show certain phases of the truth which were never even suspected before. Thus we are given anticipations that

¹ *Pragmatism*, p. 202.

a certain relation must obtain and that it will work, long in advance of any opportunity to test it. It furnishes us something to test. The pragmatist thinks that truth need only be tested in order to be completely revealed. Does he ever pause to ask the very practical question, Where do we get truths to test? Professor James insists that the pragmatic method consists essentially in the "attitude of looking away from first things, principles, categories, supposed necessities, and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts."¹ I am free to confess that it seems to me that the mind which has not formed the habit of regarding the 'first things, principles, categories, supposed necessities,' will hardly be capable of entertaining any last things as 'fruits, consequences, facts,' which will be deemed worthy of any special value or significance whatsoever. To know the beginnings, the nature, and the ground of any set of phenomena under investigation, as well as the implications which are necessitated by them, is essential to any clear understanding of their worth, or of the possibilities of their practical application. The one who best understands the nature of things will be able to do the most with them. As an eminent illustration of this, we have the work of the late Lord Kelvin, a master both in pure and applied science. According to the doctrine of pragmatism, the natural history of the various truths of science follows some such order as this, — first, the existence of some felt need, and then the discovery of some way of supplying that need. The history of modern science, however, furnishes abundant instances where scientific discovery has not only preceded any recognized need, but has itself created that need. It is necessary merely to cite the truths of electricity and magnetism and their reciprocal relations, the knowledge of which, acquired under the stimulus of pure science, has created a whole world of modern needs and the possibility of their satisfaction. Moreover, the correlation of mathematical and experimental methods in dealing with physical phenomena, is in itself a proof of the determining and suggestive function of what we may call purely theoretical considerations in interpreting and ordering the world of knowledge which we are constantly building up out of the welter of confused and separate experiences.

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 54 f.

3. We now turn to our final count against pragmatism, and will endeavor to indicate another phase of its inadequacy. The pragmatist's claim of 'making truth' can be substantiated in many particular instances; but here again there are obvious limitations of this alleged creative function. It is insisted that the world is plastic, malleable; that truth is man-made, like language, wealth, health, or our institutions of law and government.¹

Papini, whose statements, if true, would always prove too much, ventures upon the assertion that "The pragmatist's work is to alter things rather than to contemplate them, to force things to exist in a definite way, instead of asserting that they already do so exist."² Now all of this is very well to a certain extent; but there are constants as well as variables which must be reckoned with. The whole modern spirit of research is most emphatically opposed to the pragmatist's suggestion that we should endeavor to make the phenomena of the universe bend to our will. Indeed, it insists above all things that the investigator in whatever field should seek by patient, laborious observation to know the nature of the given phenomena as they actually are in all of their essential and characteristic features.

Professor James insists that we can always alter the nature of actual facts by shifting our attention from one phase of that which is given to another, or by changing the peculiar form, order, or relations of thoughts in our mind. In this way we are able to command the phenomena of experience, and, by the proper adjusting of our thoughts, can 'make' truth.³ While no one denies the human touch which thought gives to our various experiences, nevertheless the controlling power of thought does not have a limitless range of possibility before it. It is only in a figurative sense that it can be said to possess a creative function. It may accelerate, retard, modify, or neutralize the forces of nature, but it cannot change essentially their inherent properties; on the contrary, it is only by knowing them thoroughly and accurately, that one can adapt their possibilities to one's own ends, and so compel the cosmical powers to do one's bidding.

¹ James, *Pragmatism*, pp. 242, 257 f.

² *Popular Science Monthly*, Vol. LXXI, p. 354.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 245 f.

In a like vein, Professor Dewey asks the question: "Is not the truth of practical ideas wholly an affair of *making* them true by constructing, through appropriate behavior, the condition of affairs which satisfies the requirement of the idea? If, in this case, truth means the effective capacity of the idea 'to make good,' what is there to forbid the application of analogous considerations to any idea?"¹ Our practical ideas are mostly of our own making, and therefore we can often 'make' them true by throwing our own effort into the situation which our wills can dominate; however, there are other ideas which, on the contrary, dominate us, and limit our powers of manipulation and adjustment. How are we "to construct the condition of affairs which satisfies the requirement of an idea," such as that which expresses, for instance, the fundamental nature of certain electro-magnetic relations, unless we know accurately what such requirements are? And how can we know what the requirements are unless we know the nature of the phenomena themselves as they actually are, and not as we for our purposes would have them to be? We dare not ignore the constants whose nature we cannot make or unmake, and which must be reckoned with as determining factors in every creative problem we undertake to solve. We may alter the pattern, but we cannot change the stuff. We may will to accomplish certain ends, but are under compulsion to use only certain means, if we would be successful. The relation between the means and the definite end in question lies deep in the nature of things, and is wholly independent of our will or wish. Our business is not to change this fundamental relation, and make it what we might like to have it, but to discover exactly what it is and to deal with it accordingly. We may regard ourselves as artists in the composition of the truth, but hardly as creators.

As to this constant factor, which appears in every problem confronting our thought, Professor James thinks that it is one that is being gradually formed by us. As to the unity which seems to underlie the world of our experience, he insists that it is only a possible empirical unification, the *terminus ad quem* of

¹ *Mind*, N. S., No. 63, p. 335.

our constructive thinking.¹ The world, however, is not merely approaching unification, — that ‘far off *human* event, towards which the whole creation moves.’ Too many elements are combining, too many lines are converging towards the same point, for us not to think that there is something behind as well as before this onward movement. There must be a unitary ground, if there is to be a unified goal. And there is much to be said in defense of the old scholastic formula, that what is last in execution must be first in conception. This may describe the programme according to which the history of the world as a whole has unfolded, as well as the manner in which the individual orders his single life. We are not in a ‘closed and finished universe,’ it is true; but, on the other hand, we are not in a universe which is solely of our own making. We are in a universe which, while in the making, is nevertheless unfolding according to the laws and trend of its own potentialities. And if we believe that certain ends will be realized ultimately, and the complete unification of the whole finally disclosed, may not the consummate reality have been from the beginning, even though in a potential form? And so far as the universe is fashioned by human touch, is it not our primary task to understand the truth of things as they are, so that we may the better realize the truth of things as they ought to be?

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¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 280.

THE FINAL GROUND OF KNOWLEDGE.

THE purpose of the following paper is to consider what is implied as to the character of reality, taken as a unitary whole, if knowledge be valid. I shall assume, in order to go forward the more rapidly, that the 'copy' theory of knowledge is dead and buried.¹ Thinking is not a mirror which passively reflects a world, and valid thoughts or bits of knowledge are not copies of outside things. Thought is active in 'knowing' no less than in 'willing,' and the world of real existence which thought knows must be of such a character that it responds to or submits to the activity of thought without vitiation of its own actual nature. It is obviously the case that the individual mind, as knowing, does not create the materials of its knowledge, not even of its self-knowledge. There is always a determinate datum given to thought in experience. The individual knower could intelligibly conceive neither a world nor its own nature, without the presence of a datum which is existentially distinct from itself as knower.

Nevertheless, the attempt to define this original datum of experience in terms of an absolute sensible minimum or raw and irreducible material of experience, supposed to be representative of a reality by nature absolutely disparate from mind as knowing, and discolored by the reaction of the latter to it, must always prove fruitless. By the method of analytic reduction and elimination of the thought-factor, we can never reach a stage in the analysis of actual experience at which we can point to an absolute datum of sense, from which the influence of the mental reaction is entirely absent. 'Pure' sensation may exist for the psychologist, but it exists as an artificial product of analysis. There is no actual state of mind in knowing that is freer from the activity of thought than crude sense-perception, such, for instance, as suddenly bumping against an object in the dark. And yet

¹ My views on this point agree with those admirably set forth by Mr. Joachim in his work, *The Nature of Truth*.

this experience involves at least the awareness or recognition by thought of an object. When the baby becomes aware of any solid object, the bed or the body of its mother, even in this inchoate and dawning knowledge its mind reacts. Actual experience in its crudest terms is the reaction of mind to a stimulus, but the immediate datum is the experience as received by a mind. The stimulus is an inference. One cannot define a physical stimulus out of all relation to the corresponding perception or sensation. The very vibration of ether or air, supposed to be the physical stimulus of visual or auditory sensation, has meaning only in so far as it is organically related to the mind which perceives colors and sounds.

The cognitive significance of the entire world of the not-self depends on the readiness with which the most primitive experiences, as meeting points of self and not-self, lend themselves to interpretation and reconstruction in terms of the self's controlling interests and ideas. While the external world has a determinate order of its own, this order is found not to exclude the directive influence of human thought-activities and purposes. The self is able successfully to forecast the order of nature and to adjust its own activities thereto. This is the most obvious and immediate test of the validity of knowledge, viz., that, taken by and large, knowledge 'works.'

Thought, then, is not wholly constrained from without. The external world does not dictate unconditionally or indubitably to the mind the direction which its thoughts and purposes shall take, nor does it determine the rate at which knowledge shall grow. In its theoretical, as well as in its practical, procedure, human thinking is self-determining. It selects the data which it shall reconstruct in accordance with its own aims. The whole history of science bears out the truth of this view. Even in the science of mathematics, with its relatively very abstract and simple data and its rigorous procedures, progress has been slow and irregular because of frequent failure to choose and follow out the problems that were most fruitful. The mind of man, immersed in the world of objects, has but intermittently considered the nature of its own processes. Hence the comparative mod-

ernness of systematic psychology. Not only does each individual investigator choose his own field, but each age as well has a fashion in intellectual work which it follows.

The responsiveness of the external world to the changing aims of human thought implies a dynamic community, an organic relationship, between the mind and the world. Either the whole development of knowledge is the expression, in mental symbols or signs, of the actual relationships in which the mind stands to the world and in which the varied elements of existence stand to one another; and, hence, the world of reality is in some sense a system shot through by mind; or else it is impossible to say in any definite sense what the relation may be, of truth or illusion, in which human thought and experience, as factors in the individual's psychical life, stand to the world outside. In the latter case, our knowledge hangs in the air and its validity is a mere subjective prejudice.

A way out of this difficulty may be sought in a manner that is fashionable to-day, in the social consciousness. It may be argued that the final test of truth is the agreement of different minds under the same conditions and at a similar stage of development. If we cannot successfully apply the test of universal consent, we may and do rely on the testimony of experts, and experts are socially recognized authorities. Truth, then, becomes a question of the social standing of a proposition; and, on the other hand, since men and minds notoriously differ, we must presuppose, when we apply this test, that the social group is homogeneous, — for example, that it is the real masters in physics or biology to whom reference is made. Now, without doubt, this test of truth is of great practical importance. The authority of experts may well be the final court of appeal for the laymen. But this test is after all only of proximate value. It rests on a suppressed premise. It presupposes a common rational structure in all minds and the possibility of a common relation of all minds to the world of reality. One may not assert that the social consciousness is the final ground of truth, for the reason that every form and phase of the so-called social consciousness has its originating centre in individual minds, and, hence, involves a

reference of the latter's passing thought to a reality beyond itself. And every such reference assumes the validity of the general thought-processes which are alike involved in the recognition of other selves and of an external world.

The relationships between human individuals, no less than the relations of the individual mind to the order of nature, involve an *over-individual thought-actuality*. The validity of my knowledge of another self, not less than the validity of my knowledge of the so-called material world, involves the rational intercourse of my mind with an order of reality which transcends the so-called 'social contents' of my consciousness, taken as a psychological process, just as truly as it transcends the psychological processes of touch, color, form, sound, and weight sensations, which represent for me the world of material things. There can be no essential difference in kind between the validity of my knowledge in these two spheres. Human society and the physical world must, therefore, both be elements in a more comprehensive system, the reality of which is implied in any bit of genuine knowledge. The reality of truth cannot be constituted by the coöperative thinking of human society, since, in the latter, knowledge is always imperfect and in process of growth, whereas truth by its very nature refers to a reality not generated in the psychological process of its discovery. On the other hand, the development of society, through valid knowledge, efficient interaction, and deeper communal feeling, involves the same meaningful and systematic reality which makes possible the cognitive life of the single self in its predominantly individual aspects. If the conditions of the validity of knowledge, *i. e.*, of its actual reference to reality, are not directly implicated in the movement of the individual's thought, these conditions cannot be obtained by counting individual minds and calling the sum Reality = Social Consciousness.

Doubtless, knowledge of one's neighbors is, at all stages of human development, of greater practical and emotional interest than knowledge of nature. But this does not place the former on a generically different plane from the latter, nor give it a validity of a higher order. Both kinds of knowledge begin in imme-

mediate experience, — perceptions of contact, color, movement, etc., in the one case, and the feeling of another life and consciousness in the other case.¹ Primitive man is unable to distinguish clearly between these two sorts of knowledge, and even civilized man is often at a loss to tell whether a body is living or dead, and to determine the presence or degree of consciousness in an organism. How much in the dark we often are as to our fellows' motives and ideas, not to mention those of the animals!

In both cases our knowledge requires to be corrected and enlarged by the same mental processes. Both forms of immediate experience must be 'mediated' in order to yield surer practical guidance and a fuller insight. No doubt, as man develops in civilized society, his acquaintance with his fellows seems to become more intimate than his acquaintance with the physical order. Nature is de-animated; it becomes lifeless and remote. But this may be a transitional result in the development of knowledge, due to over-emphasis of the abstract physical sciences. Our knowledge of nature may become more adequate when we recognize that it, too, is the expression of a psychic life. Certainly the actual successes of human thought in establishing and forecasting the behavior of things, in constructing a systematic insight into the unity of the world, — in short, the entire work of reflectively organizing experience in relation to the physical, as well as to the social environment, — argue that the real world is an intelligible or significant system. I cannot here discuss at length the view that the truth of particular truths, or 'propositional' truths, is nothing more than an immediately apprehended quality of propositions, like the color of an orange or the bouquet of wine. G. E. Moore and B. Russell apparently draw from this contention the conclusion that there is a plurality of self-existent truths independent of their relations to any knowing mind or to one another. The latter contention seems to me to be refuted by the consideration that the growth of real knowledge always consists in the development of greater systematic coherence.

As to the former contention, it seems to me simply to empha-

¹ Lipps neatly distinguishes the immediate experience of external objects and of other selves as *Empfindung* and *Einfühlung* respectively.

size the psychical feeling or belief-coefficient that accompanies recognition of a specific truth by an individual mind. This belief-coefficient by no means relieves one from the necessity of further analysis and grounding of specific truths. The color of an orange or the bouquet of a wine is an experience capable of further analysis. So is the intuition of the truth that $2 + 2 = 4$. In such cases as the latter, the truth is not the same for a child learning it and for the mathematician with a grasp on the principles of the number system. The mathematician's truth does not invalidate the child's, but it does transform it by a more systematic insight.

When we employ the various logical methods of investigating and testing the results of thinking, we are not comparing the latter with something wholly alien to itself. We are testing the adequacy of our symbols and formulas with reference to the ideal of a self-coherent or wholly systematized experience. Knowledge is intra-experiential, in the sense that the materials and points of departure for cognitive thinking are found in immediate experience; and, again, knowledge involves all along the line a reference to experience, in the sense that its goal is a complete or perfected experience, in which every datum is become an element in a harmonious system. On the other hand, in relation to any actual experience, cognitive thinking has always a transcendent reference, since this complete or perfect experience is for us in part only 'ideal' or 'possible.' We can conceive reality in its systematic and self-consistent wholeness only in terms of the structure and functions of a 'possible' perfect experience in which knowledge or consciousness is aware of all its data in their organic or systematic unity. Valid knowledge is the symbol of, and the actual reference of the individual's thought to a reality, which, whatever the qualitative variety and quantitative multiplicity of its elements, must have those coherences or relationships that are commonly called 'rational.'

While truth has *for me* its point of departure in *my* experience, its ultimate reference must transcend the experience of any finite self. And knowledge is always the reflective consciousness of some relation or group of relations between a thinking mind and

the systematic whole of a self-coherent reality in which the mind so thinking is an element. Reality may have many series of increasingly inclusive systematic unities, from that of unconscious physical centres of relationship up to that of an absolute self-luminous unity of 'ideal' experience. If reality in all its forms were not always intelligible, at least in promise and potency, knowledge could have no absolute validity. Truth is an *individual* achievement and possession here and now in a particular mind, and yet must possess universality of reference, *i. e.*, be timelessly valid for all. How can we reconcile these attributes of truth? Kant and his immediate followers based the objectivity of truth on the existence of a consciousness or mind common to all individuals, but, in itself, *over-individual* and absolutely distinct from the empirical ego. But they failed to make clear the relation of this universal consciousness (*Bewusstsein überhaupt*) or 'transcendental ego' to the individualized human consciousness. In Kant's theoretical philosophy the former seems to be a merely formal unity. And, from one point of view, the metaphysics of Fichte and Hegel were attempts simply to bring this notion of a universal mind into more definite relation with that of the individual mind. We must now consider this problem.

I have already maintained that thinking selves develop knowledge or attain truth only in community with other members of a relational system, and that the success of the individual mind in reaching truth indicates that the world of reality can contain nothing absolutely impenetrable by mind. Individual minds have knowledge only as actual members of an intelligible system of things. Community of experience and universality, as attributes of truth, involve a fundamental identity of function, and hence of nature, in the elements of reality. Hence reality, in its systematic totality of meaning, must be a mental unity. The total real must have that intelligible character which is demanded by the place that human cognitive activity occupies therein. If any knowledge be valid, then the real universe is an intelligible and systematic whole, *i. e.*, a rational organism. If there be any truth, and if the real world be a unity, this truth is valid only as an element in a systematic whole of meaning. This systematic whole must

signify, or define, in terms of rational meaning, that aspect of reality which exists as the totality of objects of truth.

Truth, we say, is universal and necessary. By these attributes we obviously mean that any normal mind, placed in the same conditions and having had the same training and antecedent experience, must recognize the truth, or significant reference to existence, of the judgment which we have made or accepted. But to appeal to a normal mind as the standard of recognition for truth is to assume a common and over-individual structure and functioning in individual minds. This common rational structure is the Universal Mind or Thinker, the ground of the relational or rational system which is the ideal of knowledge.

The ultimate subject of reference in valid knowledge, then, is a Universal Systematic Intelligence. The reality of this Intelligence is presupposed whenever we test our judgments and theories by reference, either to the general conditions of valid thinking, or to the special conditions of actual existence. The test of self-consistency, *i. e.*, of non-contradiction in a system, implies the ultimate reality of the rational or logical structure which functions in individual minds. The test of empirical reference to perception, in scientific induction, presupposes the coherence of the physical world-order with the structure and aims of mind in us. If there be any truth, the existing objects to which truth makes valid and significant reference must possess the specific character which makes truth valid and significant. If truth be real, the elements or aspects of reality which are not in themselves consciously significant ideas, or valid meanings, must conform to valid meanings, *i. e.*, to cognitive acts of reference. In short, we may say that ultimate reality is at least two-fold in nature. It includes, in organic interrelationship, the *valid reality* of truth, or of the whole system of cognitive meanings, and the *existential reality* of thought's objects of reference. And the valid reality of truth as a systematic whole presupposes that all existent objects, whether physical or psychical, are possible subjects of cognitive meanings. Ultimate Reality, then, must be a duality-in-unity, an ideal harmony of 'differences.'

Indeed, mind or spirit is essentially a self-realizing process

which knows, feels, and acts through 'differences,' and which fulfills itself in overcoming differences. In winning truth, mind affirms its oneness with the 'other' or 'object' to which truth refers, as, in winning the Good, mind affirms the oneness of its impulses and character with an ideal end, or as, in experiencing the beautiful, mind feels its harmony with the object. The unceasing movement of mind towards conscious self-possession and self-determination, through that which is other than itself, is the primal condition of its conscious meaningful life. Did this movement cease, mind must relapse into the unconsciousness of a dead thing.

Truth, in the specific sense, is always the significant symbol of relationships of things which belong to some kind of system. Even the truths of mathematics are but highly generalized signs of relationship among certain things. Now, relationships not cognized or felt by some consciousness seem to be unmeaning. One who asserts the existence of relationships independent of any thinking centre is able to do so only because, in thinking this supposed independence, he presupposes either his own consciousness or a consciousness *überhaupt*. Relationships signify intelligible connections, and the reality of the latter presupposes a constitutive or sustaining act of intelligence.¹ If all relations were, in reality, external to the terms related, the world would be in no sense a unity. A world of *disjecta membra* of this sort would be unintelligible, and could not, strictly speaking, be called a world. For, since the development of knowledge is always a progress in our insight into the inter-relations of elements or 'terms' of reality, the growth of knowledge, if relations are external to their terms and if terms are indifferent to relations, must be an inexplicable growth away from reality. Hence, if reality honor the knowledge process, the systematic related-

¹ In this contention is contained the 'crux' of objective idealism. If intelligible relations, meanings, and values can legitimately be predicated of a world that, when considered apart from the individual finite knower, has no intellectual meanings, no psychical values, and that is in no sense constituted and sustained by intelligence, then objective idealism is false. It is because I believe that knowledge obtains for the real world, and that the latter does honor intellectual meanings and non-intellectual psychical values, that I can see no alternative to objective idealism as a metaphysical theory.

ness which pertains to knowledge, and of which the growth in knowledge is the increasing revelation, must be organic to the real. And a reality to which intelligible relations are through and through organic is an intelligent reality. The total intelligence of reality is the ground of its partial and ever growing intelligibility in and to the finite mind.

There can, then, be no truth or knowledge which does not obtain in and for some mind. And, since there can be no world of existents unqualified by truth, there can be no world of existents without a world-mind. One might, of course, arbitrarily assume a reality utterly independent of all consciousness ; but a reality of this sort would be forever beyond the pale of discussion and utterly meaningless, since without positive reference to our experience. Hence, the whole system of psychical and other finite existences, with whose interactions and interpassions the individual knower's experience is inextricably bound up, and on which in specific cases knowledge seems to depend for the validity of its meanings, must in turn depend upon a more intimate systematic unity. The system of individual experiences must have a real basis for the unity that it depends upon at every moment in its life and for its continuity from moment to moment in the world's history. The common basis for thought and knowledge must transcend alike the individual consciousness and the so-called 'social consciousness.' It follows from the principle that nothing can at once exist and have meaning which does not exist *for* a mind, that the unity of the social system of individual experiences must be *for* some mind or centre of experience. In a final analysis the objectivity of truth, the valid reference of knowledge to reality, depends on the reality of a single, systematic intelligence, which must have a determinate character, since it is the ground of a determinate system of cognitions.

But, now, the question confronts us : Why need there be any truth at all ? What right has one to assume that any knowledge has final validity, that any cognitive meaning is honored by the universe, that things have any ultimate significance whatsoever ? These queries might be answered by pointing to the splendid practical successes of science in giving man control over the

physical world. But this would be only a make-shift answer. For, again, the objection might be urged that our knowledge is, after all, as yet very limited, is constantly changing, and the years of human science are infinitesimally few in comparison with the supposed duration of the universe. Therefore, it is possible that our fragmentary science, with its ideal of systematic completeness, is but a happy hit which more or less successfully fits into the present phase of an ageless, ever-changing chaos. The vaunted fitness of science to the world may be but a chance coincidence amidst a chaos of innumerable possibilities. On the ground of a utilitarian success alone, we are not entitled to assume any final validity in knowledge nor any absolute truth.

It is true, nevertheless, that the sceptic is himself unable to refrain from assertion or judgment of some sort. In his deepest doubt there lurks the assumption of a possible knowable truth. Even when he suspends judgment and refrains from any assertion, he assumes that he knows enough about the nature of things to make every more specific assertion futile. In short, to seek truth is a fundamental impulse of rational human nature, an impulse which the most radical sceptic cannot free himself from. To become reflectively aware of any experience is to make judgments, and to make a judgment is to assume that some reality is intelligible or that some truth is real. And, if there be any truth at all, there must be an absolute organism of truth, since no single truth can be valid for reality out of its place in the systematic whole of truth which expresses the absolute and total cognitive meaning of reality. Even the sceptic cannot free himself from the rule of the instinct to know. His most radical questionings presuppose the possibility of a rational answer. His most consistent attempts to suspend all judgment imply at the least this judgment about reality, viz., that it is so constituted that no human judgment can be valid for it, or that there is no means of determining whether any specific judgment is valid.

In short, to think at all, even in terms of the most radical scepticism, is to assume the validity of truth. We *must* seek truth and promote its recognition, because it is a mode or function of the common spiritual nature in men. Truth is an end-

in-itself, since it is an integral pulsation of reason in the spirit of man. In attaining truth the individual thinker is entering into the universal heritage of mind.

Serious objection may be made to the doctrine that the Supreme Rational Unity or Systematic Intelligence, on which truth is made to rest, has self-consciousness. It may be urged that, however completely I may organize my experience into knowledge, still my experience and thought, as finite, are dependent on a 'not-self' or 'other.' Knowledge seems always to involve both a resemblance or community of nature, between the knowing self and the not-self or 'other,' and a duality of being. So far as our insight goes, it seems, then, that the very condition of a conscious selfhood and, therefore, of experience and knowledge in general, is the existence of an element that cannot be comprehended in or absorbed into the self's thinking. Therefore, it may be said, as soon as one conceives knowledge as absolute, one thinks the self as absolutely coincident with the data of experience. Knowing 'self' and known 'object' collapse or coalesce into a higher unity.¹ The objective reference or validity of knowledge in relation to the materials of experience ceases, since there is no longer any existentially outer object or 'other' to which thought can be referred by a cognitive self. Knowledge, when it becomes absolute, fuses wholly with its object and self-consciousness ceases, or is transmuted into something else, — into some higher, and, by us, inconceivable kind of experience. It would seem to follow that in this higher state of insight or experience there can no longer be any cognitive consciousness, as we human beings understand consciousness, nor any truth as we conceive truth. The complete union of self and not-self results in something which may be

¹ Those who emphasize the 'immediate' character of 'absolute' insight, as a state in which the distinction of knowing subject and object of thought is 'abolished,' 'overcome,' or 'transcended,' are fond of citing emotion and, especially, personal love, as illustrations of what sort this higher state may be. But the illustrations are hardly satisfactory from their standpoint. In personal love the distinction between lover and beloved is not abolished or overcome. Requisite love is surely a case of unity-in-duality. The two persons are, indeed, one, but thereby their distinctive personalities are enhanced and enriched to one another, not transmuted into a higher impersonal unity. Love is, indeed, a good illustration of what knowledge strives to become without ceasing to be knowledge.

more than a conscious self, but which certainly cannot be a self in the sense in which we know the self reflectively. Hence, the systematic intelligence on which the whole of knowledge depends cannot be self-conscious and nothing can be true *for* it.

Now, it must be admitted that, if a self-coherent totality of truth be real in and for a consciousness, the relation of such a consciousness to some of its objects (*i. e.*, to those objects of its knowledge that are not its own internal and immediate states of feeling) must differ decidedly from the relation of any human consciousness to its corresponding objects. Truth cannot be a perfect organism, unless it mean the thorough comprehension, by the knower, of the determinate world of objects. A universal knower must, then, as *conscious* knower, have a world of 'objects' and, as *perfect* knower, must wholly penetrate, with an intuitive insight, this world. Such a knower must be in some sense the ground of his own experience. So far as his experience depends on the activities and experiences of other beings, their experiences must, in turn, somehow depend on his activity. A world which is the 'other' of his thought cannot have self-existence external to his will. Hence, such a knower must sustain the world of objects which he knows. The 'opposition' between his thought and its objects, for example, the movements of a material system or the activities of living and conscious beings, must originate in his own activity. His life can be 'limited' or 'determined,' only in the sense that he is conscious, as originating an 'opposition' through and in which he finds consciousness; in other words, he is conscious as self-determining activity that constitutes the 'other' for his own conscious experience.

This is a difficult notion that probably no amount of reflection will make plain to our finite and growing minds. But sun-clear lucidity is not to be expected in such matters. Moreover, there is that in the nature of human consciousness which gives us some inkling of the possible nature of a 'higher' consciousness. For it is not true that knowledge, in all its phases, depends on the opposition of a wholly external 'other.' The impulse to know is by no means always a compulsion from without, and in self-

knowledge the object is within the knower's thought. The higher phases of knowledge involve the self-initiative of the knower who in knowing enlarges his being.

In order to satisfy its demands for reflective insight into the nature of things, the finite self must seemingly go outside its present selfhood. But, indeed, the truer view is that in knowledge, as in any kind of genuine self-activity, growth in depth, extent, and organization involves a constant dialectic movement between the two poles of internally initiated interest and activity and externally given materials and obstacles. And the goal of this movement is twofold,—the internal appropriation or 'spiritualization' of the not-self, and the expansion and enrichment of the self. In this dialectic process of development through 'opposition,' the mind assimilates a seemingly foreign world more and more completely to itself and enlarges its own being thereby. In knowledge, which is a special case of this general movement, the 'other,' which first appears as a negation of the knowing mind, is progressively overcome and unified with the mind.

The process of knowledge, and, indeed, of experience as a whole, is a progressive overcoming of the fundamental antithesis between self and not-self, which is the nerve of all intellectual activity, of moral endeavor, æsthetic vision, and religious aspiration. The meaning of the antithesis is that it is there to be overcome; and the self is potentially infinite, since it can overcome unceasingly the opposition in question. It does overcome this opposition, and make it tributary to its own self-fulfilment, in finding the true, as in willing the good, and enjoying the beautiful.

This process of self-realization is illustrated in the social world, where selves coöperate to win truth and goodness and to embody the vision of beauty. The farther the social relationships of selves develop, in the direction of mutual understanding and inclusive sympathy, the more completely does the single self learn to find itself in and through other selves. It dies to its narrow selfhood to live in a larger experience. The primitive savage is so ignorant and fearful that to him every stranger is an enemy, a point of absolute 'opposition.' The cultivated man of the twentieth century can appreciate the meaning of a world-literature and

cherish the thought of a universal peace and of a humane social ethics. He lives through and with others in a vastly wider, richer, and more harmonious experience than that of the savage. The deeper and more harmonious a self's experiences become, the more rationally communicable and sharable do they grow. Progress in rational self-consciousness is at once a growth in internal self-enlightenment and in communal experience. A living world of socially related individual centres tends toward fuller unity-in-variety. And the 'otherness' of its world of things and selves is a prime condition of the human self's growth in knowledge, as in goodness and in all the forms of harmonious experience. Without 'opposition' or 'negativity' to be lived through, there is no reflective insight and no ethical volition. Now, the growth in knowledge is simply the explication and revelation of that community between the self and its world (of things and selves) which is implicit from the very outset of mental life.

Object and subject of knowledge, then, are strictly co-relative. The imperfection and indirection of our human knowledge result from the finite and growing character of the individual members of the world system, both as knowers and as known. On the other hand, if there be a systematic, self-consistent whole of absolute truth, the mind *for* which this truth is true must have an insight that transcends change and that wholly penetrates, while yet it consciously lives in, the opposition of subject-knower and object-known. Its knowledge, it would seem, can neither be impelled nor limited by anything that remains stubbornly outside the reach of its experience and immediate insight.

A Supreme Mind, of course, could not be a knower without an object of knowledge. But, on the other hand, if such a mind be the ground of truth in its self-consistent totality, *i. e.*, if it be the source and basis of the unity and continuity of cognition in finite centres of being, then the 'objects' of its knowledge cannot constitute external and stubbornly opaque limits to its world insight. Every object, for a Supreme Self, must depend on the consent of his will or somehow have its basis of existence in his being. The finite self may possess its own unique experience and be the proximate initiating centre of its own deeds, but

its being and action must be impossible out of relation to the Supreme Mind who sustains its life and experience as an element in the whole system of reality. One could not conceive a Supreme Mind without finite centres of experience. Their lives and activities must enter, as elements, into the unity of its insight. Just as a finite self may be said to have his experiences sympathetically reproduced by other finite selves, so by analogy a Supreme Mind may be said to apprehend intuitively and in perfect degree the mind of a finite self without abolishing the latter's unique experience and life. Mind can give to mind without losing, and take without robbing. Truth may be shared in common by a multitude of minds and yet refer to one indivisible object. So a finite self, here and now, will have this bit of experience or this particular propositional truth as a unique element in his mental history, but the final validity and significance of this local and limited experience will depend upon its relations in and to the whole of the absolute or 'ideal' experience of the Supreme Mind. The latter may know our experiences as elements in the systematic meaning of the universe, while our experiences remain uniquely valid for us.

Of course, it is possible to assert that knowledge is but a transient episode in an unconscious universe. But, if so, and if the universe have any coherence, then no knowledge is true, since there is no absolute whole of truth. If there be no organism of truth, then the statement that knowledge is an episode in an unconscious universe is untrue, and there is no universe except for one who is willing to make unmeaning assertions.

The 'experience' or knowledge possessed by the Supreme Mind must, as we have seen, be direct and intuitive, in contrast with the hindered and piecemeal character of our human discursive knowledge. The Ultimate Mind must apprehend truth in its systematic totality, and the absolute truth must be the whole system of relations and terms which is intuitively perceived or grasped in a single and continuous act by such a mind.

It would seem to follow that neither the truths of mathematics nor of perception (the two poles of human knowledge) need exist for such a mind precisely as they exist for our minds. Obviously

perceptive intelligence in such a mind must grasp every item of perception in all its relations, and this our minds never do. The Supreme Mind must be an intuitive intelligence; our minds are largely discursive in their operations. For example, the proposition that $2 + 2 = 4$, or that the three interior angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles, need not represent acts of thought for a perfect intuitive intelligence. Grasping all finite existences in their systematic relations, it does not need to add, multiply, or divide. Grasping space in its final truth, in the totality of the real, such a mind does not need to geometrize. I venture to suggest that the intuitive processes of the highest genius in science, poetry, and art, processes which transcend discursive thinking, give us the best hints of the nature of a Supreme Intuitive Intelligence.

While the Supreme Mind is the necessary implicate of the system of finite existences, sentient and insentient, and cannot be thought out of relation to these, it cannot be an *existent* in the same sense in which finite things exist. Its being must at once transcend every form of existence and sustain the system of the finite in its organized totality of meanings or of truth. The ultimate presupposition of truth's reality or validity is a transcendent consciousness or 'ideal' experience, whose being is the pure actuality of intuitive thinking or active reason, and whose expression is twofold, — the validity of knowledge and the system of finite existents concerning which knowledge is valid.

There yet remains the grave difficulty as to how one is to conceive the relation to change and progress in finite beings of an Eternal and Perfect Knower, some objects of whose knowledge are changing and in process of development. This difficulty constitutes perhaps the greatest and weightiest of all speculative problems. Its consideration must be reserved for another occasion.

JOSEPH A. LEIGHTON.

GERMAN PHILOSOPHY IN 1907.

IN my former article, "Contemporary Philosophy in Germany (1906),"¹ I expressed the view that the development of German philosophical speculation appeared to repeat "on a new basis the development of idealism from Kant to Hegel." I used the phrase 'on a new basis' intentionally; for a blind, senseless repetition, which could only be reaction in the worst meaning, is of course out of the question. The 'new basis' is given in the fixation of the deepest Kantian principles. The clear separation of the transcendental and psychological elements, and especially the sharp sundering of the transcendental and metaphysical views of reality, are in general carried further and with severer logic by those men who go beyond Kant, Fichte, and Schelling than was the case with their great prototypes. Rickert is correct when he says: "One need have no fear that we shall be obliged again to pass through the process of development from Kant to Fichte, from Fichte to the romanticism of Schelling or Schopenhauer, and from there to Hegel. As we find them, we cannot use the systems of the past. Our time brings new problems that demand new answers, and in historical life nothing has ever repeated itself. But one should not be blind to the fact that Kantian and post-Kantian idealism is a treasure-house of thoughts that we have not yet minted, out of which we can draw a plenitude of valuable stimuli, when we have to struggle with the philosophical problems of our age."² In the same spirit I expressed myself in my last annual report on the relation of contemporary philosophy to the classical past. As far as I am able to survey the production of the past year, I can only discover confirmation of the view I then expressed on the aims and tendencies of modern investigation. Kant is still the ideal focal point; his influence continues to widen.

¹ PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, Vol. XVI, pp. 237 ff.

² *Die Philosophie im Beginn des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts.* The article on *Geschichtsphilosophie*, pp. 332 ff.

The revival of the idealistic speculation from Kant to Hegel is still going on ; the neo-romantic movement has lost little intensity. In agreement with my perspective, sketched in my last report, the fantastic excess of this tendency is more and more checked by sober inquiry, and the philosophical literature of 1907 exhibits, in general, a more solid character than that of 1906. As the theoretical situation has naturally undergone no radical change in the course of a single year, I may use my former classification and disposition of subject-matter.

First of all, I wish to call attention to one phenomenon, which for a long time has been in course of preparation, and which came to the fullest development last year : the adjustment between philosophy and science, which in a characteristic way was brought about by both sides, by the philosophers not less than by scientific investigators. Indeed, it was through the Kantian philosophy that occasion was offered for this reciprocal activity. The question as to the foundation of experience, however generally interpreted, raised the further question as to the nature of the separate scientific experiences. Now Kant, in addition to his chief work, which serves neither as a foundation of psychology nor of mathematical physics, but is an explanation of a conception of nature comprehending both inner and outer phenomena, wrote a series of works dealing with the concrete principles of the separate disciplines of physics, jurisprudence, and anthropology. In Schelling and Hegel this tendency to unite philosophy and the investigation of particular phenomena is still more markedly developed. And so neo-Kantianism assumed to a large extent the inheritance of the master, in the sense of demanding a descent from the heights of abstract universality to the sphere of scientific inquiry. The Marburg School opened the road to mathematical physics, Rickert the road to history, Natorp and Stammler to sociology. Of late, physical and especially mathematical problems have gained the ascendancy to such a degree as to threaten the obscuration of general philosophical interest.

Consequent upon this is the current high appreciation and attention accorded to Leibniz. This attention is directed not so much to his metaphysical and cosmological ideas as to his

achievements in mathematics, epistemology, and the philosophy of nature. On the other hand, investigators in the special sciences,—mathematicians, physicists, psychologists, biologists, historians, sociologists,—are seeking a philosophical basis for their methods and aims. Consequently, the cords that bind the sciences and philosophy together grow stronger, and questions of the right, aim, and limitations of such union become more prominent.

This is especially shown by two large collective works, which are the more important, because the most distinguished exponents of German philosophy express their views here: The *Festschrift* dedicated to Kuno Fischer (second, corrected edition, published by Winter, Heidelberg), entitled *Die Philosophie im Beginn des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts*, and the volume, *Systematische Philosophie*, forming a part of Hinneberg's *Kultur der Gegenwart* (Teubner). These volumes raise the consideration of three chief problems: (1) the problem of the relationship between science and philosophy in general; (2) how far the special sciences admit of philosophical foundation; (3) the question of the classification of the sciences from a philosophical point of view. All three questions, whose interdependence is evident, have been raised in modern philosophical investigation. They are especially discussed in the two collective works already mentioned and in others also. Stumpf attempts to answer the first question in an address entitled *Die Wiedergeburt der Philosophie* (Berlin, Universitätsbuchdruckerei, 1907). This is the rectoral address, delivered by Stumpf in October, 1907, at the University of Berlin. Stumpf maintains a middle position between the extremes of rationalism and empiricism. The rationalistic extreme, which consists in the deduction of all empirical form and content from an ultimate philosophical principle, is Hegel's position. The empiristic extreme, the way for which was prepared by Comte, finds its complete exposition in Avenarius, whose empiristic system limits the business of philosophy to the acquisition of the most general concepts formed within the special sciences and weighs their chances of survival in terms of their economic value. Between these two extremes there are two

other points of view, one of them represented by Kant, *i. e.*, rationalism, the other represented by Wundt, a view closely akin to empiricism. Kant's transcendental idealism sets out to deduce formal principles of philosophy *a priori*. The critical empiricism of Wundt¹ assigns to philosophy the task of assimilating the deliverances of the special sciences into a system free from inner contradiction. He does not go so far as Kant or even so far as Hegel, as he does not concede to philosophy the foundation but only the superstructure. He goes further, however, than does Avenarius in ascribing to philosophy a productive value. These four views are of basic significance. All others are derivatives of them by combination or mediation. Stumpf takes a mediating position. He distinguishes between aprioristic and empiristic philosophy, and, although he recognizes the unquestionable advantages of the former in Hegel and Schelling, he decides for the latter as more fruitful and solid. He demands of philosophy, primarily, thorough acquaintance with natural science, because the chief problems are to be sought here. Nevertheless, the philosopher is not to be placed in the same category as the investigator of nature. Neither the mere physicist (or mathematician) nor the epistemologist, but only a thinker acquainted with both realms of thought could definitively solve this problem. Stumpf is thinking here especially of the origin of the notion of number, the doctrine of probability, and atomism. Also on the primeval question of the relation between the physical and psychical, Stumpf looks for light from a union of epistemology and empirical science. He is not, however, of the opinion that natural science can furnish an adequate basis for philosophy, but concedes priority to spirit, as this is for us the only immediate. In this respect Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Lotze are right; but the revival of the philosophy of identity is unconditionally rejected by Stumpf. He expects from the future philosophical genius a combination of the Kantian and Leibnizian spirit.

Wundt's definition concedes fewer prerogatives to philosophy. His view is expressed in an essay, *Metaphysik*, published in the

¹ Heinrich Gomperz has lately taken this view, at least as a program, in his *Methodologie*, the first volume of his *Weltanschauungslehre*.

above mentioned collective work, *Kultur der Gegenwart*. "Metaphysics," he says, "is the attempt to formulate a *Weltanschauung* that unifies the component elements of our particular knowledge, the attempt being based on the total scientific consciousness of an age or on the especially conspicuous content of the same." Wundt's definition of metaphysics, as shown by his other works, is essentially identical with his definition of philosophy. It is entirely clear that metaphysics and philosophy, if they are merely a combination of the results of the special sciences into a system free from contradiction, must be dependent on the variations within these special disciplines, and subordinate to them in form and content. This view is very remote from Kant's. Kant sees the foundation of philosophy in the synthetic transcendental logic. The combination of the given into a system free from contradiction is, on the contrary, a function of general, formal logic, and this must be regarded by Wundt as an instrument of philosophical investigation. Wundt sketches in this essay an interesting plan of the evolutionary history of metaphysics, which develops in three stadia, that of poetical, dialectic, and critical metaphysics. In the works of Haeckel, Mach, and Ostwald on the philosophy of nature, — works that are only metaphysical in appearance, — one finds successively these three stadia represented. Dilthey and Paulsen ascribe to philosophy a greater independence than do Wundt and Stumpf.

Dilthey, in his essay, *Das Wesen der Philosophie* (in *Kultur der Gegenwart*), attempts to introduce unity into the body of historical definitions. Three essential tendencies in philosophy are distinguished by Dilthey, viz., positivism, objective idealism, and idealism of inner freedom. The inadequacy of metaphysics with reference to ultimate determinations, does not mean its loss of value. "The relativity of every *Weltanschauung* is not the final word of the spirit, which has passed through them all, but the sovereignty of the spirit, as opposed to each individual *Weltanschauung*, and at the same time the positive consciousness that in the different attitudes of the spirit the One Reality of the world is given us." This is a highly valuable insight, which is more and more gaining control of modern philosophy. Without giving up

metaphysics, and without regarding its method as meaningless, he does not regard metaphysical conceptions as entitled to any absolute significance. They disclose one aspect of the world, not the whole world. This view is championed also by Wundt, Eduard von Hartmann, and Volkelt, and still more positively by Simmel. The essence of philosophy, which Dilthey distinguishes happily and profoundly from religion and art, is described as a manifold of problems, the common element in which is the subjugation of the dark sphere of the instincts under the dominion of the reason and the struggle toward ultimate universal ideals of unity. "The fundamental attribute of philosophy is, therefore, the characteristic of the spirit which transcends the definite, finite, limited interest and strives to regulate every theory that originates out of a limited need by means of a more comprehensive idea." In this way Dilthey, in Kant's spirit, gives the autonomous essence of philosophy its due.

Paulsen also, in his essay, *Die Zukunftsaufgaben der Philosophie* (in *Kultur der Gegenwart*), attempts to secure for philosophy independence in its epistemological and metaphysical aspects. In reference to ontology, Paulsen characterizes his view as objective idealism; his philosophy is panpsychism. In reference to cosmology, he substitutes monistic pantheism for atomism, for the former of which support is given in the reciprocity that extends from the most minute to the greatest spatial and temporal phenomena. Like Hartmann and Wundt, Paulsen attempts to provide a synthesis between intellectualism and voluntarism. He attempts to harmonize his metaphysics with Kant's criticism. Philosophy is not exhausted by the exact sciences, neither can it be limited to an internally consistent combination of their results. So much can be stated as the result of these discussions. All investigation concerns itself with the factual; it presupposes the concept of fact. The *meaning* of fact, of reality, is a philosophical question, that precedes all particular investigation, a question that cannot be answered by any combination of actualities. Philosophical epistemology contains the principles of ontology and has a right to the title of 'First Philosophy.' Before one investigates the content of being, one must first clarify the con-

cept of being. Before one investigates nature, one must first clarify the notion of nature. And so the study of psychology demands a philosophical explanation, which scarcely permits of being confined to a negative determination of psychology without a soul (Fr. A. Lange).

Only after a general exposition of this sort, which is joined to no particular knowledge, can an attempt be made to discuss philosophically the special disciplines in detail: physics, biology, history, characterology, sociology. Ethics, æsthetics, and the philosophy of religion share with general epistemology and ontology the rank of 'First Philosophy,' having to do with norms and values, and they are, therefore, not derivable from the realm of facts. In the third place, one may conceive of a philosophy that undertakes the encyclopedic task of a consistent penetration, combination, and unification of the entire realm of knowledge. The various definitions of philosophy do not mutually exclude each other; in fact, its concept, as history insistently teaches us, cannot be strictly unitary.

From the foregoing it is clear that the attitude of these various thinkers toward the problem of philosophy is mirrored in their conceptions of logic, ethics, and æsthetics. Logic is discussed by Windelband in *Philosophie im Beginn des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts*, and by Riehl in *Kultur der Gegenwart*. As both thinkers take their start from Kant, there is no essential opposition in their views. They differ from each other only in the fact that Riehl regards algebraic logic as an important achievement, while Windelband looks upon it as a sterile game. It is especially in epistemology that both philosophers stand on Kantian ground, although Windelband represents more strictly the historical criticism, while Riehl inclines to positivism. In the *Festschrift*, Ethics is treated by Bruno Bauch, and in the *Kultur der Gegenwart*, by Paulsen. Here the opposition between apriorism and empiricism is more marked. Bauch takes the Kantian point of view: the moral law in its inner essence is not derived from experience and has a purely formal character. Bauch distinguishes between the dogmatism of the social, utilitarian morality, the immoral individualism of Nietzsche, and the critical ethics.

He favors Nietzsche as against a dogmatism which aims to level individual distinctions in the interest of shallow average values, but he sees Nietzsche's profound mistake in thinking he could utilize the naturalism of the will-to-power as a basis for the readjustment of all values. As Bauch rightly observes, power is a natural phenomenon, which has nothing to do with the selection of the superior and may even decide against the stronger. The purely formal moral principle, that Bauch develops in dependence on Kant, aims to leave free play for individuality, as the content of the act and its motive are not the essential elements here. The essential element here is the universal maxim. This appears to be a reconciliation of individualism and universalism. Paulsen, on the contrary, rejects the critical foundation and endeavors to find a unifying principle in the breadth of historical experience. He goes back to Aristotle, because he regards the essence of morality as given in the unfolding of all human and cultural forces; he approaches a naturalistic view, in citing as criterion of the moral, those elements that promote the survival of humanity. He subordinates this conception to his anti-materialistic metaphysics. The world is a spiritual totality, regulated by moral ends.

Æsthetics is treated in the *Festschrift* by Groos, in the *Kultur der Gegenwart* by Lipps. Groos discriminates between a transcendental-normative and a psychological-descriptive analysis of the problem, and ascribes a relative justification to each view. In opposition to logical normation, which lays claim to absolute value, although it is limited by the presupposition of the idea of truth, psychological normation is concerned with relative values, which may be invalidated by experience. Groos next investigates the psychical conditions of æsthetic creation and appreciation, in which the concept of *Einfühlung* (Sympathy¹) plays an essential rôle. Lipps discusses this concept minutely. He distinguishes between three kinds of *Einfühlung*: general apperceptive *Einfühlung*, as in the reduction of a manifold to unity; natural *Einfühlung*, which regards external reality as a psychical thing, filled

¹ Professor E. B. Titchener has suggested the introduction of the term "empathy" as an equivalent for *Einfühlung*.

with forces and energies ; temperament *Einfühlung*, which regards the subjective feeling-character as an element of the external world itself. Lipps furnishes, further, an interesting analysis of the arts from the standpoint of their media of representation.

The philosophy of religion is discussed only in the *Festschrift*, in which the article is written by Troeltsch. The author discusses his subject under five rubrics : the relation of religion to philosophy, to theology, to epistemology, to psychology, and finally the traditional classical philosophy of religion. He distinguishes between knowledge and faith in the Kantian sense, and objects to the attempt made by Kant to introduce an abstract intellectualization of specifically religious contents, as in the case of inspiration and revelation. He thinks the future of religion will be determined by a union of the ecclesiastical with a philosophically spiritualized faith.

The history of philosophy is also discussed in the *Festschrift*. Windelband criticises its aims and problems in a spirited essay. It seems a contradiction to say that the knowledge of absolute truth has a history and a development, that this history is even essential to such knowledge, a part of philosophy itself. But the following consideration enlightens us : man cannot grasp absolute truths in their own form, but merely in the imperfect form of his personal consciousness, which only gradually comes into possession of them. This explains the controversy between philosophical systems and the thinkability of a relative justification of opposing philosophies, as well as the significance of the history of philosophy for the essence of philosophy itself.

This closes the series of writings that discuss the relation of philosophy to science. Then follows the second problem, the problem of a philosophical foundation for the special disciplines. First of all, we have the two realms, inner and outer world, — psychology and philosophy of nature. Wundt and Ebbinghaus write on psychology, the former in the *Festschrift*, the latter in *Kultur der Gegenwart*. Wundt confines himself, in the main, to a historical survey, singling out for discussion the two achievements of the nineteenth century, experimental psychology and folkpsy-

chology. Ebbinghaus analyzes first the various theories of the nature of the psychological. He rejects the theory of interaction and favors the theory of parallelism. This he explains metaphysically: the physical and psychical are merely phenomenal forms of a unitary third element. Especial attention is devoted to the explanation of the higher psychical content, faith, art, and morality, which are viewed from the standpoint of a moderate empiricism.

The two philosophies of nature stand in sharp opposition to each other, that of Lipps presented in the second edition of the *Festschrift* and that of Ostwald in the *Kultur der Gegenwart*. While Ostwald, in spite of his empiristic tendency, advances a baroque metaphysic, Lipps stands on the heights of the critical consciousness and from this point penetrates the entire fabric of mythological and anthropological concepts, which continue to dominate the philosophy of nature.

Ostwald's reputation is based on his achievement in the special sciences, and not on his philosophical utterances, and it is therefore questionable whether his selection for this discussion is justifiable. Ostwald clings to the set of views whose ontological significance is ruthlessly exposed by Lipps, without giving any critical account of them. His study is not lacking in interesting explanations that are to the point. But as a philosophy of nature, his theories fail to justify themselves. The objection raised by Ostwald against the apriorism of mathematics, rests chiefly on the old confusion of value and origin of knowledge, a confusion censured by Kant. And so he is unable to distinguish between the philosophy of nature and the scientific investigation of nature, as he regards the former as merely the combination of the experiences deposited in the latter. The brilliant fashion in which Lipps discusses the problem from a completely opposite standpoint, I shall take up later, owing to the arrangement of my report, and because of the connection of Lipps's views with those of Schelling.

The philosophy of history is presented by Rickert and Eucken in a somewhat similar spirit; by the former in the *Festschrift*, by the latter in the *Kultur der Gegenwart*. Rickert's view is well

known from his epoch-making work, *Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung*. He shows here that a blending of history with the science of nature is not possible, because the formation of notions in the one case is an individualizing and evaluating process, while in the other case it is a generalizing process. That from the immense fullness of becoming something is selected as historically significant, is in itself a proof that we make a judgment of value. What one refers to as the meaning of history is no natural law of development; it is an ideal norm that we attach to historical process. It presupposes belief in a supreme value of life, that we at the same time regard as the absolute end of historical evolution.

Eucken also distinguishes between the meaning of history and the natural course of events. He finds, in the first place, an antinomy between the external dependence of man on temporal processes and his historical impulse to preserve the past, which can be explained only by the feeling that there are permanent values, which are untouched by temporal variations. It is the same antinomy that Windelband attempts to solve in his essay on history, and he and Eucken solve it in similar ways. The spiritual life is, in and for itself, a system of eternal values; but it reveals itself to man only piece by piece, not as a whole, and this revelation, therefore, needs time, in which it is gradually conveyed to humanity. From this opposition between the limited, natural, empirical character of human consciousness and the eternal, absolute, and spiritual nature of the ideal world, arises the necessity of history, the conflict between error and truth, the variability of culture-forms in conjunction with the feeling for the permanent that springs from the essence of culture itself. In addition to this, we find in the *Festschrift* a discussion of the philosophy of law by Lask, and in the *Kultur der Gegenwart* a discussion of pedagogy by Münch. Lask aims to introduce into the philosophy of law the strict transcendental viewpoint in distinction from the empirical, which deduces the universal character of law from particular legal facts, and in distinction from the metaphysical viewpoint of natural rights, where the concrete, historical content of the law is supplanted by arbitrary forms of thought. This

content must remain undisturbed; the aprioristic spiritual norms should serve merely for evaluation.

Münch keeps the psychological and the ethical character of education distinct; he sketches the historical development of pedagogy. He refers to the various modern movements for internal and external organization of instruction, and emphasizes the necessity of modifying it in terms of the constantly changing conditions of civilization.

If we compare the two works, we find that the *Philosophie im Beginn des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts* is more unitary than the *Kultur der Gegenwart*, which is in part explained by the fact that the essays centre about the personality of Kuno Fischer. The essays maintain, in general, the viewpoint of criticism: the clear discrimination between value and reality, ideal and actual, idea and experience, dominates the whole and its parts. On the other hand, *Kultur der Gegenwart* shows that combination of empiricism, psychologism, and metaphysics, which ordinarily manifests itself, when the principles of the transcendental philosophy are rejected.

Criticism is not a finished entirety that can be converted into a dogma, but it points the way for future development. The wealth of problems contained in it and the fruitfulness of its method become visible anew every year in the philosophical literature. The *Kantstudien* last year published a series of articles of importance for the questions under consideration. Cassirer investigated the relations of logic to mathematics in a study entitled *Kant und die moderne Mathematik*, in which, in referring to Russell's and Couturat's works, he adduces proofs that Kant's foundation of mathematics is confirmed by modern theories, if we only keep one point in mind: as an epistemological system it is deduced not from the *Æsthetic*, but from the *Analytic*, not from pure perception but from the *Transcendental Logic*. In a later number Bauch published an interesting article, *Erfahrung und Geometrie in ihrem erkenntnistheoretischen Verhältnis*. In an extraordinarily fine and subtle investigation, this thinker examined the various possibilities of a mediation between geometry and experience. The foundation of the Euclidean

geometry on the generalization of experience is rejected because of the aprioristic character of the discipline. Its superiority to the non-Euclidean geometries of Riemann and Lobatschewski is not to be explained on the ground that it is supplementarily confirmed by experience, for experience does not attain to the ideality of pure forms. Finally, Poincaré's citation of convenience, as the element that explains its success, is not tenable. For convenience, according to Bauch's convincing argument, is a purely psychological mark, incapable of supporting any logical, basic truth, and therewith the much cited principle of economy is also made ineffectual.

As long as one regards the various geometries from a universal, formal point of view, they are all of equal value. It is only when one regards the matter from the viewpoint of the transcendental logic, where the connection between thought and being comes into consideration, that differences arise. The Euclidean geometry is adequate to the confirmation of experience, somewhat in the sense that the latter is not made possible by the analytic principle of identity, but by the synthetic principle of causality. The question as to what furnishes the Euclidean geometry with this power over experience, a question which Bauch does not discuss in detail, is scarcely answerable in its entire extent; we are here concerned with an ultimate factum, not further deducible. Nevertheless, the concession seems to be made to experience here that in its universal character it needs the specific idealization offered in *our* geometry. Inasmuch as we mean by apriorism not any innate psychical faculty, but rather logical idealism, the status of apriorism is not affected. The Euclidean geometry is related to our empirical space analogously to the way in which causality is related to empirical succession. One cannot speak of an empirical deduction, but rather of an empirical possession, of pure forms. This relation of the Transcendental Æsthetic and Logic to experience I have attempted to clarify in another article of the *Kantstudien* of last year, *Die Grenzen des Empirismus und des Rationalismus in Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. A notable article by Medicus on *Kant und die gegenwärtige Aufgabe der Logik* will be referred to later. There have also been published

several supplementary numbers of the *Kantstudien* containing interesting monographs: *Die Religionsphilosophie Tieftrunks*, by Gustav Hertz; and *Kant's Stil in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, by Ernst Fischer.

The suggestiveness of the Kantian philosophy is inexhaustible. One welcomes, therefore, all the more warmly the undertaking of the Berlin Academy of Sciences to collect Kant's works in a complete, critical edition, of which Volumes VI and VII were published in the past year.

Stumpf remarked in his rectoral address that the philosophy of the future would have to discover a synthesis of Kant and Leibniz; Cassirer's monumental work, *Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit*, points to the same view. It was not in vain that Cassirer in an earlier treatise worked out a thorough exposition of the Leibnizian system. His *Erkenntnisproblem*, the second volume of which appeared last year, shows the dominant position occupied by Leibniz and the profound influence it had on Kant's thought, an influence which was formerly underestimated in favor of the English empiricists. The second volume contains the fourth book, *Fortbildung und Vollendung des Rationalismus* (Spinoza and Leibniz); fifth book, *Das Erkenntnisproblem im System des Empirismus* (Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume); sixth book, *Von Newton zu Kant*; seventh book, *Die kritische Philosophie*. In the last book Cassirer discusses especially the relation of transcendentalism to pure perception.

Hermann Cohen, by whom Cassirer is profoundly influenced, has published in the past year a *Kommentar zu Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, in which he aims to furnish a concise, unitary exposition of Kant's fundamental ideas in accompaniment with the text.¹ The volume is a supplement to Cohen's larger works on Kant.

In this connection I shall refer to my treatise published last year, *Kant's kritischer Idealismus als Grundlage von Erkenntnistheorie und Ethik*.² This treatise, the outlines of which appeared

¹ *Philosophische Bibliothek*, Bd. 113, Dürr, Leipzig.

² Ernst Hofmann, Berlin, 1907.

in 1906 in my monograph, *Kants Methodologie in ihren Grundzügen*, also examines the relations between perception and thought, mathematics and logic. The refutation of subjective idealism, which derives the forms of perception from the subject, constitutes the first part of the discussion. The second part is concerned with the fundamental principles of transcendental idealism. The forms of perception are not created by the subject, but are immediately given as the contents of perception. The categories are in no sense perceptual forms, but the forms of ideal knowledge. There is no pure perception of space and time, but only empirical perception of the same. Pure perception is an idea of limitation; it designates the fundamental principle of manifoldness in opposition to the principle of unity and identity, that issues from the pure understanding. Mathematics arises from the union of formal logic with the principle of manifoldness, dynamics from the union with empirical perception. The refutation of subjective idealism concludes with an attempt at a realistic metaphysics.

In so far as the exponents of modern philosophy are not advocates of positivism, psychologism, or empiricism, they are found for the most part in the camp of Kantianism. Thinkers also like Rickert and Windelband, who advocate a specifically epistemological neo-Fichteanism, by forming the concept of an over-individual consciousness, consciousness in general, as an inventory of timeless, logical values, and by furnishing a unitary deduction of all the categories from a supreme epistemological end, remain within the periphery of Kantian criticism, for they do not accept the essential feature, Fichte's metaphysic. Along with them we find a series of men who are more closely associated with the post-Kantian idealists, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. This circle widened last year. Medicus holds fast to Fichte. Mention was made of his book on Fichte in my last report. His article on *Kant und die gegenwärtige Aufgabe der Logik*, published at an earlier date in the *Kantstudien*, takes the same position, although in a characteristic way it reveals many echoes of Hegel. "Criticism carried out," says Medicus, "is Dialectic."

Neither Kant's nor Fichte's system is complete on all sides.

Both find their orientation chiefly in mind ; their relation to nature is not clearly determined. Schelling and Hegel undertook to establish a stable equilibrium by conceptually mastering external nature in the fullness of its forms. Above all, Schelling is to be characterized as the founder of the philosophy of nature. In my last report I said that Lipps, judged by his most recent philosophical writings, held a view closely akin to Schelling's philosophy, and I was then able with certain reservations to cite his Stuttgart address. My statement has received extraordinarily clear confirmation in Lipps's *Naturphilosophie*, incorporated anew in the second edition of the *Philosophie im Beginn des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts*. This essay is to be reckoned amongst the most interesting and brilliant philosophical achievements of late years. From the starting point of a broad empiricism, he takes a bold flight into metaphysical regions, such as has probably not been undertaken since the days of Hegel. Whatever one's viewpoint may be, one cannot deny the excellences of Lipps's exposition, his cogent logic and the world-feeling issuing from the depths of personality. His leading idea is that nature is comprehensible only by postulating as its substrate a divine all-consciousness. The essay is so important that I must note its course of thought in a few lines.

The philosophy of nature cannot be a criticism of facts ; that is the business of the special sciences. The philosophy of nature is simply the answer to the question as to structure or meaning of the knowledge of nature in general. Natural law is no pure description of phenomena ; it is rather an analysis of natural process into its ideal component elements. Further, it must reduce every material content to form-relations. These relations are primarily of a spatial character. Space is neither an empty receptacle nor the sum of varied spatial determinations, but an internal unity of phenomena. This unity dominates individual things and processes, so that they can be conceived only as parts, as *modi* of the absolute, all-comprehending substance. The following explanations of force, energy, and work mark the critical zenith of the essay, where Lipps discloses the naïve anthropomorphism of these concepts. " Nothing persists, as when one says ' energy persists,'

but possibilities persist, and these occur only in the thinking mind." The feeling of energy is experienced immediately in our psychical life. It is, therefore, meaningless to speak of an energetic theory of nature. Cosmology develops in three distinct stages. Natural science transcends the naïve stage, in finding reality not in our sensations, but in space and time relations. This second stage is supplanted by the philosophy of nature. For in space, which becomes meaningless with the elimination of perception, we have a contradiction. The spatial view of the world necessitates the postulation of isolated atoms as the substrate of natural process, but the unity of the world-process demands fusion into an absolute, all-comprehending substance as the substrate of becoming. From this interesting antinomy, whose originality and importance must be emphasized, Lipps concludes there is no independent reality of space. The philosopher of nature rejects everything that the naïve consciousness had acknowledged as reality. There remains as the thing-in-itself only an x , an unknown stripped of every determination. If one aims to determine this as an immediately given, one can do so only after the analogy of human consciousness, the only immediately given, immediately experienced. Our consciousness is no spatial thing nor any sensible quality. Nevertheless, it is a real, existing in and for itself, not mere phenomenon like the external world. Here Lipps takes issue with the famous assertion of Kant that the psychical is only phenomenon. The brain-processes are merely symbols of the events of consciousness. One cannot call the brain the cause of consciousness, because consciousness is an inner unity, whereas the brain is spatial, and space, as intimated in the foregoing analysis, presents no definitive unity. This treatment of psychophysics is original and remarkable in the highest degree. In reality, individual consciousness is not attached to the brain, but rather to the reason; which furnishes it with the complete laws of thought. This reason is an over-individual world-ego, that creates the world. In this Lipps goes far beyond the neo-Fichteanism of Rickert and Windelband, for they assign to universal consciousness merely the character of a logical abstraction, whereas Lipps makes of it the highest meta-

physical reality. Lipps thus renews monadology in its logical and moral aspect: every individual ego mirrors in his way the world-ego. "Here the end postulated for the individual is that he mirror in his consciousness and its conditions the world-ego, *i. e.*, in his place become like the world-ego." The identity between nature and spirit postulated by Lipps is a feature of Schelling's philosophy. Thinkers will not all agree with his bold conclusions. But all must agree that Lipps has brilliantly laid bare the anthropomorphisms of a science of nature ignorant of its limits and has banished them from its territory, in order to prepare the way for an idealistic philosophy.

Eduard von Hartmann's school stands still nearer Schelling's position. Its founder was at one with Schelling in seeking a mediating principle between the dynamism of nature and the logical character of mind, and this principle he thought he had discovered in the Unconscious. Hartmann's philosophy will be made accessible in a comprehensive edition of his works, planned for eight volumes, of which the first two volumes, *Epistemology and Psychology*, have been published.¹ One may expect that the concept of the Unconscious will be made entirely clear by this publication.

Amongst the followers of Hartmann, Arthur Drews has become prominent as a defender of the master. His book entitled *Plotin und der Untergang der antiken Weltanschauung* (published by Diederichs, 1907) shows this bias. Similarly, his co-partisan Leopold Ziegler, in his volume *Der abendländische Rationalismus und der Eros*, sees in Plotinus the zenith of ancient thought. Plotinus prepares the way, at least, for the solution of the relation between nature and spirit, a problem which ancient philosophy was unable to solve. Plotinus was the first to grasp the idea that nature is not deducible from spirit nor spirit from nature, but that both are phenomenal modes of an Absolute, and the Unconscious gives the key for the search for the Absolute.

In an interesting work, *Der Monismus* (first volume), published by Diederichs under the editorship of Drews, and containing a series of philosophical essays by various writers, similar views are

¹ Published by Haacke, Bad Sachsa im Harz.

conspicuous. Arthur Drews, in the first essay, describes the different types of monism, and, by eliminating the false forms, which convert the world-unity either materialistically into nature or spiritualistically into mind, he attempts to establish a true monism in the doctrine of the Unconscious, comprehending both nature and mind.

There is doubtless a distinction between these several methods of reviving the point of view of Schelling : first of all in this, that Lipps identifies the Absolute with the world-consciousness, while the school of Hartmann finds it in the Unconscious. One must, however, take into account that the world-consciousness is not to be conceived after the analogy of personal consciousness, and that Hartmann's Unconscious is not to be conceived after the analogy of Schopenhauer's blind will, but rather as an Unconscious filled with rational ideas. The Unconscious is a negative concept, by which one may characterize the All-conscious in so far as this is in principle a different type of consciousness, irreducible to the conditions of individual consciousness. In this way the two points of view may be fairly described in their metaphysical bearings. Both may be referred to Schelling, as in his philosophy there are no clear determinations on this point.

The motives that led to the transcending of Kant and the revival of Fichte and Schelling, led also to the revival of Hegel. The metaphysical and monistic impulse finds support in his doctrine. This is especially true of the purely logical impulse. While Kant's concept of knowledge remained always anthropological, in so far as it was determined by human organization (note the opposition between the discursive thought of man and the hypothesis of an intuitive divine understanding), Hegel delivers reason entirely from all reference to anything else, lets it revolve exclusively on its own axis. Conceptual thought has its centre of gravity in itself; it is no longer relative, whether in reference to the content that is thought or in reference to the thinking mind, but an Absolute, whose products are eternal, autonomous verities. This conception is completely identical with the theory of pure logic in vogue to-day. And so we have new points of connection with Hegel, whether or not one retains his

general principle of logical purism or even his method of dialectic. An external proof of this is the publication of two jubilee editions of Hegel's *Phaenomenologie*, his first fundamental work. In addition to the Dutch edition of Professor Bolland (publ. by A. H. Adriani, Leyden), mentioned in my last report, a German edition has been prepared by Georg Lasson (publ. by Dürr, Leipzig), son of the well-known Hegelian, Adolf Lasson, which is characterized by great perspicuity.

In my last report, I pointed out the fact that the wealth of Kantian motives developed in the movement from Fichte to Hegel had not been exhausted. If we omit Schopenhauer and Herbart, there is still Fries, whose significance must not be overlooked. He furnishes a supplementation rather than an opposition to the first named thinkers. While these attempt to establish a system of objective epistemological values, Fries, without attacking the objectivity of knowledge in the meaning of psychologism, turns his attention to the conditions under which these values are realized. He takes psychology and not logic as the starting-point in his endeavors to overthrow psychologism, by seeking to discover in empirical consciousness itself the values that possess a significance higher than the empirical. Elsenhans, privat-docent at the University of Heidelberg, has attempted to set this view in its proper light in his book, *Fries und Kant, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte und zur systematischen Grundlegung der Erkenntnistheorie*, the second volume of which appeared in 1907.¹ The Fries School in Göttingen, founded by Leonard Nelson, has also taken this position. The first two numbers of the second volume of the *Abhandlungen der Fries'schen Schule* (Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1907) contain three noteworthy articles in defense of the new method: a reply by Nelson to the objections of Paul Stern published in the *Philosophische Wochenschrift* under the title *Inhalt und Gegenstand, Grund und Begründung*; two replies to Ernst Cassirer's objections in the article, *Der kritische Idealismus und die Philosophie des gesunden Menschenverstandes*, published in Cohen und Natorp's *Philosophische Arbeiten*. Of these two replies, the first is entitled *Kritik und System in Mathe-*

¹ Published by Töpelmann, Giessen.

matik und Philosophie, by Hessenberg; the second, *Anthropologische Vernunftkritik*, by Grelling. The controversy between the two groups, the stricter Kantians and the followers of the Fries School, is carried on with great vehemence, but not with entire clearness. Although Cassirer is right in his warning against the reference of the epistemological values of criticism to the sound human understanding, Nelson and his followers are also right in their claim that the ultimate ground of epistemological values is a factum, namely, the immediacy of rational knowledge. One can validate the claims of the supreme logical truths in no other way than by showing that they are a factual possession of the rational spirit. They are not thereby reduced to the level of empirical facts. The pure logician, who establishes his position on all sides, arrives consistently at psychology and phenomenology, for he must prove how ideals are realized psychically, and just in this realization how they differ from empirical and variable psychical phenomena. That is the path that leads from Kant to Fries. On the other hand, the psychologist must discover within his realm relations that point beyond immediate psychical content, that *mean* more than they are in their sensible phenomenal form, and this applies to the logical laws of the formation of the concept, the function of judgment, and inference. They are distinguishable from empirical feelings and ideas by the fact that their meaning is not exhausted in their process of coming and going; they are directed towards an over-individual, timeless principle of ideal unity, that finds in the content of the idea, properly speaking, only a symbol and representation. In this way the psychologist, who starts from the presupposition that everything may somehow be represented as psychical phenomenon, arrives at a peculiar class of phenomena, the logical, religious, ethical, and æsthetic values, and thereby surmounts psychologism. This is the path followed by several thinkers, and characteristically for the most part by those thinkers whose starting-point was the extreme psychological position of Brentano: Husserl, Meinong, and Stumpf. Stumpf, whose rectoral address was mentioned earlier in this report, by discriminating between empirical and ideal values, is led to a sharp separation of phe-

nomenon from function (a view developed in his treatise, *Erscheinungen und psychische Functionen*) chiefly in reference to logical content. He further justifies this distinction in an important and interesting article, *Zur Einteilung der Wissenschaften*. Here he combines the traditional division of the subject-matter of knowledge into the science of nature and science of mind with the recent classification advanced by Rickert and Windelband, viz., natural and historical science. The problem of philosophy is here described in terms similar to those of the rectoral address.

This is the direction taken last year in the treatment of the epistemological problem. Although the way had been already indicated, still there can be no doubt that the investigation has been enriched by new factors. We see again how Kant maintains his position as the focal point in philosophical thought. The delimitation of the transcendental from metaphysical and psychological inquiry, ideal value from empirical reality, ought from being, from transcendent as well as immanent being, has continued dominant. In one respect the tendency to supersede Kant is noticeable, viz., in reference to metaphysics. Positivism and phenomenalism, represented most prominently by Mach and Avenarius, are losing ground. And so at the present moment the metaphysical motives in Kant are more emphasized than the extreme idealistic elements. We have noticed in the most diverse movements, most clearly in the case of Lipps, the recurring disposition to postulate as metaphysical ground of all phenomena an absolute principle, a principle unifying nature and spirit.

Many signs point to philosophy's becoming again a spiritual power in German civilization. Even the masses, dissatisfied with tradition, are struggling towards a new world-view. We also find a widespread tendency amongst special investigators to treat their field as a branch of philosophy. The influence of Haeckel and the success of the 'monistic guild' are proofs of this. At present this movement has lost in intensity, because in opposition to its materialistic character, spiritualistic and idealistic motives have gained ascendancy in the popular mind. This activity is variously expressed, as in the increased reading of the classical philosophers and their interpreters, in the publication of

encyclopedia collective works and chrestomathies, such as Kohler's¹ and Menzer and Dessoir's, in the popular regard for such artists and thinkers as Nietzsche, Tolstoi, and Maeterlinck, in the strong current of neo-romanticism, and in the revival of the religious spirit, leading to the deepening of the problems of the philosophy of religion, as well as to mysticism and theosophism.

Interest is still concentrated on Nietzsche's philosophy. One seeks to master the confusing wealth of his world of ideas by discovering definite points of relationship between him and other thinkers. His relationship to contemporary thought is discussed by Vaihinger's book, *Nietzsche als Philosoph*, his relation to Schopenhauer and Kant by Simmel's work, *Schopenhauer und Nietzsche*. We are now clear that Nietzsche was no nihilist, nor immoralist in the ordinary meaning of the word; he aimed to create new moral values. I had taken this view earlier in my book, *Nietzsches Lehre in seinen Grundbegriffen*. Nietzsche's relation to Wagner is treated broadly rather than deeply by Bélart in the work, *Friedrich Nietzsche und Richard Wagner* (Wunder, Berlin, 1907).

Although the idea of the suprahuman is common to Nietzsche, Kant, and Wagner, the point that distinguishes Nietzsche from the latter two is the fact that he does not look for the overman in the sphere of universality, in the religious or æsthetic universe, but rather in the sphere of individuation. It was this intensive nuance of individualism that appeared to point from Nietzsche to Max Stirner, the author of the remarkable work *Der Einzige und sein Eigentum*. Stirner's influence in modern Germany has assumed astonishing proportions, and moves in general parallel with that of Nietzsche. The two thinkers are regarded as exponents of essentially the same philosophy. This view is approximated by Max Messer in his monograph *Max Stirner*,² who sees Stirner's greatness in the fact that he was the first to show the illusory character of impersonal ideals and to recognize nothing as value that cannot justify its title to personal value. Messer is right in his contention that true idealism cannot suffer by this but

¹ Published by Enke, Stuttgart, 1907. The author is privat-docent in the University of Berlin.

² *Die Literatur*, ed. by Georg Brandes, Verlag Bard und Marquardt, Berlin.

on the contrary is fostered. He refers the apparently immoralistic character of Stirner to his attempt to set up an iron opposition to the abstract moral dogma of the past. In general he regards Stirner's work as an immense advance over Hegel's attempt to convert individual reality into a fabric of abstractions. Little as one may contest the importance of Stirner, who was an energetic rather than profound thinker, still one has good cause to be cautious in comparing him with Nietzsche. Individualism is Stirner's last word, but not Nietzsche's. Nietzsche's philosophy as a whole is not egocentric. He finds the ego spun into the world, into the great complex play, which man must fashion and live from its innermost centre, without clinging to any singular reality, not even to the reality of his own person, for the wealth of being would thus be lessened. He shall take the world with all its contradictions, without attempting to overthrow them dogmatically. There is in this philosophy an element that recalls the notion of 'romantic irony,' without being at all identical with it. And so it is explicable that Nietzsche's profoundest influence, in spite of his outward opposition to every type of mysticism, and in spite of the apparently naturalistic character of his doctrine, is closely allied to mystic motives. For it is the essence of the romantic philosophy that culminated in Schelling and Novalis to regard the focal point of reality as given not in the single individual but in a higher universal principle. It is significant that an ingenious thinker, Count Hermann Keyserling, who in his first work *Das Gefüge der Welt* revealed his kinship with neo-romanticism, raises objection to Stirner's individualism in his recent publication *Unsterblichkeit*.¹ The immortal element in man, to which his innermost will-to-survive is turned, is not his person, but rather an impersonal, ideal, cosmic element. Keyserling tries to support this thesis in an interesting but in no way cogent exposition, of a psychological and epistemological character.

On the other hand, Ernst Horneffer is decidedly wrong when he fancies in his work, *Wege zum Leben*,² that he is a follower of

¹ Lehmann, München, 1907.

² Klinkhardt, Leipzig, 1907.

Nietzsche. For his values are extreme, individualistic values, approximating the philosophy of Stirner. The aim of human life is not surrender to a universal, as to God or the universe, but unceasing shaping, separation, and individuation.

Saitschik's position is much nearer that of neo-romanticism. In his discriminating work, *Quid est veritas*,¹ which is written in the form of dialogue, he endeavors to discover a harmonious union of individualistic and universalistic points of view, and combats the positivistic fallacy that the meaning of the world is exhausted in a complex of natural laws.

Neo-romanticism continues to flourish. The arts are influenced by it, especially music, which Richard Wagner, the last and perhaps the greatest romanticist, conducted into this realm. We have observed that philosophical theories also continue to show the marks that may be traced back to Schelling's and Novalis's "moonlit magic night." This explains the historical interest in the creations and culture of the romantic period. Connected with this is last year's discussion of Herder's philosophy. *Herder's und Kant's Aesthetik* is an instructive book by Jacoby.² Carl Siegel, privatdocent in the University of Vienna, has written a work entitled *Herder als Philosoph*,³ covering the whole of Herder's philosophy in a clear and convenient way. Both of these writers regard Herder as the forerunner of post-Kantian idealism, and Siegel even characterizes him as the thinker who sowed the fruitful seeds of Schelling's philosophy of nature. Herder's relation to romanticism is, of course, too apparent to permit of question. Still more important is the new edition of Schelling's selected works in three volumes (published by Eckhardt, Leipzig), edited by Otto Weiss, to which Arthur Drews has added a preface. "The repetition," so he writes, "which contemporary philosophy is passing through, forces it from the transcendentalism of Kant to the subjective idealism of Fichte, and from the latter to the absolute idealism of Hegel. Here, however, Schelling's idealism demands consideration as a middle

¹ Ernst Hohmann & Co., Berlin, 1907.

² Dürr, Leipzig, 1907.

³ Cotta, Stuttgart, 1907.

stage and mediating member." In Drew's work Schelling, as well as Plotinus, appears in the rôle of discoverer of the Unconscious, and also as the philosopher who, in his final "positive philosophy," freed himself from the illusion of rationalism, that resolves the world unceasingly into thought, in order to set in its place an empiristic metaphysics.

The centre of neo-romanticism is the Jena publishing house of Eugen Diederichs, whose eminent services were mentioned in my last report. Amongst the new publications, the edition of the works of Novalis, in four volumes, prepared by Minor, deserves especial mention. It includes a number of interesting prefaces by Tieck. The second and third volumes contain the philosophical sketches, which although not systematically carried out, are full of profound and excellent ideas. Further, I may mention selections from Wilhelm Humboldt's *Universität*, prepared by Schubert, also the fine almanach *Jena und Weimar*, which contains a series of interesting essays by early and recent writers, referring especially to Schiller and Goethe.

Indication of the revival of religious feeling is furnished especially by the new journal, *Religion und Geisteskultur*,¹ which contains important contributions from Eucken, Achelis, Höffding and others. Without being dogmatic, this journal stands for opposition to extreme rationalism, which tends to become fixed in the depths of religion.

The conviction gains ground that knowledge and faith are two spheres, which in no point disturb each other, because they represent two fundamentally different aspects of the universe. This conviction finds expression in the three lectures that Eucken has published under the title *Hauptprobleme der Religionsphilosophie der Gegenwart*.² Religion is here conceived as a mode, in which the spiritual life communicates itself to the human individual and to nature. The spiritual life, whose discovery and knowledge is the object of most of Eucken's books, especially of his recent work, *Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung*, is the totality of the eternal values. These values are regarded by Eucken, as

¹ Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, Göttingen.

² Published by Reuther und Reichard, Berlin, 1907.

by Schelling and Hegel, as metaphysical realities. Nature and spirit should not remain in irreconcilable variance, but spirit should make itself mistress of nature, in order to fill it in all the depths of its being. Eucken here makes himself the heir of the philosophy of identity, the heir of Schelling and Hegel, who saw in the unity of nature and spirit the goal of all philosophy and civilization. And here also all the currents of contemporary philosophy flow together; that ideal world of values to which neo-Kantianism is directed and to which, as we have seen, the efforts of the School of Fries and Brentano are directed, experiences in the neo-romanticism centering in Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Novalis and in the recent philosophy of religion, only an elevation to metaphysical reality.

Herewith the path to the future is indicated. The return to Kant signifies a step forward against empiricism, evolutionism, psychologism, and relativism, which have domesticated themselves in investigation. There are timeless, eternal values of knowledge, art, religion, and ethics. But the development goes further: While Kant vacillated between transcendence and immanence, it is the tendency of the most recent philosophy (this is especially the meaning of neo-romanticism) to refer these eternal values in one way or another to metaphysical reality. But even here the critical spirit preserves us from dogmatic one-sidedness. I have shown that it is more and more the tendency of the most diverse thinkers to regard the world as a fullness, exhibiting contradictions and antinomies only in the human spirit. In this way one-sided logicism is overthrown. Logic, morality, art, and religion enjoy in their own realms complete sovereignty and cannot be reduced by psychological or empiristic attempts to anything merely relative or temporal. This sphere, however, is not the whole, but only a part of inexhaustible reality.

OSCAR EWALD.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

Scholasticism Old and New : An Introduction to Scholastic Philosophy, Medieval and Modern. By M. DE WULF. Translated by P. COFFEY. Dublin, M. H. Gill & Son ; New York, Benziger Bros., 1907. — pp. xvi, 327.

Professor De Wulf's services in the department of the History of Medieval Philosophy are well known. His brochure on Henry of Ghent, his *History of Scholastic Philosophy in the Low Countries*, his *History of Medieval Philosophy*, and his edition of the Belgian Philosophers,¹ besides his numerous articles in the *Revue Néo-Scholastique* and in the *Revue d' Histoire et Littérature Religieuses*, are the fruit of his unflinching interest in scholasticism and ceaseless investigation of the sources of its history. They place him in the foremost rank of the workers who have chosen this special and comparatively neglected field of historical enquiry. The volume before us is a translation of his most recent work, in which he essays a comprehensive definition of scholastic philosophy and discusses the various phases of the recent neo-scholastic movement.

The work is divided into two parts, in the first of which the various definitions of scholastic philosophy are reviewed and the author's doctrinal definition expounded and defended. In the second part of the book the terminology, methods, doctrinal modifications, religious and scientific aspects of neo-scholasticism are described, and the prospects of success which the neo-scholastics look forward to are discussed especially in relation to Neo-Kantism and Positivism. An appendix has been added by the translator, in which the history of the recent revival of scholasticism at Louvain, the foundation of the *Institut Supérieur de Philosophie*, the work of the *Institut*, the programme of studies, the publications of the members, and the methods of teaching are described with a good deal of detail. This portion, occupying some sixty pages of the text, and the second part, which takes up more than a hundred pages, are frankly apologetic, in the sense that

¹ *Études sur Henri de Gand* (Louvain, 1894); *Histoire de la philosophie scolastique dans les Pays-Bas*, etc. (*ibid.*, 1895); *Histoire de la philosophie médiévale*, etc. (*ibid.*, 1ère éd., 1900; 2me éd., 1905); *Philosophes Belges du Moyen Age*, a series of texts with notes, introductions, etc., of which two volumes have appeared, *De unitate formæ* of Gilles de Lessines (Louvain, 1902), and *Quodlibeta* of Godfrey of Fontaines (*ibid.*, 1904).

they appeal to the philosophical reader for a more favorable consideration and a more sympathetic study of the doctrines and methods of the Schoolmen. The first part is more strictly objective; it is a synthetic-historical review of medieval scholasticism, divided into three chapters: "Introductory Notions," "Doctrinal Definition," and "The Decline of (Medieval) Scholasticism."

In the "Introductory Notions," M. De Wulf reviews the various definitions of scholasticism. He classifies them under the heads "Nominal Definitions" and "Real Definitions." The real definitions he subdivides into: (*A*) "Extrinsic to the doctrine," namely, those which define scholastic philosophy in relation to (1) the schools, (2) language and methods, (3) the medieval epoch, (4) scholastic theology, (5) ancient philosophy, and (6) medieval science; and (*B*) "Intrinsic to the doctrinal content of scholasticism." Of the latter, some, he considers, are incomplete. That only is complete and, to his way of thinking, satisfactory, which defines scholastic philosophy in terms of that "body of doctrine" which he finds to be common to all the great schoolmen of the thirteenth century. The objection to all definitions except the last is not that they are erroneous, but that they are incomplete. "The definitions we have so far examined all contain a 'soul of truth.' Those of them that aim at connecting philosophy with some body of doctrine, such as theology or the special sciences, are deeper in insight and richer in meaning than those which try to define it by its relation to some superficial non-doctrinal element [the schools, the language and method]. Still, neither of the two classes alone, nor both combined, can satisfy anyone who wants to understand scholasticism *in itself* and to get at its real genius; they have all the common drawback of *defining scholastic philosophy by that which is not philosophy*. . . . In its stricter meaning it [philosophy] is a complete and systematic collection of theories explicative of the universal order of things" (pp. 88, 89). "There is a philosophical synthesis common to a group of the leading doctors of the West. . . . It is predominant in the Middle Ages; to it belongs the name of 'Scholastic Philosophy'" (p. 46).

No one will, we think, read M. De Wulf's criticism of the imperfect definitions of scholasticism without agreeing with him in his verdict that they are inadequate. "The philosophy of the Schools," "the philosophy of the Middle Ages," "philosophy in complete subjection to Catholic Dogma," "a mere phase of Aristotelianism," "philosophy occupied exclusively with the problem of Universals,"—these are one-sided definitions, descriptions partly accurate, but obviously

defective in that they omit what is most essential in the thing defined. When, however, the author comes to defend his own definition, which is the doctrinal one (Part I, chapter ii, "Doctrinal Definition"), he does not seem to us to be quite so successful as in his criticism of the definitions which he rejects. No doubt there was a body of doctrine which the great masters of scholasticism, without sacrificing individual originality, held in common. No doubt, too, this body of doctrine is the one essential element in a *real* definition of scholasticism. But does not M. De Wulf expect too much when he asks the historian of scholastic philosophy to draw up, as the result of his study of the period, a logically accurate definition of a system which, after all, has a historical as well as a logical side? Is he not forcing the facts of history when he sets down Eriugena and the pantheists as anti-scholastics, and Raymond Lully and Roger Bacon as representatives of deviations from scholasticism? No one will deny that *logically* the doctrines of Eriugena are opposed to those of St. Thomas, Albertus Magnus, etc.; but it seems to us that they contributed historically to the initiation of the movement which resulted in the doctrines of the thirteenth century masters. It seems to us, too, that the philosophy of the thirteenth century has its historical antecedents in the storm and stress of the twelfth century, and that the elements of that storm and stress go back through the *Chartrains* to John the Scot. M. De Wulf writes: "That synthesis [the synthesis common to a group of the leading doctors of the West] is not the work of a day, or of one man. It was not born of the genius of an Albert the Great, or a Thomas of Aquin; only centuries could have built up such a vast body of doctrine as scholasticism. Sparse at first, and scattered through many glosses and commentaries up to the eleventh century, scholastic thought became conscious of its power for the first time with St. Anselm of Canterbury" (p. 46).

This is perfectly true. But one has only to study in detail the sparse elements scattered through the glosses of the ninth century in order to realize how much Eriugena contributed to the movement which reached its first conscious expression in St. Anselm. Barach and Cousin have, in our opinion, exaggerated the antithesis between the individualistic realism of the glosses of Rhaban Maur (?) and Eric of Auxerre, on the one hand, and the monistic realism of John the Scot, on the other. The fact seems to be that M. De Wulf has viewed the whole matter too much in the light of parliamentary tactics: "If the scholastics are a party, is it any wonder that the party has its troublesome members. . . . The above mentioned synthesis . . . can vin-

dicate for itself a vast majority of all the suffrages" (p. 50). "Eriugenic Pantheism and Latin Averroism, the two chief forms of the opposition" . . . (p. 51). "You might as well identify the different political groups of a Parliament on the plea that they are all alike citizens of the same country" (p. 75). We do not find fault with the comparison, but only with what seems to us to be the laying too much stress on what is, after all, a comparison. Why may not one consider that pantheism was the centripetal, and rationalism the centrifugal force, of which scholasticism is the resultant? Or would it not be better to adopt a comparison which would bring out the fact that even erroneous systems, while logically irreconcilable with the "synthesis common to a group of the leading doctors of the West," were historically contributory to that very synthesis? That this is the view of the majority of M. De Wulf's co-workers in the field should be evident from the footnotes, in which quotations are given from reviews of his *Histoire de philosophie médiévale*; for instance, M. Blanc, M. Picavet, M. Valmy, and others are of opinion that M. De Wulf has drawn the lines of system too closely around scholasticism and refused to admit as scholastic whatever does not fall within those lines.

In the third chapter of the First Part of the work, the author enumerates very clearly and illustrates with apt quotations the causes which led in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries to the decay and downfall of scholasticism. The story is one with which we are now familiar, thanks to M. De Wulf himself, who in the volume before us merely elaborates the results of his study of decadent scholasticism which he first formulated in his *Histoire de la philosophie médiévale*. "The contest that arose in the seventeenth century between the peripatetics and the scientists had no real bearing on the essential content of the scholastic teaching, but regarded mere side issues and secondary matters. The misunderstanding was indeed inevitable . . . and unfortunately it exists even still" (p. 152).

The Second Part of the work, entitled "Modern Scholastic Philosophy," is devoted to dispelling the misunderstanding mentioned at the close of the preceding paragraph. We venture to say that the fair-minded reader of M. De Wulf's pages will find himself parting with one after another of his pet prejudices against the scholastics, and will be inclined to ask: Is this, then, all that they mean by the revival of scholastic philosophy in the twentieth century? He will realize how far the neo-scholastics are from wishing (in Eucken's phrase) "das Rad der Weltgeschichte zurückdrehen." Of special interest to the teacher of scholastic philosophy are the questions (dis-

cussed at length, pp. 167-189) regarding the method of teaching, — the use of the Latin language, scholastic disputation, scholastic style of exposition, the practice of “condensing the doctrines of others into a few syllogisms for the purpose of refuting it by a few distinctions” (p. 185), — and the place of History of Philosophy in the curriculum. For the general philosophical public, however, the most interesting chapters in the whole work are those in which the author discusses “The New Scholastic Philosophy and Religious Dogma” and “The New Scholasticism and Modern Science” (pp. 190-210). The former has given occasion, very unjustly, it seems to us, to the ultra-conservatives to mention “philosophical liberalism” in connection with M. De Wulf’s exposition of the relations between philosophy and dogma. In the chapter on “New Scholasticism and Science,” the contention is that there should be a better understanding between philosophers and scientists and a closer union between philosophy and science. Wundt is quoted to the effect that “Philosophy is the general science, whose function is to unify in one consistent system all the knowledge brought to light by means of the several special sciences, and to trace back to their first principles the methods in common use in those sciences and the conditions which they in common assume as prerequisites to all knowledge” (p. 206). In a chapter entitled “Doctrines of the New Scholasticism,” there is outlined a detailed programme for the “renovation and reconstruction” of scholasticism. “Theories now known to have been false” are to be abandoned. “The great, constitutive doctrines of the medieval system” are to be retained, “but only after having successfully stood the double test of comparison with the conclusions of present-day science and with the teachings of contemporary systems of philosophy; new facts have been brought to light, and under their influence a store of new ideas has enriched the patrimony of the ancient Scholasticism” (p. 211). Equally broad-minded and tolerant, in the best sense of the word, is the belief expressed in the concluding chapter of the book that scholasticism is “to undergo a process of overhauling and resetting which will remove its medieval appearance and make it an attractive modern article” (p. 259). This reform is absolutely necessary if scholasticism is to cease to be “a lonely and unnoticed wanderer, seven centuries behind its time” (p. 217). What one school of neo-scholasticism is doing in the way of “overhauling and resetting” the scholastic system is described in the appendix, in which the translator reviews the work of the *Institut Supérieur de Philosophie* at the University of Louvain.

If we have taken exception to the main argument of the First Part of M. De Wulf's book, we must, on the other hand, record our unqualified approval of the contents of the Second Part. It seems to us that the author has given here a fair, objective account of the new scholasticism as it is understood by its best representatives. We are convinced that his exposition of the neo-scholastic movement will fulfil the hope expressed in the Preface, namely, that the book will "meet and combat false conceptions, coördinate true notions, and so furnish the reader with some general information on the new scholasticism" (p. viii).

The translation is, on the whole, well done. Here and there a French idiom obtrudes itself in the otherwise easy flow of the translator's diction: "Plaisance" (p. 135, n.) should, of course, be "Piacenza," "Deniflé" should be "Denifle," and "Polycraticus," we think, should be written "Policraticus." These and a few typographical errors will, no doubt, be remedied in a subsequent edition, which, we hope, will soon be called for. Dr. Coffey has every reason to feel encouraged in his chosen task of preparing an English edition of the volumes which form the *Bibliothèque de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie* of Louvain.

WILLIAM TURNER.

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA.

Psychology: General Introduction (Volume I); *Laboratory Manual* (Volume II); *Laboratory Equipment* (Volume III). By CHARLES HUBBARD JUDD. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1907. — pp. xii, 389; xii, 127; xi, 257.

(I) Sooner or later every teacher feels the impulse to make a text-book which shall embody his own conception of what such a book ought to be. Mr. Judd has freed his mind on the subject in these three volumes, the first of which is a general text-book in the common understanding of the term, and of the other two, one is a laboratory manual and the other a book dealing primarily with apparatus. The first is much the most important of the trio, and we shall devote the larger part of our space to it.

Apart from the unusual excellencies of certain portions of the work in their treatment of conventional topics, the features of the book which will attract most notice are the following: (1) the genetic and functional account of the whole subject of mental life; (2) the emphasis laid upon the definitely ideational processes, especially those represented by language, as the characteristics of paramount signifi-

cance for the understanding of human psychology; and (3) the treatment of attention, feeling, and interest as attitudes.

It is a great satisfaction to the reviewer to discover another lusty recruit in the functionalist camp, and this condition of mind may render him an unfit critic of the achievement under consideration. To disarm prejudice, however, he will at once proceed to point out the dubious wisdom of so extreme a position as that occupied by Mr. Judd toward structural analyses. This stricture should in justice be prefaced by the frank acknowledgment that the author has succeeded in making one of the most stimulating and interesting presentations of psychological material which any functionalist has attained.

In the preface we read: "I am quite unable to accept the conceptions, or sympathize with the views of the defenders of a structural or purely analytical psychology." The book consistently reflects this conviction in the almost entire absence of anything verging upon the structural conceptions. This is the more striking in a pupil and translator of Wundt, whose influence is often conspicuously in evidence. In the opinion of the present writer, there are two fundamental reasons why this is a questionable procedure. Many others might no doubt be urged. (1) Is not a text-book under some obligation to render easy the approach to the general literature of the subject? Now, whatever one's private creed in the matter, structuralist ideas and analyses constitute a large part of the stock in trade of the modern psychologist. Only on the ground of conclusive proof of the falsity or futility of the materials included in these writings, would it seem possible to justify their complete omission from a book designed to introduce young students to the subject. (2) The next point is more open to debate, and Mr. Judd's attainments entitle him to the peaceful possession of his own opinion on the matter. But, as a defender of the functionalist propaganda, I dislike to accede to a form of extremism which seems at the moment unwarranted, and which carries with it certain methodological limitations of a serious kind. The concepts of the analytical and structural psychologist are necessary to render accurate and specific the processes about which the functionalist is concerned. No amount of talk about the function of sensations, for example, ever will or ever can take the place of an analysis of the exact forms under which the various sensations are encountered. Indeed, at this point Mr. Judd is sometimes a bit inconsistent with his creed; for while he avoids the language of the analyst, his facts are at times precisely those with which the latter has long made us familiar. "The voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are the

hands of Esau." Moreover, as we shall have occasion to point out a little later, the lack of just such a precise and drastic analysis as a structural psychologist would have given us, is responsible for a looseness in the account of feeling and attention which somewhat impairs the worth of that otherwise highly valuable and interesting discussion. In short, the reviewer could have wished that Mr. Judd had more gently tempered the functionalist wind to the shorn structuralist lamb.

That it is in the ideational processes that we find the most significant human traits is of course a commonplace, and it is only in the slight departures from conventional text-book usage for which Mr. Judd finds his justification in this doctrine that the matter becomes important. The implication, which to many readers will seem to accompany this doctrine, that the sensory and perceptual processes of animals are like those of human beings, is of course quite unwarranted. The extended account of language given by Wundt and certain other contemporary psychologists has prepared the mind of the present generation to accept as relevant to psychological interests a fulness of treatment which not long since would have been regarded with suspicion. But, as a rule, elementary texts have not as yet dealt adequately with this material. It is in the marked excellence of the chapter which he devotes to this topic, that the author achieves one of the most distinguished of his successes. It is certainly the most interesting brief statement of the case with which the reviewer has acquaintance. It affords, moreover, a peculiarly striking instance of certain of the virtues of the functional mode of treatment.

One feels some surprise and perhaps disappointment that, in a book ostensibly disposed to magnify the significance of the ideational processes, there should be no more penetrating and fundamental analysis of the ratiocinative activities than that which we find. The discussion is clear as far as it goes, but it is decidedly meagre in specific content. The illustrations and descriptions are both entertaining and instructive, but the actual procedure in the thinking process is nowhere adequately dissected. For instance, the synthetic theory of the judgment is accepted and dismissed in a sentence or two, and no mention whatever is made, so far as the writer recalls, of the analytic aspects of judging now so generally recognized. No doubt the author had reasons which justified this mode of treatment. But it is hardly likely to commend itself universally.

In the ruling confusion about doctrines of feeling, any new departure is sure to receive a welcome; and, although the position for which Mr. Judd stands is not altogether novel, he is the first to give it ex-

pression in a connected account of mental life as a whole. He recognizes as a basal psychological category something which he entitles "attitude," and under this rubric he includes feeling, attention, and interest.

There can be no possible objection to designating these processes 'attitudes.' It only remains to discover what is gained by the procedure, and whether any ambiguity is involved in such a transaction. If certain psychical activities are describable as attitudes and certain others not, then the distinction is relevant and may well prove pregnant. If, on the other hand, all processes of the mental kind lend themselves to such characterization,—and this is undoubtedly the case,—it remains to determine, if possible, in what particulars the so-called attitudes differ from those mental processes not so designated, and to what the former owe their readier inclusion in such a category. Let it be distinctly understood that Mr. Judd has reference explicitly to psychological attitude, not to physiological attitude. Now if one adheres strictly to a functionalist position, I do not believe that any distinction can be drawn, on the basis of attitude, between sensations and ideas, say, on the one side, and attention and feeling on the other. They are all describable as attitudes, as are also simple apprehension and judgment. If one takes an idea, as does the occasional structuralist, and abstracts from all but its sensuous content, one may, indeed, deny attitude to such an abstraction. But when one faces vital ideational processes after the functionalist method which Mr. Judd commends, ideas are invariably characterized by attitude. The inner meaning of an idea is always describable in terms of attitude, and, for that matter, its immediate personal significance can never be stated in any other way. Only on the basis of a structural analysis can one properly disregard attitudes as a basic aspect of all conscious activities. This is surely the essential point which Brentano has to make, in using as a principle of psychological classification *the way in which consciousness refers to its object*.

Perhaps most serious of all the consequences of such a method of dealing with the matters at issue are the vagueness and uncertainty with which it leaves us as to what really are the fundamental forms of feeling and attention. So many things are justly describable in attitudinal terms, that we are at a loss to know where to stop, and Mr. Judd affords us no very convincing reasons for stopping at the place that he himself does. In this connection it may be mentioned that he makes no effort to classify or differentiate the several distinct types of attention generally recognized, despite their marked significance for a functional psychology. There is a similar omission of practically all

account of sensory discrimination. Indeed, Mr. Judd has been quite daring in his omission of topics ordinarily regarded as essential to an acceptable introductory presentation of the subject. He has reduced the case almost to its lowest terms; whether advisedly or not, opinion will certainly differ.

The book is built up about five distinctions: (1) sensations and (2) their relations, (3) attitudes, (4) memory, (5) ideational relations, with an annex in which the general facts of behavior and the abnormalities of mind are discussed. These divisions work out satisfactorily, except that they almost inevitably involve a slurring of the proper position of emotion, from which the author has not altogether escaped.

Mr. Judd makes a consistent effort to show the significance of the neural processes for each of the forms of mental life. The chapters on the nervous system have many admirable features, despite some slight inaccuracies. Much space is devoted to the facts concerning the neural organization and behavior of the lower forms of animal life. The account of the human nervous system does all that could be asked in the space available. The cuts and diagrams, here as elsewhere in the volumes, are generally well devised, but indifferently executed. Particularly irritating is the small size of the letters used in some of the cuts. One is sometimes quite at a loss to know what is printed. Among other points which might well be revised in forthcoming editions of the book, is the old cut (Figure 15) on page 47, which shows the projection of fibres in a manner quite at variance with the present opinions of experts, and also with the statements of the text itself and the subsequent cuts.

The chapter on sensations is capital, and for one who believes that such an account should be accompanied by a description of the sense organs it would be difficult to name a better. This estimate is subject to the qualification that one does not regard a thorough-going structural analysis as a *sine qua non*. The discussion of the relations of sensations, which involves practically the ground covered by most texts under the heading of perception, suffers from one serious defect in its failure sufficiently to emphasize the extent to which perception depends upon the employment of previous experience. Not that the point is called in question, nor that the illustrations fail to afford opportunity for demonstrating the facts, but that no satisfactory formulation is attempted, and that the prime importance of the fact for a correct understanding of the relations of the sensory and ideational processes is thereby jeopardized.

Under the general headings of "Experience and Expression," "Instinct and Habit," a good general account is given of the motor element in experience. A few chapters on memory and the ideational processes are followed by a very brief discussion of impulse and volition, and the book comes to an end with two chapters diverging slightly from the main trail; one on dissociation, in which is offered an excellent digest of the generally prevalent views about the minor abnormalities of mental life, the other devoted to a general orientation of psychology, and entitled "Applications of Psychology." No criticism will be attempted of these chapters, beyond such as has already been incidentally given. As in several other instances, the analysis of volition would gain decidedly from something approaching the concreteness and tangibility of the structuralist descriptions. Here as elsewhere Mr. Judd has avoided the Scylla of rigid distinctions and hard and fast lines which do not exist in fact, only to be imperilled by the Charybdis of vagueness. It is difficult to say which fate it is preferable to choose when writing for young students. Certain it is that most writers of texts find it impossible to steer safely between these menacing alternatives.

Mr. Judd possesses an unusually agreeable and flowing style, and his reader is carried pleasantly along on a current of notable literary merit. There is practically no controversial writing in the book, and one is spared the asperities of criticism which sometimes mark doctrinal exposition.

In advance of actual test, no one can confidently predict the success of a text-book. So far as concerns the present specimen one may be sure that young teachers of psychology will find it stimulating. To the youthful Ph.D. fresh from the myopic detail of his thesis, as well as to graduate students of all kinds, the book will undoubtedly be grateful for the vigorous and enlivening manner in which it deals with its subject. Whether young students entering for the first time on psychological study will find it relatively so useful, is less certain. Unquestionably the approach to the material is in several chapters somewhat sophisticated, and the absence at many points of definite and distinct lines of demarcation is likely to be felt by the beginner in a disastrous manner. The book has, however, already met with a most cordial reception which augurs well for its permanent success.

(II) Two fairly distinct forms of psychological exercise are at present in vogue. In one the emphasis falls upon devices to stimulate ordinary introspection and render it more alert and accurate. In the other the stress is laid upon discovering or demonstrating experimen-

tally facts not accessible to ordinary unaided introspective methods. The manual in this series belongs, with Sanford's and Titchener's books, to the latter class, although it is designed to meet a somewhat different need from either of those mentioned. It differs from the Sanford in its selection of a very small number of tests (twenty-five main topics are included in the tests), for which fuller directions are furnished, both in reference to the performance of the test and as regards the evaluation of the results. It differs from the Titchener in aiming at a much less exhaustive and thorough study of the topics with which it deals.

The advantages and disadvantages of such a book are obvious to any one who has directed beginner's classes in experimental work. With young students Mr. Judd's procedure is likely to gain and sustain interest; for it gets somewhere promptly, and does not stay there too long after arrival. On the other hand, it undoubtedly carries with it the danger that students may fail quite to apprehend the care and patience needed for really accurate work; and, in psychology above all other sciences to-day, this misconception is perhaps least desirable. With competent instruction this danger need not be encountered. From this side of the case, some of the tests hardly seem judiciously selected. For instance, the reviewer is not able to believe that from a two-hour session a young student can possibly contract from his own plethysmographic observations any impressions that are of the slightest consequence as to the parallelism between states of consciousness and circulatory conditions. If he approaches learning to manage his apparatus in this time, he deserves high encomium. There are other tests in the list which involve an immense amount of supplementary coaching from the instructor, if there is not to be great waste of time. It is easy to criticise a manual of this kind, but one must remember the specific purpose which the author had in mind in making it, and judge it from this point of view. Accepting this criterion, it must be recognized that Mr. Judd has given us a book which is sure to be very useful in many circumstances; and not the least of its merits is that the tests are so designed as to render their performance possible with an expenditure of scarcely more than \$200.

(III) The third volume of the series, which deals with apparatus and supplementary experiments, puts all directors of large laboratories under distinct obligation. Every laboratory of considerable size ought to have a stock on hand for distribution among the many inquirers for information which this book furnishes. The only criticism of a general kind which the reviewer has to offer concerns the absence

of critical evaluation of some of the pieces listed. If the assumption were justified that everything mentioned is good, no objection could be raised. But certain of the pieces listed are notoriously treacherous, and this fact might well be remarked. A good many specific details might be called in question; *e. g.*, "The chronoscope should not vary in successive trials with such a mechanical device" (p. 191). This is a mere slip in form of statement, but it may well cause some ingenuous pioneer of a new laboratory to spend too much time trying to reach this goal, which, needless to say, no one ever has reached. If it could be attained, all the bother of computing variations could be abolished. On the same page there is, in connection with the mention of pendulum chronoscopes, no reference to Bergström's apparatus, which is by all odds much the best of the lot, so far as the reviewer knows. Other similar slips might be mentioned, but, as a whole, the book is excellent and most welcome.

JAMES R. ANGELL.

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L'année philosophique. Publiée sous la direction de F. PILLON.
Paris, Félix Alcan, 1906. — pp. 301.

Of the six articles of which this volume is composed, apart from M. Pillon's bibliography of the year, three relate to ancient and three to modern philosophy. Two of the former are concerned with Plato, who seems at last to be coming by his rights in the way of detailed study in France, as elsewhere, and one with Aristotle. M. Brochard writes of the ethics of Plato, and M. Rodier of the evolution of Plato's Dialectic. M. Brochard shows a thorough knowledge of the Platonic text, and his article affords a very useful and generally accurate and sympathetic account of the ethical teaching of the various dialogues. Certain objections might, however, be raised to some of his incidental utterances. It is doubtful whether he has not fallen at times, like most expositors of Plato, into the mistake of forgetting that a Platonic dialogue differs from a modern text-book of Philosophy in being first and foremost a work of dramatic art. Unless we keep this cardinal fact clearly before our minds, we are almost sure to make the mistake of taking what is merely the utterance of a dramatic figure, the 'Socrates' or the 'Sophist' of the dialogue, for a matter-of-fact statement of the writer's views, and so to overlook the vein of peculiar 'irony' which is as characteristic of Plato as of the great Athenian tragedians. I think M. Brochard has not always escaped this danger. For instance, the curious conclusion of the *Protagoras*, where both

interlocutors are found to be contradicting the theses about the relations between virtue and knowledge with which they set out, need not in the least imply, as M. Brochard thinks it does, any corresponding perplexity in the mind of Plato himself. It may well be no more than an example of 'irony,' a dramatic illustration of the consequences of starting from postulates which are only half true. So, again, the conclusion in the *Meno* that virtue comes neither by nature nor from education, but by a sort of 'favor of Heaven,' as is shown by the case of the famous Athenian statesmen who have never been able to transmit their 'virtue' to their sons, is surely, in large part, satirical of a class of men about whose merits Plato was always sceptical. I think, too, that we do a grave injustice to Plato when we make him responsible for all that unwise admirers have read into his text as to the supposed immorality of the teachings of the 'Sophists.' As a fact, Plato never brings any general accusation of immoral teaching against the Sophists as a profession. He is careful to avoid any imputation on the uprightness and honesty of the great Sophists, Protagoras and Gorgias, and the persons to whom M. Brochard refers as champions of immoralist views in the dialogues, Thrasymachus and Callicles, are not 'Sophists' at all. One is a popular rhetorician, and the other a cultivated *grand seigneur*. The point is important, since it raises the whole question as to the sanity of Plato's judgments on contemporary society. I would further add that M. Brochard, perhaps out of respect for traditional verdicts, seems to me to be far too ready to take it as a matter of course that Aristotle's ethical views must necessarily show a great 'improvement' when compared with those of his master. He hardly seems to realize how completely Aristotle's distinctive ethical doctrine comes straight out of the *Philebus*.

M. Rodier's essay on the development of Plato's Dialectic is, as a whole, a most excellent piece of work. I would especially commend his crushing refutation of all the interpretations of Plato which, like that of Jowett, reduce the 'Ideas' to concepts in the divine mind, or, like that of Lutoslawski, pretend to find evidence that 'Ideas' have been replaced in the later dialogues by 'Souls' as the supreme realities. I cannot, however, understand why so sane a critic should have given in to the curious view that the *Phaedrus* is an earlier work than the *Republic*. To me, as to Raeder, it seems clear that the myth of the *Phaedrus* concerning the nature and destiny of the soul would have been hopelessly incomprehensible to readers who had not already the key to it furnished by the psychology of the *Republic*. What, *e. g.*, is to be made of the 'two horses' which draw the chariot of the

soul in the *Phædrus*, apart from the psychological analyses of *Republic*, Bk. IV? In M. Rodier's explanation of the logical nature of the process Plato contemplated when he spoke of Dialectic, again, I find it hard to be satisfied with his identification of the ascending stage of Dialectic with an empirical process of establishment of more and more extensive genera of things by means of successive abstractions from sensible fact. It seems plain, I think, as a matter of language, that the demand that the process shall be accomplished "apart from all the senses," "without the aid of any sensible thing," is meant to apply just as much to the ascending as to the descending movement. Plato expressly says, in fact, that Dialectic is to take the objects studied by Geometry and Arithmetic as its starting-point. And he has said just before that, though geometers use sensible figures as aids to their studies, it is not these diagrams but the concepts they symbolize which are the real objects contemplated. Hence there can clearly be no element of the empirical anywhere in the dialectic process. What he really means seems to be this. The dialectician is to start with the various indefinables and unproved postulates of the mathematician as his data; he is then to attempt the task of reducing their number until he comes at last to what is really absolutely undefinable and unprovable. Plato assumes that in the end there will be only one such absolutely simple first principle. This is the ascending part of the whole movement. We are then to deduce the relatively unprovable postulates of the several branches of pure science from the absolutely unprovable principle thus obtained by a regular chain of inferences; and, similarly, to define the various undefinables of these sciences in terms of the ultimate undefinable discovered in the ascending process. The procedure of modern 'Logistique,' in reducing all the principles of Mathematics to those of Symbolic Logic, seems to me to afford an almost exact exemplification of the kind of thing which Plato is anticipating as the task of the philosophy of the future. The nearest analogue in the history of ancient thought would probably be the method followed by Proclus in his *Theological Elements*. In any case, it is, I think, clear that no appeal to empirical sensible facts is supposed to play any part in the process at any stage. We cannot too often insist on the point that for Plato science is not the systematization of 'experience'; in his view, Science is always and necessarily 'transcendent' of experience. Where experience begins, Science leaves off. We may not accept this view ourselves, we may even absolutely reject it; but there is no eliminating it from the very centre of the Platonic theory of knowledge.

The third article, by M. Hamelin, is devoted to a careful examination of Aristotle's doctrine of the different forms of the 'opposition of concepts.' The treatment of the subject is preponderantly expository rather than critical, and calls for no special comments here. I may note in passing one or two minor statements as to historical fact which are hardly exact. It is a mistake to say without qualification that Plato thought the difficulties raised by Antisthenes as to non-identical predication trivial ("des pauvretés," p. 77). No doubt he did think so when he put them into the mouths of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus as specimens of their professional accomplishments; but in the *Theætetus* and *Sophistes* they are treated as very real problems, the resolution of which demands the full exercise of Plato's powers of logical analysis. The point is of some importance, since it is one of the pieces of evidence which show the comparatively late date of the *Theætetus*, a result which is of the first significance for our whole conception of Plato's philosophical development. Nor is it quite true that Aristotle exclusively connects these logical problems with the Eleatic dialectic. He expressly connects the theory that 'contradiction is impossible' also with the relativism of Protagoras (*Met.*, 1009a6) and indirectly with Heracliteanism (*ib.*, 1005b25).

The two articles dealing with modern philosophy are one by M. Pillon on the philosophy of Renouvier, in connection with the recent book of M. Séailles on that subject, and one by M. Dauriac on the philosophy of M. Tarde. I cannot think that M. Pillon is altogether happy in his attempt to meet the criticisms which have been passed upon the finitist assumptions of Neo-criticism. He appears to hold that the Law of Contradiction is somehow a more ultimate and important principle than any of the other laws of Logic. He thinks, again, if I understand him correctly, that the notion of cardinal number is already logically implied by the notions of a term and of a class of terms. And he assumes that whatever has a cardinal number has a finite number. All these assumptions are, to say the least of it, rejected by a great and growing school of mathematical thinkers, and require considerable justification before they can be admitted as axioms in philosophy. The Law of Contradiction has been fairly shown to be only one among a plurality of axioms, all of which are indispensable to valid inference. When I say, "A is an X, B is an X, and A is not identical with B," I surely have already the concepts of a term, of a plurality of terms, and of a class; yet there is no reference in the proposition to any concept of cardinal number. In fact, I could go on to use the statement in constructing a definition of the number '2,' to

which it must therefore be logically prior. And, finally, it is a pure assumption that whatever has a number must be denumerable, *i. e.*, that the number of any actual collection must be finite. What, *e. g.*, is the number of the whole series of finite integers? It clearly has no finite number, yet there is equally clearly an entity connected with it in the same way in which the number of a finite collection is connected with that collection. It is greater than any finite number, less than the entity which we call the 'number' of all the real numbers, is subject to formal laws of addition and multiplication, and so forth. To recognize its existence while refusing to give it the name of a 'number' is merely to dispute about words. To deny its existence is impossible, at least for M. Pillon, who rightly denies that we create the 'number' of a collection for ourselves by the process of counting. No logical ground then has been given for denying the existence of collections with an infinite number of terms. Hence the statement that no continuum can be objectively real, and that space, in particular, is shown to be subjective by the single consideration that it is a continuum, is a pure *petitio principii*. Nor should M. Pillon have simply taken it for granted that all continua are in the end spatial, without some consideration of the modern doctrines which construct the continuum out of discrete elements and maintain that the only certain continuum with which we are acquainted is non-spatial, *viz.*, the arithmetical continuum of the real numbers. It is possible for us to agree heartily with the greater part of the article, in which the author is engaged in defending the reality of the categories of personal experience, in other words the reality of teleology, against current phenomenalism, without according any faith either to the alleged finitude of all actual collections, or admitting the illusory character of space.

The essay on the philosophy of Tarde could only be discussed by one who has a closer acquaintance with the subject than the present writer.

A. E. TAYLOR.

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

Memorials of Thomas Davidson, the Wandering Scholar. Collected and edited by WILLIAM KNIGHT. Boston and London, Ginn & Co., 1907. —pp. xii, 241.

To the memory of one who knew Thomas Davidson, the spiritual dimensions of the man seem to grow rather than diminish as the years go by. Yet, but for his memory and the lives that he influenced, he has left behind nothing that can be called great, nothing to justify to posterity the estimate of his admiring friends. A vigorous and independent thinker, he developed no system of philosophy; a social, religious, and educational reformer, he started no movement, organized no institution of very wide reaching significance or that is likely long to last; a man of extraordinary learning, he wrote no monumental or epoch-making book. His significance was rather that of a large, generous, many-sided, vital, and stimulating personality. He was a sort of modern peripatetic Socrates with the encyclopædic knowledge of an Aristotle. Impatient of artificial restraints alike in society, in the church, and in the schools, the one passion of his life appears to have been to develop in himself and others free personality based on insight and loyalty to the ideals of a complete reason, sensitive, intellective, and practical. In the possibilities of men for freedom of this sort he had profound confidence; and it was the only sort of freedom that, in his view, was worth talking about. The means he conceived as essential to attain it were philosophy, a respect for scientific method, familiar acquaintance with the greatest works in literature and art, and a well grounded knowledge of the whole history of civilization. Every man, he thought, could be educated; one of his pet ideals was a university for the wage earners. Every man and woman, he said, ought to be a philosopher. Richly endowed in his own nature, with energy enough to equip ten ordinary men, passionate, masterful, disputatious, lover of learning and of art, a good hater and a devoted friend, his mind was compacted of many contradictory elements. Always idealistic, he was by turns and at once rationalist and mystic, empiricist and transcendentalist, scholastic and modern. He had many teachers, but swore by no master. He changed his opinions from time to time, but was always pretty dogmatic in asserting whatever he happened to think true at any particular time. In his later years his wealth of learning seemed often an encumbrance, but at his best he was a keen dialectician as well as a most lucid expositor. The real nobility of his character showed preëminently in the last two years, when he gave of his best to educational work among poor Jews on the East Side of New York.

The memorials of him collected and edited by Dr. Knight will be welcomed by the many friends whom he influenced for good, to whom the

volume is inscribed, and will help others to understand the peculiar reverence he inspired, as well as the contradictions which a man of such intense energy and convictions sometimes not unnaturally provoked. It is made up of biographical notes, reminiscences and estimates of friends, letters and addresses, and other illustrative material, including an excellent portrait, a full bibliography of Davidson's works, together with a complete list of the titles of his lectures and a remarkable outline of a course of twenty lectures he planned on the "Origins of Modern Thought," from which one may gain a good idea at once of the organizing unity of his thought, of the breadth of his sympathies, and of his wide and varied learning. The best estimate of Davidson himself is the article by Professor James reprinted from *McClure's*.

H. N. GARDINER.

SMITH COLLEGE.

The Philosophical Radicals and Other Essays. With Chapters Reprinted on the Philosophy of Religion in Kant and Hegel. By A. SETH PRINGLE-PATTISON. Edinburgh and London, William Blackwood & Sons; imported by Charles Scribner's Sons, 1907. — pp. xii, 336.

This book contains four articles reprinted with slight additions from the *Quarterly Review*, the *Contemporary Review*, and the *Hibbert Journal*; three critical reviews, which originally appeared in *Mind* and in this REVIEW; and two reprints of essays written by the author in 1882 and 1883 respectively. The papers which form the first section of the work deal with "The Philosophical Radicals" (The English Utilitarians), "Mr. Kidd on Western Civilization," "Martineau's Philosophy," and "Herbert Spencer: The Man and His Work." Although these articles were written and published on different occasions, they are not without relation. As the author states in the Preface to the volume: "The title of the volume is that of the paper which appeared first in order of time, but the choice is not merely casual. Doctrines and tendencies discussed in connection with the Philosophical Radicals reappear in the papers which follow, and the prominence throughout of the social and political aspects of philosophical theory gives a certain unity to the collection." The critical reviews which are here reprinted treat of Jones's *Critical Account of the Philosophy of Lotze*, Dewey's *Studies in Logical Theory*, and McTaggart's *Some Dogmas of Religion*. They are all of great importance as giving clear and direct expression to Professor Pringle-Pattison's opinions on fundamental problems of philosophy. The reprints from earlier works are the essay on "The Philosophy of Religion in Kant and Hegel," which forms the second part of the author's *From Kant to Hegel*, and "Philosophy as Criticism of Categories," which formed his contribution to the volume, *Essays in Philosophical Criticism*, published in 1883 by the English neo-Hegelians, and dedicated to the memory of Thomas Hill Green, who died in the previous year. The twenty-five years which have elapsed since the first publication of these essays have not lessened their value, though doubtless the

standpoint which they represent is more generally understood now than when they were written. There are in these earliest writings the same elements of permanent interest, — sound scholarship, breadth of view, clearness of thought and expression, — which mark Professor Pringle-Pattison's more recent publications. As both the volumes in which these essays originally appeared have been for some time out of print, their republication in the present work will fortunately serve to make them known to a new generation of readers.

J. E. C.

The Aims and Achievements of Scientific Method: An Epistemological Essay. By T. PERCY NUNN. London, Macmillan & Co., 1907. — pp. x, 144.

This little book is an expansion of a paper bearing the same title which was read before the Aristotelian Society of London in 1906, and published in their proceedings for the same year (Vol. VI, N. S.). In its present form, it was presented to the University of London as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Science.

As a clear and compendious statement of some of the main positions of the 'New Realism,' Dr. Nunn's book may be heartily recommended. He himself acknowledges that he owes the essential features of his doctrine to the work of Mr. G. E. Moore and Mr. Bertrand Russell. "The essence of the doctrine is the view that a large part of the contents of our consciousness from moment to moment consists of elements which exhibit themselves as having a certain unique 'priority' to our conscious processes. These elements constitute what I have described as the objective. The aim of the scientific process as it occurs in the individual is to render the objective in its actual determinations intelligible" (p. 142). Along with this realistic doctrine, and as contributing to its elucidation and support, Dr. Nunn discusses the development of some of the fundamental conceptions and hypotheses of physical science, analyzing the functions which they fulfil in making the objective intelligible. Perhaps the most striking result of the discussion is the conclusion, which is maintained against both Mach and the Pragmatists, that there is a complete break between judgments which deal with primary facts alone and 'scientific' judgments which are all secondary constructions of facts.

Dr. Nunn's essay is a sound and careful piece of work. Although its brief compass made impossible any detailed discussion of the problems involved, the outline presented in the different sections is clear and precise in statement.

J. E. C.

The World Machine. The First Phase: The Cosmic Mechanism. By CARL SNYDER. London, New York, Bombay, and Calcutta, Longmans, Green, & Co., 1907. — pp. xvi, 488.

This is the first of three proposed volumes on the same general theme, the sub-titles of the other two to be, *The Mechanism of Life*, and *The Social*

Mechanism. It is an ingenious and scholarly historical work written in a popular, enthusiastic style which sometimes glows with admiration for the heroes of the history of science and their work. Perhaps most American scholars would find the book better suited to their taste, if the style were less loose and evangelistic. Certainly the present writer would. There can, however, be no question of the author's mastery of the subject, or of the permanent value of this reconstruction of the history of the deeper ideas in our scientific view of the physical world. The writer's intense human interest in and admiration for the personalities of the leaders of scientific thought in all ages, his familiarity with the details of their lives and work, and especially his brilliant sense of historical perspective and continuity, are splendid. The account is often dramatic. It not only reproduces well-known facts of history, but where these are scanty or lacking, as in the case of the ancients, he tries to reconstruct the concrete experiences which must have led up to discovery. There is, however, no confusion of fact and fancy.

It may be well to cite one example. Speaking of Bion, he writes. "Of this Bion, the mathematician, and native, like Democritus, of Abdera, we have only a line. 'He was the first person who asserted that there were countries where there was day for six months and night for six months.' That was all that remained to him of fame, when in the second century of our era Diogenes of Laerté came to write that curious history to which the larger part of our knowledge of the ancient philosophers is due. But consider for a moment all that this assertion of Bion's implies." Then follow nearly four and a half pages of reconstruction based on simple principles of geometry and the law that light moves in straight lines (such knowledge as the ancients possessed), to show that Bion, without having travelled beyond the boundaries of the civilized world, may with certainty have arrived at his deduction.

In the first chapter, the aim of the book is stated as follows: "I wish to trace out the path and the method by which these ideas [of the world-machine], these results, have been reached." The writer professes a thoroughly naturalistic and positivistic view of the world. "In the experimental investigation of the scheme of nature, the mind of man has a work to do; but with the outer mystery it has nothing to do. We may conceive that in the time to come it will wholly give over the search for final causes or first causes, will recognize its vanity and absurdity. What we call philosophy will be transformed or forgotten." He seems to disclaim any belief in religion. "A religion of nature is a chimera, an anti-thesis of terms. The aims of nature seem as various as its phenomena, and in the future the hallucinated mind which professes to surprise its secret will be regarded as the proper subject of the alienist." We can never explain, we can only describe. "No untoward visit of some vagrant sun to our system interrupting, we shall in time complete the description of cosmos and its contents; but the 'why' of things will remain as obscure

as now." Democritus and Archimedes are characterized as "the greatest intellects of antiquity," and Eratosthenes is rated as much superior to Aristotle, who "did not have the exact and measuring sort of mind." Plato's name is scarcely mentioned except as an example, along with Socrates, Hegel, and others, of all that is futile and fatuous in the way of thought. It never seems to occur to the author that his positivistic naturalism is itself a philosophy, or that it may be shot through and through with contradictions. This is a minor feature of the present book, but it must become more prominent in the two books which are to succeed it in the series; it is accompanied by a certain wordiness and bumptious grandiloquence of style which are likely to offend many thoughtful readers. Were it not for "what we call philosophy," there would probably be no science; and there can never come a time when the *imago mundi* can be completed without its aid. On the whole, we should say the world can do without science much more easily than it can do without philosophy, but we may differ in our definitions; and, in any case, this need not hinder our appreciation of the positive merits of the book as interesting popular reading in the history of science. That it may mislead some as to the meaning and uses of philosophy is perhaps a small matter.

The work contains an analytic table of contents, thirty-four chapters, a select bibliography with fifty-one titles, besides numerous other references in the text, and a fifteen-page index. From the following titles of chapters, one may gather the drift and style of the work: "*Imago Mundi*," "The Overcoming of Appearances," "Micro-man: The Bacillus on the Wheel," "The Beginnings of Certitude," "Bion and the Doctrine of the Round Earth," "Eratosthenes and the Earliest Measures of the Earth," "Aristarchus and the Distance and Grandeur of the Sun," "The Turning of the Earth: The Fixity of the Sky," "The Flying Earth: The Fixity of the Sun," "Archimedes and the First Ideas of Gravitation," "Democritus and the Concept of an Atomic Universe," "The Legacy of the Greeks," "The Rebirth of Time," "Copernicus: The True System of the World," "Bruno and the Reception of the New Ideas," "Kepler: Pioneer of the Modern Ideas of Natural Law," "Galileo and the Optic Tube," "The Advance Toward a Rational World Conception," "The True Grandeur of the Sun," "The Development of Mechanics: The Forerunners of Newton," "Newton and the Motor Force of the World Machine," "Halley and the Messengers of the Gods," "Roemer and the Proof of the Earth's Motion," "Laplace and the Stability of the Solar System," "Fixing the Boundaries of our Solar World," "Herschel and the Helter-Skelter Flight of the Stars," "The Measure of Stellar Space," "The Spectroscope and the Stuff of Cosmos," "Our Place in Space: The Plurality of Worlds," "The Astronomy of the Invisible," "The Structure of the Universe," "The Birth and Death of Worlds," "The Cosmic Exchange of Matter and Life," "The Last Riddle," "The End of the Machine."

G. A. TAWNEY.

Moderne Philosophie: Ein Lesebuch zur Einführung in ihre Standpunkte und Probleme. Herausgegeben von M. FRISCHEISEN-KÖHLER. Stuttgart, Verlag von Ferdinand Enke, 1907. — pp. xi, 412.

This book consists of a collection of extracts from the writings of contemporary philosophers, and is intended to serve as an introduction to the study of philosophy. The editor has selected a number of present-day problems to which he gives the solutions offered by representatives of opposing schools. In this way he hopes to acquaint the reader with the most important philosophical movements of our times. His main object is to render assistance to more advanced students who have had some training in the subject, but he trusts that the book may also prove serviceable to general readers who are seeking a knowledge of contemporaneous thought.

The following are the topics taken up: Problems of Epistemology and Logic (pp. 51-100); Problems of the Philosophy of Nature (pp. 103-151); Problems of the Philosophy of Mind (155-226); Problems of Æsthetics (pp. 229-288); Problems of Practical Philosophy (pp. 290-340). The selections are grouped under the following headings and are taken from the works of the authors whose names are indicated: The Objectivity of Knowledge (Dühring, Mach, and Natorp); The Theory of Judgment (Windelband and Sigwart); The Relation of Mind and Body (Ebbinghaus and Stumpf); Energetics (Ostwald and Wundt); The Function and Method of Psychology (Münsterberg and Dilthey); Historicism (Nietzsche and Troeltsch); Naturalism (Emile Zola, K. Fiedler, and Jonas Cohn); Æsthetic Enjoyment (Konrad Lange and Lipps); The Freedom of the Will (Paulsen and James); Pedagogy as a Science (Rein and Rudolf Lehmann).

The Appendix contains notes, extracts from other authors, and bibliographical references. There is also an Introduction by the Editor on the Historical Anarchy of Philosophical Systems and the Ideal of a Scientific Philosophy (pp. 3-48).

A book like this will have value for the general reader who has neither the time nor the inclination to go directly to the sources themselves, but it is hardly to be supposed that advanced students, for whom it is especially intended, will be satisfied with extracts. It is to be regretted that Dr. Frischeisen-Köhler includes in his selections the views of so few thinkers outside of Germany, and that his bibliographical references are made up almost entirely of the works of Germans. "Advanced" students certainly ought to be interested in what is being done in countries other than their own.

FRANK THILLY.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

Il Problema del Bene: Ricerche su l'oggetto della Morale. Da CAMILLO TRINERO. Torino, Carlo Clausen, 1907. — pp. xvi, 246.

This work consists of an Introduction dealing at some length with the

moral crisis and the nature of the moral problem, and two parts, "The Logical Comprehension of the Moral Idea" and "The Logical Extension of the Moral Idea." The more valuable and interesting passages in the book will be found in the first of these parts, which consists mainly of an ingenious and careful analysis of the concept of the Good, which the author defines as the satisfaction subjective and objective of wants (Bisogni). Unconscious as well as conscious wants are recognized as holding this essential relation to the Good. The second part deals with practical moral issues; but though much it contains is no doubt true, it does not, in the present writer's opinion, throw much new light upon vital ethical problems.

E. RITCHIE.

La Filosofia dell' arte in Gustavo Flaubert. Da ANTONIO FUSCO. Messina, Paolo Trinchera, 1907.—pp. 176.

Gustave Flaubert's ideal of literary art not only profoundly affected his own younger contemporaries in France, but indirectly has had a wide and lasting influence upon European literature. To gather together the scattered reflections, to be found mainly in his correspondence, upon the spirit, aims, and method of genuine art, as he conceived it, was worth doing, and Signor Fusco has performed the task with care and intelligence. The author's account of the condition of French literary criticism in the nineteenth century is valuable, and his attribution of its defects to the lack of a sound philosophical basis for æsthetics is probably correct. Signor Fusco is in sympathy with Flaubert's doctrine that art can have no other end than itself, and that the form rather than the matter must be the main concern of the artist as such; but he does not conceal the occasional extravagances and exaggerations into which Flaubert is led in the expression of a theory which is in the main sound. The present volume is an instalment of a work on French Literary Criticism which will be awaited with interest.

E. RITCHIE.

The following books also have been received:

The Philosophy of Loyalty. By JOSIAH ROYCE. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1908.—pp. xiii, 409. \$1.50.

The Works of Aristotle Translated into English. Part 2. De Lineis Insecabilibus. By HAROLD H. JOACHIM. Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1908.—pp. 968a-972b. 2s. 6d.

The Grammar of Philosophy: A Study of Scientific Method. By DAVID GRAHAM. Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1908.—pp. xi, 383. 7s. 6d.

Philosophy. By NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER. A lecture delivered at Columbia University in the series on science, philosophy, and art. New York, The Columbia University Press, 1908.—pp. 27. \$.25.

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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scholastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I. Abtl.*: *Zeitschrift für Psychologie.* — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS.

Le problème de Dieu, d'après la philosophie nouvelle. N. BALTHASAR.
Rev. Néo-Sc., XIV, 4, pp. 449-489.

The pragmatic movement takes its rise from Kantian subjectivism. In order to save from shipwreck the bases of the moral and religious life, it must give the will as practical reason precedence of theoretical intelligence. There is no object opposed to thought and distinct from it, there is no thinking subject; nothing is real but thought in action. Le Roy wishes to distinguish this philosophy from English pragmatism. He affects to satisfy the intellectual side of our being. Moral certitude is not a degree but a kind of certitude. If it is necessary to live one's thought, it is also necessary to think one's life. But abstract formulæ are never more than an inadequate and unfaithful approximation to truth. Against Le Roy we should say that the moral conditions necessary for the discovery of truth do not prevent the possibility of purely immediate evidence compelling our assent in last analysis. Le Roy's theory logically involves the measuring of truth by success, by utility. The new philosophy cannot find the bridge between the concept and reality, and cannot assign to Thought-Action its real object. Le Roy seeks to show that there are involved in the traditional arguments for the existence of God postulates which the modern mind cannot accept. Thomists and modernists have, he says, a different *Weltanschauung*. In all his criticisms Le Roy is an adversary of every philosophy of the concept. He first takes up the cosmological argument 'a motu.' According to him this argument supposes that reality is composed of immovable substances, to which movement is accidentally added. True philosophic method, on the contrary, commands us to take movement as the fundamental reality, and to consider immobility as a derivative reality, an

ideal limit in the movement which alone exists. The question between us and Le Roy may be stated thus : Can being by itself be movement, becoming, or does it receive this movement, this becoming from something outside itself ; and, in fine, does it receive it from an Absolute which itself is not becoming but being, pure possession of an unchanged reality? We may note : (1) that the traditional philosophy does not deny becoming. (2) There are two kinds of immobility : privative and transcendent. Immobility of a being made for action and capable of varying its perfection is privative ; immobility of an Absolute which has in itself no becoming is transcendent. (3) If the principle of sufficient reason has ideal objectivity, it is necessary, in order to find the sufficient reason of any movement whatever, to go back to an Absolute which possesses transcendent immobility. For no being can give itself anything which it has not got. That there is something Absolute or necessary is beyond dispute. Le Roy, however, would not allow a 'being' which becomes but is only an infinite becoming. Yet he contradicts his own theory, for he speaks of a noumenon which underlies the phenomena. (4) Our concepts do not apply to God and to His creatures univocally, but analogically. Le Roy indeed concedes the analogical value of our concepts as applied to God, but he adds that this analogy cannot serve as a basis for any but conjectural reasoning. This we cannot admit. No doubt our knowledge of God is not scientific in the Spencerian sense of the word, but it has what the ancients called metaphysical certitude. Le Roy objects that to know God by means of reason would detract from His omnipotence by subjecting him to the logical laws. Would Le Roy say with Descartes that the divine will is purely arbitrary? The last four arguments of St. Thomas are particular forms of the argument from movement. The contingent is not sufficient, but demands the anterior existence of the necessary. Le Roy says that the argument from contingency rests on the assumption of common sense that matter is an aggregate of radically distinct individuals, whereas according to him the real is continuous. Contingency is due to the unreality of the parts. The whole, the underlying noumenon, the sole reality, is necessary. But if there is nothing but continuous becoming, it is impossible to speak of an underlying noumenon. Moreover, Le Roy ignores the action of the understanding in analyzing and giving meaning to the given of sense. In the argument from causality Le Roy misinterprets the reasoning of St. Thomas. The argument for the existence of a first cause rests not on the necessity of having an end to the series of caused causes, but on the insufficiency of a series of caused causes, — even if the series were infinite, — to explain any dependent causality. This does not at all touch the question as to whether the world was made in time or is from eternity. The argument from degrees of perfection of beings is a particular case of the argument from contingency. It is not to be confounded with the ontological argument of Anselm. To sum up, the dilemma is this : Either admit a pure Act, an uncaused Cause, Being in itself, a subsisting and infinite per-

fection ; or with Heraclitus, Hegel, and the modern nominalists, affirm as Absolute a becoming without laws, a principle of creation which is incomprehensible and contradictory as soon as we try to think of it. Le Roy chooses the latter, hoping to be able to replace the 'proof' of the existence of God by his lived experience. It remains to be seen how he uses the argument from the order of the universe for this purpose.

M. MOLLOY.

The Inductive Argument for Design. D. H. MACGREGOR. *Mind*, No. 64, pp. 535-548.

Some events or series of events are such that a purely causal explanation is not adequate, does not exhaust the content of the series. The marks of causation are uniform and necessary sequence ; those of design are contingency and utility. The evidence in favor of design is greatest in the biological sphere ; but here it is least convincing, for the organic tendency to seek pleasure and avoid pain seems to explain the facts causally. In the inorganic sphere evidence is lacking. The modern argument for design substitutes an ethical and subjective for an objective and metaphysical form. Thus, as it takes the form of demonstrating finite purposiveness, it becomes more dependent on some valid proof of the unity of the world. This unity seems to be best represented in a formula which is dynamic as well as static.

M. MOLLOY.

Naturalism and Humanism. FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE. *The Hibbert Journal*, VI, 1, pp. 1-17.

The intellectual background of the modern spirit takes its color in great part from the two fundamental ideas of what we call Naturalism : (1) Man is not master over nature, but a part of it ; (2) nature is essentially mechanical. This mechanical view of things has been so successful, both in theory and in practice, that it is almost impossible for us to think of nature in any other terms. However, Naturalism has not been emotionally satisfactory. A mechanical world is emotionally bankrupt. It is this emotional poverty which has both caused and justified the opposition of Humanism to Naturalism. Humanism, however, exhausts itself because it is merely reproductive instead of productive. Looking always to the past, it never turns to the direct experience of the present. Rich in culture, it solves no actual problems. A wider humanized Naturalism or naturalized Humanism must take the place of these narrower types of thought. Mechanism itself has a profound moral and educative significance ; the deepening consciousness of its power as an instrument gives us confidence that no evils are incurable, and that human stupidity is the chief source of human ills. Moreover, nature is not merely mechanical. Its machinery exists to support and maintain its product, man. For man is a part of nature, carried on by her forces to work the works of intelligence. In him she bursts

forth into sustained consciousness of her own evolution, producing in him knowledge of her processes, estimations of her goods, and suspicions of her ultimate significance. This is a truth of nature and not a product of human fancy; and it is a truth fraught with the profoundest emotional import. The recognition of this truth would constitute a philosophy which would retain the truth of both Naturalism and Humanism, neither disregarding mechanism nor condemning human ideals as illusory.

E. H. HOLLANDS.

PSYCHOLOGY.

La définition de la mémoire. L. DUGAS. Rev. Ph., XXXII, 10, pp. 365-382.

Memory, like all psychological facts, appears between two limits. There is no memory (1) when perceptions are crude, nor (2) when they are completely systematized. Memory may fail from defect of perception, or from sensations being rejected by consciousness; for it depends upon the reception given both by consciousness. The mere reverberations of past perceptions do not constitute memory, but they are its raw material. They may reappear automatically, or by physiological necessity, but cannot be recalled. The perfect systematization of perception is no longer called memory, but habit, knowledge, capacity, talent. The memory elements must be organized in order that they may become accessible to us, or that we may evoke them; for the property of being recalled is a part of their essence. The distinction between memory and habit is therefore artificial, the one being a systematic association of images, the other a systematic association of acts. According as the representative element or the motor element predominates in a system of images, the system is called memory or habit. Both are acts of organization, and this is their fundamental character. Mental elements that are 'known' never seem to be recalled; the mind denies their character as mnemonic facts or as acquisitions of the past. It is in this sense that we say that memory excludes systematization. It is not their quality of being retained and recalled, but that of being recognized by the mind as its individual acquisitions, that gives to facts of consciousness the name of memories. There is no memory when the mind has lost trace of its personal acquisitions. The states constituting this lower limit may be called 'infra-memory'; those perfectly organized states constituting the upper limit, 'supra-memory.' Memory proper takes place between pure sensation and pure thought. The same law applies to the case of affective memory. Crude feeling states are not memories, even when more or less organized.

E. JORDAN.

M. Ribot's Theory of the Passions. A. F. SHAND. Mind, No. 64, pp. 477-505.

Under the word 'passion' Ribot includes such feelings as gluttony,

drunkenness, sensuality, ambition, love of gambling, adventure, and sports, avarice, political passion, patriotism, and religion. We must approve of this attempt to find some term to express these chief systems of character and to distinguish them from individual emotions. Ribot characterizes passion as simply a more complex and stable feeling than emotion. The principle underlying this classification is a division of the feelings based on quantitative differences of intensity, stability, and complexity. Through his application of this principle, Ribot has isolated the emotions from the passions and failed to understand their intimate, reciprocal relation. The emotions have an essential place and function in the passions, and the true distinction between them is the distinction between the same feelings regarded alternately as individuals and as forming a higher organization. Passion is organized emotion. In every passion there is a system of self-control regulating more or less efficiently the intensity and behavior of its emotions. But passion is not sufficiently defined as organized emotion; it is also organized desire. If we apply this theory to the interpretation of the passions, we find that all the passions except hate are varieties of love. We come next to the genealogical problem on which Ribot lays so much stress. The instinct on which the development of love is based is not any one of the instincts at the root of the primary emotions, nor all of them as a collection, but is their total existence as an organized system. The instinct of love, though the most complex of human instincts, is not itself love in any proper and complete sense of the term until it has found a suitable object. Joy is the signal that it has found an object. Thus the passion is based not only on the highly complex instinct of love, but also on the instincts which are involved in the dispositions of the primary emotions.

M. MOLLOY.

Concerning Animal Perception. G. H. MEAD. *Psych. Rev.*, XIV, 6, pp. 383-390.

The inadequate treatment of animal perception, both in general psychologies and in special investigations of animal intelligence, is due in part to the incompleteness of the theory concerning human perception, and in part to an insufficient analysis of the conditions of possible perception in the lower animal forms. It would seem that in human consciousness there are phases in which perception is reduced to a minimum; *e. g.*, certain processes of improvement in games take place even below the perceptual level. Thorndyke calls such a process an association of an impulse and a stimulus which lies outside the association of ideas. The present article attempts to show that this form of association will explain many instances of animal reaction commonly conceived of as perception by the animal psychologists, and that the reaction is not necessarily the result of an association of ideal contents. As a type of these instances, the author takes the action of the chick in rejecting the cinnabar caterpillar.

G. W. CUNNINGHAM.

L'imitation dans l'idée du moi. J. PAULHAN. Rev. Ph., XXXII, 9, pp. 272-281.

I dream that a stranger has attacked me, and has taken possession of my arms and hands. I am clearly conscious of the beating of my heart, which I recognize as belonging to myself, and not to the assailant. This dream presents facts common to such cases. The recognition of the second personality is usually accompanied by a clear consciousness of self. Anything, like the beating of the heart, which is recognized as belonging to the real personality, assumes great importance. A second dream: S. dreams that he is walking in silence with a friend. Suddenly, and without surprise, he sees his friend walking and talking with a companion behind him. Meanwhile, his friend is walking in silence by his side. This is another case of the construction of an extra personality, which is accompanied by an increased clearness in the consciousness of self. Another instance of this phenomenon is found in the case of personal and impersonal opinions. I hold a theory which I do not regard as my own. It is true, and hence belongs to all. If, however, the theory is antagonized, I identify myself with it, in defending it, with the result that the consciousness of self comes to the front. In still other cases, we come by the idea of ourselves by looking upon ourselves as if we were strangers. We thus construct an idea of ourselves in terms of what we imagine to be the opinions of others.

A. H. JONES.

Kritik der Widerlegung des Parallelismus auf Grund einer "naturwissenschaftlichen" Analyse der Handlung durch Hans Driesch. ERICH BECHER. Z. f. Psych., XLV, 6, pp. 401-440.

The problem which Driesch had set himself was, in general, to discover what constitutes the essential characteristics of a human action as an event in space when looked at simply from the standpoint of the natural sciences, and, in particular, to find out whether such an action could be conceived as a purely mechanical or machine-like event, as is done by the upholders of psychophysical parallelism. The latter question was answered negatively, and to both Becher raises a number of objections. The first criterion of a human action, according to Driesch, is the "historical reaction basis," *i. e.*, the peculiarity of an action is essentially determined by previous stimuli and their particular reactions. Becher objects that this does not distinguish a human action from the movement of a machine, for the well-known reason that repeated use will sooner or later wear out any kind of instrument. In a more detailed statement of Driesch's first criterion, it is said that the combination of succeeding effects is entirely independent of the combination of previous stimuli. But the same thing can easily be conceived to occur in certain machines, *e. g.*, in a somewhat modified phonograph. Such imaginary machines differ at best only in degree from the human organism. Driesch confuses here two definitions of a machine. Instead of opposing to his general vitalistic action any inorganic physico-

chemical event, he limits himself to technical instruments as constructed by man. The second criterion, according to Driesch, is the fact that the stimulus acts as a whole, as a unity, and not simply as a summation of certain physical and chemical events, and it brings forth reactions which also in a certain sense present themselves as a whole. Again Becher objects that this is not only conceivable but actually occurs in purely mechanical systems such as the telephone. Frequently the actual or immediate stimulus which touches off a series of human reactions is only the last member of a long series of more remote stimuli, and a slight change in the immediate stimulus may cause a great difference in, or even inhibition of, the normal reaction. This, however, can be easily paralleled in mechanics, as when the winding key of a very complex automatic machine is modified. Furthermore, it is said that all mechanical systems presuppose a preëstablished or preformed connection between certain causes and certain effects, while in human life the stimuli act as a separate individual whole resulting in a separate individual act. But they do this, Becher objects, only in as far as there is a preformed connection between the stimuli and the human organism; in other words, certain elements in the reaction are predetermined by certain elements in the stimulus, while certain other elements may be more or less accidental. Among other criteria of perhaps minor importance, our author criticises the one which denies a struggle for existence among purely mechanical systems, and the other which asserts the non-teleological character of machines. Other proofs adduced by Driesch for a vitalistic conception of human actions are summarily refuted by Becher as unconvincing.

L. R. GEISSLER.

À propos de la "méthode d'introspection" dans la psychologie expérimentale. A. MICHOTTE. Rev. Néo.-Sc., XIV, 4, pp. 507-532.

Within the last few years the method commonly called "introspective" has acquired a scientific standing on the same basis as the other methods of experimental psychology. Under certain conditions it is capable of furnishing scientific results. We proceed to the determination of some of these conditions. To be scientific an experiment must obey the following laws: (1) The observer must be able to make the phenomenon appear and to observe it with sustained attention. (2) He must be able at will to reproduce the phenomenon under identical conditions. (3) He must be able to isolate the conditions of the phenomena from concomitant circumstances, and to vary the conditions. To what degree do current psychological methods realize these conditions? Introspection is the observation of internal facts, as opposed to the observation of external facts. Every psychological method is therefore necessarily introspective. But among psychological methods one may distinguish direct and indirect. In the direct methods, *e. g.*, in perception, external and internal observations coincide, so that the experimental conditions can be realized in the same

way as in all the physical sciences. In the methods of studying memory, association, time of reaction, etc., what one observes is no longer the psychical phenomenon provoked by the external stimulus, but a psychical phenomenon provoked by the perception of the stimulus. These methods are indirect also in the second sense that the psychic phenomena they investigate cannot be observed in process, but only afterwards through memory. In these indirect methods the observer cannot himself determine the appearance of the phenomenon. All he knows is *when* the excitation is going to take place and of what kind it will be; and he can concentrate his attention on remembering the process. The development of the indirect method has its best source in the measurement of times of reaction. This experiment consists in applying some stimulus to a subject, who, when he perceives it, is to react in a certain way, *e. g.*, by pressing an electric button. The time which elapses between the appearance of the stimulus and the movement of reaction is the time of reaction. Introspection studies the psychical phenomena within this time. Difficulties arise here owing to the fact that the field of consciousness is not all equally clear. These difficulties are to a large extent obviated by the instructions given to the observer before the experiment. The kind of the stimulus can also be determined by the experimenter. The same instructions may be given for several kinds of excitants. The *preparation* of the subject is another important factor under the control of the experimenter. Changing the instructions in the course of a series of experiments helps to secure important results. A difficulty is found in the unreliability of memory. This is, however, here reduced to a minimum by the favorable conditions of the experiment and by the possibility of repeating the experiment several times. Still another difficulty arises in giving exact expression in language to the observed phenomena. Indeed, the identity between the reproduced and the original phenomenon remains a postulate. It is undecided whether the experimenter should interrupt the introspections of the observer with questions. On the whole, it would seem good to employ questions during the first experiments in order to ensure a common vocabulary, but afterwards they may be dropped except in rare cases. Finally, it is seldom possible to repeat an experiment under identical conditions. For the fact of having observed a phenomenon once will influence the next observation. We reply that even though the experiments are not entirely identical, yet certain parts of the processes are identical, such as the qualitative effect of the instruction, etc. A great number of experiments will thus ensure a scientific result even in the case of complicated psychical phenomena.

M. MOLLOY.

ETHICS.

Doit-on fonder la science morale et comment? A. FOUILLÉE. Rev. Ph., XXX, 11, pp. 449-475.

For any science, principles are necessary not only for its own construc-

tion, but also for determining its relations to other sciences. This is especially true of morality, for its data differ from those of other sciences; moreover, its problems are immanent and not transcendent, as in other sciences. The truth or falsity of moral ideas must be established by examination of their elements, their conditions, and their origin. To take the 'sentiment of obligation' as a 'fact,' and thus to construct a natural philosophy of manners, would be to abandon true science. The fundamentals of a science must be examined from three points of view: the logical, the psychological, and the epistemological. By the logical bases of a science is meant the body of its most general principles. The psychological bases are those which establish the conformity of the principles of that science with our constitution, as beings endowed with intelligence, sensibility, and will. The epistemological bases are established by a critical analysis of consciousness, seeking the origin and the objective validity of the principles of the science. All sciences deal with the relations of causes and effects; these relations, interpreted in terms of will, become those of means to ends, without losing their scientific character. So not only is a practical science of morality possible, but since every idea has within itself an energy, all theory is practical. The method based on this conception of the idea, called the morality of 'idea-energy,' is psychological, and has two characters: it considers (1) the nature of the internal reality, and (2) the realization of the idea through its peculiar energy. In the moral subject there are: (1) the true self, conscious of its power, the element of personal dignity; and (2) the idea of others, within which is the notion of disinterestedness, the first step toward the universal. The principle of human nature and that of the ideal purposes of humanity are the two psychological principles of the science. Our choice among things corresponds to the qualities in things. Values are always relative, and depend upon desire; but desire is rational, as determined by our ideas. That which is desired is conceived as in a sense independent of us, yet the real verity is the system of relations which subsists between subjects and objects. Obligation is such a relation; it is social because cosmic, and moral because social and cosmic. The individual finds his complete self bound up with the lives of others, and with the life of the whole. Yet the world becomes complete through the perfection of the individuals. The 'good' is that toward which the human consciousness tends, and may be called the 'persuasive ideal.' The theory of 'idea-energy' holds (1) that the origin of the moral idea cannot be determined, and (2) that the moral idea is the origin of that group of effects which constitutes morality. The validity of the moral idea and its practical efficiency depend upon the intrinsic value of intelligence and will.

E. JORDAN.

Les conséquences morales de l'effort. G. TRUC. Rev. Ph., XXXII, 9, pp. 225-247.

This investigation is an attempt to show the relation between effort as a psychic state and moral values. The conclusion reached is that effort is the measure of value; that we value things in proportion to what they have cost us. It is first necessary to consider the nature of effort. There are three kinds of effort: muscular, emotional, and moral effort. Muscular effort arises from the fact that the organism is not a photographic plate which passively receives sensations. It is its nature to react upon the outer world, and this implies force and resistance to that force. But where there is a force acting against a physical resistance, there is muscular effort. Muscular effort, then, is a sensation of simple impulsion joined to an organic reaction. In emotional and moral effort, the force and resistance which give rise to the phenomenon of effort are found in the struggle of ideas for supremacy in consciousness. In emotional effort, the images are violent and highly colored, and seem to contend among themselves for supremacy regardless of conscious control. Emotional effort is thus largely undirected, and is not very noticeable because it is overshadowed by the violence of the images, and the movements which operate in the individual to satisfy his desires. Moral effort, unlike emotional effort, arises in the conscious direction of psychical forces according to a law imposed by the individual on himself. We are now in a position to see the relation between effort and morality. This relation is expressed in the saying: we value things in proportion to what they have cost us. In other words, moral evaluation and the amount of effort expended are directly proportional. This is shown in the moral values recognized by the individual and by the race. Personal morality has its birth in the conflict between self-interest and social interest. Self-interest is one of the strongest of human instincts; consequently, wherever this is sacrificed to the general welfare, the sacrifice involves a great expenditure of effort. Costing us as much as it does, morality is valued by us above all else. In the morality of the group, we find the same relation between value and effort. Things like territorial integrity, liberty, etc., which cost the group most, are valued most highly. From this it is evident that, both in the morality of the individual and in that of the state, the moral worth of anything is dependent on the effort it has cost, and is directly proportional to it.

A. H. JONES.

The Physical Basis of Conduct. E. G. SPAULDING. Psych. Bul., IV, 9, pp. 273-297.

The purpose of the paper is to determine the relation of the organic things and events forming the basis of conduct to inorganic phenomena. The author begins by considering the laws uniformly accepted as valid for inorganic phenomena. These laws are of two kinds: general or fundamental, and specific or empirical. Four fundamental laws are given: (1)

the conservation of energy ; (2) the conditions of transformation ; (3) entropy ; (4) determinism. The four laws are then expressed by a brief formula. The author indicates three 'functional, descriptive, or empirical laws, and insists that they can be made constituents of energy-laws. Regarding the relation of the four laws to empirical laws and to concrete phenomena, two positions are taken : (1) the four laws extend through the empirical and become incorporated in the concrete phenomena ; (2) they express only the quantitative aspect, existing side by side with the qualitative ; but not penetrating it. Spaulding supports the first view, for the second position is due to the fundamental distinction made between organic and inorganic phenomena ; by interpreting teleology as contradictory to determinism 'formaliter,' it seeks to avoid at the same time any contradiction with it 'realiter.' Three cases are given of the relations of one law to another. If the second position be accepted, teleology cannot be interpreted in the usual way. If the first position be postulated, then determinism and teleology, applied to the same process, are either contradictory 'realiter,' or express incorporate characteristics of the same process, or else stand in the relation of genus and species. An attempt is now made to establish a thorough-going deterministic position applying to all phenomena within the organism. Things (systems), events, relations, and qualities are examined ; also the 'creative synthesis' operating in all cases of whole and parts. The qualities of the whole may result additively from those of the parts ; in certain cases exact functional relation may be discovered between certain laws of qualities of the whole and those of the parts ; in other cases no such functional relation is discernible. Most of our present knowledge of the organism is of the third type ; hence the view that the organism itself is the only useful unit for biological investigation. The author then shows how far physical laws apply to organisms, and argues that determinism extends to the qualities. Consistency demands that we adopt for organic phenomena the same principles of procedure as are accepted for inorganic. This means, of course, a complete and thoroughgoing determinism for all processes and qualities found within the organism. Hence there is absolutely no opportunity for teleology, if this mean the variation of means to an end ; so that, if the term be retained, its meaning must be modified. A teleology of descriptive laws conducive to the preservation and progress of the individual or of the species is not only compatible with, but is a special case of determinism. When there are certain events, physical or psychical, identified with conduct, they must conform to these deterministic principles. The psychical teleology, then, becomes a special case of the objective, and the organic is related to the inorganic as species under the same genus.

R. A. TSANOFF.

NOTES.

The Third International Congress for the History of Religions will be held at Oxford, September 15-18.

Professor E. Hershey Sneath, who two years ago resigned his position at Yale on account of ill health, has been appointed lecturer on philosophy in the graduate school. Dr. Roswell P. Angier has been promoted to an assistant professorship of psychology.

Williston S. Hough, of the George Washington University, has resigned from the department of philosophy and has been elected Professor of Psychology and Pedagogy. Edward Elliott Richardson, Ph.D., has been elected instructor in Philosophy.

Dr. Margaret F. Washburn, formerly Associate Professor of Philosophy at Vassar College, has been appointed Professor of Psychology.

Dr. G. W. Cunningham, of Cornell University, has been appointed Instructor in Philosophy in Middlebury College, Vermont.

Mr. H. B. Alexander has been appointed Professor of Philosophy at the University of Nebraska.

Professor William James has sailed for England, where he is to give a course of Hibbert lectures on Present-day Philosophy before Manchester New College, Oxford.

We give below a list of the articles, etc., in the current philosophical periodicals:

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, XIX, 2: *G. Stanley Hall*, A Glance at the Phyletic Background of Genetic Psychology; *E. B. Titchener*, The Tridimensional Theory of Feeling; *David Gibbs*, The Daily Life of Amœba Proteus; *Helen M. Manro* and *M. F. Washburn*, The Effect of Imperceptible Lines on the Judgment of Distance; *Lucy Rowe* and *M. F. Washburn*, The Motor Memory of the Left Hand; *Maria Stroh*, *A. Margaret Shaw*, and *M. F. Washburn*, A Study in Guessing; *Ruth Hoag*, *Julia A. Lindemann*, and *M. F. Washburn*, A Study of Errors in the Perception of Movement on the Skin; *Joyce Hicks* and *M. F. Washburn*, A Suggestion towards a Study of the Perception of Sound Movement; *Walter Libby*, The Imagination of Adolescents; *Louise Ellison*, Children's Capacity for Abstract Thought as Shown by Their Use of Language in the Definition of Abstract Terms; Literature; Notes.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, XV, 2: *H. C. Stevens*, Peculiarities of Peripheral Vision; *G. M. Whipple*, Vocabulary and Word-building Tests; *B. Sidis*, The Doctrine of Primary and Secondary Sensory Elements (II); *E. L. Thorndike*, Memory for Paired Associates.

XV, 3: *H. Carr*, Voluntary Control of the Distance Location of the

Visual Field; *W. B. Pillsbury, S. S. Colvin, T. L. Bolton, and J. E. Boodin*, On Meaning: A Symposium Before the Western Philosophical Association; *J. Mark Baldwin*, Knowledge and Imagination; *F. C. French*, Group Self-Consciousness: A Stage in the Evolution of Mind.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, V, 5: *William Ernest Hocking*, Theory of Value and Conscience in Their Biological Context; Literature; Books Received; Notes and News.

V, 6: *John B. Watson*, Imitation in Monkeys; Psychological Literature; Reports.

THE MONIST, XVIII, 2: *S. Arrhenius*, The Transmission of Life Through the Universe; *John Butler Burke*, The Evolution of Life or Natural Selection in Inorganic Matter; *Editor*, Evolution and the Soul; *Philip E. B. Jourdain*, On Some Points in the Foundation of Mathematical Physics; *Charles S. S. Peirce*, Some Amazing Mazes; *D. Teitaro Suzuki*, A Brief History of Early Chinese Philosophy: (II) Ethics; *F. H. Gile*, Some Dangerous Tendencies of Modern Materialistic Psychology; Criticisms and Discussions; Book Reviews and Notes.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, V, 8: *Charles Hughes Johnston*, Ribot's Theory of the Passions; *Stevenson Smith*, The Threshold of Rectified Perception as a Clinical Test; *W. P. Montague*, Consciousness and Relativity—A Reply to Professor Bode; Societies; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

V, 9: *John E. Boodin*, Consciousness and Reality: (II) Consciousness and Its Implications; *R. W. Sellars*, Consciousness and Conservation; *L. Pearl Boggs*, The Question in the Learning Process; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

V, 10: *George Albert Coe*, Religious Value; *C. A. Strong*, Pragmatism and its Definition of Truth; *A. H. Pierce*, The Subconscious Again; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

V, 11: *Thaddeus L. Bolton*, A Genetic Study of Make-Believe; *Albert Schinz*, Jules de Gaultier's Theory of the Scientific Principles of Ethics; *Horace M. Kallen*, The Pragmatic Notion of *ἰλη*; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

V, 12: *Giovanni Vailati*, On Material Representations of Deductive Processes; *W. Mitchell*, Structure and Growth of the Mind; *Max Meyer*, The Exact Number of Pragmatisms; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

V, 13: *W. H. Winch*, The Function of Images; *Halbert Hains Britan*, The Power of Music; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

ARCHIV FÜR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE, XIV, 3: *Ludwig Stein*, Eduard Zeller; *Clemens Baeumker*, Zur Vorgeschichte zweier Lockescher Begriffe; *Basilus Antoniadis*, Die Staatslehre des Mariana; *R. Bloch*, Liber secundus yconomicorum Aristotelis; *Giuseppe Cevolani*, Sopra un passo illogico della Logica del Rosmini; *G. Falter*, Platons Ideenlehre; *O. Hilferding*, Die Sinne und die Künste; *Friedrich Kuntze*, Pascals letztes Problem; Jahresbericht über sämtliche Erscheinungen auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte der Philosophie; Zeitschriften; Eingegangene Bücher.

ARCHIV FÜR SYSTEMATISCHE PHILOSOPHIE, XIV, 2: *Ludwig Stein*, Der Pragmatismus; *Friedrich Sommer*, Die Grundzüge einer Sozialaristokratie; *M. Tramer*, Stetigkeit der Geometrie und der Zahlen; *Theodor Lessing*, Studien zur Wertaxiomatik; *Viktor Stern*, Der materialistische Dualismus; Drittes Preisausschreiben der Kantgesellschaft; Dritter internationaler Kongress für Philosophie; Jahresbericht über sämtliche Erscheinungen auf dem Gebiete der systematischen Philosophie; Systematische Abhandlungen in den Zeitschriften; Eingegangene Bücher.

VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE UND SOCIOLOGIE, XXXII, 1: *H. K. Schwarse*, Die Ethik Herbert Spencers; *R. Hönigswald*, Zum Problem der philosophischen Skepsis; *Richard Müller-Freienfels*, Zur Theorie der ästhetischen Elementarerscheinungen (I); *Demetrius Gusti*, Die sociologischen Bestrebungen in der neueren Ethik; Besprechungen über Schriften; Philosophische u. soziologische Zeitschriften; Bibliographie.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE, XLVII, 1 u. 2: *Anathon Aall*, Zur Frage der Hemmung bei der Auffassung gleicher Reize; *Aloys Müller*, Über psychophysische Wechselwirkung und das Energieprinzip; Literaturbericht.

XLVII, 3: *Sidney Alrutz*, Untersuchungen über die Temperatursinne; *Paul Linke*, Meine Theorie der stroboskopischen Täuschungen und Karl Marbe; Literaturbericht.

XLVII, 4: *Sydney Alrutz*, Untersuchungen über die Temperatursinne (Schluss); *Aloys Müller*, Zur Frage der Referenzflächen; *K. Marbe*, Bemerkungen zu Herrn Professor W. Wirths "Erwiderung"; Literaturbericht.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, XXXIII, 5: *Ch. Lalo*, Les sens esthétiques (I); *Émile Bréhier*, De l'image à l'idée: Essai sur le mécanisme psychologique de la méthode allégorique; *Bertrand Mertens*, La genèse psychologique de la conscience morale; *J. Segond*, Publications récentes sur la morale; Analyses et comptes rendus; Revue des périodiques étrangers; Le VI^e Congrès international de psychologie et son organisation future.

XXXIII, 6: *P. Sollier* et *G. Danville*, Passion du jeu et manie du jeu; *Ch. Lalo*, Les sens esthétiques (fin); *Dr. Laupis*, Responsabilité ou réac-

tività; *J. Sageret*, La curiosità scientifica; *Revue critique*; *Analyses et comptes rendus*; *Revue des périodiques étrangers*; *Table des matières*.

REVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE, VIII, 5: *La Direction*, Programme d'études pour le problème de la connaissance; *Abbé J. Martin*, Un poète philosophe; *A. Marie et R. Meunier*, Les courbes respiratoires dans l'euphorie des paralytiques généraux; *P. Duhem*, Le mouvement absolu et le mouvement relatif (VII); *G. Dumesnil*, L'œuvre critique de M. Pierre Lasserre; *Analyses et comptes rendus*; *Périodiques*; *L'enseignement philosophique*.

VIII, 6: *P.-J. Cuche*, Le procès de l'Absolu (I); *Georges Aimel*, Individualisme et philosophie bergsonienne; *R. Turro*, Psychologie de l'équilibre du corps humain (I); *P. Duhem*, Le mouvement absolu et le mouvement relatif (VIII); *Enquête sur l'idée de démocratie*; *Étude critique*; *Analyses et comptes rendus*; *Notes bibliographiques*.

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE LA MORALE, XVI, 3: *F. Colonna d'Istria*, Bichat et la biologie contemporaine; *J. Maldidier*, Les caractéristiques probables de l'image vraie; *M. Winter*, Importance philosophique de la théorie des nombres; *Études critiques*; *Questions pratiques*; *Supplément*.

REVUE NÉO-SCOLASTIQUE, XV, 2: *Clodius Piat*, De l'intuition en théodicée; *C. Sentroul*, La vérité dans l'art (fin); *D. Nys*, À propos du composé chimique; *A. Gemelli*, Le fondement biologique de la psychologie; *Bulletins bibliographiques*; *Bulletin de l'Institut de Philosophie*; *Comptes-rendus*; *Chronique philosophique*; *Ouvrages envoyés à la rédaction*.

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA E SCIENZE AFFINI, X, 3-4: *G. Marchesini*, L'interesse religioso nell'insegnamento; *C. Ransoli*, L'agnosteismo cristiano; *A. Bersano*, Per le fonti di Hobbes; *A. Crespi*, Il pensiero filosofico-giuridico di Cesare Beccaria; *E. Bodrero*, I Presocratici; *Questioni varie*; Per l' "anima della scuola"; *Autorelazioni, Analisi e cenni*; *L'omaggio a R. Ardigò nel suo 80.º compleanno*; *Bollettino bibliografico di filosofia e scienze affini*; *Sommari di riviste*; *Notizie*.

RIVISTA FILOSOFICA, XI, 2: *B. Varisco*, La creazione; *N. Fornelli*, Il nuovo individualismo religioso (fine); *A. Levi*, La psicologia della esperienza indifferenziata di James Ward; *A. Tilgher*, Bramanesimo, Buddismo e Cristianesimo; *P. F. Nicolo*, Psicologia e linguistica; *Rassegna bibliografica*; *Notizie e pubblicazioni*; *Sommari delle riviste straniere*; *Libri ricevuti*.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

THE ALLEGED FALLACIES IN MILL'S "UTILITARIANISM."

IT may well seem superfluous, at this time of day, to discuss once more the familiar argument of Mill in the essay on "Utilitarianism." Have not the undoubted fallacies in that argument been shown up again and again by critics alike of the Intuitionist and of the Idealistic school? The present writer formerly shared this view,¹ but repeated study of the essay has convinced him of its essential injustice. All that is necessary, in defence of Mill from the charge that he has fallen into fallacies which are patent to the veriest tyro in logic, is to interpret his argument in the light of its context and of the purpose the author has in view. It is usual, while admitting Mill's candor and "sympathetic insight," to accuse him at the same time of a "facility in making compromises"² and a transgression of the most familiar rules of logic which is hardly credible in the author of an epoch-making work on that subject. Even so careful a writer as Professor Sorley attributes to him "a logical quibble" which is discreditable either to his candor or to his intelligence. I have preferred to assume that Mill is at once candid and coherent in his reasoning, and I think I have succeeded in clearing up the apparent fallacies, if not in eliminating the inconsistencies, in his ethical thought as presented in the famous essay.

To take first the most glaring, and therefore to my mind the most incredible case, the critics have with one consent accused Mill of committing the fallacy either of Composition or of Divi-

¹ See Preface to ninth edition of *A Study of Ethical Principles*.

² J. S. Mackenzie, *Introduction to Social Philosophy*, p. 204.

³ *Ethics of Naturalism* (2d ed.), p. 65.

sion in his "proof" of Utilitarianism, that is, in effecting the transition from egoistic to universalistic Hedonism. The argument in question is as follows: "No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good: that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons."¹ "It would be difficult," says Professor Mackenzie, "to collect in a short space so many fallacies as are here committed."² Let us confine our attention, in the meantime, to "the fallacy involved in the inference that 'the general happiness is a good to the aggregate of all persons.'" "The fallacy is that which is known in logic as 'the fallacy of composition.' It is inferred that because my pleasures are a good to me, yours to you, his to him, and so on, therefore my pleasures + your pleasures + his pleasures are a good to me + you + him. It is forgotten that neither the pleasures nor the persons are capable of being made into an aggregate. . . . Mill's argument would hold if the minds of all human beings were to be rolled into one, so as to form an aggregate. But as it is, 'the aggregate of all persons' is nobody, and consequently nothing can be a good to him. A good must be a good for somebody."³

Similarly Professor Sorley says: "J. S. Mill, while emphasising the distinction between modern Utilitarianism and the older Epicureanism, has even allowed his official 'proof' of utilitarianism, — such proof, that is, as he thinks the principle of Utility to be susceptible of, — to rest on the ambiguity between individual and social happiness."⁴ " 'No reason,' he says, 'can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness.' And this admission, which seems as good as saying that no reason at all can be given why the individual should desire the general

¹ *Utilitarianism* (9th ed.), p. 53.

² *Manual of Ethics*, p. 219.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 219-220.

⁴ *Ethics of Naturalism*, p. 47.

happiness, is only held to be a sufficient reason for it, through the assumption that what is good for all as an aggregate is good for each member of the aggregate: 'that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons.'"¹

Professor Dewey's criticism is on the same lines. "Does it follow," he asks, "that because the happiness of *A* is an end to *A*, the happiness of *B* an end to *B*, and the happiness of *C* an end to *C*, that, therefore, the happiness of *B* and *C* is an end to *A*? There is obviously no connection between the premises and the supposed conclusion. And there appears to be, as Mill puts it, only on account of the ambiguity of his last clause, 'the general happiness a good to the aggregate of all persons.' The good of *A* and *B* and *C* may be a good to the aggregate ($A + B + C$), but what universalistic hedonism requires is that the aggregate good of $A + B + C$ be a good to *A* and to *B* and to *C* taken separately, — a very different proposition. Mill is guilty of the fallacy known logically as the fallacy of division, — arguing from a collective whole to the distributed units. Because all men want to be happy, it hardly follows that every man wants all to be happy."²

Even the late Professor Sidgwick, in the long series of revisions to which he subjected the *Methods of Ethics*, seems to have remained convinced to the end of the justice of such a criticism of Mill's famous "proof." "In giving as a statement of this principle that 'the general happiness is *desirable*,' he must be understood to mean (and his whole treatise shows that he does mean) that it is what each individual *ought* to desire, or at least, — in the stricter sense of 'ought,' — to aim at realising in action. But this proposition is not established by Mill's reasoning, even if we grant that what is actually desired may be legitimately inferred to be in this sense desirable. For an aggregate of actual desires, each directed towards a different part of the general happiness, does not constitute an actual desire for the general happiness, existing in any individual; and Mill would certainly

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 64.

² *Outlines of Ethics*, pp. 55-56.

not contend that a desire which does not exist in any individual can possibly exist in an aggregate of individuals. There being therefore no actual desire, — so far as this reasoning goes, — for the general happiness, the proposition that the general happiness is desirable cannot be in this way established: so that there is a gap in the expressed argument, which can, I think, only be filled by some such proposition as that which I have above tried to exhibit as the intuition of Rational Benevolence.”¹

Now it is perfectly clear that, if Mill is attempting, in the argument in question, to prove that the general happiness is an object to be desired by each individual since each individual desires his own happiness, he is guilty of the fallacy of which his critics so unanimously convict him. The previous question, however, is whether he is attempting anything of the kind. Sidgwick alone has thought it necessary to offer any evidence that this is the object of the “proof” offered in chapter iv. After quoting Mill’s statement that, while proof, in the strict sense, is impossible, “considerations may be presented capable of determining the intellect to” accept “the Utilitarian formula,” he says that “he subsequently makes clear that by ‘acceptance of the Utilitarian formula’ he means the acceptance, not of the agent’s own greatest happiness, but of ‘the greatest amount of happiness altogether’ as the ultimate ‘end of human action’ and ‘standard of morality’: to promote which is, in the Utilitarian view, the supreme ‘directive rule of human conduct.’ Then when he comes to give the ‘proof,’ — in the larger sense before explained, — of this rule or formula, he offers the following argument.”² But if we take Mill’s own statement of the meaning of “the utilitarian doctrine,” given in the passage which we are discussing, we find that it is not the doctrine of Utilitarianism in the full sense of universalistic Hedonism, but simply the underlying and more general doctrine of Hedonism itself. “Questions about ends are, in other words, questions what things are desirable. The utilitarian doctrine is, that happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable, as an end; all other things being only de-

¹ *Methods of Ethics* (6th ed.), p. 388.

² *Ibid.*, p. 387.

sirable as means to that end."¹ The chapter is entitled, "Of What Sort of Proof the Principle of Utility is Susceptible," and when we turn to chapter ii for a definition of the "Principle of Utility," we find that "the creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness"; and that "the theory of life on which this theory of morality is grounded" is "that pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain."² All that Mill is attempting to prove, therefore, is that the object of aggregate desire, since it must be the same as that of individual desire, and this is happiness, is aggregate happiness. What he conceives himself to have proved is, in his own words, "that happiness is a good: that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons. Happiness has made out its title as *one* of the ends of conduct, and consequently one of the criteria of morality."³ There is no suggestion that the conclusion is that the general happiness is a good to each individual, but only "to the aggregate of all persons." It is the critics who, knowing that Mill's ethical standard is the general happiness, have read the former meaning into his present argument, assuming that he is here attempting to prove the validity of that criterion, while what he is really dealing with is the more elementary principle of Hedonism itself, and his argument simply is that, since the good of the individual,—that which he desires and regards as desirable,—is happiness, the object of aggregate or collective (not individual) desire can only be happiness. There is no word of the attitude of the individual to the general happiness; there is no passing over from the collective to the distributive sense of the terms.

That this is the true interpretation of the argument becomes

¹ *Utilitarianism*, ch. iv, p. 52.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 9, 10.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

still more evident from Mill's final statement of the result. "It results from the preceding considerations, that there is in reality nothing desired except happiness. Whatever is desired otherwise than as a means to some end beyond itself, and ultimately to happiness, is desired as itself a part of happiness, and is not desired for itself until it has become so. . . . We have now, then, an answer to the question, of what sort of proof the principle of utility is susceptible. If the opinion which I have now stated is psychologically true, — if human nature is so constituted as to desire nothing which is not either a part of happiness or a means of happiness, we can have no other proof, and we require no other, that these are the only things desirable. If so, happiness is the sole end of human action, and the promotion of it the test by which to judge of all human conduct ; from whence it necessarily follows that it must be the criterion of morality, since a part is included in the whole."¹ And the chapter closes with the following words: "Both in feeling and in conduct, habit is the only thing which imparts certainty ; and it is because of the importance to others of being able to rely absolutely on one's feelings and conduct, and to oneself of being able to rely on one's own, that the will to do right ought to be cultivated into this habitual independence. In other words, this state of the will is a means to good, not intrinsically a good ; and does not contradict the doctrine that nothing is a good to human beings but in so far as it is either itself pleasurable, or a means of attaining pleasure or averting pain. But if this doctrine be true, the principle of utility is proved."² It is unreasonable to suppose that, in thus concluding the argument, Mill should have omitted all reference to the essential element in the thesis supposed to have been proved. But we find him once more identifying "the principle of utility" with that of Hedonism, not with that of universalistic Hedonism or Utilitarianism.

The second in the "collection of fallacies" which this passage contains, according to Professor Mackenzie and others, is the result of "an ambiguity in the word 'desirable.'" "The only

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 57, 58.

² *Ibid.*, p. 61.

proof,' he says, 'capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people hear it. . . . In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it.' It is here assumed that the meaning of the word 'desirable' is analogous to that of 'visible' and 'audible.' But 'visible' means 'able to be seen,' and 'audible' means 'able to be heard'; whereas 'desirable' does not usually mean merely 'able to be desired.' When we say that anything is desirable, we do not usually mean merely that it is able to be desired. There is scarcely anything that is not able to be desired. What we mean is rather that it is *reasonably to be desired*, or that it *ought* to be desired. When the Hedonist says that pleasure is the only thing that is desirable, he means that it is the only thing that *ought* to be desired. But the form of the word 'desirable' seems to have misled several writers into the notion that they ought to show also that pleasure is the only thing that is *capable* of being desired. . . . The fallacy here involved is that known to writers on Logic as the 'Fallacy of Figure of Speech' (*figurae dictionis*)." ¹ And Professor Sidgwick remarks: "It has been suggested that I have overlooked a confusion in Mill's mind between two possible meanings of the term 'desirable,' (1) what can be desired, and (2) what ought to be desired. . . . I was aware of this confusion, but thought it unnecessary for my present purpose to discuss it." ²

Here, again, I cannot believe that Mill was the victim of such an obvious fallacy. We must remember that the little work so severely dealt with by the critics is a popular essay, not a philosophical treatise, and that it originally appeared in the pages of *Fraser's Magazine*. We are not to look, therefore, for the precision of statement which would be natural in a scientific work. Mill assumes that what we ought to desire must be at the same time what we can desire, that the desirable in the ethical sense must be found within the field of the desirable in the psychological sense, although the two fields are not, of course, coexten-

¹ Mackenzie, *Manual of Ethics*, pp. 213, 214 (footnote).

² *Methods of Ethics*, p. 388 (footnote).

sive. Or, to express the distinction and the relation between the two senses of the term in another way, he assumes that the Good, — that which is truly to be desired, — must be found within, and not without, the sphere of goods, that is, the things which we actually desire. What he seeks to prove is “that to think of an object as desirable . . . and to think of it as pleasant, are one and the same thing; and that to desire anything, except in proportion as the idea of it is pleasant, is a physical and metaphysical impossibility.”¹ The conclusion of the argument is, in his own statement, that “nothing is a good to human beings but in so far as it is either itself pleasurable, or a means of attaining pleasure or averting pain.”² And we must admit that the truth of the doctrine of psychological Hedonism carries with it the negation of any non-hedonistic theory of the Good, or the desirable in the sense of what ought to be desired. While we cannot say that what we are able to desire is, as such, what we ought to desire, we must admit that what we ought to desire is what we are able to desire. It follows that, if pleasure is the only thing that we can desire, what we ought to desire cannot be anything other than pleasure.

Another fallacy of which Mill has been accused, though not so frequently or so explicitly, is that of *Ignoratio Elenchi* or Irrelevancy. Professor Sorley says, for example, that “he confused the purely psychological question of the motives that influence human conduct with the ethical question of the end to which conduct ought to be directed.”³ Others have maintained that he confused the question of the sanctions of right conduct with that of its obligatoriness. But it is quite clear that in chapter iii, “Of the Ultimate Sanction of the Principle of Utility,” Mill is concerned solely with the question of the motivation of right or utilitarian conduct, with the *feeling* of obligation, and how it may be produced. “The question is often asked,” he says, “and properly so, in regard to any supposed moral standard, — What is its sanction? what are the motives to obey it? or more specifically, what is the source of its obligation? whence

¹ *Utilitarianism*, p. 58.

² *Ibid.*, p. 61.

³ *Ethics of Naturalism*, pp. 63, 64.

does it derive its binding force? It is a necessary part of moral philosophy to provide the answer to this question; which, though frequently assuming the shape of an objection to the utilitarian morality, as if it had some special applicability to that above others, really arises in regard to all standards. It arises, in fact, whenever a person is called on to *adopt* a standard or refer morality to any basis on which he has not been accustomed to rest it. For the customary morality, that which education and opinion have consecrated, is the only one which presents itself to the mind with the feeling of being *in itself* obligatory: and when a person is asked to believe that this morality *derives* its obligation from some general principle round which custom has not thrown the same halo, the assertion is to him a paradox; the supposed corollaries seem to have a more binding force than the original theorem; the superstructure seems to stand better without, than with, what is represented as its foundation. He says to himself, I feel that I am bound not to rob or murder, betray or deceive; but why am I bound to promote the general happiness? If my own happiness lies in something else, why may I not give that the preference?"¹ And when he comes to describe the deeper sanction, undiscovered by his predecessors, with the exception of Hume, of the utilitarian morality, namely, the natural sympathy with the general happiness, "the feeling of unity" with our fellows, he says that it is "this basis of powerful natural sentiment . . . which, when once the general happiness is recognised as the ethical standard, will constitute the strength of the utilitarian morality."² Comte, he says, has "shown the possibility of giving to the service of humanity, even without the aid of belief in a Providence, both the physical power and the social efficacy of a religion; making it take hold of human life, and colour all thought, feeling, and action, in a manner of which the greatest ascendancy ever exercised by any religion may be but a type and foretaste; and of which the danger is, not that it should be insufficient, but that it should be so excessive as to interfere unduly with human freedom and individuality."³

¹ *Utilitarianism*, pp. 39-40.

² *Ibid.*, p. 46.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

From these statements it is clear that the problem with which Mill is concerned, in this chapter at least, is simply the psychological and practical one of the normal dynamic, and that his solution of that problem is found in the Christian "enthusiasm of humanity." We are far too apt to think of Mill as a technically philosophical writer, because we cannot help thinking of him as the author of the *Logic*, and to forget that he, no less than Bentham and the other Utilitarians, is primarily dominated by the practical interest of the social reformer. He is really far more interested in the question how, "once the general happiness is recognised as the ethical standard," this ideal is to be practically realised, than in the question of the ethical criterion and its proof. It is, therefore, entirely to miss the point of Mill's argument in this chapter to discover in it a merely subjective interpretation of moral obligation, as Mr. Bradley does in the following statement: "Not only has moral obligation nothing in Mr. Mill's theory to which it can attach itself save the likes or dislikes of one or more individuals, but in the end it *is* itself nothing more than a similar feeling. . . . I should say that any theory which maintains that a man may get rid of his sense of moral obligation if he can, and that, if he does so, the moral obligation is gone, is as grossly immoral a theory as ever was published. Does Mr. Mill repudiate the doctrine? Not at all; he evidently accepts it, though he prefers not to say so. . . . If then all that the moral 'ought' means is that I happen to have a feeling which I need not have, and that this feeling attaches itself now to one set of pleasures and now to another set according to accident or my liking, would it not be better altogether to have done with the word, and, as some have done, openly to reject it and give it up, since already we have given up all that it stands for?"¹ Mill is not concerned with the question of the objective basis or validity of moral obligation, but only with its subjective or psychological explanation.

Are we, then, to conclude that Mill offers no proof of Utilitarianism as an ethical theory, no demonstration of the general happiness as the moral criterion? The truth is, in my opinion, that

¹ *Ethical Studies*, pp. 111, 112.

he thinks formal proof as unnecessary as it is impossible. Hedonism he does attempt to prove, as we have seen; but having proved that pleasure is the only thing ultimately desirable or good, he seems to think that it follows that the good, and therefore the ethical criterion, is the general happiness, or the greatest happiness, not of the individual, but of the greatest number of individuals. If we would make explicit the ground of this conclusion, which is left implicit by Mill himself, it would be found, I think, in the consideration that, since pleasure is the Good, the greater pleasure must, as such, be better than the less, and the greatest happiness of the greatest number (if not of all sentient beings) must therefore be better than the greatest happiness of the individual or of any number of individuals less than the total number. He assumes, as a matter of common sense, what Sidgwick represents as the result of an application of the principle of impartiality or equality, namely, that from the point of view of happiness, which is essentially a quantitative or mathematical whole, each ought to count for one and no one for more than one. The distributive principle of the Good is found, in other words, in the nature of the Good. Hence, he says, "let utilitarians never cease to claim the morality of self-devotion as a possession which belongs by as good a right to them as either to the Stoic or to the Transcendentalist. . . . The happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as one would be done by, and to love one's neighbor as oneself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality."¹ It must be remembered that, as Mr. Douglas has pointed out, "it is more characteristic of Mill's Utilitarianism than of any preceding hedonistic system of ethics to consider the facts of moral experience directly, and to make them the basis of ethical theory. He never loses that sense of an objective and obligatory end for human conduct which is the essential element

¹ *Utilitarianism*, pp. 24, 25.

in the moral judgment of actions.”¹ It is significant that, in the one reference he makes to an explicit basis of altruistic duty (though even here it is in a practical interest that he refers to it), Mill suggests the possibility, since exploited by Sidgwick, of a reconciliation of Utilitarianism and Intuitionism through the principle of benevolence. “If there be anything innate in the matter, I see no reason why the feeling which is innate should not be that of regard to the pleasures and pains of others. If there is any principle of morals which is intuitively obligatory, I should say it must be that. If so, the intuitive ethics would coincide with the utilitarian, and there would be no further quarrel between them. Even as it is, the intuitive moralists, though they believe that there are other intuitive moral obligations, do already believe this to be one; for they unanimously hold that a large *portion* of morality turns upon the consideration due to the interests of our fellow creatures.”²

That Mill's point of view is essentially identical with the Quantitative or Mathematical point of view of the late Professor Sidgwick is made clear from his final account of Justice in chapter v. “This great moral duty,” he tells us, “rests upon a still deeper foundation, being a direct emanation from the first principles of morals, and not a mere logical corollary from secondary or derivative doctrines. It is involved in the very meaning of Utility, or the Greatest-Happiness Principle. That principle is a mere form of words without rational signification, unless one person's happiness, supposed equal in degree (with the proper allowance made for kind), is counted for exactly as much as another's. Those conditions being supplied, Bentham's dictum, ‘everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one,’ might be written under the principle of utility as an explanatory commentary.”³ And in the footnote to this passage he adds: “This implication, in the first principle of the utilitarian scheme, of perfect impartiality between persons, is regarded by Mr. Herbert Spencer (in his *Social Statics*) as a disproof of the pretensions of utility to be a sufficient guide to right; since (he says) the principle of utility

¹ *Ethics of J. S. Mill*, Introductory Essays, p. lxxx.

² *Utilitarianism*, pp. 44, 45.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 92, 93.

presupposes the anterior principle, that everybody has an equal right to happiness. It may be more correctly described as supposing that equal amounts of happiness are equally desirable, whether felt by the same or by different persons. This, however, is not a presupposition; not a premise needful to support the principle of utility, but the very principle itself; for what is the principle of utility, if it be not that 'happiness' and 'desirable' are synonymous terms? If there is any anterior principle implied, it can be no other than this, that the truths of arithmetic are applicable to the valuation of happiness, as of all other measurable quantities."

But does not altruistic Hedonism or Utilitarianism contradict the underlying doctrine of psychological Hedonism? As Mr. Bradley has said, "If all that I desire and can desire is my pleasure, . . . then the sole desirable is a state or states of my own feeling, and in the second place, whatever is a means to that. To desire an object which is not the idea of my pleasure is psychologically impossible. . . . And such an object is the idea of the pleasure of others considered not as conducing to mine. . . . To tell me the pleasure of others is desirable for me, is to tell me you think it will conduce to my own."¹ Or, as Professor Sorley has put it, "Utilitarianism only becomes a practicable end for individual conduct when psychological hedonism has been given up. It is futile to say that one ought to pursue the greatest happiness of the greatest number, unless it is possible for the individual to act for something else than his own pleasure,—that is, for an end which is for him not pleasure at all. In a word, utilitarianism, while maintaining that the only thing worth desiring is pleasure, must at the same time admit that pleasure is not the only object that can be or is desired: otherwise, it can never advance from the egoistic to the universalistic form."² But does not such a criticism, when applied to Mill, ignore the other factor in his ethical psychology, namely, sympathy? Man is naturally, according to Mill, sympathetic with the pleasures and pains of others; he is a social, and not a merely selfish being, and his

¹ *Ethical Studies*, p. 103.

² *Ethics of Naturalism*, p. 77.

social sympathy carries with it the extension of his desire of pleasure to the pleasure of others, which he desires as if it were his own. Conscious as he is of his unity with them, he identifies himself with them, and seeks for them what he seeks for himself, and as if he were seeking it for himself, namely, pleasure. If he were not thus naturally sympathetic, he could never make the transition from his own pleasure to that of others; his sympathy makes him unconscious of any transition from the one to the other. Here, again, we must remember that Mill's real interest lies in the practical rather than in the theoretical problem, and we have seen that it is to sympathy that he looks as the great agent in the promotion of the general happiness by the individual.

As regards the doctrine of "psychological Hedonism" itself, while it can hardly be doubted that Mill did actually hold that view, I cannot but think that, in the present work, it is not this doctrine, in any strict sense, that he is concerned to defend. If his statements and admissions in the course of the argument are carefully noted, it will be found, I think, that when he says that "happiness" is the sole object of human desire, he is using the term in a large popular sense, to include the things in which happiness is found, rather than in the strict sense in which he has defined it in chapter ii: "By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain;" and it is significant that he uses, throughout the argument, the term "happiness" rather than the term "pleasure." His thesis, as he himself states it, is that "human nature is so constituted as to desire nothing which is not either a part of happiness or a means of happiness."¹ In summing up the result of the discussion, he says that "it results from the preceding considerations, that there is in reality nothing desired except happiness. Whatever is desired otherwise than as a means to some end beyond itself, and ultimately to happiness, is desired as itself a part of happiness, and is not desired for itself until it has become so. Those who desire virtue for its own sake, desire it either because the consciousness of it is a pleasure, or because the consciousness of being without it is a pain, or for both reasons united. . . . If

¹ *Utilitarianism*, p. 58.

one of these gave him no pleasure, and the other no pain, he would not love or desire virtue, or would desire it only for the other benefits which it might produce to himself or to persons whom he cared for."¹ Or take the following statement of the problem and of its solution: "And now to decide whether this is really so; whether mankind do desire nothing for itself but that which is a pleasure to them, or of which the absence is a pain. . . . Desiring a thing and finding it pleasant, aversion to it and thinking of it as painful, are phenomena entirely inseparable, or rather two parts of the same phenomenon; in strictness of language, two different modes of naming the same psychological fact: . . . to think of an object as desirable (unless for the sake of its consequences), and to think of it as pleasant, are one and the same thing; and . . . to desire anything, except in proportion as the idea of it is pleasant, is a physical and metaphysical impossibility."²

All that Mill is concerned to prove, then, is that pleasure is not merely a constant but a determining element in desire and choice; he does not maintain that it is the constant object of desire and choice. And if the former seems to us, as Sidgwick says, a statement so obvious as to be almost a tautology, we must remember that its familiarity is due to the advance of psychology since Mill's time, and that Mill had an important polemical interest in emphasizing the omnipresence of pleasure in desire and choice, since, if pleasure were inseparable from the ends which determine human action, a strong presumption would be created in favour of the hedonistic theory of Good. And as against a merely rationalistic or rigoristic theory of the Good, the demonstration of the presence of pleasure as the determining principle in all desire and choice might well seem to be final. It is to be remembered that Mill is not conscious of the distinction between pleasure as the dynamic and pleasure as the object of choice, and that he uses the same term "pleasure" indifferently in the two senses of "pleasant object" and "pleasant state" or "pleasantness." This very looseness in the use of the

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 57, 58.

² *Ibid.*, p. 58.

leading term in the argument suggests that the point of his argument does not require insistence upon the distinction.

That this is the true interpretation of Mill's argument is confirmed by his account of the relation of happiness as a whole to its constituent elements or "parts," as well as by his account of the relation of desire to its object. "The ingredients of happiness," he says, "are very various, and each of them is desirable in itself, and not merely when considered as swelling an aggregate. The principle of utility does not mean that any given pleasure, as music, for instance, or any given exemption from pain, as for example, health, are to be looked upon as means to a collective something termed happiness, and to be desired on that account. They are desired and desirable in and for themselves; besides being means, they are a part of the end."¹ "In being desired for its own sake," such an object "is, however, desired as *part* of happiness. The person is made, or thinks he would be made, happy by its mere possession; and is made unhappy by failure to obtain it. The desire of it is not a different thing from the desire of happiness, any more than the love of music, or the desire of health. They are included in happiness. They are some of the elements of which the desire of happiness is made up. Happiness is not an abstract idea, but a concrete whole; and these are some of its parts."² To desire a thing he defines as to "think of it in a pleasurable light, or of its absence in a painful one";³ he includes in the term "the repelling influence of pain as well as the attractive one of pleasure."⁴ Mill classifies desires as primitive and acquired, and in both cases he recognizes the presence of an object, other than pleasure or pain, to which the desire is directed. "Life would be a poor thing, very ill provided with sources of happiness, if there were not this provision of nature, by which things originally indifferent, but conducive to, or otherwise associated with, the satisfaction of our primitive desires, become in themselves sources of pleasure more valuable than the primitive pleasures."⁵ In the case of the desire of

¹ *Utilitarianism*, p. 54.

² *Ibid.*, p. 56.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

power or fame, "it is the strong association thus generated between them and all our objects of desire, which gives to the direct desire of them the intensity it often assumes, so as in some characters to surpass in strength all other desires."¹ Similarly in the case of the love of money, "the desire to possess it is often stronger than the desire to use it, and goes on increasing when all the desires which point to ends beyond it, to be compassed by it, are falling off. It may then be said truly, that money is desired not for the sake of an end, but as part of the end. From being a means to happiness, it has come to be itself a principal ingredient of the individual's conception of happiness."² And "the desire of virtue is not as universal, but it is as authentic a fact, as the desire of happiness."³

There remains the most notorious of all Mill's so-called fallacies, namely, the introduction into a hedonistic theory of a qualitative distinction between pleasures. Even in this case, however, I question whether, if we take careful account of the way in which the distinction is introduced and used by Mill, we shall find it to be really inconsistent with his fundamental position. He is dealing with the objections to Utilitarianism which arise from a misconception of the doctrine. Among these unfounded objections is that "to suppose that life has (as they express it) no higher end than pleasure, — no better and nobler object of pursuit," is "a doctrine worthy only of swine." The answer is that "the comparison of the Epicurean life to that of beasts is felt as degrading, precisely because a beast's pleasures do not satisfy a human being's conceptions of happiness. Human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites, and when once made conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness which does not include their gratification."⁴ Not only, however, is man capable of pleasures of which the mere animal is incapable; not only does human happiness contain elements not found in animal happiness, but those men who are competently acquainted with what are generally called the higher forms of

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.*, p. 55.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

human happiness are unanimous in their preference of these to the so-called lower forms, and so absolute is this preference that they prefer the higher pleasure, "even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of. . . . No intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs. They would not resign what they possess more than he, for the most complete satisfaction of all the desires which they have in common with him." ¹ The higher being's "sense of dignity" is "so essential a part of the happiness of those in whom it is strong, that nothing which conflicts with it could be, otherwise than momentarily, an object of desire to them." ²

The argument, then, is simply that, as a matter of psychological fact, the pleasures which form the constituent elements of human happiness are different from those which make up the happiness of the mere animal; that the human subject of happiness not merely prefers certain classes of pleasures to certain others, but regards the former as preferable in kind to the latter, and that this preference determines the nature of his happiness: the desire is so set upon certain forms of happiness that their absence makes the man unhappy. That the distinction between higher and lower pleasures is only intended, however, as a provisional, not as a final distinction is clear from the fact that Mill proceeds to reduce what is, from the individual point of view, a qualitative distinction to a merely quantitative one from the social point of view. "I have dwelt on this point, as being a necessary part of a perfectly just conception of Utility or Happiness, considered as the directive rule of human conduct. But it is by no means an indispensable condition to the acceptance of the utilitarian standard; for that standard is not the agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness alto-

¹ *Utilitarianism*, pp. 12, 13.

² *Ibid.*, p. 13.

gether ; and if it may possibly be doubted whether a noble character is always the happier for its nobleness, there can be no doubt that it makes other people happier, and that the world in general is immensely a gainer by it." ¹ And as if to put an end to any possible lingering question in the reader's mind as to the objective validity of the qualitative distinction which is yet so vital an element in the happiness of the individual, Mill thus explicitly states the value of the good or virtuous will : " Both in feeling and in conduct, habit is the only thing which imparts certainty ; and it is because of the importance to others of being able to rely absolutely on one's feelings and conduct, and to oneself of being able to rely on one's own, that the will to do right ought to be cultivated into this habitual independence. In other words, this state of the will is a means to good, not intrinsically a good ; and does not contradict the doctrine that nothing is a good to human beings but in so far as it is either itself pleasurable, or a means of attaining pleasure or averting pain." ²

That the distinction between the higher and the lower pleasures is ultimately for Mill not a qualitative, but a quantitative distinction, becomes clear from the account of the paramount claims of Justice in chapter v. " Our notion, therefore, of the claim we have on our fellow creatures to join in making safe for us the very groundwork of our existence, gathers feelings round it so much more intense than those concerned in any of the more common cases of utility, that the difference in degree (as is often the case in psychology) becomes a real difference in kind. The claim assumes that character of absoluteness, that apparent infinity, and incommensurability with all other considerations, which constitute the distinction between the feeling of right and wrong and that of ordinary expediency and in expediency." ³ Interpreting the statement of the qualitative distinction between pleasures in chapter ii in the light of this passage, we see that all that Mill intended to assert was that, " as is often the case in psychology," a transcendently important " difference in degree " " becomes a real difference in kind " ; for it is obvious that from the

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 16.

² *Ibid.*, p. 61.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

social, if not also from the individual point of view, the so-called "higher" pleasures do thus differ from the so-called "lower" in the degree of their utility or hedonistic importance. I think, therefore, that we must agree with Professor Stewart when he says: "It is sometimes urged that Mill has no right 'on his own principles' . . . to recognize, as he does, a qualitative difference between pleasures. I venture to maintain that few moralists have a better right. His critics seem to forget that his standard of conduct is the public good. His standard of conduct is emphatically not pleasurable feeling. Only an eristic treatment of isolated phrases (phrases which need not surprise any one who looks at Mill's system in its place in the History of English Ethics) could represent it as such. Mill's 'hedonism' is pretty much on a par with that of the writer of the E. N., vii, 11-14."¹

All that I have tried to prove, however, in this case as in that of psychological Hedonism, is that Mill was not concerned, in the essay on Utilitarianism, with the deeper ethical question which we cannot help raising. His entire argument is dominated by the practical purpose which inspires the essay, as it inspired the Utilitarians as a group of thinkers who were primarily not theoretical moralists, but social reformers. Had the deeper question, whether the qualitative distinction in pleasure has objective, as well as subjective, logical as well as psychological, validity occurred to Mill, I cannot doubt that he would have seen, as clearly as his critics have since done, the essential inconsistency of such a view with a hedonistic theory of ethics.

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¹ *Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics*, Vol. II, p. 434.

THE AGENT AND THE OBSERVER.

I.

IN comparing the various modes of viewing human action and experience, there is no contrast more striking than that furnished by viewing a situation from within as agent, and viewing it from without as observer. There is no greater difference than the difference between the way a thing feels when you do it yourself, and the way it looks when you see it done by another; between having an experience, and contemplating the expression of such an experience. This contrast of point of view will furnish the subject matter for the following pages, in which it will serve as the basis for a mainly descriptive analysis of the distinction between subject and object.

The current modes of stating this distinction are very largely formal. Suppose a pack of cards to represent so many items of experience; the various distinctions of subjective and objective may then be indicated by supposing the cards to be sorted into two groups (not necessarily mutually exclusive) according to certain rules. One rule separates the immediate from the inferred; another the individual and peculiar from the common and universal; a third marks off a mathematically coherent group as objective and scientific, leaving 'subjective' to stand for the residuum. But none of these distinctions seems to effect any important transformation in the nature of the terms distinguished; whether a term falls within the subjective or objective group is treated as a mere accident of position involving no difference of quality; whereas, as I aim to show, the distinction involves a difference of quality and interpretation which is world-wide, and is of fundamental significance for both psychology and metaphysics.

Even in the more overt bodily actions there is a surprising difference between how an action looks and how it feels. Things simple in the observing are unaccountably hard in the doing. The successful strokes of another in tennis or billiards seem clearly a matter of course, his failures stupid, and a good game, so easy

and graceful in the observing, is full of stress and strain in the playing. Take even a difficult sonata of Beethoven ; I can hardly conceive that what seems so easy and natural for the virtuoso is utterly impossible for myself, especially when my impression of the sonata is vivid and its meaning seems clear. Now in these more overt activities the ground of the contrast is to a degree simple. The point of view of the doer is different in a spatial sense from the observer's. The agent views the situation literally 'from the inside' of his body,—that is, he has muscular as well as visual information of his movement. We shall ask presently whether this difference is not of vital significance for the general peculiarity of the agent's view. But the point to be noted at present is that, in contrast to the observer, the agent *knows what he is doing*,—*i. e.*, he knows the purpose of his action. For him the present act is a term in a continuous process in which it is blended with past terms leading up to it, and with anticipations of future acts to follow, the whole pointing in a more or less definite direction whose signs are mostly hidden from the observer.

As we pass from relatively overt acts to more complex attitudes, the contrast of point of view becomes more striking. Sidgwick has noted that, while we are confident that our own acts are the expression of choice (and more confident at the moment of choice), we are disposed to view our neighbor's acts as externally determined. My life-insurance policy is a mark of judgment ; my neighbor's is the result of the persistence of the company's agent. This attitude is typical of all of our judgments of self and of others. My neighbor's toothache is never so bad as my own ; his grief cannot be so real ; nor are his children so essentially interesting. His friends have not the same intelligence, substance, and dignity of character. His opinions are never so obviously sensible. I cannot admit that his appreciation of Beethoven is so thoroughly nice and comprehensive (note the jealousy which guards the musical self). And, above all, where my love-making is a matter so deeply serious, his cannot fail to be somewhat ridiculous. Altogether I find it difficult to credit him with the same richness of inner life that I find in myself, or to believe that his acts have an equal significance.

Narrowly speaking, I can never fully appreciate what it is to be any one but myself. Though I know how it feels to be a man, I wonder somewhat how it would feel to be a stout man, or a tall man, or a man of great strength, — as I wonder how it would feel to be President. It is still harder to imagine the inner life of a dog, harder again that of the snail; and how it would seem to be a watch, a steam-engine, or a water-fall, I can hardly even wonder.

Yet it is relevant to note that even the last question is not without meaning. The refusal of modern thought to consider an 'inner' side for inorganic activities is based less upon rigid logic than upon practical incredulity. It represents the convenience of a simplified science, whose convenience would perhaps be better promoted if the inner side of the world could be dismissed altogether. It is a question, however, whether the very meaning of scientific inquiry into the ultimate nature, — the 'inner constitution,' — of physical things is not to arrive at their 'inner' nature in just the subjective sense now before us. A scientist may claim that by 'inner' he means only the inside in a sense purely spatial. But why should the inside be so significant? Because, one may say, by increasingly minute mechanical analysis he hopes finally to arrive at terms whose relations and interactions are not merely a matter of mechanical fact, but are at the same time logically necessary and self-evident, — in other words, necessary from the standpoint of conception and motive. But this, I suggest, would be equivalent to understanding how one would feel obliged to act if one were the object in question, and how it would feel to be that object.

The agent's view may thus conceivably be extended to cover any action whatever. On the other hand, in its most intensive meaning, it is restricted not merely to myself and my action generally, but to myself at the moment of action. For between my view of my action at the moment of action and my view of my action as past, there are differences of the same kind, varying according to remoteness in time or feeling, as lie between my view of my own action and my view of my neighbor's; and I never completely know how it feels to do a thing except while I

am doing it. Here, indeed, we have the ground of Kant's distinction between the ego as subject and the ego as object. To be the agent of an experience or activity, and to contemplate your own experience or activity, when necessarily it is in some degree past, are radically different; the way an action feels is never quite the way it looks even to oneself; and so far as the activity is merely looked at, it is looked at more or less in the same way, and presents the same appearance as the activities of other persons. This point is of great importance for the determination of what we mean by introspection; for it may be said of the whole kaleidoscopic show of mental states exhibited as 'the results of introspection' by the usual associational-empirical psychology, that it rests less upon a genuinely introspective view than upon the relatively external view of the agent contemplating his own action as observer. The 'mental state' is exhibited, not as it is felt by the agent when it occurs, at most as it appears to him sometime later, but rather as it ought to appear from the standpoint of a science of psychology based upon the observer's view.

And so, as my action recedes into the past, I tend to feel about it more or less as I should feel about the action of another person. I begin to suspect that my taking out a life-insurance policy a year ago was not unrelated to the persuasiveness of the company's agent. I am ready to join in the cynical or humorous view of my youthful aspirations; what was then tragedy is now more or less comic. And what I wrote a few years ago seems now more or less insipid, though what I now write seems none the less significant. The experiences that I recall of early childhood seem almost to belong to some one else. Yet this is only the difference, written large, which lies between every act of mine when in the doing and when, as it passes into retrospect, I attempt to fix and hold it in idea.

And if, again, we extend our conception of the agent to cover now not merely the whole individual, but a whole generation or historical period, we have the same differences repeated in the ways in which the life of the period appears to those concerned in it and to the historian who describes it. The historian neces-

sarily interprets the life of a period in the light of later results, but it is always a question how far these results entered as purposes into the consciousness of the time, and how far we, with the later events in mind, can ever reconstruct its actual point of view. Inevitably we think of "when the world was young," as if it had ever been anything but old and modern to those living it. We can hardly realize a point of view from which Locke's "dear old book," as James so fittingly calls it, was really modern thought, or from which its language and attitude were anything but quaint and naïve. And, above all, we tend to think of nearly all historical periods as periods either of fixed conditions, or of steady progression, in contrast to which the present is a period of transition and unrest; whereas it may be asked whether every period is not a period of transition and unrest to those who live in it, and whether, indeed, if we accept the present theory of consciousness, it is not necessarily so.

II.

From this general sketch of the two views I proceed to a more exact analysis of their differences; and for a standing illustration let us suppose that two persons, who are to play the part of agent and observer, are in the agent's office or study; the agent's telephone rings and he responds to the signal. Our first question is, Why does he respond? How are we to describe the connection between signal and response?

Let us put the question to the observer first. He will state the relation as one of stimulus and reaction,—in other words, of cause and effect. If, remembering that both signal and response were contemporaneous with other events and conditions, we ask why this particular effect was the effect of this particular cause, he will reply, following Mill and Jevons, that in a multitude of similar observations they are related as sole invariable antecedent and consequent. If we ask for any causal terms lying between signal and response, he will refer us to the nervous system, and affirm that between the points where the vibrations of sound meet the endings of the auditory nerve and where the motor nerves finally act upon the muscles, there is a continuous

neural structure and an unbroken chain of neural causes. For the source of his information he will refer us to anatomical observations made upon the nervous system of other agents. And if we object that such observations have not succeeded in completing the chain of causes, he will reply that nevertheless the terms to be supplied must be of the same mechanical kind as those observed. And herein lies the peculiarity of the observer's view. The observer knows nothing of consciousness as such, since from his position as observer the conscious process is forever inaccessible. If for any reason he introduces conscious terms into his causal series, they must first be made over into 'mental pictures' or 'compounds,' and disfigured, so to speak, to fit the mechanical and causal categories; so that, as a matter of fact, he is not describing consciousness, but only such mechanical objects as pictures and compounds. And thus, however he may name his terms, his formulation of the relation of signal and response is a mechanical formulation, in which the relation is conceived to be one of cause and effect.

But for the agent this mode of viewing the relation is quite irrelevant. The agent would never say: "I was *caused* to take down the receiver by the ringing of the bell." No one ever says of himself that he was caused to perform an act which was within his power of choice,—that, like an instrument of wood and iron, he was simply operated upon by forces from without. To say so is to write yourself down a fool; and you will avoid this admission as far as possible, not merely because it is unwelcome and degrading, but because, from your point of view as agent, it is in the last analysis incredible. If you conceive yourself as agent, the only conceivable ground of action is, never a cause, but a *reason*. Other men may be caused to act, but one's own action can be conceived only as the expression of some conception of value. Even the victim of a post-hypnotic suggestion feels bound to explain as an expression of judgment what, for the observer, he was clearly, so to speak, wound up to do. And so the agent of our illustration would reply to this effect: "I answered the telephone-call because I expected to hear a message of some interest to me." He might admit that no expectation of the sort was clearly

defined, but he would insist that, apart from some notion of value, he could not have acted at all.

Accordingly, where the observer looks for causes, the agent expects to find reasons. What the observer views as a relation of cause and effect is for the agent a relation of ground and consequence. For the observer the moving term is a blind force, for the agent it is a conception of value. In a word, the observer's view is mechanical, the agent's is logical and teleological.

Passing from doing to knowing, our second question is, How does the agent know that the telephone-bell really rang? Now the observer has of course no direct access to the agent's knowing, but he has what for him stands for the same thing, namely, the agent's reaction so far as it is externally accessible, which includes not only the grosser movements of walking to the telephone, etc., but what is more significant for his knowing, his speech, gesture, and facial expression. Accordingly, for the observer the second question is practically identical with the first, and his answer will be the same; as the agent's action is a matter of cause and effect, so is his knowledge; the stimulus as the cause of his reaction is the cause also of his knowing.

But now for the agent. In answering the question, he of course is referring directly to his knowing, *i. e.*, to his conscious process. And he cannot say, "I was caused to hear the bell by the ringing of the bell"; for, however you may analyze his situation, he does not have both the hearing and the external ringing. To him the hearing and the ringing are one and the same; if he distinguishes them, the distinction is his own act; in any case, they are not so separated in time or in place that one may stand as the cause of the other. And if he had only the hearing (or the ringing) as presented at the time of its occurrence, he could not say positively whether the bell rang or only seemed to ring. His answer will accordingly be the statement of a conclusion. He will say, perhaps: "When I answered the telephone, I found So-and-so waiting to speak to me; and thus I had *reason to believe* that the bell really rang." In other words, his belief as well as his action rests upon reasons rather than causes. From his point of view it is as incomprehensible that

he should be caused to believe as that he should be caused to choose. Whatever he believes must in the last analysis be the expression of his 'will to believe'; it must be what he can approve and verify as reasonable, intelligible, and consistent. Even when he is 'compelled to believe' what is relatively unsatisfying, it is only because, so far as he can see, any alternative belief would involve him in a greater and more unwelcome absurdity. The observer, as observer, is confronted with brute facts which compel his acceptance; for the agent, whatever is accepted must also be in some sense chosen.

Let us carry the inquiry a step further. We have seen that the agent's logical process presupposes that for everything there must be a reason. A third question then arises, Upon what does this principle rest? Does it in the last analysis arise from the nature and point of view of the agent, or is it simply the result of the environment in which he is placed?

The latter is the observer's view. For him the only question to be asked about this or any belief is one of origin and history. Now the observer has before him the vast expanse of nature with its exhibition of regularity and order. He sees individual men in contact with nature, and he notes in their behavior a regularity and order corresponding to that of nature, and 'corresponding ever more perfectly as time goes on. Accordingly, just as the individual stimulus is the cause of its reaction, so is the regularity of nature the cause of the corresponding regularity of human behavior. As a psychologist, the observer will express this in terms of the law of association, according to which the order of experience tends to become fixed, through the formation of habit, in the order of thought. In strictly external terms, this means that the order of sense-stimuli determines the order of reactions. The principle that everything must have a cause is then simply the expression of one of the most ingrained of these habits. That it *must* have a cause means only that the habit is unbreakable, the association is indissoluble, — not that the contrary is logically inconceivable, but simply that any other mode of thought, or rather any other mode of responding to stimuli, is mechanically impossible.

The agent, however, is not confronted with the broad expanse of nature, but only with so much of it as can reach his sense-organs. And, as Kant pointed out, there is a radical difference between the "subjective order of apprehension," the order in which facts are received, and the "objective order of apperception," or the order in which they are finally disposed as details of an objective world. Where the observer has before him a relatively complete series of causes and effects, which he either observes himself or accepts on the authority of other observers, the experience of the agent is highly fragmentary. He has causes without effects and effects without causes; and causes after effects and effects before causes. An objective space-order may be for him a time-order. Moreover, even if his experiences were, as a matter of fact, a faithful and complete copy of the external order, it is not to be seen how, from the cause alone, he should be impressed with the order of cause and effect; for individual causal series are not presented separately but mingled together in one vast complex of experiences. And granting that he had succeeded in disentangling the individual series, and had located every detail as a member of such a series, he is still without a basis for affirming that everything *must* have a cause. For to the agent this means, and means necessarily, that the contrary is inconceivable. And this means, again, not merely that he is unable to construct the contrary in thought, but rather that he has investigated the conditions of such construction and finds that they involve a positive self-contradiction. Now, because two terms are found always together, there is no contradiction in conceiving that they may exist apart; and that I have always thought of them together furnishes no ground for supposing that they necessarily belong together. A habit or association, however ingrained, falls always short of a logical necessity; and for the agent nothing is really indissoluble except that whose dissolution involves a self-contradiction.

Accordingly, for a subjective interpretation of the necessity of the causal relation, we must refer once more to reasons as opposed to causes. And here it is to be noted that we are speaking of the ground of the assumption rather than of its history; and,

moreover, that the relation designated by the assumption is intended to be a relation of ground and consequence rather than of cause and effect, — the subjective expression of the law of cause and effect is the principle of sufficient reason. Now when I say that for every event there must be a reason and that the contrary is inconceivable, it is because there must be a reason for every action of my own. For me as a conscious agent a ground or reason furnishes the only conceivable basis or motive for action, the only basis upon which I can render any action intelligible, and therefore the only basis which I can admit to be possible or real. Accordingly, when I undertake to say how a body must be conceived to act, what I do is to put myself in its place and say how I should act, and should feel in reason obliged to act, if I were that body. Such, for example, is the meaning, for me, of Newton's first law, which declares, roughly speaking, that a body at rest must remain at rest until moved, and a body in motion must move until stopped. Judging the matter from my own standpoint, as of one who knows directly what it is to move or to stop moving, I declare it inconceivable and in contradiction to the nature of a motive being that it should move or stop or make any change whatever without a sufficient reason for doing so ; and therefore I affirm that action without intelligible ground must be forever impossible and unreal, and that the real world must be a world of reason and motive.

Thus the agent's view is, if you like, essentially anthropomorphic, and not anthropomorphic merely, but, to use Spencer's word, automorphic. For it conceives the world not merely in the form of reason, abstractly considered, but in the form of that individual purpose which gives body and concrete meaning to one's judgments of what is reasonable and of value. Not only must the real world be a rational world ; no world can be finally and satisfactorily rational which does not justify my individual existence and my individual ideals from the standpoint of the ideals themselves. To this motive must be ascribed the extraordinary vitality (from any objective standpoint) of the belief in a future life. In the broad daylight of scientific observation and common sense, belief in a future life can be explained only as a relic of superstition, but to

the inner personal consciousness it expresses a motive profoundly logical, which survives as a logical determinant after the substance of the belief has been lost, and compels attention from those who deny that it is logically valid. For it will be noted that, even where the personal motive is formally rejected, the argument against future life rarely fails to include the *ad hominem* argument to show, either that individual aims are satisfied within the present life, or that from their own standpoint a continuance of existence is not really desirable.

III.

Passing from these more general considerations, I shall endeavor now to illustrate by a few brief examples, introduced somewhat parenthetically, the importance of our distinction for detailed psychological description.

1. Are sensations to be described as the elementary material of thought, or as its final product? This subject has been involved in great confusion. Professor James has suggested that the status of sensation will differ according as our view is analytical (the agent's) or physiological (the observer's);¹ and the confusion of these has been neatly characterized by James himself as the psychologist's fallacy. Yet I think he is guilty of this fallacy, when he presently tells us that sensations are first things *in consciousness*. For the only standpoint from which sensations can be described as prior or elementary is that of the observer. From the observer's point of view, the stimulus acts *first* upon the sense-organs, and the nerve-current *then* passes along the sensory-nerve to the brain; at the same time the several kinds of stimuli furnished by the one object *first* excite separate sense-organs, the currents from which are *then* combined in the brain. But it is not so for the agent. The sense-qualities of his object do not first appear separately and then unite to form an object. It is even inconceivable how a quality could be apprehended except as a quality of an object. For the agent, sense-quality and object are the final and coördinate product of a process of analysis and definition.

¹ *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. II, pp. 1-3.

2. Hence, for the agent sense-qualities and thought-qualities (*e. g.*, the hardness of a watch and its value or its accuracy) are equally original and ultimate. The broad distinction between sensation and thought is an observer's distinction. Not even is *nihil est in intellectu* an axiom for the agent. Rather is he bound to assume that, since reality is one, any feature of reality may, with sufficiently acute analysis, be derived from any other, and that a man born blind may thus be conceived to obtain from hearing or touch, not merely a knowledge about, but some knowledge of or acquaintance with the nature of color.

3. I have noted that for the agent knowledge is necessarily a question of internal coherence. But for the observer it is of equal necessity a question of correspondence between the object and the agent's idea, or the reactions supposed to express his idea. For where the agent has only his process of knowledge, by which, for him, the object and his idea of it are coördinately distinguished and determined, the observer has the object before him as a fixed *datum* wholly independent of the agent's recognition of it. Hence, the only question for the observer is whether the agent's recognition corresponds in the normal way to the characteristics of the object.

4. Again, is the perception of the object followed by the reaction to it, or are the two simultaneous? It will be remembered that James's scheme of idea-motor action, which furnishes the basis for his theory of emotion, consists, on the subjective side, of an idea (or perception of an object) followed by a feeling of movement. Dewey has pointed out that this relation of succession is the product of reflection. It is also, however, as I should prefer to say, the direct consequence of the observer's view. The sequence of stimulus and reaction, which exists only for the observer, has been simply transferred to the consciousness of the agent. There is no such sequence for the agent. He does not, to use James's illustration, first perceive the bear as an indifferent object and then, by running away, appraise him as dangerous. On the contrary, the dangerous quality is necessary to the apprehension of the bear as a bear, and the act of running is simply one of a group of simultaneous activities, including the adjust-

ment of the sense-organs, etc., in the coördination of which the agent defines his object.

And here I may remark that James's whole account of emotion suffers from a failure to keep the agent's and observer's views distinct, and thus to adhere consistently to one view or the other. After the process of emotion has been described in purely mechanical fashion as a conflict of instincts, *i. e.*, of preformed neural tendencies, initiated by environmental changes, for which the human soul serves only as a theatre of action, one is somewhat astonished to learn that the view is not to be called materialistic; whereas, if the conflict had been described from the beginning as it would be interpreted by the agent, as the value-side of the process of comparison involved in forming a decision, the teleological intentions of the theory of emotion would have been perfectly clear.

IV.

So far the agent and observer have been presented as living in different worlds and speaking wholly foreign tongues. The problem of bringing them into relation and stating their differences systematically involves too many considerations to be attempted here. Our descriptive account has shown, however, that the two views differ, among other respects, in content and position, and it will be profitable to consider the possible bearing of these differences in particular upon their more general peculiarities and relations.

We have seen that, at least in the more overt bodily actions, the point of view of the doer is different in a spatial sense from that of the observer, inasmuch as the agent views the action literally from the inside of his body, and that this difference is related to a difference of sense-content. Confining our attention for the present to the difference of content, it will be worth noting that it is current usage which speaks of how an action *looks* to an observer, but of how it *feels* to the agent. And this at once recalls the fact that an observer's view of his neighbor's action is predominantly visual, though of course not exclusively so; that this is more the case in proportion as the neighbor is in any

sense a distant neighbor ; and that in any case the observer has no direct information of how it 'feels' to perform the act of another, in terms of muscular and organic sensation. Now, as James has suggested, every stimulus sets up a movement which reverberates throughout the organism and causes changes in probably every part of the system. Of this incalculable mass of change probably every feature is represented to some degree in the feeling-tone of the agent ; but only a few are directly accessible to the view of the observer. And thus, with regard to a particular momentary act, the scope of the observer's view,—of the look as compared with the feel,—is extremely limited. On the other hand, if we adopt the common view that every change of thought or will is the parallel of some organic movement, we may assume to have in the movements hidden from the observer the basis for those features of the agent's thought which are private to himself,—in particular, his consciousness of the purpose and direction of his activity. This would be given in those beginnings of movement which are felt by the agent, but which have not yet eventuated into movements sufficiently gross to be externally evident.

It is perhaps too much to say that there is any internal movement of the organism which may not, with sufficiently minute analysis, be discovered from its external accompaniments. But there is another factor which contributes to the limitations of the external view, namely, the narrowness of attention,—a factor which, by the way, has much to say in determining the logical and psychological peculiarities of all aspects of human thought. The individual's momentary act, inconceivably complex in itself, is still but one term in a vast system of activities constituting his personal character, which, again, is but one term in the yet vaster system constituting the character of the race. Now it may be said, I think, that any view of any portion of human action is not only partial and one-sided, but also to that degree materially false, which is not also a view of human action as a whole ; and, moreover, that any view of the whole is so far false which is not also a view of the whole in detail. But it is obvious that no human view can meet these conditions. A given act of thought may

cover a larger or smaller field, but not with the same fulness of content ; or if with the same fulness, not with the same systematic unity and definiteness of detail. These conditions must then be included among those governing the distribution of content between the two views. Owing to the way the act is presented to him, the agent's view of his own act is many-sided and rich in content ; but, as a matter of attention, he cannot apprehend with similar fulness the acts of his many neighbors. On the other hand, the broad range of his observational view, as well as its systematic clearness, both of which are related to its visual character, require that it be a partial and abstract view of any individual act.

These differences have undoubtedly a bearing upon the logical attitudes expressed by the two views. The special fitness of muscular and organic content for an interpretation in terms of purposive activity can perhaps be only suggested, but it seems to me that the relation between visual content and the mechanical interpretation can be made reasonably clear. For the essence of the mechanical view is that aspects are not only distinguished, but distinguished as spatially separate parts, each, so to speak, wholly within its own skin ; and there is no region of sense-content where this is so completely possible as the region of sight. One may say, indeed, that the perfection of the mechanical conception is to be found only in visual geometry, — as also the perfection of systematic clearness. And, moreover, as just pointed out, the systematic clearness of the external view, as well as its breadth of field, which is again a special characteristic of vision, impose upon it a high degree of abstractness and simplicity. So we find that it is the tendency of the external view, first, *e. g.*, to reduce all springs of action to pleasure, and then to refer pleasure to the activities of reproduction and nutrition, — thus reducing the whole complex of human activity to the simple interworking of the two factors most obvious to the external observer. But this very simplicity may, I think, be recognized as the special correlate of mechanism. Here, again, it is easier to suggest a relationship than to prove it.¹ But the redundancy of the phrase

¹ In Chapter XVI of my *Introductory Study of Ethics* this point has been treated more at length.

'mechanical simplicity' is an evidence of the parallelism in our thought. At the same time, it may be noted that the most complex of the objects concretely recognized as mechanical, — namely, the machines made with hands, — is enormously simple as compared with any animal organism. It may be pointed out, moreover, that the cold-blooded aspect of their operation is a function not only of their simplicity, as conceived by us, but of the predominantly visual character of our conception. Our view ignores the molecular stresses and strains within the parts. If these factors were included, it is doubtful if we could grasp the activity either as simple or as purely mechanical.

So much for the difference of content. We have now to note that these differences are referred to one object, and, indeed, localized as belonging respectively to the inside and outside. This suggests that the two views, in spite of the difficulty of combining them, may, as general points of view, be regarded as belonging to the same field and supplementing each other. Consider, for example, the matter of sexual attraction. To the observer this is simply the antecedent cause of reproduction; to the young lover nothing could, as a rule, be more remote from his purpose or possibly more abhorrent. Yet subsequent reflection will probably convince him that this feature, both in its immediate and its remote aspects, was really indispensable to his purpose, and that he could hardly have made a choice from which it had been expressly excluded. Here, then, the external view serves to complete and to correct the agent's definition of his purpose. On the other hand, the external view misses most of the factors necessary to account for the concrete choice. To the observer the case in hand is one of simple sexual attraction. He compares it with the sexual behavior of the lower animals, already conceived by him too simply and impersonally, and recognizes no important difference. The complex sympathies, whose correlation represents to those concerned the fulfilment of highly personal ends, — these are hidden from the observer, and can hardly be included in a view which will be definite, systematic, and scientific. They belong rather to the sympathetic insight which finds expression in the work of the poet and novelist; yet in the last

analysis they are needed for a fully scientific determination of the note concrete choice.

From this it will appear that each view is in its way partial, inadequate, and abstract. But, in particular, it will be worth noting how much of the content of human life is excluded from the view of the observer, and how this exclusion involves also a distortion. The observer of an act sees only a stimulus followed by a reaction, which he can interpret only as a sequence of cause and effect. But the agent has before him a more or less extended process of debate, including the alternatives rejected as well as that finally adopted, and involving their comparison and valuation. He is thus, by the very nature of the situation presented by his broader view, justified in regarding his act as the expression of choice. Likewise he is in a measure justified even in the undue emphasis placed upon his own view. He regards his own children, his own friends, his own appreciations and opinions as more significant than those of others, but he has the advantage of a more intimate acquaintance. His own views are involved in a network of subtle suggestion and cross-suggestion of which he is conscious as no one else can be. His intercourse with his friends reveals complexities of character which are hidden from more remote acquaintances. He errs only in assuming that his own are exceptional. So far, then, from discounting the agent's view because of its individual emphasis, we may rather assume that all agents' views are likely to be true. It is possible that the great mass of 'men on the street,' so desperately uninteresting in the crowd, might all turn out to be significant personalities if only they could be individually studied. And when we attempt to conceive the result of a possible unified total of such individual views, and place over against it the total result of observers' views, it is at once suggested that the observer's view is truly, as it is instinctively felt to be, a superficial view, however necessarily so, and that its superficiality involves a rather serious misinterpretation of the subject-matter. And this suggestion is strengthened when we remember, not only that the personal life suffers abstraction at the hands of the observer, but that it suffers a similar abstraction in 'the agent's present view of his life

as a whole, — that, indeed, no individual life has ever been viewed as a fully concrete unity even by the agent himself.

The results of such abstraction are to be seen in the various conceptions of humanity offered by the social sciences, so called. There is the economic man of classical economics, whose only activity is to buy cheap and sell dear ; the hedonistic man of scientific ethics, who sums up pleasures with the impersonality and indifference of an adding machine ; the reproductive man of scientific anthropology, who perpetuates his kind regardless of what kind he may perpetuate ; and, finally, the associational man of ultra-scientific psychology, whose activity is confined to combining mental elements into compounds, and whose structure is a combination of the kaleidoscope, the vitascope, and the cash-register. These conceptions have an important function as instruments of analysis, but as pictures of human life they are neither living nor human. And it is no wonder that to the popular mind the social sciences, with their conceptions of social progress, represent the negation of all that is humanly interesting. Their picture of human life bears a general resemblance to the shades of Greek mythology. Psychologically they are largely visual abstractions, constructed by an observer who sees without feeling, and to whom, therefore, human activity presents itself as a series of phantom-like images.

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NEO-REALISM AND IDEALISM.¹

ONE of the most interesting features in the philosophical writing of the last few years, particularly in the periodical literature, has been the appearance of a new type of Realism. Although its adherents in this country and those in England,—chief among whom are Mr. G. E. Moore and Mr. Bertrand Russell,—seem to have worked out their theory independently, at least at first, yet, in spite of a generally predominant polemic interest, and the absence of any extended or systematic development of its presuppositions, sufficient harmony of doctrine seems to be traceable to entitle this tendency to the name of a school. The aim of this paper is to state briefly what seem to be the essential features of its epistemology, and to estimate their bearing upon Objective Idealism.

In the first place, this Neo-Realism is sharply distinguished from the older Realism by an explicit rejection of the representative theory of knowledge.² It does not oppose to Idealism the supposed necessity of a real external order to make our ideas of that order true; nor can the Idealist reply by indicating the absurdity of making any statements about an object which is by definition quite external to knowledge, or the uselessness of such duplication of worlds. The field of argument is materially changed. I may quote the very clear statement of one of the recent advocates of the theory: "There is surely another course open, lying between the doctrine that everything that is perceived is a 'modification of consciousness' and beyond such 'modifications of consciousness' there is nothing, and the doctrine that everything is perceived as a 'modification of consciousness' and beyond these modifications there is something like them in quality, but forever

¹ Read before the American Philosophical Association, at Cornell University, December 27, 1907.

² Mr. Russell, however, has recently made a reservation as to the *possible* tenability of a "form of the correspondence theory," according to which "facts" would be the "only non-mental complexes." Cf. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1906-1907, pp. 45-49.

inaccessible to consciousness. It is perfectly permissible to conceive the object of vision as being not a 'modification of consciousness' at all, but as the real thing; in this case there is no duplication of worlds *præter necessitatem*." ¹

These sentences of Professor McGilvary describe an attitude towards knowledge which seems to be common, under various forms, to all the representatives of this school; and with it the Objective Idealist surely has no quarrel. He might say that in the first type of epistemology mentioned he recognizes Subjective or Psychological Idealism, which he rejects. The second seems to be that Lockean type of Realism out of which Subjective Idealism was, in modern times, developed; and the third states his own attitude in insisting that knowledge is objective and super-individual, as against the subjectivism of the other two types. So far, he would be glad to agree with the Neo-Realists, and to welcome their assistance in the common warfare against scepticism and subjectivity.

But he would find that the agreement ends here. For the Neo-Realist not only holds that knowledge is objective; he holds also that knowledge makes no difference to the facts which are known. The facts, and the truth of any proposition about them, are quite independent of any knowledge or judgment about them,—logically prior, indeed, to such knowledge or judgment.² As Professor Woodbridge puts it, reality undergoes no change in becoming known. "The transformation which takes place, takes place in the one who knows, a transformation of ignorance to knowledge."³ The Idealist quite agrees with this statement, so far as any particular judgment of this or that individual is concerned. But it is of the essence of his theory to take the unity of thought and its object, which the Realist has just stated, seriously, and to conclude that to speak of facts quite independent of knowledge is an inadmissible abstraction. It would seem, then, that Neo-Realism must refute Idealism in order to establish its point.

¹ *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, Vol. IV, p. 453.

² Professor McGilvary, however, is an exception among the Neo-Realists, in that he expressly denies this. Cf. his articles in the *Jour. of Phil.*, Vol. IV.

³ "The Field of Logic," in *Transactions of the International Congress of Arts and Sciences*, St. Louis, Vol. I, pp. 325-326.

This, of course, is what it attempts to do. But most of the arguments which have thus far entered into its polemic must seem to the Objective Idealist to be based on a serious misapprehension of the historical meaning of Idealism; for they all assume that its fundamental postulate is, that *esse* is *percipi*, and that if this be disproved, the whole idealistic construction falls to the ground. Accordingly, Mr. G. E. Moore is at pains to show that, starting from this assumption, we cannot logically avoid solipsism, and also that the definition of reality as perception is circular, since it presupposes the distinction of a real from a fictitious perception. Moore, Montague, and Woodbridge insist that we do not intuitively apprehend the objects of immediate perception as states of the knower, but that the conclusion that they are so is a result of logical sophistication. McGilvary, Montague, and Woodbridge point out that the physiological argument that *esse* is *percipi* is self-contradictory, since it postulates the reality of unperceived physiological processes, and the priority of the object of perception to those processes. Montague and McGilvary strengthen this criticism by an argument for the objectivity of the so-called 'secondary qualities.' Finally, Woodbridge regards the whole of modern Idealism, including Hegelianism, as a logical development from Locke's axiom that "the mind . . . hath no other immediate object but its own ideas." In short, save for one slight reference which I shall mention immediately, throughout the whole literature of this controversy which has as yet fallen into my hands, Idealism is identified with subjectivism.

But the historical inadequacy of this view is surely obvious. It is a view which applies, in the case of Kant, to only a portion of the first Critique, and entirely overlooks the other two. It makes of later German Idealism a mere attempt at 'deduction of the categories,' and neglects the fact that the problems which gave the motive to Hegel's philosophy were as much religious and moral as epistemological. And, to sum up in one word the objections to it: It thinks that, when Idealism says that reality is spiritual, it means this in a psychological and subjective sense, and that this is its starting-point, instead of its conclusion. But

Objective Idealism at least aims to be an *interpretation* of experience, and not a short and easy explanation of it, as this view of it implies. Nevertheless, the Idealist, while disclaiming their application to his own position, will welcome the fresh and telling way in which the arguments against Subjective Idealism have been restated, and even recognize some useful additions. And he must also admit, as Professor Caird has recently pointed out, that there has been a certain subjectivism about the discussions of some recent English Idealists, a tendency to speak of the mind as 'creating relations' or 'constructing reality,' to which these criticisms legitimately apply.¹

It has been said above that there is one exception to this restriction of the realistic criticism to *esse est percipi*. Mr. G. E. Moore, in the course of a long and minute argument of some fifty pages, pauses once, and, merely in passing, devotes a half page to two other definitions of reality. "Some philosophers," he says, "have sometimes suggested that when we call a thing 'real,' we mean that it is 'systematically connected' in some way with other things. But when we look into their meaning, we find that what they mean is . . . systematically connected with other *real* things. . . . And other philosophers have suggested that what we mean by 'real' is . . . connected in some way with a purpose. . . . But if we look into this meaning, we find they mean connected with a *real* purpose."² Both definitions, therefore, are circular, for both presuppose reality in some simpler sense.

Now this criticism is vitiated by an assumption which seems to the Idealist very common in realistic arguments. This assumption is that there are many possible systems of things, but only one among them is *real*, and so qualified to serve as a test to apply to any object claiming reality. Therefore we must look for some more ultimate reality to distinguish the real system from those which are not real, and this we can find only in that reality

¹ Cf. "Idealism and the Theory of Knowledge," in *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 1903-1904, p. 105.

² In *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1905-1906. Mr. B. Russell has also recently made use of this idea in criticising the 'coherence-theory.' Cf. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1906-1907, p. 34.

which, as an immediate quality, attaches to its members as contrasted with things which are merely possible. This is surely a radical misconception of the meaning of the Idealists whom Mr. Moore here has in mind. For them there is only one system of reality, either possible or real, whether they emphasise its logical or its purposive coherence. This system is real, because it is the system of real things; and these things are real, because they find a place in the system. Nor is this a vicious circle. The Idealist has no royal road to Reality. He takes it as he finds it, quite as submissively as does the Realist. But he thinks that he finds good reason to believe that it is systematic and coherent, although he may be, often is, fairly cautious in his estimate of the depth of his own insight into its ultimate nature. And he submits that there is nothing essentially absurd or self-contradictory in the notion of a self-maintaining system, and that the Realist's request for some further basis for its reality is as absurd as for the astronomer to seek for some support in space for the stellar universe. If he were asked further why, then, he cannot pass *a priori* judgments of truth and falsity, he would reply that his individual ignorance of the systematic connection of one part of reality with another in any given case is no disproof of its presence; and, in any case, this connection is not *merely* logical.

It would seem, then, that the formal polemic of Neo-Realism against Idealism, so far as it has yet been developed, is not effective. What judgment must we pass on its own attempts at stating the relation of knowledge to reality? How far does it succeed in giving an account of experience as something of which the facts may be 'independent'?

This constructive side of the theory is not so easy to discuss as its critical side, since there is not the same agreement among the various writers of the school.

In the first place, we find Messrs. Moore, Russell, and McGilvary agreed in regarding consciousness as 'awareness,' which has to its object the unique relation of knowing, or being aware of it, and not that of a thing to its quality or state, or of one part of any content to another part, to follow Mr. Moore's statement. This awareness is qualitatively the same for all objects. The

objects may vary indefinitely, but consciousness is always the same. It is just this independent variation of the objects, without either affecting or being affected by consciousness, which constitutes the independence of truth or knowledge.

This form of the realistic theory I do not wish to dwell on at any length. Its highly abstract account of consciousness, as bad in its way as the old ethical fiction of the indifferent will, seems to refute itself. For the question is not, of course, Can we distinguish between consciousness and its objects? but, Is consciousness real apart from any objects? And if the answer is given, as it is by Professor McGilvary, that it is separable for analytic abstraction, though not in existence, this is quite sufficient for our purpose. The concrete variable is then 'consciousness of objects,' or 'objects as known,' and not objects by themselves. Indeed, Professor Woodbridge, though in a different context, defends his own more concrete view against this definition of consciousness in a way which is quite acceptable to the idealist. He says: "Such phrases as 'conscious of' and 'conscious that' have often been taken to indicate that consciousness is not simply the kind of relation I have indicated, but that it has in addition the property of 'awareness,' which gives to things a peculiar and immediate kind of presence. I am not sure but that we find ourselves here in a verbal difficulty, for what is it 'to be aware' of anything? If we cannot make the 'awareness' responsible for the thing's qualities or for its spatial and temporal relations, what is then left to constitute that peculiar presence? Indeed, it seems to me, on analysis of the situation, that just this character of 'awareness' turns out to be the manifold and irresistible meaning connections which the things in the conscious situation have. . . . It is to be noted also that the 'awareness' diminishes in its evident character just in proportion as the linkage of meanings becomes de-ranked."¹

Just what, however, Professor Woodbridge intends by his own definition of consciousness, I am not quite certain. For him, consciousness is a relation between objects, akin to the spatial and temporal relations, in that it is a continuum. And just as objects

¹ From his paper on "The Problem of Consciousness" in the Garman commemorative volume.

may vary independently of their spatial and temporal relations, so they may vary independently of the conscious relation. As to the nature of this relation, it is, in the first place, quite internal to the reals between which it holds good. "Reality as known is a new stage in the development of reality itself. It is not an external mind which knows reality by means of its own ideas, but reality itself becomes known through its own expanding and readjusting processes." Pragmatism, therefore, is refuted by the fact that, paradoxical as the statement may seem, the very relativity of knowledge to the evolutionary process involves its absoluteness. Adaptation, as Professor Woodbridge remarks, is itself metaphysical.

In the second place, this relation may be defined as one of meaning. In consciousness, "objects become grouped and systematized in a manner quite different from their grouping in any other form. They become representative of each other." "One thing may be a certain measurable distance from another thing, but it may mean that other thing without encompassing the distance. And I wish to emphasise the fact that this relation of meaning which is so prominent among the things is just as much a *relation between them* as is space or time." This sentence is immediately followed by the only examples of these relations of meaning which I have been able to discover in Professor Woodbridge's discussions. "It is the ice," he says, "which means that it will cool the water, just as much as it is the ice which does cool the water when put into it. The water which means that it will quench thirst is the water which does quench thirst when swallowed. I take a powder to dispel the pain in the head, not only because pain and powder are incompatible in juxtaposition, but incompatible also in their meaning."¹

To me, I must confess, these examples of the meaning relation are more mystifying than illuminating. They seem to be only cases of the contrast of a possible with an actual relation in space and time; and surely either may be *meant*. Or, again, they are differences between the matter of an hypothetical and that of a categorical judgment; and surely we may *mean* to pass either

¹ *Loc. cit.*

one. Then it seems strange, also, that this 'immaterial synthesis' of meanings should include *all* material syntheses within its scope. That the territory of this one relation should be coextensive with that of all the others is left merely as an unexplained fact.

Passing over the difficulties of this definition of conscious relation as one of meaning, we may raise the further question: Admitting provisionally some type of relational definition of consciousness, are its implications realistic? Professor Montague assures us that they are, because "all relations presuppose the existence of terms between which they subsist." But how true is this statement? Just as true, I should say, as its opposite, and no more so, that all terms presuppose the existence of relations existing between them. The whole truth consists in related terms or terms in relations; neither is *logically* prior. Let us take a simple example from the favorite field of the Neo-Realists, Mathematics. The first three digits of the common numeral series may be related one to another in various ways. I may add 1 to 2, multiply 2 by 3, and so on. Does this mean that 1, 2, 3 must be given before $1 + 2$ can equal 3, or 2×3 can equal 6? Would it not be equally true to say that for 1 and 2 to be given, they must be addable, and further that the result of their addition must be 3? 1 and 2 *are* nothing but the potentialities, so to say, of this relation among many others. When we choose less abstract relations, the mutual implication of terms and relations is even more obvious. Who would say, for example, that the parental relation presupposed the existence of parent and child? Temporally as well as logically, this relation and its terms are given together. The parent *qua* parent and the child *qua* child are just the terms of this relation. Or, again, who would ask whether the spectrum presupposed its colors, or the colors the spectrum?

Here, however, we may be confronted by an objection from a Realist of the type of Mr. Russell. "We do not," he might say, "define consciousness as a relation grounded in its terms at all; and the terms of which we particularly speak in other ways are ultimate *simples*, which, as such, *do* precede any relations into

which they may enter, and, being altogether unanalysable, are not to be defined in turn by these relations." The answer to this would be two-fold. In the first place, one could wish some of these *simples* to be pointed out, as actually taking some part in the world we know. Do they ever *do* anything? I must confess a strong prejudice to the contrary, and the examples chosen by the adherents of this view have not impressed me favorably. The names of these simples end too often in 'ness' or 'ity.' If, however, they are concrete actualities, then of course they enter into relations, however external these relations may be to them. How is this miracle accomplished? Is this entrance into relations merely arbitrary, a brute *datum*? It must be so, if it is not grounded in the nature of the related terms. Mr. Joachim has elaborated this objection with much skill in his recent book, *The Nature of Truth*. Mr. Russell, however, replies that he cannot see why a reason should be expected for everything, unless we make theistic assumptions. But even if we provisionally admit this as an answer, it can hardly be said to get at the root of the difficulty. For what is demanded is a ground of truth in judgment. These simple terms, of course, are combined in propositions, and these propositions are either true or false. But it is 'according to the nature of this relation,' says Mr. Moore, — and Mr. Russell agrees with him, — 'that the proposition is either true or false.'¹ Now, let us grant as much as you will that "the kind of relation which makes a proposition true (or false), cannot be further defined, but must be immediately recognized," — the truth or falsity is nevertheless grounded in the nature of the relation in question; and the same relation, obviously, which is false of two given terms, might be true as between two others. It is then *this* relation, of this specific nature, which is true or false of *these* specific terms. And this can be so only because its nature is *not* external to the nature of the terms. If they reject or accept it, they do so in accordance with their own natures. And still more may be said. However simple the ultimate terms of the original propositions may be, such propositions are further combined in wider synthe-

¹ "The Nature of Judgment," in *Mind*, N. S., No. 30, p. 180.

ses. We say, for example, that such a proposition implies, or is equivalent to, or contrary to, such another; and such a wider proposition may be either true or false. Now here it is sufficiently apparent that the relation does not presuppose the terms, which in this case are propositions, any more than the terms do the relation; for the propositions are this equivalence, or opposition, or implication. On the theory we are discussing, then, the criterion of truth must be not one, but two. It is immediate in the case of simple judgments, but mediate in that of combinations of such simple judgments.

But if the terms imply the relation, and the relation imply the terms, — and consciousness be a relation, as Professor Woodbridge holds, — then after all this new Realism has not modified the philosophical problem so very profoundly. What we start with is still the world as known; and we make the preliminary statement that these objects presuppose consciousness, and, *per contra*, that consciousness presupposes these objects. If the first half of the statement be over-emphasised, we develop a Subjective Idealism; if the second, a Naturalistic Realism. But if both be given their due weight, and neither side of the one truth neglected, we shall have an Objective Idealism, the strength of which will lie in its overcoming the on-sidedness of both the opposing theories. It will be quite as confident as Realism that there is no consciousness apart from objects; but it will be equally sure that there are no objects, ultimately, apart from consciousness.

To the second half of this statement, Professor Woodbridge has objected that the conscious relations of objects are not permanent, and that evolution has shown us that objects were temporally prior to consciousness, existing long before it, as all the evidence shows. But in this matter we can use Professor Woodbridge's own statements against himself. He admits that the objects are nevertheless spiritually determined from the first, or preadapted to knowledge. This is the essence of the Idealistic position. Adaptation must be quite as metaphysical here as Professor Woodbridge insists it is in criticising Pragmatism. The problem of time cannot be broached here; but it is certainly not less a difficulty, to say the least, for the Realist than for the Idealist.

To conclude, then, very briefly. To start with relations and try to arrive at reals, or to start with reals and try to arrive at relations of reals, are equally abstract procedures. The first is essentially the method of Subjective Idealism. The second is, apparently, that of this type of Realism, in so far as it is in any way distinguishable from Idealism. The concrete reality is a whole of related things; and the metaphysical problem is, What is the nature of this whole? Neo-Realism gives us the point of departure from investigation, cleared from all subjectivism, if we take it on its Idealistic side, which I have tried to exhibit; but it does not go beyond. The solution of Idealism may be very tentative as yet, but at least it does not halt with the statement of the problem.

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HAPPINESS AS AN ETHICAL POSTULATE.

MORAL philosophers have usually supported the belief of the naive mind that there must be an ultimate, if not an immediate, connection between virtue and happiness. It will be the endeavor of this paper to show that, provided happiness is defined with sufficient care, psychological support can be found for its employment as a moral postulate, and that this postulate will be found significant for ethics.¹

The term 'happiness' has been employed in a great variety of senses by moral philosophers. The ordinary English use has made little distinction between happiness and pleasure, and is fairly well represented by John Stuart Mill's *Utilitarianism*, where he says: "By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness pain and the privation of pleasure." At the farthest, most English writers have distinguished happiness from pleasure only by longer duration, greater intensity, or by making it consist in a sum of pleasures. Happiness was pictured by the Epicureans as a state of mental imperturbability in which are few pains, and many pleasures experienced at little cost. Happiness has been thought of as a life in which the desires that spring from the true nature of man are satisfied, and man feels the affective glow that comes from successful activity,—such at least seems to be Aristotle's usual conception of *εὐδαιμονία* in its affective aspect. Happiness, again, has been thought of as a state of purely intellectual satisfaction, in which the affective glow that attends intellectual insight is the only pleasure felt, since no activity except of a purely intellectual nature is present, and so no kind of feeling other than intellectual feeling,—such seems to me to be the character of *εὐδαιμονία* in the last book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and also of Spinoza's 'intellectual love of God.' Again, happiness may be thought of as chiefly intellectual in character, but nevertheless be a state of strenuous activity,—as

¹ In the preparation of this paper the writer owes a large debt of gratitude to Professors Tufts, Angell, and A. W. Moore, of the University of Chicago, for numerous suggestions and criticisms.

in the cases of Leibniz and Fichte. Finally, happiness may take an ecstatic turn, and look to a state of mystic rapture, which may be presented from an intellectual and æsthetic point of view as by Plotinus, and in general by mystics of a distinctly intellectual stamp, or the mystic rapture may be thought of in more sensuous imagery.

One generalization may, perhaps, safely be made from the various theories of happiness: Whether or not this is its sole constituent, at any rate its most conspicuous characteristic has always been pleasure. Happiness as consisting of pleasure, without much if any closer discrimination of degrees or kinds of pleasure, has been regarded as either a necessary concomitant or ultimate reward of the moral life by a large variety of thinkers of types as diverse as the names of Butler, Locke, Dugald Stewart, Paley, and Kant will suggest. Most thinkers of other types in the history of ethics, though following the example of Plato¹ in selecting only particular *kinds* of pleasures, have yet regarded these as in some sense the necessary rewards of a life that is truly moral. Though, indeed, Kant first attached the term 'moral postulate' to the notion of happiness, the idea of an inevitable association between happiness and virtue is older than reflective philosophy itself, and religious considerations were derived from this relationship long before the time of the Königsberg philosopher.

It certainly seems clear that, for so close an association between virtue and happiness to have arisen in the minds of most ethical thinkers, some psychological relationship between the mental experiences represented by the two conceptions must exist. Since, then, happiness has always consisted in part of some kind of pleasure, what is pleasure?²

For our purpose, of course, pleasure-pain *sensations* are of little concern. The existence of pain nerves affording cutaneous sensations of pain seems pretty well established, while the pres-

¹ Especially in the *Republic* and in the *Philebus*.

² Much ethical obscurity in the use of 'pleasure' has been due to failure to define the term. *E. g.*, British writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries do not define 'pleasure,' and, notwithstanding their keener ethical insight, lack the precision of their continental contemporaries for this reason.

ence of pleasure nerves is still in doubt. No one, however, would think that happiness consists fundamentally in the presence of pleasure sensations, — if such there be, — or in the absence of sensations of pain.

Pleasure, therefore, so far as it concerns us as an important constituent of happiness, is affective, not sensational. Affective pleasures may be either sensuous or ideational. It is hard to find a definition that will apply equally to both. Sensuous pleasure attends the normal functioning of a sense organ, and general healthful organic activity. Sensuous pain or displeasure attends the under- or over-stimulation of the organism, whether in respect of intensity or duration.¹ Ideational pleasure attends the consciousness of mental activity unimpeded in its progress toward an end, while ideational pain or displeasure is present when the course of mental activity is thwarted, harassed, or in some other way impeded. This definition, as Stout² has shown, applies throughout the entire range of intellectual pleasures and pains, from the displeasure that comes from the interruption of habitual perception by seeing a book upside down on one's library shelf to the pains of bereavement that come from the thwarting of customary mental channels by the death of a friend.

A moment's reflection will convince us that the happiness that must inevitably be associated with virtue cannot be sensuous pleasure. Sensuous pleasures may or may not be the goal of mental activity, and they are by no means the inevitable accompaniment of unimpeded mental activity when moral, nor can we see any reason why they ought to be. There is no essential reason why one should enjoy one's dinner because one is an honest man, or why a man should have no relish for food because he is a trickster in the stock market.

Nor are *all* kinds of ideational pleasure necessarily present in every consciously moral action, and necessarily absent in every immoral action; and most will agree that there is no reason why they should be. Possibly there may be something of an æsthetic nature implied in judgments of the Good; but certainly there

¹ Angell, *Psychology*, chap. xiv.

² *Analytic Psychology*, Vol. II, chap. xii.

seems to be no reason to suppose that virtuous conduct need involve anything analogous to the pleasure which the scholar enjoys in successful research. If we consider life as a whole, instead of specific actions, it becomes clear at once that the good man is not necessarily he who experiences or is capable of experiencing the greatest number and largest variety of intellectual pleasures.

One type of ideational pleasure, however, is necessarily present in every moral action, and necessarily absent in every action that is either immoral or unmoral. In every moral action, effort is directed towards an ideal, and the agent is faithful to his ideal. However unsuccessful his efforts may be in the actual achievement of what he tries to accomplish, however greatly unforeseen or otherwise unavoidable circumstances may thwart him, his ideational activity is unimpeded when he considers the moral sincerity of his efforts, and in so far forth he experiences pleasure. Whether he thinks of himself as having the approval of his conscience, or of preserving his own self-respect and maintaining his dignity, or of inevitably commanding the approval of gods and men so far as these are rational spectators of his conduct, he at least, in his action, secures the satisfaction that he feels is of highest value, — a satisfaction which he would not exchange for all the paltry pleasures that might attend the gifts of fortune and plaudits of men at the cost of conscience and honor. To those of high moral character, such satisfaction is the highest of all pleasures. Thus far the Stoics, the Scottish School, Adam Smith, and John Stuart Mill are agreed, and we may well agree with them.

While, then, there is a certain pleasure of the loftiest character present in every moral action, whether successful or not, from the mere consciousness that the action was performed from a regard for duty, there will of course be a still greater amount of moral pleasure if the action has been successful in actually realizing a moral ideal. For instance, if one attempts to put through a political reform and fails, he will still feel a certain pleasure in having been true to an ideal, but if he succeeds in effecting the reform, the pleasure will be vastly enhanced.

A familiar question arises here. Should one discriminate *kinds*

of pleasure? Shall we say that the pleasure attending moral action is of a quality different from and superior to all other? If we say yes, that the pleasures of Socrates and the pig are wholly different, and ever so little of the one is preferable to ever so much of the other, we find it impossible to discriminate between such types of pleasure except through their cognitive concomitants and implications. The difference between the pleasures of Socrates and the pig are due to the different objects of their attention and effort. On the other hand, if we say that all pleasure is qualitatively the same, we are compelled to view pleasure as almost as much of an abstraction as sensation. If the pleasures in the solution of a mathematical problem and in eating a dish of strawberries are qualitatively the same with the pleasure attending the performance of duty, and all the qualitative differences between these three psychoses are referred to the cognitive side, we must regard pleasure as an abstraction as meaningless as color which is neither red nor green nor blue nor yellow. Another difficulty arises from the impossibility of attributing moral values to cognition. To a pure intellect devoid of feeling, nothing could be either better or worse than anything else. If pleasure is a meaningless abstraction with no values in it but more and less, and if there are no cognitive values at all,—whence, then, do the qualitative values come? ¹ As it would seem absurd, not to say revolting, to refer them wholly to instincts and appetites, our only recourse is to conclude that, however we may decide to define pleasure, at any rate the conscious experience which gives us our moral values is neither wholly cognitive nor wholly affective, but must partake of the nature of both.

There is, then, a peculiar psychic experience which attends moral action,—not wholly cognitive and not wholly affective. In its affective aspect, it is pleasurable because self-consciousness is unimpeded in its contemplation of the moral worth of its action. It is cognitive because the ends striven for are of course cognized. This experience is the most highly prized of all experiences; it

¹ The difficulties in quantitative hedonism are too familiar to require discussion; and, while the present position is non-hedonistic in that it does not make pleasure the criterion of morality, these same difficulties would preclude the affirmation of a happiness consisting of all pleasures reckoned quantitatively as an ethical postulate.

represents the highest satisfaction that a moral man can experience,—it is happiness.

Happiness, therefore, as a moral conception, does not comprise every pleasure which a man can experience, nor every state of consciousness which he may desire. Happiness is restricted to that state of consciousness in which a man is true to his moral ideal and receives the approval of his conscience. It is not a sum of pleasures, it is not the most intense of pleasures, it is not to be defined in terms of pleasure exclusively. It is, however, the loftiest and noblest experience which a man can have; and it is an integral constituent of the highest Good, and therefore an ethical postulate.¹

Happiness is an ethical postulate because it is an inevitable accompaniment of the performance of duty. A duty, if it is a duty, must in some sense be realizable. An ideal, if it ought to be an ideal, must in some sense be attainable. As Kant pointed out, "thou canst because thou oughtest" is a moral demand which we are constrained to make of the universe.²

The point here insisted upon is similar to one raised recently in the logical field: What is the satisfaction which must attend the attainment of truth? Is truth prized for its own sake? Mr. Bradley, together with many others, maintains this to be the case. While moral and other interests may well determine not only the occasions and the limits to which the interest in the pursuit of knowledge should be followed, but even the *kinds* of truth to be sought, still truth is the object of a genuine interest of the mind distinct and apart from its other interests.³ It seems to follow that the satisfaction which the pursuit of truth affords is a distinct satisfaction, not to be confused with other satis-

¹ The justification for employing 'happiness' in this unusual sense may be questioned. The conception here intended is, to be sure, more like Spinoza's 'beatitudo' or Fichte's 'Seligkeit' than the ordinary English use of 'happiness.' But one dislikes to employ terms of such thoroughly religious connotation as 'blessedness' and 'beatitudo' for ethical purposes.

² It would be possible, I think, to show that there is a psychological basis for this connection between duty and possibility of performance. Nothing can be thought of as a duty that is not at the same time thought of as possible of performance, ultimately at least.

³ *Mind*, N. S., No. 45, pp. 320 ff

factions, and that the pleasure attending the attainment of truth is a highly desirable conscious experience,—a logical satisfaction similar to the moral satisfaction which above has been called happiness. The two are satisfactions of wholly distinct interests, and are in no way connected with each other. The learned man may, or may not, be a good man.

The comparison of happiness with intellectual satisfaction thus raises this question: While intellectual satisfaction and moral happiness are distinct states of consciousness, should we regard them as objects of interests which can be *absolutely* distinguished? Here, of course, the absolutist and pragmatist differ. Professor Dewey, to be sure, among the pragmatists, would insist that intellectual satisfaction is arrived at only when ideas accomplish the ends for which they are intended,—in other words, that one cannot regard *any* kind of successful outcome as an instance of truth-satisfaction though the outcome be other than was anticipated.¹

But no pragmatist, one supposes, would admit that truth affords a satisfaction altogether unique, that can be pursued for its own sake wholly apart from every other human interest. For one reason, the truth interest would on this supposition have to create its own material, and this is impossible, argues Professor Moore.² Ultimately, then, the truth interest, the moral interest, and every other interest must arise from a common self or in a common situation, and each interest must be mediated by the others and cooperate with them. However, from the pragmatic point of view, perhaps it may be maintained that the satisfaction possible in the moral situation, in which a question of character is always raised,³ is distinguishable from that in a situation in which only logical or scientific problems have been presented.

Against this whole theory of happiness one may imagine an

¹ *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, Vol. V, pp. 93 ff. That Professor James would assent to this limitation of intellectual satisfaction seems doubtful, according to this review of his *Pragmatism*.

² *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, Vol. V, pp. 429 ff.

³ Professor Dewey distinguishes the field of ethics from that of science by saying that in the former the question of character is vital, while in the latter it is ignored. "Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality" in the *Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago*.

objector saying : " This happiness which you describe, you say, may be limited to the mere satisfaction which the good man receives simply from knowing that he has done right ; although, indeed, you add that, so far as he may actually have been successful, his happiness is thereby increased. Now is this enough to make the good man *happy*, in any genuine sense of the word ? Suppose the good man miserably fails in all his endeavors, and meets with every possible reversal and affliction, like Job for example, can we say that simply because he has done right, he is therefore happy ? If such a man could be happy at all, would it not have to be by maintaining a blind obliviousness to his actual condition, — by cultivating a Stoic apathy, or, perhaps, a mystic ecstasy or a Christian Science which ignores actual facts ? "

Our objector is quite right in protesting against a happiness that could be obtained only by ignoring actual conditions ; our practical twentieth century rightly must regard it as cowardly and unethical to seek such an happiness, even were it obtainable, and much more repudiate such happiness as an ethical postulate. While to answer our objector fully might lead us too far afield into metaphysics, this much may at least be said without forsaking the psychologico-ethical methods of the present paper : Happiness is open to our afflicted good man so far as he positively identifies himself with all the social and moral forces of his age, and, through his faith in the ultimate triumph of justice and right in society, derives satisfaction from the conviction that, since he has been faithful to the cause of goodness, he can rightly in some sense regard himself as a participant in realizing the social good that is sure to come. Some such conviction must be supposed to animate the mind of the patriot who foresees the immediate failure of his efforts, for instance ; and, to some degree, despite his other-worldliness, of the religious martyr.

It would be pushing a supposed case of this type to an impossible extreme to assume that the sincerity of the good man's efforts can be absolutely unavailing. Defeated he may be in his own time, and future history may never vindicate him ; still, if he knows that he has been true to a social ideal, he may feel assured that, in however humble a way it may be, his efforts must

have done something to further the growth of the ideal in the minds of men. Much of the difficulty in many problems of this type is due to their artificiality in assuming a ready-made self with fixed interests that demands satisfaction before it enters a moral situation, instead of appreciating that the self and its interests become defined in the moral situation in which the problem is solved. As Professor Dewey very pertinently says: "It is the business of men to develop such capacities and desires, such selves as render them capable of finding their own satisfaction, their invaluable value, in fulfilling the demands which grow out of their associated life. Such happiness may be short in duration and slight in bulk; but that it outweighs in quality all accompanying discomforts as well as all enjoyments which might have been had by another course of action, is attested by the simple fact that agents do consciously choose it."¹

Let no Hegelian accuse us of virtually setting up as the criterion of moral action "the utterly subjective and superficial feeling of pleasant and unpleasant." In the first place, as here defined, happiness is not simply pleasant feeling, but has its cognitive aspect as well; and, in the second place, happiness, even as here defined, is not made the criterion of moral action. We should entirely agree with Hegel that attention, in morality of a high order, is not directed toward the self or to any of its subjective experiences, but is directed toward objects. The good man does not do right for the sake of the happiness which is the concomitant of righteous action; his interest is not directed toward himself at all, but toward the objects, the ends, which he is endeavoring to bring about. But while this is most emphatically true, it is equally true that these ends are approved by the affective side of his nature, and that, in attaining these ends, he is also experiencing happiness.

A further consideration in this connection is the inevitable necessity that any end, if it is to be acted upon at all, must evoke a response upon the feeling side of our nature. How to secure this was a problem that baffled moral philosophers prior to the nineteenth century, and was very imperfectly met by Kant and

¹ Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics* (H. Holt & Co., 1908), p. 396.

Hegel, as I have shown in another connection.¹ A purely rational ideal, if by rational is meant something exclusively cognitive, is *not* an ideal at all, not anything of value whatever. Valuation must involve the feelings. Consequently, the realization of the moral ideal must evoke the approval of the feelings, and pleasure must attend both the process of realization and the moment of final attainment. Such pleasure cannot be devoid of moral significance. So, if we restrict the term 'happiness' to such pleasure and its cognitive concomitants, happiness must be the inevitable attendant of successful moral endeavor, and, as the very idea of duty involves possibility, and in some sense actuality of attainment, the attainment of such happiness becomes a moral postulate.²

To revert again to the field of logical controversy, it should be clear that the sense in which happiness has here been treated of as an *a priori* ethical postulate is not designed to raise a logical issue. To the idealist there ought to be no objection to speaking of happiness in this way, when he bears in mind the sense in which happiness is here employed. Nor should the pragmatist take offense, since *a priori*, as here used, need not be interpreted in its narrower sense. It may well be that the principles which are here alleged to be *a priori* have arisen because they have 'worked' in satisfying human needs. The very notion of morality may have arisen in this manner. But if this be true of moral principles, according to the same arguments it is equally true of time, space, causation, — nay even of the very principles of identity and contradiction themselves, as Mr. Schiller has attempted to show.³ If the present argument should convince the reader that the doctrine that moral happiness is an inevitable accompaniment of moral action with its implications 'works' as well as an hypothesis in

¹ *The Ethical Significance of Feeling, Pleasure, and Happiness in Modern Non-Hedonistic Systems*, in the *Philosophic Studies of the University of Chicago*.

² The difficulty in Kant's employment of happiness as a moral postulate is thus seen to be due to his including all pleasure in happiness, instead of limiting the pleasure of happiness to pleasure attending the realization of moral ideals. Spinoza and Fichte were on the right track in limiting the pleasure attending the highest moral good to 'blessedness,' though they both failed to make it clear in what way blessedness is necessarily involved in moral action.

³ In "Axioms as Postulates," an essay published in *Personal Idealism*, 1902, edited by Sturt.

ethics as time, space, and causation do in theoretical spheres, its purpose will be fully accomplished.

In conclusion, a word may be said regarding the religious implications of happiness as an ethical postulate. Kant, it will be remembered, to a large extent based his arguments for God, freedom, and immortality upon the conviction that happiness must be the ultimate attendant of virtue. The chief objections to Kant's use of happiness here seem to the present writer to rest upon his misapprehension of what pleasure is properly included in happiness as an ethical postulate. He thought it necessary to include all pleasure in happiness. If happiness be limited to the content here proposed, it is believed that, whatever arguments may be based upon duty and the necessity of fulfilling the moral law as grounds for belief in immortality and the other Ideas of the reason, will be considerably strengthened by the postulation of happiness.

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REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

The Philosophical Basis of Religion. By JOHN WATSON. Glasgow, James Maclehose & Sons ; New York, The Macmillan Co., 1907. — pp. xxvi, 485.

Professor Watson's latest volume covers in its contents a wide field. The first half of the book is devoted to an admirably clear exposition of his own familiar philosophical standpoint, on the side of its religious implications, and to a criticism of various modern views that stand opposed to it, — in particular those of Newman, Dr. Wilfred Ward, and Loisy, Professor James, Harnack, and representatives of Personal Idealism and the newer Realism. Chapters VIII–XV are studies in the history of theology, and deal with Philo, Gnosticism, Augustine, Medieval Theology, and Leibniz. In two concluding chapters a more definitely constructive attitude is attempted, in connection with the two problems of God's relation to the world, and the justification of evil. The book is in large measure a reproduction of two sets of lectures delivered to different audiences, and at first one is inclined to feel that it is lacking somewhat in point of unity. Indeed, the plan of the book does suggest a little the process of welding materials that have grown more or less independently out of a long revolved philosophical interest. However, this fundamental interest is everywhere in evidence, and is enough to obviate any serious criticism on the score of unity. Throughout, the volume is an argument, impressive alike for its solid reasoning and its wealth of historical knowledge, for rationality in religion, — for reasoned conviction as against authoritative dogma, on the one hand, and, on the other, for the value of well defined intellectual formulations, or theology, as opposed to the haziness of current faith and feeling philosophies, to unknowable Gods, and to the substitution of poetry and symbol for rational conceptions. Thus the historical chapters are arguments as well ; they are written with the somewhat specialized purpose of pointing out the influence, and the critical deficiencies, of the Neo-Platonist tradition in theology, and of the attempt to save a sphere of revelation above reason. One might perhaps gather from the preface that the author's purpose was rather more constructively theological than it turns out to be. If one excepts the suggestive treatment of the problem of evil in the last chapter, there is little attempt at any positive reinterpretation of theological beliefs that goes beyond the formulation of the

central thesis of Professor Watson's Idealism ; and the relatively technical difficulties of the philosopher have much the larger part to play in the treatment. It is the lack of certainty as to just the audience Professor Watson had in view, that makes it not altogether easy to pronounce upon the real effectiveness of the volume. If, as might appear on the surface, a semi-popular audience is chiefly intended, there are certain criticisms which it would perhaps be hardly fair to press, though one may question whether the results are not too abstract to make a very wide general appeal. On the other hand, there are reasons why the book is not fully adapted to convince the philosopher, where he is not already in sympathy with its general position.

Of course this does not mean that there is not a great deal in the book, in detail, which is valuable and enlightening. One could expect nothing else in view of its source. On the whole, the historical chapters seem to me perhaps the most important. They are very carefully and independently done, and they help fill a real gap in the field of easily available knowledge about the men and movements of which they treat. So also some of the criticisms are excellent. That of Newman and his followers, — not perhaps the most difficult of tasks, — is clear-cut and effective, as is also, in a somewhat narrower way, the attack upon the over-emphasis on the subliminal consciousness in Professor James's theory of religion. The discussion of Harnack seems to me less successful, in so far at least as it raises the historical question. Of course it is a problem to what extent the Jesus of the Gospels may represent an historically limited and one-sided religious genius, — a genius limited either by the traditional Jewish ideas, or by an ascetic bent. But if one chooses to attribute these traits rather to his reporters, and to give weight, — and to this Professor Watson would seem not disinclined, — to the evidence for a singularly sane, free, and universal religious insight, there certainly may be made to seem more justification than Professor Watson will allow for the preference, in terms of truth, of primitive Christianity to its later dogmatic development, whatever historical and practical value this may have had. Professor Watson seems to me to rely altogether too much on the mere abstract Hegelian conception of history as always the same necessary sort of process, — an actualizing and rendering concrete of what is originally given only in the germ. An attempt to show this in its application to actual historical Christianity might have been less convincing. It may be that the later conception of religion worked out in Christianity is truer than that which its

founder formulated and lived, or it may be that it is less true. But that the two are essentially the same, that the one is the natural outcome of the inner intention of the other, the unfolding and the clearer recognition of its latent meaning, is very distinctly open to doubt. One need not minimize the value of intellectual insight, when one admits that there are times when a truer insight is to be got by going back to the past.

It is, however, in connection with the main philosophical thesis of the book that I venture to express the most dissatisfaction. Doubtless most of us who pretend to be philosophers feel at times out of sorts with the thinness and barrenness of the transcripts of reality we are compelled to use, and a disquieting sense of their inadequacy to the real stuff of the concrete world. When the new concept is first struck out in the course of a victorious march of thought, it may indeed appeal to us as extraordinarily full and significant. But as it takes its place as the formula of a finished philosophy, assuming the warrant of a faith once for all delivered to the elect, it soon tends to become to any save the devout believer dry and tasteless, when it does not arouse our active dislike. I confess to something of this feeling toward the 'single self-differentiating principle' of Speculative Idealism, when intended to put an end to controversy. Professor Watson is one of the few writers of importance now left who apparently can profess themselves satisfied with this particular creed. The new statement of it which is here given is an excellent one, probably as lucid and as pregnant as could well be made; and, if intended for a popular audience, it perhaps does not call for criticism. But it does not, as it seems to me, add anything to the real philosophical situation, for the reason that it still fails to come to close quarters with the serious difficulties which, in the past few decades, have been felt and expressed by hostile critics. Even in the chapter which deals with the most recent direct opponents of Professor Watson's type of Idealism, there is little evidence of any really sympathetic effort to put himself in the epistemological position which he criticises. There is the same familiar endeavor to rule the new philosophy out of court by the arguments that have done service against the earlier sensationalistic foes of Idealism. Thus Personal Idealism is condemned by pressing the entirely unreal conception of an absolute independence and unrelatedness of the individual. Presumably all recent exponents of the doctrine are aware of the difficulties of such a position, and to saddle it upon them with no notice of the qualifications they attempt to introduce, is too short and easy a method of refutation to be convincing.

I am not competent to defend the Realists, for I confess I find it difficult quite to assimilate their position; but I suspect they also would have some objections to raise to Professor Watson's interpretation. Certainly the criticism that Realism tends to solipsism might sound more formidable, were it not that, in the present state of disagreement in epistemology, this is an objection which is brought against every theory in turn, including Professor Watson's own theory of Idealism.

My chief ground for fault-finding, then, is this ignoring of some of the most fundamental difficulties that have been brought against the traditional idealistic epistemology, and the assumption that it affords a safe and settled standard, failure to agree with which sufficiently condemns any rival theory. For example, the psychology of knowledge, — the existence of individual thinkers with relatively impervious experiences, and the connection of knowing with such thinkers, — is not a mere arbitrary figment of the philosopher's imagination. Interpreted in some fashion or other, it represents an obvious and unescapable fact, which has to be looked in the face by any adequate epistemology. Professor Watson, so far as I can see, makes no attempt to meet the demand that we be shown just what we are to do with this. There is the familiar oscillation back and forth between what, — no matter how the name of psychology be abjured, — is plainly our human and individual experience, and the absolute experience which transcends us; but how we are to get from the first to the second, and what the concrete experiential relationship is between the two, supposing we have got them both, is once again slurred over. In a new philosophy such gaps might be excusable; but Speculative Idealism has been long enough in the field now to be held accountable. If its God be nothing but the hypostasizing of the abstract laws of intelligence, obtained always from the individual philosopher's examination of his own personal experience, — and I confess that is the best understanding I can get of it finally, — the failure of any satisfactory answer to the demand is easily explained.

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Philosophische Voraussetzungen der exakten Naturwissenschaften.

Von ERICH BECHER. Leipzig, J. A. Barth, 1907. — pp. vii, 244.

This work, which is a well-conceived study of an important subject, falls conveniently into three parts, of which the first (Chaps. I and II) deals with the meaning and value of hypotheses, the second (Chaps. III–VI), with the grounding of our hypothesis of an 'outer world,'

and the third (Chaps. VII-IX), with our motives for attributing to this world a certain mechanical constitution. Of these, the third part is a little work of art. With great skill of illustration the author gathers around historic assumptions respecting the structure ("discontinuity of matter") and the laws of behavior ("Kinetic-elastic and Kinetic-electric Images") such an analysis of evidence as would enable us in their reference to distinguish between 'hypothesis' and 'fiction.' By this part of the subject, the present reflections have been chiefly inspired.

Meanwhile, the second division appears to be less deserving. It is also occupied with the issue between 'hypothesis' and 'fiction'; but now *à propos* of the assumption of an 'external world' of bodies in space and time. An effort is made to bring the 'evidence' which saves the assumption of such a world from being a mere fiction in line with the inductive evidence on which hypotheses of a less fundamental nature are based. The author has chosen this occasion for an analysis of the presuppositions (*Voraussetzungen*) from which alone induction can proceed. These presuppositions he takes to be the following:

(1) "Jedem menschen ist das ihm momentare gegebene, d. h. Bewusste, unbedingt gewiss" (p. 59); (2) "Die axiome (der Logik) sind denknotwendig gewiss" (p. 60); (3) "Das vergangene die Erinnerung zwincklässt, und diese als Repräsentation des Vergangenen erkennbar ist" (p. 65); (4) "Die beobachteten Regelmässigkeiten in meinem Bewusstseinsinhalten, die ich aus dem gegenwärtig gegebenen und der Erinnerungsdeutung kenne, auch gelten über dies gebiet hinaus, für das ganze Gebiet meines vergangenen und zukünftigen Bewusstseins" (p. 73). From these postulates we proceed *by induction* to the acceptance, first, of other minds, then, of bodies in space and time. As to the stuff composing the outer world thus constructed, the author is explicit enough. "Wir halten fest dass eine Aussenwelt existiert, und dass ihre Existenz im Qualität-Sein besteht, Qualität in dem Sinne, in dem wir die gegebenen Bewusstseinsinhalte Qualitäten zu heissen pflegen" (p. 134).

If this portion of our author's work was greeted with less enthusiasm than the preceding, it is because the author, though following an oft-tested road, seems scarcely to have given heed to the warnings of history respecting its pitfalls. Criticism has pointed out that, in the matter of such presuppositions, the difficulty lies not so much in getting a world out of them as in putting a meaning into them, — a meaning, that is, which does not presuppose the construction of a world to have been already made. To be sure, a circle may not be wholly

vicious, but the interest of the philosopher can be caught only by one who makes some effort to point out circular virtues that will pass muster before a scrupulous conscience. In general, the status of presuppositions in empirical method is matter for the nicest reflection. They are not meant to be 'fictions,' obviously, and they cannot be 'hypotheses,' whose definition, as we shall see, requires them to be verifiable by the very method whose presuppositions are in question. How such presuppositions are possible, is a question that has not lost its meaning since Kant's day, and still insists on an answer. We have thus worked backward through examples of situations in which the author conceives the disjunction, 'fiction' or 'hypothesis,' to arise, to the question, What does this disjunction mean? This is the problem of the first two chapters of the work before us.

Here we start with the following distinction: "Das wissenschaftliche Denken kann 1. Annahmen machen, von denen es voraussetzt dass sie unzutreffend sind in allen oder einzelnen Punkten, oder 2. Annahmen die es für wahrscheinlich oder gar wahr hält, wenigstens in einzelnen Theilen" (p. 11).

The first class of assumptions are 'fictions.' Among them the author would include (1) mere 'simplifications,' like the concepts of material point, frictionless motion, ideal gas, isolated magnetic pole; (2) graphic models, like the many that have been constructed to demonstrate the properties of the ether. For the fiction thus defined the author claims a high utility, and, in spite of its "partial or entire" incorrectness, a place among the indispensable apparatus of science.

It is to be regretted that the author does not enter at greater length into a question that has puzzled many thinkers: How, namely, can a partial or complete falsehood be useful or indispensable to a science pretending to an insight into truth? Too much capital has been made of the 'indispensably fictitious' character of scientific construction to allow us longer to content ourselves with such expressions as 'simplicity' and 'convenience.'

But more important to the internal consistency of the work before us is the reflection that, if fictions contain a recognized element of falsehood, the disjunction 'fiction' or 'hypothesis' is no longer complete enough for the classification of the historic assumptions of science. We have already seen that the 'presuppositions' of inductive method would fall into neither class. But, what is more important to the author's purpose, the assumptions of an atomic structure, of an ether-medium, are not regarded by those who deny their scientific

value as partially false assumptions ; but merely as going an *unnecessary length* beyond the facts. For the critics of such hypotheses, the use of such unnecessary apparatus is a sign of that infirmity of mind which, in Ostwald's phrase, calls for a 'crutch.'

The point is perhaps most clearly brought out in the history of the attempt to determine the 'atomic masses' of the chemical elements. If one is averse to the use of a crutch, one may still retain the historic term 'atom' in some such use as that of Laurent (*Chemical Method*, 1853). "By the term 'atoms,' I understand the equivalents of Gerhardt, or, what comes to the same thing, the atoms of Berzelius." Or again: "In order to avoid all hypotheses, I shall not attach to the term 'atom' any other sense than that which is included by the term 'proportional number.'" Now the methods by which these 'proportional numbers' were originally assigned, made use only of the mass-ratios in which elements combine. But this method would not enable us to assign a unique 'proportional number' to a given element ; it would leave on our hands a series of numbers standing in the relation of submultiple to multiple.

How remove this ambiguity? One way of doing so is to make use of Avogadro's Law. This law was conceived and originally formulated in terms of assumed discontinuity of structure in gases. It introduced the concept of the molecule, and, historically, the motives for employing it as a means of choosing one of a series of 'proportional numbers' left on our hands by a comparison of masses were bound up with the conception of an equal number of molecules in equal volumes of gases under certain identical conditions. But, naturally, in practice one does not *count* the molecules ; and it would be perfectly possible to describe the procedure by which determinations of volume are combined with considerations of mass to determine 'proportional numbers' without so much as mentioning the terms 'molecule' and 'atom.' This procedure would, to be sure, appear perfectly arbitrary, if no other facts were known than those of quantitative analysis and the weights of equal volumes of gases. But, with increasing knowledge of the physical and chemical behavior of substances, a motive for the procedure can be assigned which does not reintroduce the assumption of a molecular structure. We may, namely, say that we shall select from among the series of proportional numbers that one which will give to the element such place in the array of elements as will render its behavior most conformable with the Periodic Law. The uniformity to which this law gives expression is sufficient simplification of our thought to furnish a motive for preserving it when possible,

and contains fewer unproved assumptions than does a theory of discontinuity of structure. It is therefore scientifically imposed upon us, and any use of a structural-image must be regarded as a merely personal choice of thought apparatus.

The issue here is not between 'hypothesis' and 'fiction,' as our author has defined his terms, but between compulsory hypothesis and purely permissible hypothesis. But this issue is really a vital one. If the atomic-theory is to be defended, it must be shown that it is compulsory; and to show that it is compulsory, one must do more than point out that certain analogies do not break down. One must make it clear that by its means an economy is introduced into our thinking greater than that permitted by the broadest generalization effected without it.

Now this greater economy introduced with the concept of discontinuity of structure may, the present writer feels, be demonstrated. If one compare the situation of a science whose last generalization is the Periodic Law (idealized, if you will, to the point of making the properties of elements an exact function of 'proportional numbers') with the situation of a science expressed in terms of such spatial discontinuities as contemplated by the corpuscular theory (in the form, *e. g.*, presented by J. J. Thomson), one realizes that the economy effected by the assumption of discontinuity (whether of masses, of charges, or of both) affects the 'dimensions' of our final image of nature. One may express the 'ideal' that has controlled the development of science in a simple way. It has been, first, to arrive at such an insight as would enable us to predict the future behavior of a system, given the conditions *a, b, c*, at each point in space at a moment of time, and, second, to reduce the numbers of these independent conditions (we have hence called them 'dimensions') to a minimum. It is to effect such a reduction of the number of dimensions that theories of concealed discontinuities have always been invoked. Success has always been dependent upon the construction of one of a number of dimensions out of others of that number. For example, to express temperature as a function of velocities is to eliminate temperature as a dimension of our image of nature. To construct atoms out of corpuscles is to eliminate atomic mass as a dimension, one which the Periodic Law retains.

In a word, then, the assumption of discontinuity of structure is forced upon us, in the present state of our knowledge, not by the increased power of prediction with which it provides us, but by the simplicity of the apparatus of prediction which it makes possible. And this sim-

plicity is not gained by a 'neglect,' by an 'abstraction' from a recognized element of falsity, but by a reduction of the independent variables which are required for our description of nature. The alternative does not lie between hypothesis and fiction; but between a simple hypothesis and a cumbersome group of hypotheses.

It would have been a pleasure in this connection to follow the author in his brief discussion of the ether-hypothesis. The present writer shares his feeling that the motives which inspire most physicists to accept this assumption are insufficient. The economy effected by the assumption is far from clearly demonstrable. But the problem is a delicate one and not susceptible of a brief discussion. The writer, and he thinks many others, would welcome a more complete analysis of the assumption from a pen equipped as is our author's with a technical information that would render an opinion competent.

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Schopenhauer und Nietzsche. Ein Vortragszyklus. Von GEORG SIMMEL. Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot, 1907. — pp. xii, 263.

This book is not an attempt to give a complete and systematic reproduction of the philosophies of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. That would be but a waste of time in the case of Schopenhauer, for he has himself stated his philosophy with such transparent clearness and logical directness; and in the case of Nietzsche it would be impossible, for his poetic and impassioned utterances, when reduced to cold logical propositions, lose their distinctive meaning and may be interpreted in the interests of diverse philosophies. So what the author proposes is to give a philosophical study of the philosophers themselves. He would strike right through to what is central in their thinking, holding that what is objectively most valuable in their work is to be found precisely in the few leading motives that inspired it. Viewing the philosophers in this light, their brilliant paradoxes, their eccentricities can for the most part be ignored. They are but barbaric ornaments of style, or else weapons employed in offensive and defensive warfare with opposed views, and have, in the main, but an occasional significance.

In seeking to portray this central core of doctrine, the author allows himself the liberties of the portrait painter. History deals with her great men much as the artist does with the subject whose portrait he is painting, selecting this feature for emphasis, ignoring that, and giving the picture a unity of character which no mere photographic

reproduction would possess. Professor Simmel would anticipate the artist time and paint the portraits of his philosophers in such a way as to bring into relief what is original and unique in their teaching, and what makes them significant in the history of human culture, ignoring many things, and overlooking the many 'contradictions' which to the biographer or the psychologist might have special interest.

According to Dr. Simmel, the animal and the primitive man feels a want and makes straight for its satisfaction. The development of civilization is characterized by an ever-increasing indirectness in the realization of one's desires. Means are introduced between the desire and its goal, and means between the means, until in the end the means become so numerous, so complex, and so engrossing, that the goal slips altogether from view. When this stage has been reached, the problem as to the existence of any definitive and supremely worthy end which shall justify a pursuit apparently wholly absorbed in means, is pushed to the front. This problem Christianity sought to solve with its doctrine of absolute values, of the salvation of the soul and the kingdom of God. But in modern times this solution has failed to carry conviction to a great many minds that none the less feel quite as keenly the need of solving just this problem. Schopenhauer and Nietzsche are two such minds, and they offer us their solutions. This gives us the point of view from which Dr. Simmel proceeds to paint the portraits. For both philosophers alike, the starting-point is found in the conception of the restless will forever seeking the goal which in the world it can never find, and in the denial of any absolute worth to being. But, for Schopenhauer, the will, which is the creative ground of all things, is doomed to perpetual discontent. Every satisfaction proves to be but a momentary resting-place on the weary journey, just because in every such satisfaction the will is seeking its goal outside itself. Life thus becomes void of worth and meaning, because it is merely the manifestation of a will tormented by illusion. The practical outcome is consequently renunciation. But between Schopenhauer and Nietzsche Darwin comes; and, when one looks on Schopenhauer's world with Darwin's eyes, the meaning of life is transformed. It is then seen as the story of growth, of increase, of power more and more concentrated in the individual subject. And Nietzsche accordingly enters with zest into the game. Life itself becomes in his view the goal of life, just because the restless will is never satisfied, and just because it can view every achievement as the stepping-stone to a next higher level of power. The *Ueberschensch* is not a fixed and determinate goal which gives evolution its meaning. It is rather an

expression for the fact that no such goal is necessary, but that life finds its worth precisely in the fact that every stage may yield to a higher, of ampler power and greater development. Superman is the next step in development beyond that which humanity has already achieved. Dr. Simmel calls attention to the apparent circle in Nietzsche's reasoning which would find the value of life in the development of life, whereas the very conception of development seems to presuppose the standard of value which it is supposed to create. But this, he holds, is only an illustration of the common tendency to translate quantity into quality, value into energy.

Dr. Simmel makes no attempt to reconcile the views of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche in 'a higher unity.' This he holds to be impossible. In the last analysis, Nietzsche's optimism rests upon a dogmatic affirmation of the value of life. The life process exhibits the mysterious form which the elements of nature have assumed, and any doctrine which would attempt to oppose nature is on the face of it absurd. And Schopenhauer's pessimism rests upon an equally dogmatic denial of the worth of life. We have here a temperamental difference which admits of no reconciliation, but must be taken as an ultimate fact.

Placing the philosophers in this contrast, the sympathy of the modern man is decidedly with Nietzsche. The spirit of our time is convinced that, whatever the fate of Darwin's doctrine, life presents the opportunity to realize ever higher and more complete forms of development. And Nietzsche has had his share in making this doctrine popular. So, in spite of his anti-social tendency, and in spite of the fact that, as a philosopher, he is far inferior to Schopenhauer, he is the more faithful spokesman of our *Zeitgeist*.

Every philosophy worthy of the name is unique and incomparable. It has the limitations and individuality of its maker. And so it is with the philosophies of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. They belong together, not in themselves but for us, because they represent in clear and definite views the two conflicting moods which dominate life. So Dr. Simmel presents the portraits of the two men independently, giving the greater portion of his book to Schopenhauer, and describing in his several interesting chapters Schopenhauer's philosophy under the familiar headings, and devoting only two chapters to the portrait of Nietzsche. These two chapters are probably the most interesting portion of the book. Dr. Simmel has succeeded in giving a very definite picture of Nietzsche, which makes it easier to understand the extent of his vogue and influence in his native land. Nietzsche's sig-

nificance lies in the sharp contrast which he keeps making between humanity and society (*Menschheit* and *Gesellschaft*). The word 'society' is used in the nineteenth century as a word to conjure with, very much as the word 'nature' was in the eighteenth century, and it is surrounded with as many ambiguities and has been even more mischievous in its results. The tendency has been to explain all things in terms of the social, and to forget that man has an individual life as well which cannot be resolved into his relations to his fellows in society. Nietzsche would once and for all break down this identification of humanity with society, and would find a value in the life of humanity as such which is independent of the social order. He is interested exclusively in the 'Universal-human.' Humanity lives only in individuals, and the individuals possess worth and interest irrespective of their social relations. This doctrine is not one which would cut the individual off from society; it would avoid this atomistic result by holding that all of humanity triumphs in the achievement of any one of its members. Again, Nietzsche's doctrine is just as hostile to the individualistic liberalism of his country, with its democratic conception of equality and its rule of majorities, as it is to contemporary socialism. Neither society as such, nor the individual merely because he is an individual, possesses any genuine worth. Rather should worth be attributed exclusively to those individuals in whom humanity succeeds in reaching a higher stage of development than any hitherto achieved. And thus Nietzsche comes to emphasize continually the *natural interval* between man and man. Modern ethical theories, whether given a socialistic or a democratic turn, do violence to nature, which has set emphatic differences between individuals, so that, as Nietzsche holds, there is not one virtue alike for all.

Dr. Simmel's book is interesting throughout, and he has succeeded well in what he has undertaken to accomplish. He has not succeeded in making the philosophical views of his two philosophers more convincing or in freeing them from contradictions; and particularly is this true of Nietzsche. But then Professor Simmel has guarded himself in advance against any criticisms of this nature by the point of view which he has adopted. He has not attempted to do more than to give us the portraits of the two philosophers as illustrating two diverse temperaments which find expression in their several philosophies, and which represent two moods which are commonly found in our day, and which are, according to Simmel's own view, ultimate differences that admit of no reconciliation.

CHARLES M. BAKEWELL.

The Philosophy of Loyalty. By JOSIAH ROYCE. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1908. — pp. xiii, 409.

This new book of Professor Royce's is, as he tells us, not a text-book, and does not mean to be an elaborately technical research. Nor is the author writing merely and mainly for philosophers, but for all those who love ideals, for all those who love their country, — "a country so ripe at present for idealism, and so confused, nevertheless, by the vastness and the complication of its social and political problems. To simplify men's moral issues, to clear their vision for the sight of the eternal, to win hearts for loyalty, — this would be, in this land, a peculiarly precious mission, if indeed, I could hope that this book could aid, however little, towards such an end" (Preface). The goal at which Professor Royce is aiming is the old one of finding the fundamental principle of morality; it is a *Grundlegung der Sitten*, with the accent, however, placed upon the practical application. Like Kant, he seeks to establish a supreme standard which shall serve as a guide even to the commonest reason and in all the relations of life, a criterion that will put an end to our moral doubts and give meaning and stability to human conduct, a concept from which all the other duties may be rationally deduced. This basal virtue is loyalty, "the heart of all the virtues, the central duty amongst all the duties" (p. viii). About a rational conception of loyalty, he thinks, you can truthfully centre your entire moral world. Justice, charity, industry, wisdom, spirituality, are all definable in terms of enlightened loyalty (p. 15).

What is this loyalty? Professor Royce devotes the largest part of his book to defining the term and showing all that it implies. Loyalty is the willing and practical and thoroughgoing devotion of a person to a cause. Your cause is something objective, it is not your private self. Moreover, it is wholly impersonal, it concerns other men; loyalty is social. Again, a cause is general and so tends to unite the many fellow-servants in one service. Whoever is loyal, whatever be his cause, is devoted, is active, surrenders his private self-will, controls himself, is in love with his cause, and believes in it. Loyalty tends to unify life, to give it centre, fixity, stability. Since no man can find a plan of life by merely looking within his own chaotic nature, he has to look without, to the world of social conventions, deeds, and causes. Now, a loyal man is one who has found, and who sees, neither mere individual fellow-men to be loved or hated, nor mere conventions, nor customs, nor laws to be obeyed, but some social cause, or some system of causes, so rich, so well knit, and, to him, so fascinating, and

withal so kindly in its appeal to his natural self-will, that he says to his cause: 'Thy will is mine and mine is thine. In thee I do not lose but find myself, living intensely in proportion as I live for thee' (Lecture I). Loyalty is for the loyal man chief amongst all the moral goods of his life, because it furnishes to him a personal solution of the hardest of human practical problems, the problem: 'For what do I live? Why am I here? For what am I good? Why am I needed?' (p. 57).

But some causes are good, while some are evil. We therefore need a test of good and evil. A cause is good, not only for me, but for mankind, in so far as it is essentially a loyalty to loyalty, that is, an aid and a furtherance of loyalty in my fellows. Hence so choose your cause and so serve it, that, by reason of your choice and of your service, there shall be more loyalty in the world rather than less. All the common-place virtues, in so far as they are indeed definable and effective, are special forms of loyalty to loyalty, and are to be justified, centralized, inspired, by the one supreme effort to do good, namely, the effort to make loyalty triumphant in the lives of all men. I shall serve causes such as my natural temperament and my social opportunities suggest to me. Nevertheless, whatever my cause, it ought to be such as to further, so far as in me lies, the cause of universal loyalty. My causes must form a system, they must constitute a single cause, a life of loyalty. Have I then duties to myself? Yes, my duty to myself is the duty to provide my cause with one who is strong enough and skilful enough to be effective according to his own natural powers. Have I private and personal rights, which I ought to assert? Yes, precisely in so far as my private powers and possessions are held in trust for the cause, and are, upon occasion, to be defended for the sake of the cause. And my duties to my neighbors, too, justice and benevolence, are mere aspects of our one principle. Justice means, in general, fidelity to human ties in so far as they are ties. If you are just, you are decisive in your choice of your personal cause, you are faithful to the loyal decision once made, you keep your promise, you speak the truth, you respect the loyal ties of other men, and you contend with other men only in so far as the defense of your own cause, in the interest of loyalty to the universal cause of loyalty, makes such contest against aggression unavoidable. Benevolence is that aspect of loyalty which directly concerns itself with your influence upon the inner life of human beings who enjoy, who suffer, and whose private good is to be effected by your deeds. Since no personal good that your fellow can possess is superior to his own loyalty, your own

loyalty to loyalty is itself a supremely benevolent type of activity. And since your fellow-man is an instrument for the furtherance of the cause of universal loyalty, his welfare also concerns you, in so far as, if you help him to a more efficient life, you make him better able to be loyal (Lecture III).

But is the principle of loyalty to loyalty an actually general, safe, and sufficient test of what is right and wrong in the doubtful moral situations which may arise in daily life? Does our principle tell us what to do when loyalties seem to be in conflict with one another? It tells us: Decide, knowingly if you can, ignorantly if you must, but in any case decide, and have no fear. "As a fact, the conscience is the ideal of the self, coming to consciousness as a present command. It says, *Be loyal*. If one asks, *Loyal to what?* the conscience, awakened by our whole personal response to the need of mankind replies, *Be loyal to loyalty*. If, hereupon, various loyalties seem to conflict, the conscience says: *Decide*. If one asks, *How decide?* conscience further urges, *Decide as I, your conscience, the ideal expression of your whole personal nature, conscious and unconscious, find best*. If one persists, *But you and I may be wrong*, the last word of conscience is, *we are fallible, but we can be decisive and faithful; and this is loyalty*" (Lecture IV). That is, the way in which to show loyalty to loyalty varies endlessly with the individual and can never be precisely defined except by and through his personal consent. Provided the cause to which I am loyal involves the union of personal interests, provided I do not enter into any unnecessary destruction of the loyalty of others, provided I seek to further loyalty as a common good of all mankind, I must leave to the individual the choice of the cause or causes (pp. 200-3).

Now, what must be true about the universe if even loyalty itself is a genuine good, and not a merely human illusion? If loyalty has any truth, human lives can be linked in some genuine spiritual unity. Such a unity is a fact. Loyalty, therefore, has its metaphysical aspect. It is an effort to conceive human life in an essentially superhuman way, to view our social organizations as actual personal unities of consciousness, unities wherein there exists an actual experience of the good which, in our loyalty, we only partially apprehend. Whoever talks of any sort of truth whatsoever, be that truth moral or scientific, the truth of common-sense or the truth of a philosophy, inevitably implies that the world of truth of which he speaks is a world possessing a rational and spiritual unity, is a conscious world of experience, whose type of consciousness is higher in its level than is the type of

our human minds, but whose life is such that our life belongs as part to this living whole. Against pragmatism Professor Royce declares that the loyal are not seeking *only* a mere collection of their private experiences of their personal thrills of fascination. You cannot express the value of your loyalty by pointing at the mere heap of the joyous thrills of the various loyal individuals. We need unity of life ; in recognizing that need Professor Royce's own pragmatism consists. We never find unity present to our human experience in more than a fragmentary shape. We get hints of a higher unity. But only the fragmentary unity is won at any moment of our lives. We therefore form ideas,—very fallible ideas,—of some unity of experience, a unity such as our idea of any science or any art or any united people or of any community or of any other cause, any other union of many human experiences in one, defines. Now, if our ideas are in any case indeed true, then such unity is a fact successfully experienced upon some higher level than ours, and is experienced in some conspectus of life which wins what we need, which approves our loyalty, which fulfils our rational will, and which has in its wholeness what we seek. How do I know all this? I know simply that to try to deny the reality of this whole of truth is simply to reaffirm it. To deny that there is truth, or that there is a real world, is simply to say that the whole truth is that there is no whole truth, and that the real fact is that there is no fact real at all. Such assertions are plain self-contradictions (Lecture VII). "The thesis that the world is one whole and a significant whole of conscious life is, for these reasons, a thesis which can only be viewed as an error, by reinstating this very assertion under a new form. For any error of mine concerning the world is possible only in so far as I really mean to assert the truth about the world ; and this real meaning of mine can exist only as a fact within the conspectus of consciousness for which the real whole world exists, and within which I myself live" (p. 372).

Our ethical theory has transformed itself into a general philosophical doctrine ; and loyalty now appears to us not only as a guide of life, but as a revelation of our relation to a realm which we have been obliged to define as one of an eternal and all-embracing unity of spiritual life. This realm of reality is conscious, is united, is self-possessed, and is perfected through the very wealth of the ideal sacrifices and of the loyal devotion which are united so as to constitute its fulness of being. So we may now define loyalty as the will to manifest, so far as possible, the Eternal, that is, the conscious and super-human unity of life, in the form of the acts of an individual self.

Although one can be loyal without being consciously and explicitly religious, loyalty, if sincere, involves at least a latent belief in the superhuman reality of the cause, and means at least an unconscious devotion to the one and eternal cause. But such a belief is also a latent union of morality and religion, and such a service is an unconscious piety. However, whoever serves the universal cause inevitably loses his cause in our poor world of sense-experience, because his cause is too good for this present temporal world to express it. A lost cause, however, has two companions, grief and imagination, and these two are the parents of all the higher forms of genuinely ethical religion. Such religion interprets the superhuman in forms that our longing, our grief, and our imagination invent, but also in terms that are intended to meet the demands of our highest loyalty. For we are loyal to that unity of life which, as our truer moral consciousness learns to believe, owns the whole real world, and constitutes the cause of causes. In being loyal to universal loyalty, we are serving the unity of life.

We can know *that* we are linked to the eternal ; *how* we are linked, our sciences do not make manifest to us. The symbolic portrayal of religion attempts to characterize, in its general outline, an absolute truth ; this may be called the creed of the Absolute Religion, and consists in the following facts : First, the rational unity and goodness of the world-life ; next, its true but invisible nearness to us, despite our ignorance ; further, its fulness of meaning despite our barrenness of present experience ; and yet more, its interest in our personal destiny as moral beings ; and finally, the certainty that, through our actual human loyalty, we come, like Moses, face to face with the true will of the world, as a man speaks to his friend. All this seems to Professor Royce to be an inevitable corollary of his theory of truth (Lecture VIII).

It would be impossible, within the short compass of a review, to give an adequate criticism of this little volume, which evolves a complete philosophy of the universe and of life out of a single ethical principle. We might call this system a system of rationalistic and idealistic ethics. In method it resembles the system of Kant, for Kant, too, derives a whole host of truths from his supreme moral principle ; in its results or content it betrays kinship with the school of thought which has been variously described as energism, perfectionism, ethical idealism, and which counts among its followers nearly all the great thinkers from Socrates and Plato down to Lotze, Green, Wundt, and Paulsen. It is not a new doctrine, — only the terms

employed are new ; its fundamental teachings are as old as the history of ethics. Whatever criticism may be passed upon it by us will touch its form rather than its content, will bear on the rationalistic rather than on the idealistic side of it. As we said before, the author's aim is to find a basal principle of ethics, a standard which shall serve as a practical guide of life. This is a legitimate undertaking ; human beings will never give up the search for principles that will bring meaning into their lives and conduct. Professor Royce finds such a principle in loyalty : " Be loyal to loyalty, do what you can to produce a maximum of the devoted service of causes, a maximum of fidelity, and of selves that serve and choose fitting objects of loyalty." This is a noble virtue, but unless we read into it all our virtues and our entire traditional morality, it cannot serve us as the basal principle of ethics ; it will, like Kant's famous criterion, remain too general and empty to be of any great theoretical or practical value. ' Be loyal to loyalty,' — this is like commanding : Be just to justice ; be good to goodness, be true to truth, or to thine own self be true ; honor honor, etc. Professor Royce admits the impossibility of defining precisely how the individual shall show his loyalty to loyalty, and falls back upon the conscience, for better or for worse. But any one of the fundamental virtues would, if supported by a developed twentieth-century conscience, prove just as satisfactory as the loyalty principle as a general guide. In a certain sense it is true, as the old Stoics said, that he who has one virtue has them all, but in that sense loyalty has no advantage over the others. The fact is the different virtues describe different forms of moral behavior for us, and only by defining them to suit our purposes can we make any one of them stand for all. It may be wise in moral preaching, in order to reach practical ends, to emphasize a particular rule of conduct and group around it all the rest. But though this is part of Professor Royce's aim, his purpose goes deeper after all. " Our philosophy of loyalty," as he tells us, " must try to delve down to the roots of human conduct, the grounds of our moral standards." " And the lesson will be this : In loyalty, when loyalty is properly defined, is the fulfilment of the whole moral law " (p. 15, compare pp. 7-8).

The reason why Professor Royce is able to deduce from the concept of loyalty all the fundamental virtues and duties is that he reads them into it : he simply succeeds in getting out of his notion exactly what he has put in. He cannot therefore be said to have reached " the roots " of human conduct. He does not justify the virtues by a principle ; he does not explain the moral laws ; he simply defines his criterion

in such a way as to embrace them all. Loyalty is not a principle ; it is a general label for all the virtues. Under it he embraces the forms of conduct which will, in his opinion, tend to realize the highest good ; Have a cause or ideal ; it will give plan and unity to your life, and make it worth living ; let it be a social ideal, an ideal which will make it possible for your fellows to strive after the good. In order to realize the ideal, you must be loyal, devoted, truthful, trustworthy, faithful, etc. ; you must care for yourself and others ; you must be just and benevolent ; you must follow the recognized rules of morality. All this appeals to us, and there is no particular harm in bringing all these excellent precepts under the term 'loyalty,'— other terms would do equally well, — but that does not make loyalty the ground of our moral standards.

The real criterion which seems to me to lie in the background of Professor Royce's thought and by which he justifies all the loyalties, all the virtues and duties, is the social criterion, social unity, a kingdom of ends, a union of selves inspired by social ideals. This is the standard with which we are everywhere confronted in the book : Your cause is objective, not your private self, it is wholly impersonal, concerns other men, tends to unite many fellow-servants in one service, is an aid and a furtherance of loyalty in your fellows, that is, of universal loyalty. Thoroughgoing devotion to a social cause is the demand. Private rights and duties, the rights of neighbors and the duties to neighbors, all are to be justified by the effort to make loyalty triumphant in the lives of all men. Expressed in the language of the schools this would mean : The welfare or perfection of individuals in society, or social welfare, is the criterion of morality ; such acts are good as tend to realize social welfare, the welfare of individuals in society.

But, as we have seen, Professor Royce deduces from the concept of loyalty not only the rules of conduct, but a system of metaphysics. It is a faith, a beautiful idealistic faith, a faith that has worked wonders in this world and will never cease to work wonders. We can even say that it is not an unreasonable faith, indeed, that it is a reasonable faith. Those who accept it have a basis for their ethics that will satisfy them. But it is not a logical deduction, an absolute truth, or even an inevitable corollary of Professor Royce's theory of truth. We wish it were. It is based on the longing for the eternal ; it is the wish of the heart that the good may endure beyond the present, that there may be a spiritual kingdom in which all that is of highest value to us human beings may be preserved for evermore. Our moral life, however,

would not be an illusion if we could not prove these things. Humanity could not exist and live the kind of life which the men we most revere have praised as the life of real worth, without obeying the rules which are the result of a long and hard-won experience. So long as we are what we are, we must value the higher life; and so long as we do that, we must value the means leading to it. So long as life exists on earth, it shall be a worthy life: that is our will; and it cannot be such a life unless it be a moral life, hence, that is our will too. We believe that men will hold it worthy as men have held it worthy, and we hope there is an Eternal Consciousness in which all that is true and beautiful and good may endure. But Critiques of Practical Reason, Prolegomena to Ethics, and Philosophies of Loyalty have not supplied the logical proofs.

These criticisms, however, do not affect the great practical value of the book; it gives beautiful and forceful expression to ethical idealism, and grandly fulfils its purpose "to simplify men's moral issues, to clear their vision for the sight of the eternal, to win hearts for loyalty." There is moral enthusiasm in it, there is patriotism in it, there is love of humanity in it. It comes from the heart of a man, from the big heart of a big man, from a fine loyal soul. Fichte never spoke with greater fervor and eloquence than does this idealist of Cambridge, and it is to be hoped that his words will sink deep into the hearts of the nation.

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NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

Mental Pathology in its Relation to Normal Psychology. By GUSTAV STÖRRING. Translated by THOMAS LOVEDAY. London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1907. — pp. x; 298.

The appearance of this translation of Störriug's *Vorlesungen über Psychopathologie* is an event of some importance ; first, because it will extend the influence of a useful book, and, secondly, because the translation is itself well done. The original Lectures were written while Störriug was *Privat-docent* at Leipzig (1900), and they were dedicated to his teacher, Wilhelm Wundt.

Psychology has of late formed a number of intimate relationships. Of them all, none has been productive of so much coöperative work (with one possible exception) as that established with psychiatry. Self-interest has strengthened the union from both sides. The student of mental diseases has, on his part, appealed to psychology for facts and for methods of investigation ; while psychology has been attracted to the abnormal both for its own sake and for its promise to throw light upon the normal operations of consciousness. The psychologist has from time to time been called to account for travelling outside his own province ; and, on such occasions, he has been at pains to explain that the abnormal is 'nature's experiment,' and that from the contemplation of an excess, or defect, or deformity of mind, one proceeds better equipped to the description and explanation of the normal or typical or average consciousness. The origin and the date of adoption of this line of defence are difficult to trace. Its dogmatic tone and its extensive use, however, both suggest great age. But what can be said of its empirical sanction ? What, precisely, has psychology learned of the average healthy mind from its determined pursuit of the abnormal ? The challenge is fair. The quest has continued long enough to bring positive results, if positive results are to be expected. This book may be regarded as an unpremeditated answer to the challenge ; for the book is our nearest approach to a psychological account of pathological states of mind. "The subject of this course of lectures," — thus Störriug begins, — "is the significance of mental pathology for normal psychology." What is the net result ? I doubt if it quite accords with the psychologist's defence. The work proceeds, upon the basis of the general symptomatology of the insane, to bring a great variety of rich, illustrative material from illusions, hallucinations, delusions, from amnesias and aphasias, from deranged actions and behaviors, to the psychology of perception and memory, of thought and belief, of action and emotion. All this is grist to the psychologist's mill ; but it is general symptomatology, and general symptomatology borrows more, I think, than it pays. It consumes more psychological

energy than it releases. It raises more problems than it settles. Classical instances of the alleged gain to psychology are hysteria and aphasia. But consider these two cases. The more hysteria and aphasia are studied, the more difficult do they become, and the more uncertain their psychological status. Hysteria displays marked and interesting derangements of attention and of association; but the contributions made to the doctrines of attention and association by the study of hysteria can hardly take rank with the normal investigations made within the last ten years in these same subjects. Aphasia promised to give us not only an analysis of the complex functions of speech, but the establishment as well of the principle of separate cerebral localization for sensation qualities and motor coördinations. The promise has been only partially fulfilled. Within a few months the very cases upon which Broca based his theory of nearly a half century ago have shown themselves capable of a different interpretation, and, in consequence, the foundation of the theory has been called in question. To-day it seems to be quite impossible to bring order out of the chaos of clinical and anatomical facts without recourse to normal psychology for a rational account of the processes involved in language. On this score, pathology stands more a debtor, all must admit, than creditor to general psychology. We must not, however, lose sight of the fact that psychology stands, after all, heavily indebted, although in a somewhat different way from that which we have just considered. Psychiatry is, as I just intimated, exceedingly fertile in psychological problems, and no scientific legacy can be richer than the bequest of new work. In this direction psychology has distinctly profited, and, if ever she grows inert from full accomplishment, she can easily quicken her activities from the resources of the alienist.

But a more important matter than benefits and obligations is suggested by a book which, like Störing's, unites the labors of the psychologist and the pathologist. It is the question of the logical and rational relation of the psychology of the abnormal to the science of psychiatry. Psychiatry treats frankly diseases and 'symptom-complexes'; that is to say, psychiatry is distinctly medical in its point of view. Whether in its description of individual disorders (special psychiatry), its general account of symptoms (general psychiatry), or its prescriptions and treatments, it allies itself with the medical sciences and arts. Psychology, on the other hand, has nothing in strictness to do either with disease or cure, with symptom or therapeutics. Whether the concept 'disease' is in any way applicable to mental derangements, and whether a scientific psychopathology is possible, are questions which still remain unsettled.¹ But psychopathology will, if it eventuates, be a medical and not a psychological branch of investigation. It will still leave to psychology the description of the abnormal mind in terms,—not of symptoms or of 'disease-pictures,'—but of conscious processes and conscious functions and conscious states, *i. e.*, it will leave untouched the 'pure' psychology of the abnormal mind.

¹ The logic of the situation has recently been worked out with interesting conclusions by W. Hellpach (*Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie*, VII, p. 143).

The difference, then, between the psychology and the psychiatry of insanity and allied derangements is, first of all, a difference in point of view; the one that of the medical sciences, the other that of the mental sciences. The second difference is one of aim or intent. The one looks toward the description, classification, cure, and prevention of disease; the other toward the analysis of the abnormal and the comparison of the normal and the deranged mind. The third difference has regard to method. Doubtless the present interchange of ideas upon methodical procedure will continue; but the difference in standpoint and in interest must lead more and more to a modification of method to suit the requirements both of psychology and of medicine.

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The Psychology of Religious Belief. By JAMES BISSETT PRATT. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1907. — pp. xii, 327.

The growing literature upon the interpretation of religion is appreciably enriched by the appearance of Professor Pratt's volume. The book shows a wide acquaintance with the historical development of religions and the history of religious philosophy; and Part III, on "The Present Status of Religious Belief," contains the presentation of a valuable collection of material upon the nature of religious belief. The conclusions are essentially in line with those of James, Leuba, and other students of religion: "We are forced back upon the region of feeling and of instinctive and unreasoned demands and intuitions. Here must Religion take up her stand and make her fight. From this quarter she must draw her chief supplies or be starved into surrender" (p. 290). The chapter on "The Value of God," for example, which is one of the most suggestive, concludes that "People are chiefly interested not in what God *is*, but in what He can *do*" (p. 263). Part II, which studies the religions of India, Israel, and Christianity, finds ample evidence that religions are based upon feeling and culminate in an emotional belief of which mysticism may be regarded as the type. The merits of the volume are its comprehensiveness and erudition.

The chief criticism would be that it seems immature in its philosophical generalizations and in its psychological analysis. It is bent upon an attempt to establish a theory that religious beliefs "fall naturally into three distinct types, primitive credulity, intellectual belief, and emotional belief" (p. 34). Religion, it is believed, in both race and individual, tends to pass, in its development, through these three stages. To the uninitiated into the finer points concerning the growth of religion, the discussion leaves the impression of apt illustrations of the theory through a skilful selection of details rather than a demonstration of it. One wonders if the facts would not lend themselves quite as readily, by such a method, to showing that the "intellectual" beliefs are later than the "emotional,"

and represent therefore a higher type. The point of view taken is in the interest of a merciless undoing, as is the fashion of the time, of ideation, reason, and logic, in consciousness in general and also in religion.

The psychological creed of the volume is stated thus (p. 27): "The one thesis which I wish to defend, the one contention for which I really care is that the whole man must be trusted as against a small portion of his nature, such as reason or perception. These latter should, of course, be trusted, but they should have no monopoly of our confidence. The ideals which have animated and guided the race . . . have not come from the brilliantly illuminated centre of consciousness, have not been the result of reason and logic, but have sprung from the deeper regions of our nature." The discussion of the processes involved in the "whole man" or "the deeper instinctive regions," which occupies Part I of the volume, is far from clear and satisfying. This region, the author usually identifies with feeling. "The one contention for which I wish my book to stand is the vital importance of our instinctive life as manifested in the feeling background" (p. 28). But what are the evidences, one is led to inquire, that the instincts are not as truly the background of reason and perception as of feeling. We are reminded of not infrequent and apparently successful attempts to follow up the evolution of native instinctive endowments into perception and reason. The author believes that feeling is almost the sole interpreter of life. But why are the intellectual processes not also, equally with feeling, a means of "internalizing activity and will"?

The inroad into the psychological viewpoint is along the line of James's distinction between "fringe" and "focal point" of consciousness. The fringe is identified with feeling and desire, and the focal point with intellection and thought, the latter term comprising ideation and sensation. With such a classification it is easy to make the fringe appear the bulkier and more important region, and to show that religion, furthermore, has its setting within this fringe, in the midst of the indefinable, incommunicable elements of consciousness. Is not such a classification, however, confusing and unconvincing? Why should sensation longer be regarded as raw material for thought any more than for feeling? The unsteady and inconsistent use of the term "sensation" throughout the early pages is an indication that the relation even between sensation and ideation is not clear. Again, do not the feelings and desires tend to become "focalized"? And would, then, the distinction between "fringe" and "centre" not be a basis for classifying the feelings themselves without reference to other states and processes? Do not the intellectual processes and sensations shade off directly into the submerged, indefinable region, and so need the same category for their classification? In what sense, then, can "fringe" and "centre" apply to the distinction between feeling and thought?

This inadequate synthesis would seem to be in response to a felt need of coördinating feeling and thought, and emotional and intellectual belief.

Since the general treatment of the feelings is in harmony with the convention of the time, would not the author have profited by still farther following the prevailing custom and making an appeal to a "voluntaristic" psychology as a basis for the correlation of these two functions? Religion might well be interpreted as a mode of human adjustment whose groundwork is a set of reactions or will.

Although the volume may be psychologically premature in its presentation to the public, it would be an injustice to judge it from this standpoint. There is hardly a page that does not richly pay the reading. The main contention compels assent, in spite of, as much as because of, its psychologizing. It is a great gain to have its point of view presented with such grace of style and so much forcefulness.

EDWIN D. STARBUCK.

STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA.

Philon. Par JULES MARTIN. Paris, Felix Alcan, 1907. — pp. 303.

This volume forms one of the series "Les Grands Philosophes," under the editorship of Claudius Piat. It gives a straightforward account of Philo's teaching, without much argumentation or discussion, under the following four heads: (1) The Principles of the Doctrine, (2) God and the Universe, (3) God and Man, (4) The Universe. Though intended for the reader who is not a special student of Philo, the notes contain copious references to Philo's works, which the specialist may very well consult in his study of the subject. The exposition is conducted partly in the author's own words, and partly in quotations from Philo's works. The latter is essential to give an idea of Philo's method. Martin is right in emphasizing that Philo can scarcely be called a philosopher, or an original and exact thinker. He is not only eclectic, but he is not even independent in his eclecticism. He must satisfy two masters whose bidding pulls in opposite directions. He has once for all attached himself to the text of the Bible as the soil which he tills for the love of it, and only certain plants will grow naturally in that soil. To attempt to cultivate exotic growth can only result in products which are stunted. Thus Philo is at his best as a moralist, as a homilist. As a physicist and metaphysician he is vague, ambiguous, confused, inconsistent. Martin points out these inconsistencies and vaguenesses in the treatment of the Logos (p. 62), of the relation of God to the world (p. 71), of the character of creation (*ibid.*), of matter (p. 73), of Ideas and Powers (p. 75 f.), of Good and Evil (pp. 99, 103), of our knowledge of God (pp. 139 f., p. 146), of the doctrine of Grace (p. 165), of the freedom of the will (pp. 167 f.).

Abbé Martin's interests being chiefly theological, he is constantly drawing parallels between Philo and the New Testament writings, and the works of the Church Fathers. This is also demanded by the subject itself; for it is above all in the theological works of the first five centuries of Christianity that Philo's method and point of view are in evidence. Admitting

that Philo is an outgrowth of contemporary conditions, Jewish and Hellenic, Martin considers Philo as a step in the direction of Christianity, and points to adumbrations of the Trinity (p. 62), and the doctrine of Grace (p. 159). From this point of view, it is only natural that Martin regards the developments of these and other views in the Christian writers as fuller, clearer, bolder, superior, etc. That there is a similarity in phraseology between Philo and the New Testament writings, Martin correctly refers to the circumstance of a common Jewish-Hellenistic dialect.

It seems doubtful that Philo ever consulted the original Hebrew of the Old Testament, or that he could read it if he wanted to. That he interprets the proper names according to the Hebrew meanings of them proves nothing; or rather, what little it does prove is against the supposition that Philo consulted the Hebrew text. Thus, to cite one instance out of many, Hur (= Heb. חור), who aided Aaron in holding up the hands of Moses during the battle with Amalek (*Ex.* xvii, 10, 12) is transliterated in the Septuagint ὤρ. This suggested to Philo the Hebrew word חור (= light), and he builds his allegory on that supposition. If he had been in the habit of using the Hebrew text, he could not have indulged in his favorite pastime with the same equanimity.

Martin names two editions which he says are the only ones of importance (p. 4 note 4, II), those of Hoeschell, Paris, 1640, and of Maugey, London, 1742. Both in the note and in the bibliography (pp. 292-3) he omits the new edition of Wendland & Cohn, which has been publishing since 1894.

While the book is not intended for the specialist, it might have been made more complete by brief discussions or statements of the reasons for and against the authenticity of certain of the works attributed to Philo. The subject of Philo's sources could have been treated with greater detail, and a word might have been said on the debt Philo owed to the exegesis of the Halacha in Palestine. The latter subject has been treated by Frankel, Ritter, Siegfried, and others, and Martin's book would have gained by having their results embodied therein.

ISAAC HUSIK.

Geschichte der Jüdischen Philosophie des Mittelalters, nach Problemen dargestellt. Erster Band: Die Grundprinzipien I. Von DAVID NEUMARK. Berlin, George Reimer, 1907. — pp. xxiv, 615.

This work is important and deserves a more extended treatment than space here permits. For this the present writer may refer to his article in the *Jewish Exponent* of Philadelphia, May 8, 1908. In five volumes and nine books the author aims to cover the ground of the Jewish Philosophy of the Middle Ages under the following heads: Introduction, Matter and Form, Doctrine of Attributes, the Four Postulates, the Fundamental Principles of the Post-Maimonidean Philosophy, Psychology and Epistemology, Prophetology, Ethics, Dogmatics.

Modern Jewish Philosophy, the author says, has three tasks to accom-

plish, or rather, one task which is three-fold. First is a history from a philosophical point of view of Jewish dogma in antiquity. The aim of this undertaking is to trace the genesis and progress of theoretical thinking in Judaism, and the formulation of abstract doctrines. By a study of the composition of the Biblical documents we learn to know what they signify as dogmatic works of authority, and which of them were originally meant to be authoritative, and which not. This first part of a complete Jewish philosophy Dr. Neumark has completed in the Hebrew language, though only an abridgment of it in the shape of an encyclopedic article has been published so far.

The second task is a history of the Jewish philosophy of the Middle Ages, which was an attempt on the part of the mediæval thinkers to conceive a *Weltanschauung* in which, as they thought, Aristotelianism and Judaism coincided. The volume under review is the first of a five volume series to treat of this problem. So far as these parts of the author's plan are concerned, one agrees with Dr. Neumark on the mode of treatment. One may differ in details, especially when the author's views are original, as on the character and number of the Biblical 'Covenants,' on the dogmatic significance of the Mishna, on the two points of view in Aristotle, on the fundamental doctrine of Maimonides's philosophy, etc.

When Dr. Neumark, however, gives us a silhouette of the third part of his Jewish philosophy, one is inclined to think he is making a mis-step. That the Jew should seriously and deliberately at this date build a philosophy on the foundation of monotheism, even though it be an ethical monotheism, seems, to say the least, an unphilosophical aspiration. Is philosophy to be thus bound by the religion in which one is born? All honor to that individual Jew, who may be the creator of a philosophy on an ethical monotheistic basis, but so may a Christian build a philosophy on an ethical monotheistic basis. The Jew *qua* Jew is not bound to build his philosophy on any prescribed basis, any more than philosophy *qua* philosophy can have a given basis forced upon it. Philosophy will be of value so long, and only so long, as it keeps itself independent of any special religious or other dogmatic doctrine.

The volume under discussion consists of a lengthy introduction on the general characteristics and sources of Jewish philosophy, constituting the first book, and the treatment of the problem of matter and form in mediæval Jewish philosophy, which forms the second book. The introduction contains some novel and suggestive views on the development of dogma in Judaism. The author's point of view and tendency is seen also in his notion that the importance and originality of the Jewish mediæval philosophers has been greatly underestimated by historians of the subject, and their dependence on the Arabians much exaggerated. He finds the Jewish philosophers superior to the Arabians as interpreters and adapters of Aristotle.

The chapter on Aristotle's treatment of matter and form is, by virtue of its orientating character and the novelty of some of its views, very important.

But, in the opinion of the present reviewer, Dr. Neumark has not succeeded in proving his point of a two-fold Aristotle, of the Physics and of the Metaphysics, in the former of which all matter, even the most primitive, is already possessed of form, whereas, in the latter, pure matter, as potential substance, is the new doctrine. The present writer furthermore disagrees with Dr. Neumark's translations of a number of passages in the Physics and the Metaphysics, in which he goes contrary to all commentators, ancient and modern, as well as to the terminology of Aristotle.

The book is nevertheless of great value, as the author has mastered his field, and is an able and suggestive thinker. The work is especially noteworthy as being the first on the subject on so comprehensive a plan, and with a view to the development of philosophical problems. The only other works of the same kind the writer knows are Munk's sketch in his *Mélanges de philosophie Jewie et Arabe*, which is very brief and purely historical and bibliographical; Spiegler's *Geschichte der Philosophie des Judenthums*, which Ueberweg-Heinze calls *werthlos*; and Bernfeld's *Daath Elohim* in the Hebrew language, which is rather the work of a popularizer than of a specialist and authority in the field. The numerous other works dealing with the subject of Jewish philosophy take up special problems, or special men, like Joel, Eisler, Kaufmann, Guttman, etc.

The proof-reading in the book might have been better, there being quite a number of misprints in the text, particularly in the Greek quotations in the notes.

ISAAC HUSIK.

The Aesthetic Experience: Its Nature and Function in Epistemology.

Psychological Review, Monograph Supplement, Vol. I, No. 1. By WILLIAM DAVIS FURRY. 1908. — pp. xv, 155.

Philosophy, like Science, is progressing to-day not through the work of system-builders, but by gradual accretions of truth from different points of view worked intensively. This monograph upon the Aesthetic Experience and its relation to Epistemology purports to give us some further light upon an adequate conception of the nature of knowledge. The author, as he himself confesses, is but following out suggestions which he has received from Professor Baldwin, to whom he refers constantly in support of many of his points.

His main thesis is that the aesthetic experience has not only had its rise simultaneously with the epistemological, but that it is causally related to the latter. This he endeavors to substantiate in two distinct ways, ways so distinct, indeed, that the unity of the monograph is seriously strained. First, by an analysis of the process of cognition at the various stages of its development, and second, by a historical survey of the whole field of philosophy to show that what is true ontogenetically is true also phylogenetically. In Part I are four chapters: "The First Immediacy," in which attention is directed to the a-dualistic character of early consciousness;

"The Second Immediacy or Semblant Consciousness," in which we are told how, in the play-consciousness, after the first immediacy has been destroyed there is a new unity, and how the attributes of consciousness at this stage of knowledge are in truth æsthetic; "Dualistic Character of Reflective Experience," in which it is pointed out that neither the intellectualistic nor the voluntaristic psychology can exhaust experience; "The Æsthetic as a Hyper-Logical Experience," in which the attempt is made to show that "the æsthetic experience represents a mode of mental determination in which these two types of meaning are reconciled and thus unified and completed." Thus he believes that he has shown that the æsthetic and the epistemological consciousness have correlated stages in their development, and that, when the highest stage of reflective thought is reached, in which an irreducible dualism remains, the æsthetic ideal enables thought to transcend this dualism and to find the requisite unity.

In Part II, to use the author's own language, "an attempt is made to trace the development of thought with reference to the rise and development alike of the Epistemological and the Æsthetic, together with the use made of the Æsthetic Consciousness as the organ of world unification and interpretation." Thus, in this part of the work he is interested to point out how philosophic thought in its development has exemplified the same order and relation which he has already outlined.

His thesis, so far as it points to a relation between the æsthetic and the epistemological consciousness, is valid. His analysis, however, is not clear-cut; the constructive part is too much obscured by reference to various opinions which he criticises and evaluates and by a lack of logical order in details. The discussion of the historical part is marred by its own comprehensiveness. Since the æsthetic and the epistemological consciousness are both a part of the developing mind, they will necessarily show certain similarities and correlated stages. But analogies are but doubtful forms of argument, interesting and suggestive though they may be. Dr. Furry has pointed out certain analogies in philosophic thought between these two aspects of consciousness, but he has failed to show that this order is inevitable and why it must be so.

HALBERT HAINS BRITAN.

BATES COLLEGE.

Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future. By FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE. Authorized translation by HELEN ZIMMERN. Edinburgh and London, T. N. Foulis; New York, The Macmillan Co., 1907. — pp. xv, 268.

The marked influence exerted upon European thought during the last twenty years by the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche, renders it almost imperative that the English-speaking world should be provided with a translation of at least the more important of his books. Some time ago an attempt was made to publish a complete translation of the whole series, but

lack of funds prevented the appearance of more than two or three volumes. It is therefore a matter for congratulation that the publication of the others is now made possible and is begun with Miss Helen Zimmern's translation of *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*. This book was first published at Nietzsche's own expense in September, 1886, and is one of the most important of those belonging to the third period. Taken together with its successor, *Zur Genealogie der Moral*, it gives the more sober version of the ethical theories embodied in *Also sprach Zarathustra*. Here one finds the essential characteristics of both the negative and the positive aspects of Nietzsche's doctrine. The current moral ideals are stigmatized as the weak and morbid views of slaves and are given a rather fanciful historical derivation; while, as opposed to them, Nietzsche expounds the morality of the masters, which consists in a healthy and vigorous self-assertion without the decadent altruistic taint necessarily belonging to the ideas of the crowd.

The translation is in most respects all that could be desired. The author has evidently endeavored to keep as closely as possible to the original text, and in doing so has perhaps sacrificed something of literary grace to accuracy of statement, but under such circumstances that is rather a virtue than a fault. One must regret, however, the occasional use of such terms as 'scientificity' (p. 182) and 'scientificalness' (p. 248). They could certainly be avoided, and they mar the effect of an excellent piece of work.

GRACE NEAL DOLSON.

WELLS COLLEGE.

The Philosophy of Common Sense. By FREDERIC HARRISON. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1907. — pp. xxxvi, 418.

In this volume the veteran champion of Positivism brings together a number of essays and addresses written, and in many cases published, by him during a long course of years, — some having appeared in periodicals, or been read before the Metaphysical Society, in the early seventies. As Mr. Harrison has remained uninfluenced in his philosophy by writers of the present or the immediately preceding generation, no difference of attitude or view between his earlier and his later utterances is discernible; he has the courage to avow himself a "Mid-Victorian," and it is as such that he must be regarded as a philosopher. In reference to metaphysics he writes: "I hold that the substantial truth of the matter may be found in the works of Spencer, Mansel, Mill, Lewes, and Comte." Hence, as we read his praise of Lewes's *History of Philosophy*, or his discussion of Huxley's Agnosticism, or his criticism from the Comtean standpoint of the Hegelian Absolute, we seem to be listening to an echo of "far-off things and battles long ago." Mr. Harrison can hardly complain of this; he himself is at pains to show that the human mind will at one period regard as vital and essential the very problems which at another time and under different conditions will cease altogether to engross its energies or engage its attention. Some such change has taken place in the last half century;

and, though Positivism has neither generally triumphed nor yet been wholly overcome, it has been to a great extent set aside or merged into new forms. The intellectual conflict still goes on, but it concerns itself with other issues. None the less this book is by no means without value, though its interest is, perhaps, for the most part historical and autobiographical. Its author's personality, as revealed in this and his other works, compels admiration for his genuine and life-long devotion to the cause of truth, his generosity to his opponents, and his enthusiastic love of humanity, — a love which in his case has shown that the Positivist creed can be a religion in fact as well as in name. The student of nineteenth century philosophy who desires to conceive aright of the spirit, method, and aims of the system of thought inaugurated by Auguste Comte will find them nowhere delineated more clearly and adequately than in this volume by the most prominent and able of Comte's disciples.

E. RITCHIE.

The Ethical Significance of Feeling, Pleasure, and Happiness in Modern Non-Hedonistic Systems. By WILLIAM KELLEY WRIGHT. (Philosophic Studies, Number 1.) The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1907. — pp. 95.

The monograph is a critical study of the teachings of philosophers from Descartes through Green and Nietzsche. In Dr. Wright's judgment, Lotze, of all these, most nearly succeeds in answering the problems to be faced, yet fails because he does not recognize that "moral imperatives have a deeper and more thorough-going objectivity and universality than æsthetic judgments." Any earlier writers who escape this pitfall, either blur the distinctive character of pleasure or give no adequate explanation of the way in which a purely rational morality is to "secure its motivation by the sensible, affective nature of man and so be carried into action." Thus, in its positive conclusion, the monograph may be considered a brief for the inadequacy of rational morality, as yet developed.

Dr. Wright himself looks to "the better comprehension of the psychology of ethics which we have at the present time with strong hope of help in the solution not only of these problems just suggested, but also of the closely connected problem of the relation of happiness to perfection." The care he himself takes to state the various definitions of happiness which he finds, as well as general experience, indicate, it would seem, that a generally accepted definition for that halo-crowned but Protean word 'happiness' would also mark a long step in advance for ethical theory. Meanwhile, though he offers no such definition, this statement by Dr. Wright performs a similar office in relating non-Hedonistic teachings to Hedonistic standards of value, with some definiteness and clearness.

Among the studies of philosophic systems, the study of Kant's works is given especial attention. His system of ethics is treated as developing from the Wolffian position, through the period of British influence, to a

final form expressed in the 'Tugendlehre' and the 'Critiques.' There, according to Dr. Wright, Kant teaches that "desire may, indeed, be effected by the moral law, but it must invoke pleasure or pain before it can pass into action"; and happiness, which "consists wholly in a pleasurable state due to the satisfaction of desires arising from the sensibility," has claims on us both in the person of others, "when the absence of happiness (*e. g.*, in poverty) would furnish temptation to transgress the law of duty," and as an aspect of the complete good. The explanation given for the different interpretation usually put on the Kantian system is that a recognition of the needs of his time for a different emphasis led Kant to pay but slight attention to this phase of his doctrine, in his writings. Thus the conspicuous failure in Kant's ethical treatment of pleasure and happiness should be understood to be his failure to reorganize them and bring them into logical relationship with duty in the moral act; "the greatness of his work lies in his full recognition and development" of "the opposition between duty and happiness" as he conceived of them.

An editorial announcement states that this monograph begins a series of 'Philosophic Studies,' which the Department of Philosophy in the University of Chicago is to issue, and that "these studies will be similar to the series of Contributions to Philosophy, but, not like that series, contain psychological papers, or reprints of articles previously published."

FRANCES H. ROUSMANIERE.

MT. HOLYOKE COLLEGE.

Christianity and Modern Culture. An Essay in Philosophy of Religion. By CHARLES GRAY SHAW. Cincinnati, Jennings and Graham; New York, Eaton and Mains. No date. — pp. 310.

Professor Shaw is of the opinion that we have reached a crisis in the history of Christianity, and that the question is pertinent whether, in view of modern culture, we are still Christians. He undertakes to answer this question and his answer is affirmative.

The work is a difficult one to review for the reason that the enquiry ranges over so many themes, raises so many problems, and treats them so vaguely. Besides the ethical and metaphysical problems of Christianity, Professor Shaw deals with such problems as the relation of Christianity to History, to Art, and, specifically, to Romanticism in art, etc., etc. He is conscious of the fundamental religious and metaphysical problem involved in the relation of the historical and empirical element in religion to the absolute element. He raises this problem several times, but he nowhere adequately handles it. "Christ," he tells us, "achieved history"; but we are nowhere told how far primitive and later Christianity rest upon true historical records. Again, "Christianity has created history." What does this mean?

Again, Professor Shaw touches several times on the problem of the meaning and worth of culture, and asks what is the relation of Christianity

thereto ; but I do not find anywhere a definite statement as to what culture is and what are its problems. He says that "conscious culture is a contribution which Christianity has made to the intellectual life of the world." This, surely, is a claim that cannot be made good in the face of Greek culture. Professor Shaw admits that the ancients had culture, but he says they were not *conscious* thereof ; ensconced in nature, they had no feeling for the transcendent. That the Greeks were simply a lot of happy, jovial holiday-makers, is a myth that finds no support in the pages of Æschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Plato. This myth Professor Shaw seems to adopt without enquiry.

There is considerable discussion of Romanticism as the Christian form of art. In general, the author seems to follow Hegel. As to Professor Shaw's interpretation of the significance of particular artists and their works, I am not sufficiently at home in the history of art to discuss them. There are a number of good things said as to the relations of Christianity to Egoism and Pessimism, and as to the peculiar temper of spirit that is Christian. Here and there one comes on fragmentary things well said in regard to religion, art, and philosophy ; but the book, taken as a whole, makes upon the reviewer the impression of opening up and slightly touching upon a great many fundamental problems without working out any of them. One suspects, after failure to carry away from careful perusal any clear lines of thought, that the author has attempted altogether too much and has written without having previously worked out to a conclusion any of the problems that he has undertaken to handle.

JOSEPH A. LEIGHTON.

HOBART COLLEGE.

The following books also have been received :

Ethics. By JOHN DEWEY and JAMES H. TUFTS. Henry Holt and Co., New York, 1908.—pp. xiii, 618.

Essays on Evolution (1889-1907). By EDWARD BAGNALL POULTON. Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1908.—pp. xlviii, 479.

Notes on the Development of a Child. II. The Development of the Senses in the First Three Years of Childhood. By MILICENT WASHBURN SHINN. University of California Publications, Vol. IV. Berkeley, The University Press, 1907.—pp. 258.

Individualism and After. By BENJAMIN KIDD. The Herbert Spencer Lecture, delivered in the Sheldonian Theatre on the 29th of May, 1908. Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1908.—pp. 36. 1s.

Denken und Wirklichkeit: Versuch einer Erneuerung der kritischen Philosophie. Von A. SPIR. (Gesammte Werke, Band I.) Vierte Auflage, mit Titelbild nebst einer Skizze über des Autors Leben und Lehre von Helene Claparède Spir. Leipzig, Verlag von J. A. Barth, 1908. pp. xxx, 547. M. 12. M. 13. gebunden.

- Geschichte der Philosophie.* Von KARL VORLÄNDER. (Philosophische Bibliothek.) 2. Auflage (4-6 Tausend). I. Band: *Altertum, Mittelalter und Übergang zur Neuzeit.*— pp. xiv, 361. M. 3.60. II. Band: *Philosophie der Neuzeit.* Leipzig, Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1908.— pp. viii, 512. M. 4.50.
- Herbert Spencers Grundlagen der Philosophie: Eine kritische Studie.* Von DR. P. HÄBERLIN. Leipzig, Verlag von J. A. Barth, 1908.— pp. iv, 205. M. 5.40
- Grundlinien der Psychologie.* Von DR. STEPHAN WITASEK. (Philosophische Bibliothek, Band 115.) Mit 15 figuren im Text. Leipzig, Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1908.— pp. viii, 392. M. 3.
- Umriss zur Psychologie des Denkens.* Von BENNO ERDMANN. Zweite, umgearbeitete Auflage. Tübingen, Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1908.— pp. viii, 59. M. 2.
- Sociologie: Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung.* Von GEORG SIMMEL. Leipzig, Verlag von Duncker und Humblot, 1908.— pp. 775. M. 12. M. 15. gebunden.
- Evolutionisme et Platonisme.* Par RENÉ BERTHELOT. Mélanges d'histoire de la philosophie et d'histoire des sciences. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1908.— pp. iv, 326. 5 fr.
- L'optimisme de Schopenhauer.* Par STANISLAS RZEWUSKI. Paris, Felix Alcan, 1908.— pp. 178. 2.50 fr.
- L'intellectualisme de Saint Thomas.* Par PIERRE ROUSSELOT. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1908.— pp. xxv, 256. 6 fr.
- La philosophie de Taine: Essai critique.* Par PAUL NÈVE. Louvain, Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1908.— pp. xvi, 359.
- Les savants et la philosophie.* Par GASTON RAGEOT. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1908.— pp. 179. 2.50 fr.
- Contribution à la pathologie des mystiques: anamnèse de quatre cas.* Par FRANCOIS DA COSTA GUIMARAËS. Paris, Jules Rousset, 1908.— pp. 51.

SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mt.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Rev. Nto-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scholastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I. Abtl.*: *Zeitschrift für Psychologie.* — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS.

Logical Community and the Difference of Discernibles. J. MARK BALDWIN.
Psych. Rev., XIV, 6, pp. 395-402.

This article is an extract from the fourteenth chapter of the second volume of *Thought and Things*. By 'logical community' is meant that aspect of the meaning of judgment in virtue of which it holds for more than one individual. The process ordinarily known as generalization in logic is one in which a community in meaning arises. The so-called 'singular' judgment gets its generalization only through this character of community. Where one single object is actually experienced by different persons, as in the case of the 'falling' star, its meaning as a single object for the different observers can become logical if community of experience takes the place of extensive quantity. Again, in the event of a single object being experienced by a single person only, the meaning is generalized, not through extensive quantity, but through community; the judgment of identity is based on the individual's recurrent experience, but possesses the character of community wherein consists its claim upon other minds. But when recurrent experience fails to establish the judgment of identity, the experiences are read as different objects. Here enters the principle of the 'identity of indiscernibles,' usually associated with the name of Leibniz, over against which may be set a principle called the 'difference of discernibles.' In terms of the present paper, the former means that, in the absence of discernible difference, two or more objects are judged to be one and the same in recurrent experience; the latter means that in recurrent experience a single object, by reason of difference discerned in its appearances, is rendered more than one. The former is illustrated in the case of the paranoiac who feels that everybody is persecuting him; the latter, in the case of the individual we call 'subjective,' who always sees in our con-

duct, however uniform, varied signs of change. Within the meaning of community two modes are distinguished: community 'for whom,' where judgment is universally held; and community 'by whom,' where the judgment is held by a certain number only.

G. W. CUNNINGHAM.

The Idea of Development and its Application to History. G. GALLOWAY. Mind, No. 64, pp. 506-534.

Aristotle read the meaning of becoming as a transition from potential to actual existence, — a transition which is based on the presence even in natural organisms of an intelligible form or constitutive idea. For Mill, the succession of historical phenomena is to be explained by an extended application of the principle of causal connection. For Hegel, it is to be interpreted through the idea of development. If the end does not operate throughout, the process is not intelligible. Phrases like the 'development of art' are misleading; for they suggest that the particular type of culture has a vital principle within it, whereas in truth a phase of culture only exists as an element in the self-conscious life of individual persons. Mental development is throughout teleological. Psychical events in men are the kernel of history, but these events are not intelligible apart from the social and spiritual environment which supports them. It is given to a few individuals in each generation to find an answer to the problems of progress; the problems themselves have been set by the historic life of humanity. There is a continuity in history, and perhaps it is progressive. However, neither a perfect final state in time nor an endless process in time is satisfactory as a goal. The facts appear to necessitate the acceptance of some form of transcendency. By insisting on the inner relation of each personal life to the eternal, it seems possible to do justice to personal values, and likewise to maintain that the meaning of history is being realized at each step of the temporal process. Thus, in virtue of the solidarity of personal and social good, we can vindicate the idea of development in history.

M. MOLLOY.

Professor Baillie's 'Idealistic Construction of Experience.' R. F. ALFRED HOERNLÉ. Mind, No. 64, pp. 549-571.

Knowledge or experience is not, in Professor Baillie's phraseology, an 'adjective' of the mind or an event in the mind, in contrast with the world outside, but it is the very substance of the mind, its most concrete form of existence. There are some points in the working out of this theory of experience which Professor Baillie does not give a satisfactory account of. That many individual consciousnesses have an identical content does not imply that this content is itself a 'self-consciousness.' The explanation of the problem of evil also requires a fuller discussion. Another difficult point is to determine the sense in which the Hegelian uses the word 'Experience.' Is there no distinction between experience 'for us' and 'for the Absolute'?

Is there no experience except that of individual minds? The view that experience is found only in finite centres seems to elevate a purely empirical distinction into an ultimate metaphysical fact. Any theory which even seems to reduce the world to an accident of the existence of finite minds violates the fundamental need of true Idealism. Is the order of Experience from Sensation up to Religion to be understood as logical, or historical, or both? The problem at the bottom of this ambiguity is the old puzzle about existence and essence. Professor Baillie deals with the problem of essence rather than with that of existence.

M. MOLLOY.

Immediacy, Mediacy, and Coherence. THE EDITOR. *Mind*, No. 65, pp. 20-47.

The view that all knowledge is mediated by representative contents is a fallacy due to the supposed impossibility of otherwise explaining erroneous, imaginative, and universal concepts. But none of these have being only for thought. The universal is real as a common nature shared by the particulars, possibilities are always related to some universal, and error presupposes knowledge of logical possibilities at least. However, cognition may be mediate in another sense, in so far as it comes to us through inference or in some way analogous to inference. In this sense, it is obvious that not all knowledge can be mediate. The immediate element in it is of two kinds: (1) The immediacy which is exemplified by self-evident propositions in so far as they are self-evident; (2) the immediacy of a feeling or sensation as actually felt or 'sensed.' The second is the type of immediacy discussed here. What is thus immediately given is never entirely isolated, but always cognized as part of a context. On the other hand, it is equally impossible to separate the implications from the datum. The test of truth involves both coherence and immediacy as its essentially correlated aspects. Mere immediacy would contribute nothing to the development of knowledge; and, in the end, truth cannot be recognized merely through its coherence with other truth. In the absence of immediate cognition, the principle of coherence would be like a lever without a fulcrum. To this objection, the adherents of coherence as the sole test reply that systematic coherence involves mutual support. This is, however, not always the case. The prediction based on an hypothesis does not support it, but only the empirical verification of the prediction, which contains an immediate datum. They also urge that the immediate ceases to be immediate in becoming mediated, and that immediacy is an imperfection attaching to finite knowledge. But immediacy is not merely the absence of mediation. It has a positive character of its own, else there would be nothing to mediate; and, in this positive sense, it is not destroyed by mediation. The immediation of the mediate, which we call 'verification,' is just as essential as the mediation of the immediate, which we call 'explanation.' Ideally perfect knowledge must be conceived not only as

completely mediated but also as completely immediate. The interdependence of cognitions presupposes their relative independence. Even in affirming that any one part is dependent on the whole, we affirm that it is dependent not only on the other parts but on itself; in other words, we affirm that it is relatively independent. Another objection may be raised to the view here advocated. It is stated that judgments must be more or less transformed in entering into relations with other judgments, and that, therefore, all judgments in so far as they are unmediated must be false. This is Bradley's argument. The first half of the statement is quite true; but the second does not follow. An unmediated judgment never fails to affirm its conditions, or its partiality, at least implicitly; and its further mediation and transformation, even for perfect knowledge, does not involve its falsity, but, on the contrary, presupposes its truth, and brings out its full significance.

E. H. HOLLANDS.

Non-Phenomenality and Otherness. HUBERT FOSTON. *Mind*, No. 65, pp. 1-19.

This article deals with the psychological sources of the belief in 'non-phenomenal' reality. (I) Touch does not arouse the belief, unless it be active touch. The active consciousness is *sui generis*; it cannot be reduced to sensation, and the phrase 'sensations of resistance' begs the question. It is peculiarly adapted to arouse the belief in objective reality, for it always transcends the presented content of experience. This is seen in the attempt to realize an unattained end, and in the effort of attention to get hold of undisclosed perceptual facts, which are simply implied, neither represented nor known. (II) When thought construes experience on a basis of causation, we supply unperceived links between points of perceptual experience. Thus, while activity seems essentially to posit in the object an inaccessible point of tendency, beyond experience, thought, on different lines, inevitably supplements phenomenal experience with the postulation of a sphere consisting largely of non-phenomenal being never coming within experience. (III) Feeling is a non-phenomenal element *in* experience. Pleasure elusively glides back into the subjective region whenever we try to observe it. A painful state either loses its pain when observed, or else, if the pain seriously persists, it does so as a mysterious threat to my living being, towards which I cannot adopt the attitude of an attentive observer of phenomena. In short, pleasure and pain are never phenomena, but rather exist to bring meaning to bear upon them. Our whole poignant consciousness of what feeling *is*, and not the mere attachment of feeling to certain representative phenomena rather than others, is the especial basis of our belief in the real existence of other men. No philosophy can safely neglect impulses so essential to mental life as these. We have no right to assume that the theoretical residual mind thus constructed would be either self-consistent or a reasonable basis for a philosophy.

E. H. HOLLANDS.

Pragmatisme, humanisme, et vérité. A. LALANDE. Rev. Ph., XXXIII, 1, pp. 1-27.

The essential thesis of Pragmatism is useful and just,—just, in its insistence on particular and observable facts as the basis of truth. Truth is a value, that which works in particular cases and unifies experience demonstrably by the scientific process. James, Schiller, and Dewey agree that the idea which, as part of our experience, helps us to enter into relations in a satisfying way with our experience is truth. Yet experience is not infinitely variable in arrangement; some truths have become fixed; yet it was our needs which fixed them. Reality is ever transforming itself by means of our wishes and thoughts. But how can truth meet individual needs, since in every individual there are opposing needs and tendencies? Hence the weakness of general formulas which test truth by actual achievement. To decide truth thus, one must believe true all that he personally and momentarily needs, or abrogate the principle of contradiction; or else, rejecting distinctions of subjective and objective, one must signify by need an impersonal and logical demand, asking for the tendencies and needs whose satisfaction guarantees a logical value to the thought which satisfies them. It should be clear that we cannot pass from our needs to our truths, but from truths unanimously conceived to the needs they satisfy. Our collective thought, conceived as an ideal, is God. Schiller seems to doubt this convergence, and merely supposes as ideal a vague harmony which will be the future state of the world created by our effort. Yet Schiller testifies indirectly to the necessity for final agreement, in admitting that truths are unified and validated by relation to a Supreme Good. And the fact that the very idea of humanity is increasingly intelligible gives us the right to believe in a final unity, be it placed at infinity. Moreover, if the world be plastic enough to satisfy all our needs and desires, how can it fail to satisfy a need so powerful and continued as the final unity which all our efforts at justice and science presuppose? Man has always performed an act of pragmatic faith in positing the unity of truth and has been justified by increasing success.

C. WEST.

Realism and the Physical World. E. B. MCGILVARY. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., IV, 25, pp. 683-692.

A new form of an old argument against realism urges that qualities perceived must *all* be numerically identical with actual qualities or *none* can be. Why may not some be identical and some different? The question arises: Can we furnish a criterion for distinguishing the two classes? Certain tests can be found. The first is that of common experience. In case this is challenged by some who do not share it, it must be supplemented by that of coherence. Schiller's objection to the latter, that the consciousness which condemns a dream experience is not the same which experienced it, is not effective. An inductive element now enters. To secure

greater coherence, a world of independent objects is postulated. Still another criterion of objectivity is irradiation of differences. It is impossible to verify realism; only reasons can be given for it. This view combines immediatism and pragmatism; for immediate experience presents the qualities from which, by means of these pragmatic tests, we choose those which can be consistently assumed to have independent reality. We constantly learn more concerning these and must assume that all reality is ultimately knowable.

C. H. WILLIAMS.

The Physiological Argument against Realism. E. B. MCGILVARY. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., IV, 22, pp. 589-601.

Since an object gives rise to different sensations under different conditions of the sense organs, some conclude that all sensations are dependent on brain processes and so subjective. If so, brain events, too, should be subjective and appear in consciousness. This difficulty cannot be met by substituting 'possible perceptions' for brain events, for these perceptions are not possible under the actual conditions. We have not *a priori* any right to say that an object is not really perceived. Nor does the objection that there are intermediate objects hold, for the original object conditions its variations as an object of awareness through these. This awareness remains the same, though details change. So consciousness is not a function of the brain, in the strict sense. To the question as to how a past reality, *e. g.*, a star whose light has been a year in coming, can be present in consciousness, realism replies that it is the same object *in different relations*. If it be asked how one can be immediately aware of what is not immediately present, we reply that, when the ambiguity of the word 'immediately' is removed, there is no difficulty here. The question as to *why* there is awareness cannot be answered; we must simply accept facts. The physiological argument reacts against idealism; *e. g.*, Strong is forced to admit that the object is past and the perception present, *i. e.*, the object is temporally independent of the awareness. The argument proves realism.

C. H. WILLIAMS.

The Universe as Philosopher. L. P. JACKS. The Hibbert Journal, VI, 1, pp. 18-36.

Any complete philosophy must explain itself as part of the All-of-things concerning which it theorizes. This truth is always fading away and needing to be revived, and the present article is a plea for its revival. Dualism, Naturalism, and Pragmatism are signal examples of its neglect. The type of thinker most commonly met with to-day is one who violently seizes a point of view outside the problem he is seeking to answer. The frequency of this error is largely due to the great part played in Western life and thought by the relation of private ownership. We speak of 'my experience' in a way which is quite incomprehensible to the Hindu; and, while 'my science' would be absurd, 'my philosophy' passes current every-

where. For any form of Monism, however, it should be self-evident that no interpretation is valid which fails to account for its own presence as an organic factor in the All-of-things. This is by no means a novel doctrine, and in it Philosophy is at one with Religion. Our thoughts, as well as our wills "are ours to make them Thine." Every system of philosophy, so far as it is true, the Monist must regard as a self-confession of Reality. But if Nature is one, she surely cannot be simultaneously in two, or twenty minds about her own constitution. How is it possible to read the Monism of Spinoza, the Dualism of Martineau, the Pluralism of James, as the self-confessions of a Single Being? This difficulty will be considered in another article.

E. H. HOLLANDS.

The Alchemy of Thought. L. P. JACKS. The Hibbert Journal, VI, 2, pp. 401-421.

In the previous article, "The Universe as Philosopher," philosophy was defined as the self-confession of Reality, and the question arose: How then can there be such radical differences between philosophies? But from the other side it can be argued with equal cogency that the philosopher creates his world, since to interpret experience is to control it. This is certainly an extreme contradiction; but in its very extremeness lies the hope of its solution, and, along with it, of the proposed question. The opposite conclusions are not only intelligible but necessary, for the very reason that they lie within the unity of a universal Self-consciousness. No system of philosophy has any meaning out of relation to the systems from which it differs. What, for example, would become of Pragmatism, if there were no Idealism to reject? Philosophy is an organic whole, the logical *prius* of all the philosophies, and that system comes nearest to absolute truth which shows the largest capacity for taking up the others into itself by means of the principle which is the living spring of them all. If we conceive of God as the immanent life of all thought, it involves the admission that not only is a plurality of self-expressions *compatible* with the unity and self-consciousness of the whole, but it is an inherent logical *necessity*, if we are to speak of God in any of the terms that are applicable to Spirit.

E. H. HOLLANDS.

William James et l'expérience religieuse. ÉMILE BOUTROUX. Rev. de Mét., 16, 1, pp. 1-27.

James studies religion from its inner aspect, which is the principal one. His method is that of radical empiricism. The psycho-physiological ensemble of which religious phenomena form a part is first considered; then these are distinguished from concomitant and related phenomena, and the religious element proper is established. Finally, the value of the fact thus arrived at is determined. Boutroux summarizes James's account of the various religious phenomena. Religion is the consciousness of our partici-

pating in a power greater than ourselves, the desire of collaborating with that power in deeds of love, of concord, of peace. Religion is an essentially personal affair ; there are as many forms of religious experience as there are individuals. In justifying the rational value of religious experience, James attacks his problem from the so-called pragmatic viewpoint. He judges the tree from its fruits. The fruit of religious life is sanctity. Faith is not only a sufficient, but a necessary condition of some of its effects. Religion is useful, and in certain cases indispensable. What else does it require in order to be true ? Thus, setting out from religious experiences, a theory of religion itself is developed. Being experimental, like science, has religion the same claim to our adherence as science ? According to some, religious experience is different from scientific experience. The relative persistence of religion is but a survival destined to disappear before the impersonal, verifiable, scientific experience. James, however, maintains that, if the two experiences be not identical, neither is their verification. Religion and science, verifiable each in its own way, will be co-eternal. Religion is the greatest possible realization of all that can be an object of clear and distinct knowledge, the sum-total of which is the so-called objective world. Science is not only incapable of replacing religion, but it cannot dispense with subjective reality which is the basis of religion. The apparent opposition between science and religion is the result of an artificial definition of both, of identifying science with physical science, and religion with the set of dogmas which symbolize it. Religious experience is just as useful and authentic as the scientific. It is even more immediate and concrete, vaster and deeper ; it is presupposed by and implied in scientific experience. This is no logical theory of James's. It is rather the comprehension of the religious experience itself in its complexity, clearly and penetratingly analysed. Science and religion are bound to each other. Both have the same goal, the welfare and power of man ; the same method, experience, induction, hypothesis ; the same field, human consciousness, religion dealing with the whole and science with but a part. Scientists may contend that, in the first place, the 'experience' of James is no experience, scientifically speaking. Scientific experience affirms, not that something seems to me to be thus and thus, but that something is. Yet does science exhaust all experience ? Is not scientific experience of a derived and artificial nature, related to a real experience of life and reality, which would thus be the first and the true experience ? Religious experience is not by itself objective. It is faith that gives it an objective character. Belief or faith is at the heart of all knowledge. Again, the title 'religious' has been denied to James's experience. None the less it is the belief implicit in the religious experience, which characterizes it both as experience and as religious. If feeling is the soul of religion, belief and institutions are its heart.

R. A. TSANOFF.

PSYCHOLOGY.

The Nature of Feeling and Will and Their Relations. WILBUR M. URBAN.
Psych. Rev., XIV, 5, pp. 299-314.

The problem of feeling and will depends upon the distinction between appreciative and non-appreciative description. The distinction between feeling as passive and will as active is an appreciative distinction. When these distinctions are taken to apply to content from which meaning has been abstracted, contradictions arise. Dualistic theories take the distinction as non-appreciative and ultimate; while monistic theories insist that the distinctions are either appreciative or are 'pure logical artifacts,' and that there is an identity of feeling elements underlying all these distinctions. Dualistic theories try to reduce the relations between feeling and will to causal psychic determination. (a) Psychological hedonism maintains that feeling as a passive state is the effect of content. But there are impulses which have no conscious hedonic antecedent. It is shown that this is a virtual acceptance of the 'identity' theory. (b) The second theory of dependence is that all feelings have as their necessary antecedent some phase of conscious conation. But certain emotions, as surprise and fear, appear without any conative experience as their antecedent. In any case, the causal relation can be made universal only by supplementing immediate experience with hypothetical conceptual constructions. The conclusion, therefore, is that the dependence of feeling on conation can be established only when we modify our proposition to read conation *or* conative disposition. The 'monistic' theory denies that the distinction of feeling and will is fundamental. Wundt holds that feeling and will presuppose each other; and that the distinction between them is due to the point of view, and therefore purely conceptual. Brentano held a similar view, prior to Wundt. He held that affective volitional meanings form a continuous series, where distinction is relative and conceptual. The dualist must show at what point feeling ends and conation begins. Hence efforts to mark off the active and passive aspects of experience must prove unsuccessful. And this gives positive ground for our definition of worth as 'affective-volitional meaning.' This distinction, made by the monistic theory, is one of recognitive and selective meaning. The passive and active are differences of genetic mode. Feeling and desire are differences of functional meaning, not of content. The worth of an object is its affective-volitional meaning, and is given in feeling attitudes in which there is always reference to conation. Feeling always presupposes conative tendency; and desire, feeling disposition. The disposition is the significant concept in the definition.

E. JORDAN.

A Fourth Progression in the Relation of Body and Mind. R. W. SEL-
LARS. Psych. Rev., XIV, 5, pp. 315-328.

According to Baldwin, there are three 'progressions': (1) The projective progression, which reads: projects become personal-pr. and thing-pr.; (2)

the subjective progression, which reads : personal-pr. become subject-self and object-self ; and (3) the ejective progression, which reads : object-self becomes mind and body, — the last alone representing complete dualism of body and mind. A further progress in this relation of body and mind the author calls "a fourth progression." It is a new progression entirely different from the other three progressions ; it arises as the consequence of a changed standpoint, and may be designated the progression of 'duplication.' Recent writers regard the mind-body relation as capable of treatment in psychology as a methodological distinction rather than a metaphysically existential one. Certain of its expounders arrive at their view by means of an analysis of the genetic conditions under which the mind-body differentiation first makes itself felt in the experience of the individual. Others attain the position by a flank movement, emphasizing, to begin with, the insoluble contradictions with which one is met when the distinction is treated as resting on existential differences in the primordial elements in the cosmos. Thus, considerable unanimity has been developing of late years in regard to the methodological character of the theories of physiology and psychology in respect to this relation. The psychological and the physical are incompatible only because we have made them so in the development of our scientific description of the universe. The distinction is a functional one, instrumental to the practical ends represented in their methodological demands. In view of such agreement, the discussion of the relation of the body to mind seems to be the discussion of a problem which cannot be a problem at all. Some thinkers, however, still hold to interaction, while others render allegiance to parallelism. Even those who advocate parallelism generally admit that consciousness is not a negligible factor. There must be some ghost here which will not down. The author thinks that body (organism) must drop out of one's experience in the same way that mind does, and supports his conclusion by such neurological and pathological facts as cerebral localization and the alleged discovery that consciousness arises only in a circuit of at least five neurons involving the Golgi cell, type ii. Thus, the author's position is naturalistic, but not materialistic, since matter has disappeared and left process. If his arguments hold, 'reality' becomes a more inclusive term than 'experience,' existentially speaking, and the organism is more than the individual's experience. The organism is not matter at all in the old metaphysical sense, but is in the same complex evolving world with the rocks and trees and air and water. It is a matter of function and process.

T. NAKASHIMA.

The Psychology of Mysticism. É. BOUTROUX. Int. J. E., XVIII, 2, pp. 182-195.

Mysticism consists in seeing with the eyes of the soul, and manifests itself most essentially in ecstasy. The starting-point of its development is an aspiration towards the Good, which the heart demands and which the

mind cannot conceive. In the mystic this state is profound and lasting, and the soul gradually forms an idea of the object of its aspiration. The second phase is an effort to convert the idea into feeling. The means employed are purification and asceticism. The third state, called ecstasy, is the reunion of the soul with her object, and manifests itself through the feeling of love. To love is added the intuition of intelligence. The true order of events, however, is the inverse of the order in which they appear to the immediate consciousness. The fourth phase is a return upon the former life, and a new orientation as regards both judgment and conduct. In the fifth phase, the supernatural life must be developed and realized in all its fullness. Investigated from the mystic's point of view, subjectively, several observations may be made. Beneath the conscious there is the unconscious, more and more accessible to a consciousness which methodically and with increasing intensity searches out the ultimate causes of our thoughts and the most secret springs of our actions. By experimentation the mystic attempts to convert the abstract idea of certain feelings into a reality of the soul; for feelings are primitive, knowledge is dependent and comes afterward. God is divine grace present within ourselves; grace becomes liberty superior to all temporal conditions; and liberty is love. This ideal love is the foundation of being and the substance of ourselves. Viewed objectively, the phenomena of mysticism seem referable to two affections of the mind,—to auto-suggestion and mono-ideism. These affections are not, however, always pathological, but are definite conditions of existence for every man who reflects. The absolute value of mysticism depends upon the value of the idea which the mystic presents to consciousness as its supreme and exclusive object. Psychology discovers two problems in mysticism: Is there, beside an individual life, a universal life also? What is the relation between them, and how can the second be fully realized? Certain mystics hold to the abolition of the individual life; others make the condition of the universal life the enlargement of the bounds of individual consciousnesses until they mutually interpenetrate.

F. A. PEEK.

Essai sur l'histoire naturelle des idées. MAURICE MILLILOUD. Rev. Ph., XXXIII, 2, pp. 113-144.

We need a history of mind which can trace the common mental attitudes of the principal historical epochs. But, in order to know the mind of an epoch, one must know the movements, interests, habits, and aspirations which compose it. One must know, moreover, the laws of mental combination. There may, indeed, be mental types, natural correlations of psychic elements; and to determine some of these would illuminate moral history. Now of all these correlations ideas are indices; yet not all ideas are such indices. Again, ideas play a more or less important part in mental syntheses; a false idea, however, can perform this function as well as a true idea; a false idea can be a protection and a rallying sign. We

must admit that ideas have a logical value which makes their truth, and a psychological value which makes their action, and their truth is no more the measure of their action than their action is of their truth. That is why the history of ideas should be connected with the history of minds. In the same mind one finds strange unions of opposed principles ; one meets, for instance, Christian anarchists and humanitarian pessimists. But the psychological function of ideas is obviously far more complex than their logical function. It is not even certain that the manifestations of an idea in diverse epochs form a series with transitions. But it is certain that the soul always presents a connection of parts of which ideas are indices ; so that ideas are not merely connected externally by association, but internally and more profoundly, and the terms of the relations are often unconscious : affective tendencies, intellectual, social, and habitual reactions, which we can in a measure classify, becoming mental types, but these psychic groups have, of course, less fixity than animal species.

C. WEST.

De l'intuition dans l'acte de l'esprit. GEORGES DWELSHAUVERS. Rev. de Mét., 16, 1, pp. 55-65.

All thought is the analysis of intuition. The state of intuition is emotive ; the unity of the mental act is not a logical, but a pre-logical unity. It is doubtful whether the affirmation of the object can dispense with intuition and manage with purely logical conditions. The unity of the object implies the unity of the affirmation which posits it. Every object is at the same time a subject. This is valid not only of animate objects, but also of all others. One might endeavor to explain this by means of the categories, by placing personality among them. As a matter of fact, the categories are the laws of representation ; they are inseparable from the thought of the object. Hence it is not the categories that posit the objects as subjects, but rather the intuitive acts themselves ; as if, at the moment of perceiving, the act of some other ego coincided with our own. The artist and the scientist may both spend long periods of thought-preparation and thought-elaboration ; but the act of recognition itself is a momentary flash, a sudden inner vision of the truth. Finally, the belief in the external world depends upon intuition. Reasoning transforms the concrete fact of intuition into a 'phenomenon' of thought-analysis. Yet it is wrong to posit an irreducible opposition between intuition and reason ; the two can be complementary without contradicting each other. The mental act in its integrity is just as affective as it is rational ; it is intuitive, previous to its self-recognition by means of reflection. Creation is no mere matter of abstract reasoning ; it always contains an irreducible basis of emotion and intuition. We affirm the external world, because, in perceiving it, we create it anew. Analysis starts from and ends in intuition. The vision of genius is the supreme affirmation of the things and of itself ; it is creation ; it is belief and intuition all in one.

R. A. TSANOFF.

NOTES.

Dr. Otto Pfeiderer, Professor of Theology at Berlin University, died at his home in Gross-Lichterfelde on July 18. Professor Pfeiderer was one of the ablest of the modern teachers and writers of theology, and his death will be regretted by the many Americans who enjoyed his instruction in Germany or met him during his visits to the United States. Professor Pfeiderer was born near Stuttgart, Wurtemberg, in 1839, and studied at Tübingen under Ferdinand Christian Baur from 1857 to 1861. After practical work in the ministry, he was called to the chair of Theology at Jena in 1870, where he remained for five years, when he became Professor of Systematic Theology at Berlin.

Among his works, nearly all of which have been translated into English, may be mentioned : *Die Religion, ihr Wesen und ihre Geschichte*, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1869 ; *Moral und Religion*, Leipzig, 1872 ; *Paulinismus*, Leipzig, 1873 ; *Religionsphilosophie auf Geschichtlicher Grundlage*, Berlin, 1878, third edition, 1894, 2 vols. (I, *Geschichte der Religionsphilosophie von Spinoza bis auf die Gegenwart* ; II, *Geschichte-speculative Religionsphilosophie*) ; *Grundriss der Christlichen Glaubens- und Sittenlehre*, Berlin, 1880 ; *Das Urchristentum*, Berlin, 1887 ; *Entwicklung der protestantischen Theologie seit Kant*, Berlin, 1892 ; *Religion und Religionen*, 1906 ; *Entstehung des Christentums*, 1907.

In 1885 Professor Pfeiderer gave a course of Hibbert Lectures in London on "The Influence of the Apostle Paul on Christianity." In 1894-95 he was the Gifford Lecturer in Edinburgh University, his subject being "The Philosophy and Development of Religion." At the Congress of Liberal Arts and Sciences, held at the St. Louis Exposition in 1904, he delivered an address before the Philosophical Section on "The Relation of the Philosophy of Religion to the Other Sciences." Professor Pfeiderer made a second visit to the United States last year to attend the Congress of Religious Liberals, at Boston, which he addressed on "The Evolution of the Ideal Truth of Christianity from Its Traditional Forms." During the autumn he also gave a series of lectures in Brooklyn and at Harvard, Cornell, and Columbia Universities. He was admired as a brilliant and forceful speaker, and won the love of all who came to know him personally for his simplicity of manner and manly honesty.

News has just arrived of the death of another distinguished professor of philosophy at the University of Berlin. Professor Friedrich Paulsen died at his home at Steglitz, near Berlin, on August 14. A notice of his life and work will appear in the next number of the REVIEW.

Professor A. E. Taylor, of McGill University, has accepted the chair of Moral Philosophy at the University of St. Andrews, recently made vacant by the resignation of Dr. Bosanquet.

Professor S. E. Mezes has resigned the chair of Philosophy to accept the Presidency of the University of Texas.

Professor W. C. Murray, who holds the chair of Philosophy in Dalhousie College, has been appointed President of the newly founded University of Saskatchewan.

Professor Warner Fite, of the University of Indiana, has been appointed Professor of Philosophy in that institution.

Dr. M. A. Caldwell, Assistant in Philosophy at Harvard University, has been elected to the Professorship of Philosophy at Ursinus College.

Dr. M. S. McDonald, of the University of New Brunswick, has been appointed Instructor in Philosophy at McGill University.

We give below a list of the articles, etc., in the current philosophical periodicals :

MIND, No. 67 : *Leslie J. Walker*, Martineau and the Humanists ; *Leonard J. Russell*, Space and Mathematical Reasoning ; *Angelo Crespi*, The Principle of Causality in Italian Scientific Philosophy ; *Helen Wodehouse*, Judgment and Apprehension ; *A. Sidgwick*, The Ambiguity of Pragmatism ; *F. C. S. Schiller*, Is Mr. Bradley a Pragmatist ? *E. E. C. Jones*, Precise and Numerical Identity ; *J. N. Shearman*, Infinite Divisibility ; Critical Notices ; New Books ; Philosophical Periodicals ; Notes.

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, XVIII, 4 : *Carl Heath*, The Treatment of Homicidal Criminals ; *Alfred H. Lloyd*, the Relation of Righteousness to Brute Facts ; *J. Ellis McTaggart*, The Individualism of Value ; *William M. Salter*, Mr. Bernard Shaw as a Social Critic ; *George Unwin*, A Note on the English Character ; *Walter Libby*, Two Fictitious Ethical Types ; *W. J. Roberts*, The Racial Interpretation of History and Politics ; *Frank T. Carlton*, Is America Morally Decadent ? Book Reviews.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, XIX, 3 : *Elsie Murray*, A Qualitative Analysis of Tickling : Its Relation to Cutaneous and Organic Sensation ; *Frederick L. Wells*, A Neglected Measure of Fatigue ; *John Bascom*, Laurens Perseus Hickok ; *Edward L. Thorndike*, The Effect of Practice in the Case of a Purely Intellectual Function ; *William H. Burnham*, The Problem of Fatigue ; Literature ; Notes.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, XV, 4 : *I. M. Meyer*, The Nervous Correlate of Pleasantness and Unpleasantness ; *H. Heath Bawden*, Studies in Æsthetic Value : (I) The Nature of Æsthetic Value ; *R. W. Sellars*, An Important Antinomy ; *O. Nagel*, On Seeing in the Dark : Remarks on the Evolution of the Eye ; *B. H. Bode*, Some Recent Definitions of Consciousness.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, V, 7 : *Shepherd Ivory Franz*, A Physiological Introduction to the Study of Philosophy ; Literature ; Books Received ; Notes and News.

THE MONIST, XVIII, 3; *Dr. Paul Carus*, Pragmatism; *O. F. Cook*, Heredity Related to Memory and Instinct; *Pierre Besiau*, The Third Movement of the Earth; *Pierre Besiau*, Warm Epochs and Glacial Epochs; *Francis C. Russell*, Hints for the Elucidation of Mr. Pierce's Logical Work; *Charles S. S. Pierce*, Some Amazing Mazes (Concluded); Criticisms and Discussions; Book Reviews and Notes.

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THE
PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

ON THE MEANING OF TRUTH.¹

THE philosopher labors under a difficulty which is not felt in the several sciences: the terms which he employs, at least when any of the larger and more interesting problems are in question, are, almost without exception, what Matthew Arnold calls 'literary' terms. They have no single determinate meaning. They cover a variety of meanings which imperceptibly shade into one another. They are like living things, and in the actual business of intellectual intercourse they have a bland and genial way of adapting themselves to the company they keep. This is one reason why philosophical discussions are in their unique way so humanly interesting, and also one reason why they are apparently so interminable. We are forced to speak the language of the market-place, which means we must use terms that lack precision. Since every one uses these terms, every one understands them, — until he is brought to book and asked to define his meaning. Then he finds it well nigh impossible so to define his meaning as to make it include all he intends the term to cover without at the same time including a great deal more. Truth is just such a term. We all use it, and all know what it means, until we try to make that meaning definite and explicit. Then even those who should be experts are non-plussed.

The first answer that one is tempted to make to "jesting Pilate's" question is the sophists' answer: "There are truths many, and no lack of definitions of them." But if a Socratic gad-fly is on hand to rouse us from our sluggishness by urging: "But

¹ Read as part of the 'discussion' of this subject at the Cornell meeting of the American Philosophical Association, December 28, 1907.

do truths differ as truths because there are many of them, or not rather from some other quality? Is there not some common definition of them all?" — then we can no longer rest content until we have succeeded, to our own satisfaction at least, in framing a definition which will include all the special cases, doing full justice to each, even to those where in popular usage 'to be true' is apparently equivalent to 'to be loyal,' and to those where truth is used as the antithesis of the lie.

We might pause a moment on the threshold to point out certain things about truth regarding which it would seem as if we ought all speedily to reach agreement. They are matters so obvious that my only excuse for mentioning them is the fact that, in recent discussions, they have been brought to the fore with a great flourish of trumpets as if their recognition constituted in some way the distinctive achievement, and the special recommendation, of a particular philosophical sect that has lately come into prominence. Surely we can all agree, when we are satisfied to speak in a large and loose way, that "true ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, and verify"; that our notion of truth is "bound up with the way in which one moment in our experience may lead us towards other moments which it will be worth while to have been led to"; that a true theory is a theory that will work, and that its working means that "it must mediate between all previous truths and certain new experiences"; that it is in the long run the expedient way of thinking; that in getting truth we always start with experience, and to experience must ever keep returning; that truth does not hang in the air, an inert static relation, but that it lives in actual experience.¹ Incidentally, too, we all do agree in using the word 'concrete' as an adjective of approval in describing our own view, while condemning all the views of our opponents as more or less 'abstract.' And surely we can all join the choir of the pragmatists, and with them sing the praises of truth and its practical value. Have we not all of us, when the philistines have scornfully described us as mere theorists indulging in idle speculation, met their accusation by trying to show, what we all devoutly believe, that our pursuit is

¹ James, *Pragmatism*, pp. 201, 216, *et passim*.

in the best sense of the word practical, and that the truth which we seek has a value for the daily business of life.

The issue, in so far as there is an issue between us, would be more sharply defined if we would only, once for all, take these things for granted, and turn to the root of the matter. Now, passing by the difficulty involved in the attempt to define truth in terms of the expedient, — a matter which I have discussed elsewhere,¹ — what I find it most impossible to accept in the so-called 'new' view is the doctrine that Mr. Schiller expresses when he says that "the truth of an assertion depends upon its verification," or that Professor James expresses when he writes: "Truth happens to an idea. . . . Its verity is an event, a process: the process namely of its verifying itself." That the psychological experience of truth-getting is the experience of a verifying process is true enough, — tautological even, — but this tells us nothing of the nature of the truth that is so got. As a matter of fact, it is to the structure of experience, and that means the structure of things and the structure of minds as well, that I turn for confirmation or refutation of my ideas. But in doing so I am necessarily taking it for granted that my ideas are, in advance of such processes of confirmation or refutation, either true or false. For example, I may have inferred from certain lines on Mars that they indicate the presence of canals, and therefore of inhabitants, and I may thereupon assert that Mars is inhabited. This is either true or false now, though no one has yet experienced the verifying process. It may be said that this is so obvious that no one ever thought of denying it, and yet its denial is clearly involved in the attempt to identify truth with the verifying process, and is expressly stated in some of the writings of the pragmatists. There is a striking passage in Professor James's *Pragmatism*, and one cannot but regret that he did not keep it definitely in view throughout his discussion of truth. It should certainly lead him to temper his strictures on "intellectualism," and, I think, to modify his own account of truth. He writes: "When new experiences lead to retrospective judgments, using the past tense, what these judgments utter *was* true, even though no past thinker had been led there."² Surely

¹This journal, November, 1907, p. 632; and article, "Latter-day Flowing Philosophy," in *University of California Publications, Philosophy*, Vol. I.

²*Pragmatism*, p. 223.

this is a recognition of truth as meaning a relation that obtains prior to the process of truth-getting, and it is enough to admit the entering wedge for all the intellectualism you please.

Now the idealist, like his first cousin the realist, starts from, and emphasizes, perhaps at times over-emphasizes, the objective side of truth ; the pragmatist starts from, and emphasizes, and I think over-emphasizes, the subjective side.

It is a fundamental error to take the agreement formula, the notion that true ideas are those that copy or agree with reality, as the original, natural, instinctive, and obvious meaning of truth. Such a formula is, in fact, unintelligible until after the appearance of the sceptical individualism which would separate the knower from the world of reality which he seeks to know. The natural standpoint is far more object-minded. The history of science and of philosophy clearly shows this to be the case. Men sought after truth, knew what they meant, and were more or less successful in their search, long before they were sufficiently self-conscious and sufficiently sophisticated to understand what the agreement formula means. And we get much light on the nature and meaning of truth by going back to these earlier thinkers to see what it was they were actually after when they were seeking truth, and before they had ever thought to ask, What is truth? Now what they were after was the discovery of actual relations that obtained in the world of experience, and relations of such a kind as would enable them to tie together diverse experiences. *What* they sought was the hidden unity behind the manifest diversity of the world about them, the abiding substratum of changing things. In a word, they sought to anchor the passing experience, to give it a setting where it would stay put. Of course, they got into all sorts of difficulty when, in their simple innocence, they conceived unity as excluding variety, fixity as excluding change. But it is still natural for us all, whether students of philosophy or of science, to take truth in the first instance thus objectively as meaning the discovery of unity in experience, the discovery of the abiding reality of the world of changing things. Only we have been learning more and more, as the result of bitter experiences, to conceive of unity

and variety as correlative, permanence and change as correlative, and we are thereby enabled to avoid some of the pit-falls of the earlier thinkers. Abstract unity, and abstract permanence, and the other-worldly view of truth which they inspired, had sufficiently exhibited their futility twenty-four hundred years ago. None the less the prime intellectual need is still to find unity and permanence. How shall these be interpreted concretely? That is the problem. To conceive of truth as the discovery of the hidden harmony of all things, as the discovery of the universal reign of law, as the discovery of the single thread of meaning that runs through all things and guides all things, — these are some of the ways in which early thinkers sought a solution of this problem. When, however, philosophy had once reached the full stature of self-consciousness in the discovery that man inevitably measures all things for himself, and by standards that are his own ways of thinking, it became henceforth obvious that the reality which is the object of truth must be conceived anthropocentrically and teleologically, or, if you prefer, humanistically and in the light of purpose. Herewith we are thrown back on our original quest, which must now be taken up afresh, for this Protagorean insight seems to be the triumph of the many at the cost of the loss of the one, and to leave us with truth hanging in the air, subjective and unstable. In the presence of this situation, and in order to save truth from being lost in the anarchy of opinions which such a doctrine seems to threaten, one is then prone, and if his temperament be poetical or religious this proneness is particularly pronounced, forthwith to project the *anthropos* who shall be the only genuine measurer of truth up into the clouds, to view him as the man in the heavens, and as also the man in men; and at the same time to conceive of the purpose or *telos* as the object of a universal will. But while this conception may have its value to the poet and the saint, for purposes of praying and dreaming and writing poetry, how can it be of any service in the drudgery of prosaic life? Is not this just an attempt to “bury our heads in the sand of heavenly things”? Is it not simply re-introducing the old barren notion of abstract unity and permanence? For one cannot,

of course, take one's own standpoint to be that of the absolute knower of all truth, and seek to determine how things actually are by determining how it is best for them to be. But one has a second string to one's bow. That conception of a universal mind may remain the inspiration of the thinker as well as of the saint, but we are forced none the less modestly to begin where we now are, with just the experiential situation in which we now find ourselves, and proceed to make good our slow steps in the direction of that desired goal. At the same time, the form which that progress takes is determined by that ideal. For, take any object, any bit of experience whatsoever; if your judgments about it are clear and definite and coherent one with another, if, moreover, they are of such a kind as to enable you to read the meaning of this object so that it shall define, and in turn be defined by, all other objects of the same order, if, finally, they enable you to put this bit of experience in its larger time context as well, to view it in the light of its genesis and probable destiny, — then, and in so far, your judgments concerning it are true.

Truth is always conceiving a particular object in the light of its 'idea,' its concrete universal, that is to say, simply conceiving it in its total context or setting. This it is that gives the unity and permanence that thought is after; and it will be observed that this is a unity and permanence that lives in and through variety and change. This is the broad conception of truth.

Truth is not a copy of reality. Truth is in question just as much where we are dealing with unrealities as where we are dealing with realities. Centaurs are unreal. Yet for all that it is true that Cheiron was a centaur, and it is true that he carried Achilles on his back and fed him on bear's marrow. Otherwise Achilles would not be Achilles, and Homer would not be Homer. So I can tell the truth about my castles in Spain. Again, it is a matter of congruity and coherence and of finding the context within which the object gets defined. But of course the conception of Cheiron is incongruous with the prosaic world of the anatomist. I cannot live in my castles in Spain, and, if I over-indulge in the habit of building them, I may find to my sorrow that I cannot live anywhere else, and chaos and unreason will be my doom.

Again, the scientist at work in his laboratory is always in search of the larger context for the specific fact or facts he is dealing with. He wants to read the particular experience in such a way as to have it throw light on all other experiences that fall within the chosen field of investigation, and have all the rest throw light upon it. He too is after vision in the light of the whole. Of course he doesn't reach his goal any more than the philosopher does his, but he is all the while getting truth just in proportion to his success in discovering the larger unity of experience within which the particular facts from which he sets out acquire their own determinate meaning. Every case of getting truth, if we describe it objectively, and not from the standpoint of the private emotions of the successful truth seeker, consists in the discovery of the significance of some object in the focus of consciousness when that object is conceived in its context, in its relations to other objects of actual or possible or imagined experience. Focusing attention isolates the individual object of interest; thought restores the object to the larger context to which it belongs and through which its own meaning and reality get defined. The ideally completed knowledge would thus be, not the discovery of some far off heaven of eternal truth which resembled the dull monotonous abode of the Epicurean gods,

Where never creeps a cloud or moves a wind,
Nor ever sound of human sorrow mounts to mar
Their sacred everlasting calm,

but rather simply this: the ability to read each momentary fact of experience as it comes along in its absolutely total experiential context, such a context being the one in which no item of actual or possible experience is left out.

The implication underlying this view is that the particular object of experience has its place in that complete context, and it is just such a context that we mean when we speak of a realm of experience. When one appeals to experience as the test and control of truth, it is experience in this transcendent sense that is meant. It is clearly not my experience, nor the sum of all of our experiences that is meant, for it must also include all possible experiences, and all experiences that

once were but no longer are possible experiences. Now what I understand idealism to mean is that this total experiential context is real, and is what we mean by reality objectively considered, and that it gets its reality vouched for by the fact that it lives in every experience, being just the setting that is necessary to give the particular item of experience its own significance. At the same time, experience thus viewed clearly is not, nor ever could be, an experienced fact; for, as experienced fact, it would have to be all here and now, and all mine, or thine, whereas the experience which one means, when one appeals to experience for the control of truth and the definition of reality, transcends all such limitations. In other words, the concept of experience is itself transcendent of experience, and in the nature of the case could admit of no empirical verification. It is transcendent of my present conscious experience, and of the sum of all my experiences, and also of the sum of all the experiences of my fellow men, and of the whole human race, for it includes, as equally real with consciously experienced facts, and as continuous with them, all that befell on this planet, for example, before conscious life existed, and all that has happened since, or is happening now, but which falls, or has fallen, within no man's actual experience. And this conception of experience is not peculiar to the so-called 'intellectualists.' I think even the pragmatists keep using it even while they are abusing the rest of us for doing so. When, for instance, Professor Dewey says that "reality as such is an entire situation," is not this "entire situation" just another name for the same conception? For in every case the entire situation would carry one far beyond the limits of the present momentary conscious experience.

In view of what we now have before us, we may then define truth as grasping the transient fact in its transcendent context.

But perhaps the objection will be raised that I have been discussing not truth but reality. I shall be reminded that those philosophers and scientists who engaged in this quest after what I have been calling truth viewed their quest as the search after the really real, after being as such. And, it will be said, truth is not a characteristic of reality but of ideas, conceptions, judgments.

The dispute as to whether truth is one with reality is in part a matter of words. The fact is, reality is just as ambiguous a word as truth. If reality be regarded as equivalent to objects of experience taken just at their face value, precisely as they are immediately experienced, then indeed truth and reality will be far from being identical. And, again, if reality be regarded as consisting of a world of things-in-themselves, the two terms will be even wider apart. But if one is led to view reality as constituting a realm of experience which is a whole made up of parts which are inter-related in such a way that any one part, when seen as it is, shall be fraught with the meaning of all the rest, and if one therefore regards any item of experience as having its own reality fixed and determined in that context, then the terms come much closer together. Yet even so there is an important distinction which would seem to be lost sight of in making this identification. For the judgments and conceptions which state the true meaning of the facts should be distinguished from the facts whose true meaning is in them reported, even from an absolute point of view.

But I have so far been viewing truth in what some may think too objective a fashion. And I have left out some most important considerations, to which I shall turn presently. None the less, what those early thinkers described as the search for the real, or for being as such, is just what we mean when we, being ontologically more modest, use as common sense does the phrase 'search after truth,' or when we speak of the scientist as a truth seeker. Our natural standpoint is thus objective, and other views of truth are more sophisticated, and are grafted upon this earlier view. In seeking truth the self is effaced, ignored, forgotten, and one is wholly absorbed in the object and its relations.

Now the scientist may, and the epistemologist must note that when truth in this sense is discovered the result is no mere affair of immediate perception. Nor is the truth objective in the sense that the individual who finds it has succeeded in actually leaving himself behind. The initial datum has, in becoming a definite and significant object, been transformed, been 'translated,' in Pearson's

phrase, into conceptions, and, we should also add, into judgments, which are conceptions whose meaning has been made explicit. From this standpoint, truth will undoubtedly be primarily a certain property of our conceptions and judgments. And it is here that the notion of 'copying' and of 'agreement' comes in, a notion that is quite as inaccurate, quite as misleading, quite as metaphorical, as is the mirror notion as applied to self-consciousness.

The individual truth-seeker, if he should stop in the midst of his quest to say: "After all, these conceptions and judgments are merely mine; I wonder whether they agree with or copy reality," would certainly not get very far. He is not troubled with any doubt as to whether in seeing he is seeing the thing as others would see it, whether in judging he is judging as others would judge. All that he takes as a matter of course, and so he confidently expects that the judgments which are true for him are true for any other intelligent person confronting the same experience precisely in so far as they can be regarded as *true* for him. But if he is led to reflect that after all truth is in question only when the meaning of experienced fact is expressed in ideas, conceptions, or judgments, and that these are always ideas, conceptions, or judgments which I or some other individual has, are affairs of consciousness; whereas they purport to describe seemingly outer fact, a common realm of experience, — he may then indeed doubt his instinctive confidence. But the doubt is apt to be quashed almost immediately by the copy metaphor. On its surface that seems an easy way out. My judgments are true when they represent, copy, agree with reality.

But the difficulty of making such 'copying' intelligible, when the real which is to be copied is conceived realistically, is notorious, and I need not dwell upon it here. The pragmatist has recently, however, sought to pour new wine into these old bottles. Has he made the matter any clearer? To agree with reality, says Professor James, means "to be guided either straight up to it or into its surroundings, or to be put into such working touch with it as to handle either it or something connected with it better than if we disagreed." But look at this assertion more

closely. I may be supposed to understand what I mean when I say I agree with you, or when I say that my solution of this problem agrees with yours. But suppose I go on to interpret my meaning by saying, by agreeing with you I mean that I am guided either straight up to you or into your surroundings, or am put into such working touch with you as to handle either you or something connected with you better than if we disagreed. Well, it sounds just as strange if we apply this interpretation to agreement when referring to two solutions of the same problem. If there is one thing that such an attempt does make clear it is that the agreement formula is a clumsy figure of speech. It does not definitely express any intelligible account of the truth relation.

The puzzle which we are here concerned with is the one that arises from the reflection that the judgments one makes are one's own, and, at the same time, as true, purport to have objective validity. Now if the truth seeker, who has not been misled by epistemological subtleties, has any doubt as to his success in getting truth, it is clear that what he doubts is not whether his judgments agree with or copy reality, but rather whether they do or do not successfully read the meaning of this particular fact or group of facts before him in the light of their total experiential context, or of so much of it as is marked off for him by the point of view which has determined the boundaries of his chosen field of work. This would be for him the entire situation. This is clear, I say, for if he wants to assure himself that his judgments are true what does he do? He certainly does not try to match up his judgments with outer reality, to find a one-for-one correspondence between them. No, he simply seeks more precise instruments of observation, takes his object from different angles, goes over the steps of his reasoning, to see whether or not in translating the percepts into concepts he has succeeded in getting that fact in just its setting.

But there is also another way in which one may test his results. He may make appeal to another observer, get some one else to stand in his shoes, view the same fact, use his instruments and method, and then wait for his verdict to see whether the con-

ceptions and judgments of another agree with his own. The investigator always takes it for granted that his seeing is typical, his thinking is typical. The inevitable personal equation, the influence of temperament, and the like,—these are imperfections in the instrument that may be compensated. And it is this conception of the typical that, I think, gives the copy theory its plausibility. It is not I, John Smith, that reach these results, but I as a rational observer of a common order of experience. Well, then, if this be so, my fellow worker will see and judge as I do. My truth will be his truth, will be all men's truth, truth for any intelligent observer of just this fact. And so the expression, "my conceptions and judgments are true because and in so far as they agree with reality," means simply that they are true in so far as they are free from the limitations of anything purely private and idiosyncratic in me. In so far as this is the case, they agree with the judgments and conceptions of the typical judge, of the wise man who absolutely knows, or with what such a judge, could he be found, would report. And since I cannot find this all-wise judge, I gain such assurance as I can from the agreement of my wise friends and fellow workers.

And if I mean by reality any experienced fact, as such a judge would describe it, I may say that truth and reality ultimately coincide. But inasmuch as even in such a case we should distinguish between reality as experienced and the accurate description thereof as expressed in judgments, the identification should not be made. One should reserve the word 'truth' to describe the quality which judgments have when they successfully report for thought the significance of the experienced fact or facts. And the mark of success here would be to lift the immediate fact out of its apparent, and, in so far as it is viewed as simply immediate fact, its real isolation into the transcendent context, into its place in the realm of experience.

But, as Professor James remarks, experience is shot through with unities. There is not one context, but many of them. And we can take a fact in one context, and regard its relations in all other contexts as irrelevant. True. But if the object has relations in those other contexts, while we may find it convenient for

certain purposes to ignore them, it is equally clear that we cannot discover the whole truth about the object in question until we conceive it also in those neglected contexts. Until we do so we are viewing the object under a partial aspect, are dealing with an abstraction, or, if you prefer, a sort of legal fiction about the fact, and not with the fact in its full concrete significance.

Again, these partial unities, and the kind of coherence which they reveal, depend upon the categories, that is, the points of view, from which the particular objects are regarded. It is thus, for example, that the fields of the several sciences get marked off from one another, biology from chemistry, and both of these from mathematics, etc. And these points of view determine the principles by means of which the desired unities are effected. But, if we are entitled to speak of a world of experience, it is clear that these various categories, and the points of view which they determine, must have their own organic interconnectedness. They are not just random, haphazard points of view. If they were, chaos so far as the world of experience is concerned, insanity so far as the knower is concerned, would be the result. Thus it is necessary to assume that these different points of view which guide us on the different levels of investigation have their place in the total context, or completed system, of such points of view. In other words, the conception of a realm of experience and the conception of an all-wise interpreter thereof are correlative terms.

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THE NATURE AND CRITERION OF TRUTH.¹

I.

IN discussing this subject it is advantageous, I think, to keep in mind that the question regarding the nature of truth and its criteria may be answered from different standpoints, and that these different answers may all be justified at their own level. Though divergent they need not be contradictory. Thus, for example, truth might be popularly defined as the agreement of ideas or judgments with the real nature of things, or as insight into the way in which we should act in a given situation. And under such circumstance we might properly enough appeal to the opinions of the plain man, or those of the scientific expert, or to the practical results of our own judgments when carried out in action. Or again, one might approach the question in a more detailed and elaborate fashion from the standpoint of the psychology of cognition, analyzing knowledge into its various elements, and attempting to show the various characteristics which distinguish true ideas and judgments from those which are false. In all of these and similar cases, the answers would vary with the standpoint from which we approached the subject, and with the presuppositions we made as to the data and terms with which we were dealing. These and numerous other accounts might be accepted as true 'from a certain standpoint,' or 'for certain purposes,' or 'provided we define our terms and state our assumptions in a certain way.' It is of fundamental importance, however, though not always easy, to remember the 'condition annexed' to all these statements and not to mistake them for philosophical truth.

The hypothetical standpoint of the special sciences has recently been so strongly emphasized, both by representatives of science and of philosophy, that there should henceforth be no danger of neglecting to recognize this limitation, or of confusing the philosophical issue by taking the conclusions of these sciences as absolute and categorical. At the present time the danger rather

¹ Read as part of the 'Discussion' of this subject at the Cornell meeting of the American Philosophical Association, December 28, 1907.

lies in a tendency to adopt an individual and external mode of philosophizing, which may properly enough be described as that of the essayist. The essayist deals in popular fashion with the problems of life; he discusses truth, for example, from a certain angle which seems to him suggestive, pointing out, perhaps, its resemblances to other things and its various uses and adaptations to human life. He may say a great many wise and illuminating things, and even point out facts and relations which must be taken account of in any philosophical treatment of the subject. But his results should not be mistaken for philosophy. For the essayist does not attempt to organize his results according to any logical principle or to develop them to a systematic conclusion. To-morrow, if another aspect of the subject presents itself to his mind, he may give us quite a different account without feeling any obligation to bring it into relation with that of to-day, or even to explain any inconsistencies that may seem to exist between them. Montaigne, the originator of this form of writing in modern times, sets forth in a characteristic passage the standpoint and reflective mood of the essayist: "I take the first argument that fortune offers me; they are all equally good for me; I never design to treat them in their totality, for I never see the whole of anything, nor do those see it who promise to show it to us. Of a hundred members and faces which each thing has, I take one, sometimes to touch it only lightly or to graze the surface, and sometimes to pinch it to the bone; I give a stab not as wide but as deep as I can, and in general I love to seize things by some unwonted lustre."

Now however interesting or edifying such a method of treating philosophical problems may be, it nevertheless differs in at least two fundamental respects from philosophy. In the first place, philosophy, like all other genuine sciences, has passed beyond the stage of the merely striking or suggestive treatment of problems, and aims not at interesting or picturesque results, but at the systematic organization of the facts with which it deals according to some general principle. The object of philosophy is not to make the world interesting, but to satisfy the mind's demands for intelligibility. To this end the philosopher is bound to develop system-

atically some unitary point of view, to organize his various experiences and observations in such a way as to make it possible to think them in some kind of relation. To discover the principle which unites these facts with each other is the purpose of this treatment, not to reflect upon them externally from the particular angle which seems to offer itself for interesting or suggestive treatment.

It is equally important to notice, in the second place, that the standpoint of philosophy, no more than the method of treatment, is to be determined by the mood of the individual, or by his love of "seizing things by some unwonted lustre." It follows from the scientific aim of philosophy that its standpoint must be logically justified, that is, shown to be the standpoint of truth itself, and not one arbitrarily chosen by any special individual interest. If one believes in philosophy at all, one cannot abandon the search for such a standpoint.

The recognition that there is an objective standpoint which it is possible to attain seems to find expression at the present time in the almost universal appeal to experience on the part of philosophical writers. Whatever school one belongs to, one still claims to be an empiricist in the sense that his results are professedly founded on the impregnable rock of concrete experience. But in spite of this verbal agreement, differences arise as soon as we come to a reading of experience. For facts exist for us only in the light of theories, and a theory of experience is a whole philosophy. The objective standpoint, the truth of the facts themselves, is not, then, one at which we can arrive without pains and labor, merely by lifting up our eyes and looking. Indeed, when we sharply contrast facts and theories in this way, thinking of each as having an existence independently of the other, we are at once brought to a standstill. As we cannot begin with either, it may appear that we cannot begin at all. The antithesis between facts and theories, however, is a false one; and, as a matter of fact, philosophy, like all the sciences, did begin with both, with facts which were not less inaccurate and incomplete than its theories were crude and inadequate. The progress of the sciences has taken place through further analysis of the starting-point, a proc-

ess that involves at once the criticism of facts in the light of theories and the elaboration and development of new theories in the light of facts.

We have said that it is the business of philosophy to justify its standpoint, which means, to show that this is really objective, and thus correspondent to the true nature of things. But how is it possible, even provisionally, to define such a standpoint? How is it possible to get, as it were, inside experience itself, to attain, even partially, the standpoint of internal reflection, which, as Hegel says, is *der Gang der Sache selbst*? The case would be hopeless if any individual thinker were called upon to take up the problem of philosophy without any reference to the past. What I wish to emphasize is the necessity of going to the history of philosophy to discover the true standpoint of philosophy itself. For the history of philosophy is the record of the progress that humanity has made in defining the objective standpoint from which alone experience can be rendered intelligible, and, consequently, in defining the nature and criterion of truth. Depreciation of the value of historical study in philosophy overlooks entirely the objective character of truth, and of the process of its development. It is doubtless true that scholarship in the history of philosophy might tend to stifle a certain kind of originality, but perhaps this loss would not be altogether a disaster. It is surely true that a genuine contribution can be made in philosophy, as in the other sciences, only by one who knows and understands what has already been done. Only such a person is in a position to formulate a significant problem or to raise a pertinent objection. Philosophy cannot be directly advanced, then, either by the essayist or by the original thinker who works in independence of the past. The would-be philosopher who resolves to occupy himself only with current problems and present-day tendencies has cut himself off from all possibility of philosophical insight. No man can lift himself by his own bootstraps.

II.

I have ventured to refer to these matters because they seem to me to be materially involved in the present discussion. It is

necessary, before attempting to agree in our definitions of truth, to have some understanding as to what constitutes a philosophical definition, and also, since we must begin somewhere, to have some common understanding as to what we may fairly regard as established by the historical systems and what criticism has shown to require correction or restatement. If one believes in philosophy at all, one must admit that some philosophical truth has been objectively established, that there are some things that one has to learn and at least provisionally accept. I do not mean, of course, that philosophy at the present day has merely to follow one of the great historical systems, Aristotle's, or that of Kant or Hegel. But, as a protest against the attitude of the free lance who asserts his right to make his own standpoint and method, I am insisting that no such individual or arbitrary procedure offers any hope, or has any genuine title to the name of philosophy.

My own contribution to this discussion will consist in stating very briefly some of the fundamental conceptions with which the history of philosophy has furnished us as instruments for the interpretation of experience. I shall then attempt to show what application these conceptions have to the current discussion of pragmatism.

In the first place, every one would admit at the present time that experience must be conceived as a process, and that truth has to do with the relation of the parts of that process to each other. In the pre-Kantian modern systems the prevailing mode of explaining experience was to represent it as a mechanical aggregation of unchanging elements, and to find the criterion of truth in some quality or characteristic of the elements themselves, as, *e. g.*, in their clearness, or strength and vivacity. Now, I think that we all agree that the problem can no longer be stated in this form: we no longer ask, in logic at least, what particular mark belongs to a mental process as such in virtue of which it is true. Truth is recognized to involve the functional relations and interplay of ideas, it is found in the achieved organization, in the attained consistency of experience. This general recognition of experience as a dynamic process through which organization is achieved is, of course, a result of the application to logic of the

notion of development. But although this conception is of fundamental importance, and has transformed the older way of stating the logical problem, it has not served to set at rest the historical disputes regarding the nature of experience, as Spencer fondly hoped that it would. For although it is undoubtedly true that if we could give a complete genetic account of knowledge, exhibiting fully its various functions and implications, we should have answered all the questions that can intelligibly be asked regarding its nature and validity, the old difficulty recurs as to the terms in which the true genetic account is to be given. Hegel and Spencer, for example, reach very different results by following the evolutionary method, and an almost equal divergence shows itself in later writers who profess to give an account of experience in developmental terms. The truth is that every description of the origin and development of mind implies, either implicitly or explicitly, a general theory regarding the nature of experience both in relation to the self and the world.

It seems to me that knowledge may be best understood when it is taken at the outset as the process through which both the individual subject and the race attain consistency of experience. But this consistency, it should be added at once, is no merely formal consistency of internal ideas,—if such a consistency be possible at all,—but involves and implies a view of the world as a harmoniously organized system of reality. These two sides, the thought and its object, are distinguishable aspects of the total concrete experience, but cannot be taken as separate entities that might exist apart from each other, and thus might be connected only in an accidental way through external casuality. We are not to conceive the matter as if there were first mind and an objective order each existing independently, and as if these two things then proceeded to act upon each other at more or less irregular intervals. For to be a mind at all is just to stand in relation to a world, an objective order of things and events. And, on the other hand, the objective order is never in experience at any of its stages something merely isolated from and independent of mind.

It is doubtless true that in the earlier form of experience,—

which is sometimes described as the stage of primitive awareness,—this dualism of aspects is not distinctly recognized as present. To impute to this earlier stage of knowledge the full-blown dualism between subject and object which later appears in consciousness would certainly be a mistake. And even to say that the distinction is at first implicit or potentially present may be misleading. The uncritical use of the potential or the implicit is almost certain to lead to a begging of the question. I do not see how we are to avoid employing the notion in some sense, but I do not feel able at present to show in detail what are the limits of its justifiable use. It is certain, however, that in describing experience, we cannot say that a distinction is present or not present in the same sense in which we pronounce a body present or absent in a particular space. Even in psychology we recognize the distinction between what is at the centre and what is at the periphery of attention. And, in analyzing knowledge, we are not dealing with existing processes, but with meanings, whose signification may be dimly felt without being clearly recognized.

Now even in the most primitive experience we are entitled to argue, I suppose, that the conditions of consciousness must be present. These conditions I do not think are fulfilled in the descriptions of this experience which characterize it as a "distinctionless mass," or a 'chaotic undifferentiated whole.' For experience is an internal process, and seems at least to carry with it a 'being aware' or 'simple apprehension' on the part of a subject. However vague and indefinite this awareness may be, there is involved the two aspects of the act and of some object of which the subject is aware. The distinction of act and object is, of course, not there for the subject in explicit form, but it is functionally operative as the very condition of conscious experience. Similarly, on the presentation side, there is some distinction in the total presentation, some discrimination of a content as a distinguishable element, as that of which we are aware.

In short, I do not see how we can avoid the conclusion that consciousness is an awareness of an objective content, and that the content to be a content at all is already from the first in some way discriminated and related, that is, taken as a meaning. Con-

consciousness is not there as a prius, as if it were a kind of entity, a receptacle perhaps to be filled with sensations and feelings and other things, but it is the immanent and dynamic function of interpretation in experience. Now this function of interpretation is progressive throughout the development of experience. That is, it everywhere does essentially the same work, organizing experience through analysis and synthesis. In tracing the development of experience we are following the movement of one continuous function, which from the beginning is a functional discrimination and relation among objects. I fail, therefore, to see why experience should not be described in terms of this function as the development of thought or judgment. We should, of course, have to recognize the enormous difference between fully self-conscious thinking and the early modes of experience where the distinction between subject and object, between existence and idea, is not yet consciously present. But the disadvantages of applying the term 'judgment' at different levels would seem to be amply compensated by the emphasis which is thus placed upon the unity of mind, and the relief which thus is afforded from the impossible task of deriving thought from bare existence. Moreover, we may go on to say, just as thought or interpretation is the motive and the moving principle which is immanent in experience from first to last,—its universal subject, — reality is everywhere present throughout experience as the universal object. The process of cognition does not deal with reality at second hand, so to speak, by referring its own states of consciousness to reality as a predicate, but apprehends and interprets reality directly, as it is its nature so to do. In sense perception we know objects as having such and such qualities, in reasoning we are not operating with states of our own consciousness, but are interpreting objective existences and relations. It has been acknowledged over and over again that we cannot get knowledge out of mental states; but in spite of this acknowledgment, the belief in their reality as actual existences seems to persist in many quarters. Undoubtedly, it is said, they have to be touched with thought, universalized or referred to reality, but in themselves they form the ultimate basis of our knowledge. Whether there are any states of consciousness

in this sense, whether we can justifiably speak of feelings and emotions as merely *in the mind*, is a question that need not here be discussed. But it seems evident that, so far as the process of knowledge is concerned, there are no such subjective intermediaries present between the mind and the reality which it knows. In sense perception the sensations are not affections of the subject, but qualities of the objects. In reflective thinking, where the dualism between subject and object is more explicit, it is doubtless possible to distinguish between our ideas and hypotheses and the nature of reality. But even here this separation is only temporary and tentative. In the end it will be found impossible for any idea to be real apart from some relation, direct or indirect, to a real objective order.

The view, then, which I am endeavoring to state, and which I think has been established by the historical development of philosophical conceptions, maintains that the relation between the mind and reality is essentially inner and organic. Experience throughout all its modes is the expression of this unity in difference. In the progression of experience both the opposition and the connection of the two aspects are made more and more explicit. That is, both the subject and the object assume an increasing independence as over against each other, and at the same time they more and more exhibit their mutual dependence and inter-relation. Moreover, in the whole cognitive process thought is present as a function of interpretation, operating indeed at various levels and with varying degrees of conscious control, but always as a process of thought, whose function is to determine concretely and still in universal terms the real world. Knowledge, then, is to be defined by tracing the development of this continuous function, and noting the forms assumed by the oppositions and dualisms within it and the result reached at any stage through the positive and negative interplay of its parts.

All of this is stated here in very general and schematic terms, and the standpoint, of course, could only be fully justified and its significance shown by applying it in some detail. Knowledge and truth can only be exhibited in the concrete working out of the relations of the parts of experience, and not in the general

point of view. But, still, it is essential in the detailed working out to follow the thread, to interpret experience even in its most primitive form in the light of the purpose which is being realized. It seems to me that it is only by emphasizing the presence of mind throughout experience, as the immanent principle of development, that the various stages and processes can be exhibited as teleologically related and connected.

III.

This brings us, I think, to a point from which it is possible to state the fundamental problems at issue in the discussions which are now going on about pragmatism. When we ask what is the purpose which the thought process is realizing, the idealist generally replies, 'completeness and coherence of experience,' or 'a consistent view of the nature of reality.' Now the objection, as I understand it, which the pragmatist raises is that this definition is too absolute and formal, and that it rules out as irrelevant the natural processes and conditions which give to truth its concrete meaning. "The more it is insisted," says Professor Dewey in a recent article in *Mind*, "that the theoretical standard — consistency — is final within theory, the more germane and the more urgent is the question: What then in the concrete *is* theory? and of what nature is the real consistency which is the test of its formal consistency?"¹ And again he writes: "Those who question this basic principle of intellectualism . . . will urge instead of consistency in reality resting on the basis of consistency in the reasoning process, that the latter derives its meaning from the material consistency at which it aims."²

There can be no doubt that this criticism is effective against any view that regards thought as something by itself in abstraction from the material of experience. And it must be admitted that, in their anxiety to vindicate the priority of thought, idealists have often ended by robbing it of all concrete meaning. To take thought as a formal process of reflection operating outside and independent of the real world of experience, and then to find truth

¹ *Mind*, N. S., No. 63, p. 325.

² *Ibid.*

in the formal consistency of such a process is obviously an absurdity. But real thinking, as we have seen, is not isolated, but exists only as the form and immanent principle of experience ; and the consistency at which it aims must include the full concrete consistency of all the empirical elements. When we say, then, that logical consistency is the end and criterion of truth, we must give these terms a broader and more inclusive meaning than that which is often ascribed to them. We must regard thought as including within itself, and using as means for the accomplishment of its own ends, not only sense-perception, memory and imagination, but even physical movements and social verifications. Thinking is no closed process which develops truth according to an abstract principle of internal consistency, but is essentially a going to facts, a process of experiment and verification. As Herder says, "it is significant that the word 'Vernunft' is derived from 'vernehmen,' to learn or give ear to, for reason or thought involves looking abroad and learning." But thinking includes also the interpretation and organization of the reports derived from this or that quarter, their testing and evaluation in the light not only of the inquiry at hand, but also of their relation to the wider system of experience in which the particular inquiry stands, so that it is equally an internal process, a coming home to itself.

One may acknowledge, then, the value of pragmatism in so far as it is a protest against abstraction, the besetting sin of philosophical constructions. But it seems to me that there has been a tendency, — at least on the part of certain representatives of pragmatism, — to go to the opposite extreme and to deprive thought or reason of all hegemony in experience. Thinking, from the thorough-going pragmatic standpoint, is regarded as a particular function in experience which is instrumental to the ends and aims of life, and which is justified by the practical effects which it shows in action. It grows out of the needs of concrete ways of living, and is tested by its practical consequences in terms of effects. There can be no doubt, I think, that it is perfectly natural to interpret these and similar statements as an appeal to some other standard than thought, and to find in them an attempt to read experience in terms of life (the indi-

vidual organism and its needs) rather than in terms of rationality. Pragmatism thus seemed to offer us a new doctrine, and in its exclusive emphasis upon the 'practical' to lead to new and startling consequences. But it is not too much to say that this more extreme and sensational side of pragmatism has been definitely refuted by the flood of criticism which it has called out. There has not, I think, been a shred left of its original form, or of its claim to supersede all the older systems.

We have been told recently, however, that all this criticism is beside the mark, that the action and practical consequences to which the pragmatist appeals include further consequences for thought, the changes in values of all kinds, which will be brought about if a given conception is accepted as true. Now this interpretation of 'action' and 'practical consequences' was not entirely ignored by the critics, who pointed to the ambiguity which these words were made to cover in the pragmatists' writings. But the doctrine that thinking is always a means to more thinking, that the criterion of knowledge is more knowledge, can scarcely be considered an original discovery of pragmatism. That each element in experience gets its place and meaning from its relation to the other elements, that the truth of any conception is not in the mere result, but must be taken together with its process of becoming, that the test of thinking is more thinking, — is not all this familiar doctrine? But even though this is true, we may still grant that pragmatism has rendered an important service by attempting to state the doctrine in more concrete terms, thus giving it a new meaning and emphasis. It is not entirely fair to say that the difference between the new and the older statement of the relation of the various parts of experience to one another is a mere difference in phraseology. The new terms are significant of the more concrete way in which we think of experience as a functional system, a dynamic unity, in which neither the parts nor the whole have any reality or meaning when taken in isolation; and to the development of this view the pragmatic movement has materially contributed.

If we may interpret the pragmatic test of truth in this way, there is no reason why it may not be profitably accepted by

idealism. For it is no appeal to the results of external consequences or to any mere individual feeling or act which is not organized as a consistent part of experience. But it is its mission to recall us from an abstract and formal view of thought and consistency to a broader conception of concrete rationality. In temper and motive it is identical with Hegel's vindication of the standpoint of reason as against the static conceptions and formal consistency of the understanding. Strangely enough, though quite in harmony with their lack of historical appreciation, pragmatists generally fail to appreciate Hegel's constant warfare against abstractions and continue to regard him as their arch-enemy rather than as their most powerful ally. Whatever may be the explanation of this antagonism, it seems to me that the most fruitful way of regarding pragmatism is as enforcing and carrying further Hegel's appeal from the fixedness and isolation of the conceptions of the understanding to the fluid process of reason.

Nevertheless, even if we admit that the criticism which pragmatism has directed against idealism to a large extent has been deserved and should be laid to heart, the new school cannot be said to have developed any new views which are able to stand alone. The history of the whole discussion illustrates the comparative barrenness of philosophical criticism which is not carried on from some systematic point of view. It is impossible, I think, to give a philosophical account of the nature or test of truth without some general theory of experience. The nature of truth cannot be defined apart from any theory of reality; one cannot first settle logical questions and then go on to metaphysics. One must play the game of philosophy with the cards all on the table. The failure of the pragmatists to define their own standpoint, or perhaps to take any definite standpoint at all, has been mainly responsible for the misunderstandings of their doctrine of which they complain. More serious still, the lack of theory shows itself unmistakably in the nature of the pragmatic results, at least as they have been formulated by most writers. The pragmatists demand concreteness, but not having developed any objective view of logic, the only concreteness to which they can attain is that of psychological experience expressed in terms of subjective feeling

and purpose. In a certain sense, it is of course true that we cannot deal with experience apart from its relation to the individual mind. But the genuinely concrete standpoint of experience which enables us to discover and define the nature of truth is not found in the form of psychological feeling or action, but in the universal aspect of logical organization of which all minds, in so far as they are rational, partake. It is surely a mistake to suppose that we render our view of knowledge more concrete by bringing it into relation to any private satisfaction or personal ends. It is only in so far as our desires and purposes are capable of being universalized that they can participate in the nature of truth and goodness, and it is only when viewed in the light of this relation that the 'actions' and 'satisfactions' of the individual can contribute to an understanding of the objective experience which is dealt with both by logic and ethics.

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SELF-REALIZATION AND THE CRITERION OF GOODNESS.

DESPITE its general acceptance in one form or another, the self-realization theory is not entirely satisfactory as a solution of the ethical problem. Its defects have been recently pointed out in a manner so forcible as to command the attention of those who for various reasons are inclined to this view. Professor W. R. Sorley has criticised 'self-realization' because it affords no standard of moral judgment. To justify its existence an ethical theory must furnish, he believes, some criterion whereby it may be possible to distinguish between good and bad actions. This, self-realization fails to supply, since all acts are equally expressive of the self. "In every action whatever of a conscious being," he says, "self-realization may be said to be the end: some capacity is being developed, satisfaction is being sought for some desire. A man may develop his capacities, seek and to some extent attain self-satisfaction, — in a manner realize himself, — not only in devotion to a scientific or artistic ideal or in labours for a common good, but also in selfish pursuit of power or even in sensual enjoyment. So far as the word 'self-realization' can be made to cover such different activities, it is void of moral content and cannot express the nature of the moral ideal."¹ In a different connection Professor J. E. Boodin makes the same criticism, that self-realization fails to furnish a standard for the evaluation of conduct. "There are many types of selves and each type desires its own fulfillment. If self-realization is to be the criterion of life, what self is to be realized, the baboon self, the pig self or what sort of self? If all but human selves are to be excluded, what sort of human self? Not the criminal self or the insane self, surely? Only a normal self could be the standard. As Plato says, it must be a very wise man who is to be the measure. But what is normal?"²

These critics strike at a vital point in the theory they attack.

¹ *Recent Tendencies in Ethics*, p. 90.

² "The Ought and Reality," *International Journal of Ethics*, July, 1907, p. 457.

The defect dwelt upon is not an unimportant or external feature which can be easily removed. Instead, it appears to be inseparably connected with the fundamental principle of self-realization. For it is the peculiar merit as well as the distinguishing characteristic of this doctrine that it finds the Good not in the exercise of any one part or faculty of human nature, but in the symmetrical development of the whole self. But does not this fact, which is the boast of the self-realizationist, — that his theory recognizes as equally legitimate and worthy all the tendencies and powers of conscious personality, — prove a stumbling-block when the attempt is made to use the theory as a basis of moral judgment? For how discriminate between acts, approving some as good and condemning others as bad, when all are equally natural expressions of the self? And how impose the same standard upon different selves, when they vary in character and ability, and the ideal demands that each should realize his own capacities?

Because they exalt one side of human nature at the expense of the rest, the time-honored doctrines of Hedonism and Rationalism have been discarded. But by virtue of this very quality, — one-sidedness, if you will, — they succeed where self-realization seems to fail, in furnishing a definite standard of moral judgment. Take Hedonism for instance; pleasant feeling is declared to be the Good. Hence all acts that bring pleasure now or in the future are morally good; all acts that bring pain are morally bad; all other acts are morally indifferent. The case is the same with Rationalism, if the exercise of reason be substituted for the feeling of pleasure. If we take either of these two doctrines as a rule of life, we can contrast acts which satisfy the chosen part of the self with acts that satisfy other parts, draw a sharp line of distinction between them, and judge the former actions to be good, the latter to be bad. Thus we gain a serviceable principle for the ordering of our lives, which is certainly better than no principle at all, and perhaps better than a principle which presents an attractive ideal but supplies no guide for the conduct of daily life.

Are the opponents of self-realization right, therefore, in main-

taining that it furnishes no definite standard for the evaluation of conduct? Before admitting that the theory possesses this grave if not fatal defect, we should carefully re-examine it, particularly in its implications as to moral value. If any criterion of right and wrong is necessarily implied in it, we may hope in this way to discover such criterion and exhibit it with convincing clearness. Let us try thus to go to the root of the difficulty.

All value is relative to the needs or capacities of conscious beings. Hence the criterion of value depends upon the nature of the need to be fulfilled, the capacity to be realized. An object or action has more value as it better fulfills the need, realizes the capacity which is the ground of its worth. This, of course, is true of moral value. But the question is, What need or capacity is the ground of moral value? The different ethical theories have returned different answers, for the most part singling out some one aspect or activity of the human self. Rationalism, for example, chooses reason, Hedonism feeling, and Ener-gism will. In any of these cases the criterion of moral value is obvious. The bearing which an action has upon the satisfaction of the faculty singled out for emphasis decides whether it is good or bad. Self-realization, however, refuses to take any one part or aspect of human nature as the ground of moral worth, insisting that morality demands the realization of the whole self with all its aspects and activities. In other words, it chooses as its principle the self in its unity in preference to an isolated element. Here, too, the ground of value chosen determines the criterion by which we evaluate actions and objects. Plainly such a criterion is implicit in the self-realization view. The difficulty thus resolves itself into gaining such a clear conception of the demands of the self in its unity as will enable us to discriminate between actions which fulfill these demands, and are hence good, and actions which gratify only a part of self, and are accordingly bad.

A clear conception of the self in its unity is not obtained by regarding it as a combination of elements. This is the error into which many self-realizationists have fallen. Such a conception is based upon a structural analysis of conscious life in which

many different impulses and activities are distinguished. The result of the analysis is naturally abstract, and when the parts distinguished are added together and taken for the whole, this latter is an aggregate, untrue to reality and not the unity sought for. The self is thought of as related to the single capacity as a sum to one of its components, and goodness becomes a question of the number of capacities realized. If, in contrast to this, the essential unity of the self is to be adequately understood, we must conceive of it *dynamically*, must discover what its function is, what it does. When once the central function of the self is firmly grasped, the different capacities will fall into an organic system, being related as means to the one supreme end.

Conceived thus dynamically, the self is seen to be an organizing agency. Its function is to be a microcosm, expressing the universe from an individual point of view. By a process of differentiation and integration, it realizes within its own unity a system of objects through which its various impulses gain requisite satisfaction, a community of persons with whose larger good its individual interest is joined, and a cosmic order in which this wider human welfare is provided for and conserved. A clearer meaning will be given to the statement that the self in its unity is a principle of organization, and, at the same time, ample proof of the correctness of this assertion will be furnished, if we recognize in the first place that volition alone among the activities of the self completely expresses its whole nature, and then go on to see that volition is essentially an organizing activity.

The activity of volition is a complete expression of the nature of the self, as a unity conditioned by the opposition of subject and object, which opposition is in its turn being constantly surmounted and overcome within the transcending unity of self-hood. Volition, in fact, epitomizes the principle of self-conscious personality. In the volitional process we behold the unity of the self giving way to difference and opposition when the object is consciously chosen for pursuit. Inasmuch as the object is an object only so far as it exists for the self, it has a place within the unity of self-hood from the very first moment when it was contemplated as a possibility of action. But since, as an end, it is not

achieved but only desired, the object exists without the self and stands in opposition to it. Thus tension and conflict are introduced into the unity of self-consciousness. This very conflict is instrumental, however, in introducing a new and fuller unity. For, as soon as the object is laid hold of by the self as an object of its choosing, we have the beginning of a new unity that is established as, in the course of pursuit and attainment, the object is drawn within the expanding life of the self. In volition, therefore, the inmost nature of self-conscious personality is revealed as a spiritual activity which sunders itself in realizing itself, being divided into subjective desire and objective end, but through this very diremption strengthening and enriching its own unitary life.

As the central and characteristic activity of the self, volition is not one 'faculty' among many, but the comprehensive activity which includes all others. Thus it involves aspects of thought, feeling, and action (in the narrower sense), being in its completeness a union of three elements, an object understood, a feeling aroused, and an effort put forth. Both thought and feeling, when taken independently, are one-sided and partial expressions of the self. Thought is one-sided in its emphasis upon objectivity. Of course the self as knower is present in every act of knowledge, yet in thought the reference is always to, and the emphasis upon, an objective reality which possesses authority over the knowing subject. Feeling is equally one-sided in its subjectivity. Although it has objective conditions, feeling concerns primarily the state of the subject. But volition, on the contrary, gives full expression to the whole self, subject and object, acting in completest interdependence and balanced unity. Hence thought and feeling appear in their real significance only when seen as functions within the volitional process. Here their one-sidedness is cancelled and each appears in its true office as means to that end which is supreme in all personal life, — self-realization. Through thought the self constructs an object which, by virtue of its nature as understood, appeals to it and arouses feelings of desire. By effort the externality of this object is overcome, it is given a place within the life of the self, the

feeling of desire is transformed into that of satisfaction, and thus a step is taken in the realization of the self.

If these considerations are sufficient to prove that volition completely expresses the whole self, an examination of the simplest act of will is enough to show that it is essentially a principle of organization. We all know that our wills are constantly selecting new objects and adjusting them to the unity of our personal lives. The result is to increase the complexity (*i. e.*, both the difference and the unity) of conscious experience. The two features of *differentiation* and *integration*, which accompany all organization, are thus clearly present in the volitional process, — differentiation in the introduction of new ends and objects, which destroy the unity and equilibrium of the self, and integration in the attainment of these ends and objects, which restores the original unity with a richer and more varied content. A review of the leading forms of voluntary action affords further evidence that the work of volition is one of organization. In simple impulsive action, an object is first distinguished by the exercise of attention and then appropriated by an outgoing activity of the self. In selective action, again, an object is chosen because it agrees with a controlling purpose or tendency with which the interest of the self is for the time identified. And through the highest form of action, where choice is preceded by a weighing of motives and a consideration of ultimate consequences of alternative lines of action, these controlling purposes are so correlated and adjusted as to form an organized system of principles which represents the good of the whole self. Thus, as we follow volition through the different forms which it takes in the course of its development, we find it effecting in each successive stage a more thorough and elaborate organization of conduct. To be sure, the higher stages in this development are never reached in the case of many individuals, but such is the normal development of volition when continuously exercised, the goal of which is the complete organization of the life of the self.

This process of self-organization is also a true self-determination. It is the process whereby the self realizes its own freedom. As an active principle of synthesis, the self has an infinite

capacity and is able to embrace universal reality within the scope of its life. But, without such a progressive organization as we have been considering, it would remain a mere formal principle of unity devoid of content, a capacity unrealized. Through this continued differentiation and integration, however, it acquires an objective content which gives it reality as a free spirit. By the exercise of thought it becomes aware of a world of objects and of persons which appeal to it in various ways. These objects are not external to the self as physical objects are external to each other in space; for they are all embraced within the unity of conscious experience. But they are external to, and hence limit, the self as objects unattained which are not really a part of its nature and only arouse its desire. How is the self to surmount this opposition and remove the limit which is thus imposed upon its freedom? Obviously by the organizing activity of volition, in which the opposition of the object is overcome and is appropriated by the self. This simple act of impulse is the first step in self-determination. Suppose that the self continues to act from impulse, however, pursuing now this and now that object as it chances to make a momentary appeal. Its conduct is not wholly self-determined. The self of the moment finds expression in the impulsive action; but when, in an after moment, it is discovered that the act in obedience to this impulse has prevented the satisfaction of another desire now more strongly felt, the act is bitterly regretted. Such impulsive action does not, therefore, express the whole self. How is the self to find complete expression? How is conduct to become entirely self-determined? Certainly not by resisting the appeal of all objects and thus withdrawing from the world of action. Rather it is by resisting the strength of present impulse and bringing every action under the control of principles and purposes deliberately adopted by the self as a whole. The subjection of every action to such control means that all the different acts which make up the sum-total of conduct shall be perfectly adjusted to one another, and become parts of an organized system related functionally as means to the achievement of a single supreme end. This organization of conduct is just the work undertaken

by volition, and its achievement depends upon the degree to which volition is exercised. It signifies the extension of the power of the self over a greater and greater field, in truth, the progressive realization of its freedom.

When we thus understand the nature and function of the self, the ideal of self-realization supplies at once a well-defined standard of moral judgment. Since the self is essentially an organizing agency, the object of supreme worth is a completely organized life, and the criterion of moral value must refer directly to such organization. An act is good in the degree in which it promotes self-organization, and bad to the extent that it hinders the same process. In other words, the ideal demands that every act shall be a function of the central process of organization through which the unity of the self is expressed. The single act which promotes self-organization thus shares the absolute value possessed by the ideal. The obligation to perform it is categorical in its imperativeness, for the act in question is a means to the attainment of the one end which has unconditioned worth and absolute authority. All acts that tend to prevent the attainment of this end are, on the other hand, utterly condemned. They are morbid growths which threaten the health of the moral organism, and they must in consequence be ruthlessly cut away. Self-realization is not limited, then, to vague and ambiguous recommendations; it issues definite and peremptory commands, and justifies extreme measures in their execution.

A difficulty arises quite naturally at this point which requires for its removal some further explanation of the interpretation of self-realization given in the foregoing pages. If moral value be thus attributed to self-organization, is not the goodness of any life determined wholly by the formal completeness of its organization without regard to the character of the activities which make up its content? If so, is not the conduct of the shrewd and calculating criminal, all of whose actions are strictly subordinated to his ruling purpose, sinister as this may be, of equal worth with that of the philanthropist whose every effort is given to the service of humanity? And is not a life devoted entirely to

the attainment of one end, such as revenge for a murdered parent or kinsman, well-organized, and hence deserving of a high degree of moral approval ?

In answer to these questions, it is only necessary to say that it is not mere organization, organization in the abstract, to which moral value is attributed. It is the organization of the human self, of human conduct under the actual conditions of human life. The course and characteristics of this particular process of organization cannot therefore be deduced from the concept of organization in general. They can be discovered only by a study of the moral experience of humanity. The fact that every self is *qua* self an organizing agency determines the form of the moral ideal for all. But the content depends upon the conditions and circumstances of human life, upon the temperament and ability, the environment and opportunities, of the self. Of course these conditions vary with each individual and produce a corresponding variation in the content of the ideal. But while there is so great a degree of variation, still the content of the ideal is not entirely subjective and indeterminate. Certain fundamental conditions are the same for all human life. These uniform conditions make certain adjustments necessary in the case of every individual, if he is to attain the ideal of a completely organized life. Such forms of action, because necessary to organization, share the absolute value possessed by the ideal. Their value as required steps in self-organization is attested by their common recognition in the guise of the familiar virtues.

What are these fundamental conditions which determine the course of organization in the human self? The first is the possession by all men in common of a number of natural impulses. Some of these spring from physical needs which man shares with his animal progenitors. Such are the desire for food and shelter, the sexual and the play instincts. Others are connected with those mental capacities which man alone exhibits in their full development. The desire for companionship, the craving for knowledge, and the æsthetic impulse are examples of this class. These different impulses require different objects for their gratification and inevitably come into conflict. The first step in

self-organization must therefore be the removal of this conflict and the adjustment and coördination of these opposing impulses. The ideal will permit each impulse to act only as a function of the unity of the self, being integrated into an organic system in which the good of the whole is the good of each member. This adjustment is not merely a compromise, however, in which the equal rights of all impulses as independent units is admitted. Certain ones may deserve an exceptional degree of expression because more closely identified than others with the welfare of the whole self, as, for instance, the impulse of intellectual curiosity, which, by increasing knowledge, assists in the satisfaction of all other desires. Moreover, the process may be relatively complicated, subordinate groups being formed within the larger system, as when the various animal impulses are comprehended within the general purpose to maintain physical health and well-being. But the result is always the formation of a unified self-interest which provides for the maximum of satisfaction for the self as individual. The view that the moral ideal demands a functional adjustment of the different tendencies of the self is as old as Plato and Aristotle. According to Plato, justice, the supreme and all-inclusive virtue, consists in a strict division of labor and a harmonious coöperation between the three principles in the nature of the individual.¹ Aristotle, in his doctrine of the mean, would allow to each impulse that measure of gratification consistent with the realization of the end, which is the fulfillment of all of man's capacities under the guidance of reason.²

The growth of a definite self-interest in the individual is accompanied by a growing consciousness of the interests of others. The interest of the self is seen to differ from, and often to oppose, the interests of others. Yet the social relation is a universal and essential condition of human life. Self-organization, therefore, requires as the second condition of its progress the adjustment of these opposing interests. Now it may appear that in this case the adjustment is not within the self, but is of the self to something without. Duty seems here to be external and not grounded

¹ *Republic*, 443c.

² *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1106b.

on the good of the self. But the very fact that an obligation is felt to consider the interests of others shows that these are not really external. They are only external to the narrow and limited self which is actual, and not to the larger nature existing *in potentia*. It is true that another's good does not make the immediate and vital appeal that one's own interest does, because our neighbor's desires are only imagined while our own are felt. Self-realization calls for true self-sacrifice at this stage, in the sense that the individual is compelled to give up what appeals to him at the time as his good. But when the hard duty is unflinchingly performed and the painful adjustment of selfish to social welfare is resolutely made, the interest of the self is steadily enlarged until it includes the good of others and even of all humanity. The extension of the feeling of sympathy gives to the good of fellow-men the same emotional appeal possessed by the interest of self. The type of organization thus achieved in the social sphere differs from that attained among the impulses of the individual. For the many selves, each with a different interest, are not related as means to some further end, but are treated as ends in themselves. The result of the adjustment is the development within each self of a 'kingdom of ends' in which each member, by virtue of his independent self-hood, has equal worth. Into this system representing the good of selves in society, or of the larger 'social' self, the interest of the self as individual must be fully integrated as the second step in self-organization. The necessity of this adjustment with its accompanying self-sacrifice was not fully appreciated by the Greek moralists; it was first recognized with clearness in the ethics of Christianity.

A third condition is essential to all human life. Every man as a real being is a constituent part of universal reality. Self-organization hence requires, as the final step in its progress, the adjustment of the human self to the universe or the cosmic order. This adjustment carries us beyond the sphere of morality into that of religion; for it is more a matter of thought and feeling than of action. Still the complete organization of human life makes necessary at least a certain attitude or disposition of will toward the universe, a willingness to coöperate with and assist

the controlling forces of the cosmic order. And, if these forces be recognized as intelligent in character and benevolent in purpose, man finds in union with them a full and final realization of his highest self, the divine principle in his nature, and becomes a veritable microcosm, a personal expression of Absolute Reality.

The worth of a criterion of good and evil is best seen when it is put to practical use. We ask of such a criterion that it shall enable us to discriminate clearly between good and bad acts. According to the criterion which we have found implicit in the self-realization theory, only those acts are good which contribute to the organization of human conduct and character, or, in the sense previously explained, to the realization of human freedom. Let us, as a further test, apply this criterion to a typical case or two where a moral judgment is called for. First, consider an instance that concerns the individual primarily and has no direct social bearing. Suppose a person is called upon to decide which of two impulses, each in itself equally natural, it is right for him to follow. Shall he devote his evening to enjoyment at the opera or to the furtherance of a business project that promises money gain. His impulse to seek relaxation and pleasure is pitted against his acquisitive instinct. On which side is the right? Our criterion pronounces good the impulse that better fits in with that growing system of objects and aims which the individual has come to regard as his own interest, and condemns the other as bad. Action which follows upon the former impulse strengthens organization, action upon the latter would weaken it. Take another instance which has a direct social reference. Self-interest demands the performance of a certain action, but this action is inimical to the interest of another. Is it good or bad? Our criterion requires that the action be judged, not by its effect upon the interest of the self or upon the interest of the other as separable factors, but by its bearing upon that organized system of personal interests which represents the welfare of a society of selves. If it promotes the organization of this system standing for social welfare, it is good ; if the reverse, it is bad.

Of course this criterion furnished by the self-realization theory

is no infallible touchstone of good and evil, deciding for us in every case of moral perplexity. The most baffling instances of a 'conflict of duties' are those in which the situation is so complicated by reason of the many factors entering into it that the application of any standard of judgment, no matter how definite, is exceedingly difficult. But this is a disadvantage under which every moral criterion must labor and, as such, reflects no discredit upon any particular one.

An advantage not inconsiderable of this interpretation of self-realization is that it brings the process of self-realization into line with the direction of universal evolution. Progress means organization with increase of differentiation and integration in the physical world and in the organic sphere; naturally we should expect it to mean the same in the moral realm. Thus understanding it, we give moral values that grounding in the nature of the universe which their absolute authority seems to demand.

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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE HEGELIAN CONCEPTION OF ABSOLUTE KNOWLEDGE.¹

IN his book on Hegel's *Logic*, Dr. Harris sums up the result of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in the following statement: "The first principle of the world is found by a consistent philosophy to be a self-conscious absolute thinking being. Such a being has been revealed in the religion accepted by the civilized nations of mankind. But the process of reaching the insight into the necessity of such a first principle, as well as a capacity even to conceive such a first principle when revealed, implies the possibility of absolute knowing on the part of man. The first principle of the universe is an absolute knowing being; man is made in his image."²

I quote this passage, not because I desire to criticise it, nor, on the other hand, because I think it adequately or even clearly states the real purpose and result of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. I quote it because it serves as a background against which the limits of the present paper may be defined. Let me say at once that this discussion does not presume to be exhaustive of its subject; I only hope to point out some of the essential elements upon which Hegel has laid emphasis in what he calls 'absolute knowledge.' So I take the liberty to eliminate from consideration the question whether or not Hegel actually does, as Professor Baillie asserts,³ identify Absolute Experience and the experience of the Absolute. In the first place, the discussion of such a question would necessarily consume more space than is at my disposal. Secondly, whether Hegel maintains, as Dr. Harris suggests in the passage quoted above, that over and above the experiences of finite beings there exists "a self-conscious absolute thinking being," whose standpoint is that of absolute knowing, is a problem the solution of which could have no direct

¹ Read in part before the American Philosophical Association at the Cornell meeting, December 26, 1907.

² P. 120.

³ *Hegel's Logic*, pp. 186 ff.

bearing on our immediate purpose. What we are now especially interested in is the significance of this Hegelian conception, viewed from the standpoint of the knowing experiences of finite individuals. And our efforts can only be facilitated, if, at the beginning of the investigation, we agree to dismiss from our minds this more ultimate and complicated problem, which, after all, depends for its solution upon the results to which the present preliminary discussion may lead us.

There can be no doubt that what Hegel calls 'absolute knowledge' is simply the result of his consideration of thought as it appears in every knowing experience. In justification of this assertion, we need only recall the purpose and the result of the *Phenomenology*. Its result, as even a glance at the table of contents will show, is the stage of consciousness known as 'absolute knowledge' (*das absolute Wissen*). Its purpose Hegel has very clearly indicated in the Preface to the work. "The task which I have set myself," he says, "is to elaborate the fact that philosophy approaches the form of science, — approaches the point where it lays aside the name of *love* for knowledge, and becomes *real knowledge*." ¹ Later in the same Preface, we read: "The development of science in general, or of knowledge, is set forth in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Knowledge as it is at first, or the immediate spirit, is the spiritless, the sensuous consciousness. In order to become real knowledge, to reach the element of science, which is its pure notion itself, this sensuous consciousness has to work itself through a long way." ² This way, of course, is that of the *Phenomenology*; and the end of the way is absolute knowledge. From these passages (others to the same effect might be quoted) it is clear that Hegel's purpose in the *Phenomenology* is not, like Kant's in the first of the Critiques, to investigate the possibility and limitations of knowledge, but rather to determine its essential nature. Hegel accepts knowledge as given, very much as it is accepted by common-sense, and proceeds to develop its implications. The final outcome of his study is the standpoint of absolute knowledge, which consequently must be accepted as his definition of what seem to him to be the true characteristics of thought.

¹ *Werke*, Bd. II, p. 6.

² *Ibid.*, p. 21.

It is very important to notice at the outset, and to keep constantly in mind, the fact that Hegel bases this conception of absolute knowledge directly and unequivocally upon our common knowing experience. This point is so fundamental, and is so generally neglected by the critics, that it needs emphasis even at the risk of digression. If more evidence is wanted than has already been adduced, it is not far to seek. In the Preface to the *Phenomenology* itself, we find an explicit statement to the effect that there is no break between consciousness as it appears in sensuous perception and in absolute knowing; and this very fact, Hegel argues, makes possible the transition from the lower to the higher stage. "The beginning of philosophy," he says, "makes the presupposition or demand that consciousness be in this element" (*i. e.*, as the context indicates, in the 'element' of 'absolute science,' which is simply the point of view of absolute knowledge). "But this element receives its completion and clearness only through the process of its development. . . . On its side, science demands of self-consciousness that it raise itself into this æther. . . . On the other hand, the individual has a right to ask that science at least let down to him the ladder to this standpoint, that is, show him the standpoint within himself."¹ Furthermore, in the Introduction to the larger *Logic* we read: "Absolute knowledge is the truth of all modes or attitudes of consciousness. . . ."² Finally, there is a passage in the smaller *Logic* which runs thus: "In my *Phenomenology of Spirit* . . . the method adopted was to begin with the first and simplest phase of mind, immediate consciousness, and to show how that stage gradually of necessity worked onward to the philosophical point of view, the necessity of that view being proved by the process."³ Now it would seem that the import of such passages as these is unmistakable. The *Phenomenology* begins with the most naïve attitude of consciousness, where the matter of intuition is looked upon as a mere datum; its progress, as Professor McGilvary suggests,⁴ consists just in showing that this sensuous consciousness is an

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.

² *Werke*, Bd. III, p. 32.

³ *Enc.*, § 25.

⁴ PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, Vol. VI, p. 500.

essential element in absolute knowing. In other words, the standpoint of absolute knowing is involved in every, even the simplest, phase of consciousness ; it is implied in every act of knowledge, in every subject-object relation, — which is tantamount to saying that it is conterminous with experience itself.

Near the end of his discussion of the *Phenomenology*, Haym, looking back over the course of its development, remarks : “ This whole phenomenological genesis of absolute knowledge was nothing other than the *presence of the Absolute*, which unfolded itself before our very eyes in the methodical manner peculiar to its spiritual nature. It was the self-development of the Absolute as it has mirrored itself in consciousness and in history.”¹ One is led to believe that the critic means by this, as he says later, that the ego “ is at the beginning of the *Phenomenology* exactly where it ought to be at the end, — not in itself, but in the Absolute.”² The suggestion of such a point of view as this, however, seems to me to be at best misleading. Whatever may be said concerning the relation of the result of the *Phenomenology* to the standpoint of an Absolute Intelligence, there is certainly no reason for maintaining that Hegel would ask us to assume such a standpoint at the beginning of the *Phenomenology*. He asks us merely to place ourselves at the point of view of sensuous consciousness, and to try to discover its logical implications. It is, indeed, true that in the attitude of sensuous consciousness Hegel sees the standpoint of absolute knowing, which thus finds its basis in the actual knowing experiences of finite individuals ; and it is also true that these experiences are never left out of consideration by him. But this means nothing more than that absolute knowledge is logically involved in every knowing experience, and that investigation can prove that it is so involved. Hegel himself has very clearly put the matter in another context : “ It may be said that the Absolute is involved in every beginning, just as every advance is simply an exposition of it. . . . But because it is at first only implicit, it is really not the Absolute. . . . The advance, therefore, is not a sort of overflow, as it would be were

¹ *Hegel und seine Zeit*, p. 255.

² *Ibid.*, p. 256.

the beginning truly the Absolute; rather the development consists in the fact that the universal determines itself. . . . Only in its completion is it the Absolute."¹ Even granting, then, for the sake of the argument, that Hegel finally identifies absolute knowledge with the point of view of an omniscient Intelligence (which assumption is by no means self-evident, — indeed, it is difficult to prove that Hegel's Absolute is such an Intelligence), we are certainly not justified in saying that he emerges from the *Phenomenology* with nothing more than the assumption with which he began his investigation. The standpoint of absolute knowledge is not assumed at the beginning; it is arrived at only at the end. And to accuse Hegel of having begun with the point of view of the Absolute is an indication that his actual procedure has been misconstrued. Absolute knowledge does not, as Haym asserts, find its justification in the fact that "the *Weltgeist* has completed itself in history," but, as we shall see later, in the fact that it is the necessary presupposition of all concrete individual experience.

Lotze, too, has brought practically the same accusation against Hegel. "It was not after Hegel's mind," he tells us, "to begin by determining the subjective forms of thought, under which alone we can apprehend the concrete nature of this ground of the Universe,—a nature perhaps to us inaccessible. From the outset he looked on the motion of our thought in its effort to gain a clear idea of this still obscure goal of our aspiration as the proper inward development of the Absolute itself, which only needed to be pursued consistently in order gradually to bring into consciousness all that the universe contains."² Now I submit that such an accusation entirely overlooks the procedure of the *Phenomenology* in establishing the category of absolute knowledge. The very purpose of this effort was 'to determine the subjective forms of thought' as they appear in the knowing experience of the individual. It is true that Hegel did not enter into psychological discussion of individual minds; his aim was epistemological and not psychological.³ It is also true that he

¹ *Werke*, Bd. V, pp. 324-325.

² *Metaphysics*, Bk. I, chap. vii, § 88.

³ See Haym's criticism of Hegel on this point, *op. cit.*, pp. 235 ff.

ended his investigation by exhibiting the essential objectivity of these so-called 'subjective forms' of thought. But the fact still remains that he took his stand on actual human experience, and began his inquiry with common everyday consciousness. In the case of the *Logic* (provided one forgets the fact that the result of the *Phenomenology* is its presupposition) it may be argued with some show of plausibility that from the outset the author regards thought as the "proper inward development of the Absolute itself." But there can be no doubt whatever concerning the baselessness of the charge when made with reference to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The category of absolute knowledge is not a first principle shot out of a pistol at us, as it were, but a conclusion laboriously reached; and it is attained only by a careful and painstaking examination of all stages of consciousness from the sensuous to the scientific and religious. Wherever there is a subject-object relation, there the characteristics of absolute knowledge are disclosed.

Absolute knowledge being, then, Hegel's interpretation of the essential characteristics of thought as it appears in every actual knowing experience, the question arises concerning the details of the conception. What are the fundamental characteristics of thought as defined in this Hegelian category? It is to an attempt to answer this question, partially at least, that we now address ourselves.

In the first place, Hegel claims that his conception of absolute knowledge gives thought release from the subjectivity in which it was bound by both the Kantian and Fichtean systems. Kant, he admits, does indeed give to thought a quasi-objectivity, namely, universal validity. "Kant gave the title objective to the intellectual factor, to the universal and necessary; and he was quite justified in so doing."¹ That is to say, for Kant objectivity means the universally valid in contradistinction from the particularity and relativity of sense-perception; and this is a step in the right direction towards true objectivity. "But after all," Hegel continues, "objectivity of thought, in Kant's sense, is again to a certain extent subjective. Thoughts, according to Kant, although

¹ *Enc.*, § 41.

universal and necessary categories, are *only our* thoughts, — separated by an impassable gulf from the thing, as it exists apart from our knowledge.”¹ In other words, Kant’s categories cannot, by their very nature, express the real: they are mere ideas, which can indeed tell us about the temporal and spatial relations of objects, but which just for this reason can give us no insight into the nature of ultimate reality. Hegel elsewhere speaks of them as prisms through which the light of truth is so refracted and broken that it can never be had in its purity. Such idealism, Hegel justly concludes, is purely subjective.² Heroic as were Fichte’s efforts to break through to reality, they were, Hegel asserts, unavailing. “Fichte,” he says, “never advanced beyond Kant’s conclusion, that the finite only is knowable, while the infinite transcends the range of thought. What Kant calls the thing-by-itself, Fichte calls the impulse from without, — that abstraction of something else than ‘I,’ not otherwise describable or definable than as the negative or non-Ego in general.”³ To express it otherwise, Fichte, in his search for objectivity, finds nothing more satisfactory than an unattainable ideal, an eternal *Sollen*. But this vanishing ideal does not meet the difficulty; thought, which merely ought to be objective, is still subjective, even though an infinite time be allowed for transition to objectivity. Consequently, Fichte’s position, like Kant’s, is in the last analysis nothing more than subjective idealism. Now the standpoint of absolute knowledge, Hegel maintains, transcends the dualism in which the systems of Kant and Fichte seem hopelessly involved. It gives to thought, not a quasi-objectivity or an objectivity that ought to be, but an objectivity that is at once genuine and actual.

Hegel has left us in no doubt as to what he thinks such an objectivity implies. In the context of the above criticism of Kant, he says: “The true objectivity of thinking means that the thoughts, far from being merely ours, must at the same time be the real essence of the things, and of whatever is an object to us.”

¹ *Loc. cit.*

² *Werke*, Bd. IV, p. 127.

³ *Enc.*, § 60.

Later in the same context he tells us that objectivity means "the thought-apprehended essence of the existing thing, in contradistinction from what is merely *our* thought, and what consequently is still separated from the thing itself, as it exists in independent essence." From these very explicit statements it is evident that objectivity of thought means for Hegel at least two things: (a) that thought which is truly objective is not particular and individual, but in a sense transcends the individual; and (b) that truly objective thought does actually express the essence of things. A consideration of these two points will now occupy our attention for a time.

The first of these points, that thought is really more than an individual affair, Hegel states very explicitly in the smaller *Logic*. In the twenty-third section he asserts that thought is "no private or particular state or act of the subject, but rather that attitude of consciousness where the abstract self, freed from all the special limitations to which its ordinary states or qualities are liable, restricts itself to that universal action in which it is identical with all individuals." Furthermore, he constantly insists that the dialectic of thought is really *der Gang der Sache selbst*. "It is not the outward action of subjective thought, but the personal soul of the content, which unfolds its branches and fruit organically."¹ The question, however, at once arises, Are not such statements meaningless? Is the "abstract self, freed from all the special limitations to which its ordinary states or qualities are liable," anything more than an hypostatised entity? Do we know anything about the 'universal action' of thought apart from an individual experience? Is the finite knower merely a passive observer of the 'march of the object,' or of the organically unfolding 'soul of the content'? To meet the objection implied in these questions, a preliminary consideration is necessary.

Every act of thought may be looked at from two points of view. It may be regarded as a process in time, that is, as a mere psychological event, or as a meaning. As a process in time, it is a state of consciousness among other such states to which it is related and by reference to which it may be

¹ *Werke*, Bd. VIII, p. 63 (Dyde's trans., p. 37).

explained. As a meaning, it is the expression of the relation of subject to object, the expression of which relation gives it its significance as an act of knowledge. Neither of these aspects of thought can, of course, be neglected; a timeless act of thought is as much a non-entity as a meaningless act of thought. But, on the other hand, the two aspects must not be confused; thought as a process in time is something quite different from thought as a meaning. Both points of view are legitimate and, indeed, necessary in dealing with concrete mental experience. If, now, these ways of viewing thought be the standpoints of psychology and epistemology, respectively, we are perfectly right in saying that, from the psychological point of view, thought is subjective and particular, while from the standpoint of epistemology it is trans-subjective. As a psychological process, thought is subjective and particular for the simple reason that, when so viewed, it is nothing more than an element in a complex presentation which at a particular moment makes up the mental life of the individual subject. Even belief in a trans-subjective world, the psychologist treats, as Professor Seth Pringle-Pattison says, "simply as a subjective fact; he analyses its constituents and tells us the complex elements of which it is built up; he tells us with great precision what we do believe, but so far as he is a pure psychologist he does not attempt to tell us whether our belief is true, whether we have real warrant for it."¹ Epistemology, on the contrary, necessarily transcends this subjective standpoint of psychology. It deals, not with the knowing experience of any particular mind, not with knowledge as it is possessed by any particular subject, but with knowledge as it is in itself. Epistemology finds its special field just in determining the validity or falsity of the claims of our trans-subjective belief. Its business is to give us a criterion of truth, to investigate the subject-object relation within experience and to develop its implications. In doing this it must neglect the particular experiences, or, to use Professor Bosanquet's phrase, it must abstract from the abstractions of psychology, and fix its attention upon the essential nature of knowledge *qua*

¹ PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, Vol. I, p. 135.

knowledge. It does not, of course, deny the significance of the psychological aspect of thought, nor does it try to escape from the implications of experience when read from that angle of vision. It simply deals with thought from its own specific standpoint, its aim being to handle its data unencumbered as much as possible by psychological considerations.¹

Now, as I understand Hegel, we can accuse him neither of confusing these two points of view, nor of overlooking one in his zeal for the other. As has been pointed out, his interest in the discussion of knowledge is primarily epistemological in the sense above defined; and he keeps consistently to this point of departure. He sees clearly that, from this point of view, knowledge must be investigated as it is in and for itself and freed from the prejudices and preconceptions which attach to it in individual minds; if an adequate standard of truth is to be attained, relativity in knowledge must be overcome. But it should be very carefully noted that Hegel does not, at any rate need not, forget that thought is always a process in a knowing mind. The objectivity which he claims for thought in the category of absolute knowledge is claimed for the thought of every individual who knows; the truth of absolute experience, truth as it is in itself and for itself, is simply the truth of the experiences that are here and now. This point I tried to emphasise at the beginning of the discussion. Thus the 'abstract self,' freed from the limitations of its ordinary states and busy in its universal mode of action, turns out to be the finite self making an unusually strenuous effort to be consistent. Genuinely objective thought is not the private possession of A or B; it is rather the thought activity in which, so far as they are rational creatures, A and B participate. Even if we are fully convinced that Hegel has gone too far in the identification of the finite knower with the Absolute, still we must admit the legitimacy and necessity of this demand of the category of absolute knowledge. For if the subjectivity in which experience is involved by the Kantian and Fichtean philosophies is really to be transcended, experience must be given some form

¹ See Professor Bosanquet's discussion on this point in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1905-1906, Vol. VI, pp. 237 ff.

of genuine objectivity ; and if that form of objectivity is to be found in thought, then thought must be looked upon as it is in its essential nature and not as it appears in this or that individual mind. And this, it would seem, is all that Hegel means when he says that truly objective thought transcends the individual experience.

The second factor involved in the conception of true objectivity, namely, the capacity of thought to express the essential nature of its object, Hegel shows to be the necessary presupposition of all knowing experience. Thought must disclose the constitution of reality, he maintains, otherwise experience is doomed to a hopeless dualism. "The truth as such," he tells us, "is essentially in knowledge."¹ "Only in so far as reflection has relation to the Absolute is it reason and its activity that of true knowledge (*Wissen*)." ² Every individual who knows does, by virtue of that very fact, transcend the dualism which seems to exist between subject and object ; on any other assumption it is not easy to see how experience can be brought into actual contact with ultimate reality. To elaborate this argument is exactly what Hegel undertakes in the *Phenomenology*. He shows there by dialectical procedure how the lowest and most naïve attitude of consciousness to its object subsumes the opposition which *prima facie* seems such a barrier to the comprehension of reality ; such subsumption must be assumed, or we shall never be able to say that experience and reality are one. One might summarily say, without doing violence to Hegel's own words, that the purpose of the *Phenomenology* is to show, in opposition to the Kantian philosophy, why the *Ding-an-sich* must be known and how it can be known. It must be known, because this is the presupposition of experience from its earliest and simplest stages ; it can be known, because thought is no merely subjective and private process going on in our heads, but in its very essence is a significant relation to objects. Thus Hegel solves the problem of the opposition between subject and object by pointing out that the problem is really made by our own abstract

¹ *Werke*, Bd. V, p. 237.

² *Werke*, Bd. I, p. 178.

procedure in dealing with experience. In point of fact, he tells us, there is no such opposition; on the contrary, the very fact that we can have significant knowledge forces us to the conclusion that thought is truly objective, and that the object is in reality as it is in knowledge.

Hegel's position on this point can, perhaps, be more clearly understood when contrasted with Lotze's view. In his *Logic* Lotze summarises his position thus: "We have convinced ourselves that this changing world of our ideas is the sole material given us to work upon; that truth and the knowledge of truth consist only in the laws of interconnection which are found to obtain universally within a given set of ideas."¹ Now when we recall that these ideas are for Lotze more or less subjective, mere 'tools' by means of which we somehow come in contact with reality, but through which the essence of objects can never be known, the contrast between his position and Hegel's is plain. According to the one, we are shut off from reality by means of the very tools we vainly endeavor to work with; reality is a realm 'whose margin fades forever and forever as we move.' According to the other, we are never out of touch with reality, since to know is *ipso facto* to know the essential nature of the objects of knowledge. To the former, truth is nothing more than consistency within a given set of ideas; to the latter, truth is nothing less than reality itself. In a word, on the theory of Lotze thought is after all still subjective, still confined to the abstract realm of bare universals, impotent to overtake the phantom reality it pursues; Hegel teaches, on the contrary, that thought is essentially objective, that form and content interpenetrate, that the process of knowledge is the process of things. And this conception of the objectivity of thought, Hegel would urge, is a necessary presupposition of experience, unless indeed we are willing to abide the consequences of an epistemological dualism.

But if thought expresses the essence of its object, then thought *ipso facto* comprehends its object and so exhausts reality. This implication of his doctrine of the objectivity of thought Hegel

¹ Bk. III, chap. i, § 309.

not only recognizes but insists upon. "Conception is the penetration of the object, which is then no longer opposed to me. From it I have taken its own peculiar nature, which it had as an independent object in opposition to me. As Adam said to Eve, 'Thou art flesh of my flesh and bone of my bone,' so says the Spirit, 'This object is spirit of my spirit, and all alienation has disappeared.'"¹ This same idea Hegel has in mind when he speaks of thought as *begreifendes Denken*. "*Begreifendes Denken*," says Professor McGilvary, "is grasping, clutching thought, thought that grips its object as its own inalienable possession. Perhaps we might translate *das begreifende Denken* by the phrase 'object-appropriating thought'; for the logical relation of such thought to its object is analogous to the legal relation of the master to the slave; the slave had no independent status; he stood only *in* his master, who engulfed him."² Again, the one distinguishing feature between what Hegel terms 'finite' and 'infinite' thought is that the latter destroys the opposition between form and content, which opposition the former never transcends; as Hegel puts it, 'finite' thought is "subjective, arbitrary, and accidental," while 'infinite' thought is what alone "can get really in touch with the supreme and true."³ And, of course, it is 'infinite' thought with which Hegel has to do in his category of absolute knowledge. Furthermore, in the Introduction to the larger *Logic* Hegel argues that to separate the form and content of knowledge is to presuppose an external objective world which is independent of thought; and this, he objects, is unjustifiable.⁴ And later, in the same Introduction, we read: "In logic we have nothing to do with thought *about* something which lies independently outside of thought as the basis of it."⁵ Finally, in the smaller *Logic*, he asserts: "In the negative unity of the Idea, the infinite overlaps and includes the finite, thought overlaps being, subjectivity overlaps objectivity."⁶ Other passages bearing on

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¹ *Philosophy of Right*, Dyde's trans., p. 11.

² PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, Vol. VI, p. 502.

³ *Enc.*, § 19.

⁴ *Werke*, Bd. III, p. 26.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

⁶ *Enc.*, § 215.

this point might be quoted, did it seem necessary ; but the above passages state very clearly Hegel's position. In fact, the position is inevitably involved in his whole conception of the objectivity of knowledge. Truly objective knowledge cannot have opposed to it an unaccountable residuum of fact, which it is unable to comprehend or interpret ; on the contrary, it must be conterminous with reality.

The following quotation from Mr. McTaggart presents an admirable antithesis to Hegel's position here. "Thought is a process of mediation and relation, and implies something immediate to be related, which cannot be found in thought itself. Even if a stage of thought could be conceived as existing, in which it was self-subsistent and in which it had no reference to any data . . . at any rate this is not the ordinary thought of common life. And as the dialectic process professes to start from a basis common to every one, . . . it is certain that it will be necessary for thought, in the dialectic process, to have some relation to data given immediately, and independent of that thought itself."¹ It makes no difference that this statement is given by the critic as an interpretation of Hegel ; it is in truth exactly contrary to Hegel's view of the matter. Thought, as Hegel conceives of it, certainly has no data opposed to, and independent of it ; nor is it merely a process of mediation and relation among phenomena external to it. It bears no relation whatever to immediately given data, 'nuclei' of being, which lie outside of and beyond it, for there are no such. On the contrary, it transcends this dualism, and always finds itself 'at home' in its object from which every trace of alienation has disappeared. Perhaps I can best bring out the contrast between Hegel's real position and that attributed to him by his critic by letting him once more speak for himself: "If under the process of knowledge we figure to ourselves an external operation in which it is brought into a merely mechanical relation to an object, that is to say, remains outside it, and is only externally applied to it, knowledge is presented in such a relation

¹ *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic*, § 14. Compare with this conception of thought Lotze's view of thought's first activity as the process by means of which the immediately given impressions of sense are converted into ideas (*Logic*, trans., Vol. I, pp. 13 ff.).

as a particular thing for itself, so that it may well be that its forms have nothing in common with the qualities of the object ; and thus, when it concerns itself with an object, it remains only in its own forms, and does not reach the essential qualities of the object, that is to say, does not become real knowledge of it. In such a relation knowledge is determined as finite, and as of the finite ; in its object there remains something essentially inner, whose notion is thus unattainable by and foreign to knowledge, which finds here its limit and its end, and is on that account limited and finite." So far we have a statement of the critic's view with its attendant difficulties. By way of criticism and exposition of his own position, Hegel continues : " But to take such a relation as the only one, or as final or absolute, is a purely made-up and unjustifiable assumption of the Understanding. Real knowledge, inasmuch as it does not remain outside the object, but in point of fact occupies itself with it, must be immanent in the object, the proper movement of its nature, only expressed in the form of thought and taken up into consciousness."¹ This passage is self-explanatory, and comment on it seems superfluous. In it Hegel has simply pointed out the inevitable dualism involved in the position which Mr. McTaggart has attributed to him ; and in opposition to such a position he has stated his own more objective standpoint.

An objection which arises just here seems *prima facie* unanswerable. If it be true that thought actually does exhaust reality, then it must be that thought, or knowing experience, and reality coincide. But can such a view possibly be seriously entertained ? Is it not nonsense to say that thought is co-extensive with the real, when so much of our every-day experience, our hopes, our fears, our loves, our hates, fall outside the thinking process ? Can one be so mad as to attempt to reduce existential reality to terms of ideas ? Lotze has put the objection very forcibly thus : " Nothing is simpler than to convince ourselves that every apprehending intelligence can only see things as they look to it when it perceives them, not as they look when no one perceives them ; he who demands a knowledge which should be more than a per-

¹ *Philosophy of Religion*, Engl. trans., Vol. III, p. 163.]

fectly connected and consistent system of ideas about the thing, a knowledge which should actually exhaust the thing itself, is no longer asking for knowledge at all, but for something entirely unintelligible."¹ Mr. Bradley, in a classic passage, has voiced the same feeling: "Unless thought stands for something that falls beyond mere intelligence, if 'thinking' is not used with some strange implication that never was part of the meaning of the word, a lingering scruple still forbids us to believe that reality can ever be purely rational. . . . The notion that existence could be the same as understanding strikes as cold and ghost-like as the dreariest materialism. That the glory of this world in the end is appearance leaves the world more glorious, if we feel it is a show of some fuller splendour; but the sensuous curtain is a deception and a cheat, if it hides some colourless movement of atoms, some spectral woof of impalpable abstractions, or unearthly ballet of bloodless categories."² Now Hegel's answer to this objection is, I think, found in the second characteristic of thought as he has defined it for us in absolute knowledge; and this we shall proceed at once to examine.

Thought, Hegel argues, is not mere abstract cognition, but, on the contrary, is truly universal. In answer to Mr. Bradley he would say that thought does stand for something which falls beyond *mere* intelligence. That is to say, actual concrete thought, in Professor Bosanquet's phraseology, is a process, not of selective omission, but of constructive analysis; its universals are syntheses of differences.³ In Hegel's own words: "The notion is generally associated in our minds with abstract generality, and on that account it is often described as a general conception. We speak, accordingly, of the notions of color, plant, animal, etc. They are supposed to be arrived at by neglecting the particular features which distinguish the different colors, plants, and animals from each other, and by retaining those common to them all. This is the aspect of the notion which is familiar to the understanding; and feeling is in the right when it

¹ *Logic*, Bk. III, chap. i, § 308.

² *Principles of Logic*, p. 533.

³ See Bosanquet's *Logic*, Vol. I, pp. 63 ff.

stigmatizes such hollow and empty notions as mere phantoms and shadows. But the universal of the notion is not a mere sum of features common to several things, confronted by a particular which enjoys an existence of its own. It is, on the contrary, self-particularizing or self-specifying, and with undimmed clearness finds itself at home in its antithesis. For the sake both of cognition and of our practical conduct, it is of the utmost importance that the real universal should not be confused with what is merely held in common. All those charges which the devotees of feeling make against thought, and especially against philosophic thought, and the reiterated statement that it is dangerous to carry thought to what they call too great lengths, originate in the confusion of these two things."¹ In other words, universality may mean two very different things. On the one hand, it may indicate nothing but abstract generality which is arrived at by neglecting the marks peculiar to particular objects. On the other hand, it may mean the synthetic analysis of the particulars, and so include within itself the essential characteristics of them. If one only remembers this distinction, and remembers that the true universal of thought is the subsumption, not the annihilation, of the particular, then, Hegel would say, there should be no objection raised against the assertion that ultimately the real is comprehended by thought. For, in this meaning of thought, experience and thinking experience are synonymous terms.

There are various passages in which Hegel emphasizes this aspect of thought by insisting that thought is not one mental faculty among others coördinate with it, but that it is the principle of universality in mind and includes within itself the other so-called mental faculties as essential elements. In his lectures on the History of Philosophy occurs a criticism of Kant which is very suggestive in this connection: "With Kant the thinking understanding and sensuousness are both something particular, and they are merely united in an external, superficial way, just as a piece of wood and a leg might be bound together with a cord."²

¹ *Enc.*, § 153.

² *Werke*, Bd. XV, p. 516. (Trans., Vol. III, p. 441.)

Against any such atomistic conception of the mind Hegel would insist: "Even our sense of the mind's *living* unity naturally protests against any attempt to break it up into different faculties, forces, or, what comes to the same thing, activities, conceived as independent of each other."¹ But he would go further than this. Not only does he maintain that thought is not one element in an aggregate of disparate parts; he also urges that thought is rather the very life of the one organic whole which we call mind, "its very unadulterated self."² For example, in the smaller *Logic* he asserts that thought is present in every perception and in every mental activity.³ "We simply cannot escape from thought," he elsewhere says, "it is present in sensation, in cognition, and knowledge, in the instincts, and in volition, in so far as these are attributes of a human mind."⁴ In the *Philosophy of Right* we read: "Spirit, in general is thought, and by thought man is distinguished from the animal. But we must not imagine that man is on one side thinking and on another side willing, as though he had will in one pocket and thought in another. Such an idea is vain. The distinction between thought and will is only that between a theoretical and a practical relation. They are not two separate faculties. The will is a special way of thinking; it is the impulse of thought to give itself reality."⁵ The conclusion of the whole matter is, that "in the human being there is only *one* reason, in feeling, volition, and thought."⁶

Overlooking this conception of universality in Hegel's doctrine of thought, Mr. McTaggart criticises him for holding "that the highest activity of Spirit, in which all others are transcended and swallowed up, is that of pure thought."⁷ Such a contention, we are informed, ignores a fact which Lotze has emphasized in many parts of his system. And that fact is "that Spirit has two other

¹ *Philosophy of Mind*, § 379.

² *Enc.*, § 11.

³ *Ibid.*, § 24.

⁴ *Werke*, Bd. IX, p. 12.

⁵ Dyde's trans., p. 11.

⁶ *Philosophy of Mind*, § 471.

⁷ *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic*, § 104.

aspects besides thought, — namely, volition and feeling, — which are as important as thought, and which cannot be deduced from it, nor explained by it.”¹ Now this criticism assumes that Hegel actually tried to reduce the contents of mind to terms of abstract cognition. But, as we have just seen, such an assumption is entirely groundless. Hegel never thought of reducing will and feeling to knowledge, meaning by knowledge what his critic means by it, namely, one of several coördinate elements within the life of mind. What Hegel means by thought, when he asserts that it is conterminous with experience, is simply that principle by virtue of which experience is an organic and unitary whole. It is that life of mind itself, which includes within itself feeling, will, and cognition, and which finds its very being in the expression of this living unity of the mind’s activity.² For Hegel, there is “only *one* reason, in feeling, volition, and thought.”

After all, the difference between Hegel and his critics on this point is not so great as might at first appear. Mr. McTaggart is perfectly willing to admit that it is not impossible that these elements of mind “might be found to be aspects of a unity which embraces and transcends them all”; but he is unwilling to call this unity thought.³ Mr. Bradley, likewise, demands an ultimate synthesis; but it must fall beyond the category of rationality.⁴ Though Lotze states it as his conviction “that the nature of things does not consist in thoughts, and that thinking is not able to grasp it,” yet he goes so far as to say that “perhaps the whole mind experiences in other forms of its action and passion the essential meaning of all being and action.”⁵ Thus it would seem that the real quarrel between Hegel and the critics is concerning the real nature of the synthesis. What the critics vaguely term

¹ *Loc. cit.*

² See, in this connection, an article entitled “Experience and Thought” by Professor Creighton in THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, Vol. XV, pp. 482 ff. “Thinking or rationality is not limited to the process of abstract cognition, but it includes feeling and will, and in the course of its development carries these along with it. There is, of course, no such thing as what we have called abstract cognition; but the different moments are all united in the concrete experience which we may name the life of thought” (pp. 487-488).

³ *Cf.* especially *op. cit.*, § 206.

⁴ *Cf. Appearance and Reality*, chap. xv.

⁵ *Microcosmus*, Bk. VIII, chap. i, § 8.

an ultimate unity, Hegel prefers to call thought, reason, or Spirit. The former try to find a synthesis of elements which they have defined as practically exclusive and independent, though, of course, not ontologically separable from each other; and they seek this synthetic principle in feeling or intuition, — something ultra-rational. Hegel, on the other hand, insists that mind is an organic unity, and that it is such only by virtue of its own most characteristic activity; it is a *one* reason. Every concrete act of knowledge, he argues, is an activity of the whole mind; and this unitary, synthetic activity can be made intelligible and given true objectivity, not, as the critics seem to maintain, in terms of intuition or feeling, but only in terms of rationality. And reflection on the point will, I think, convince us that Hegel is in the right.¹

We are now in a position to expose another aspect of the current misconception of Hegel's doctrine of universality. The misconception concerns Hegel's supposed identification of thought and being, and is, perhaps, one of the most prolific sources of adverse criticism of the Hegelian philosophy. I refer to the prevalent view implied in the above quotations from Mr. Bradley and Lotze, which Professor Seth Pringle-Pattison expresses thus: "The result of Hegel's procedure would really be to sweep 'existential reality' off the board altogether, under the persuasion, apparently, that a full statement of all the thought-relations that constitute our knowledge of the thing is equivalent to the existent thing itself. On the contrary, it may be confidently asserted that there is no more identity of Knowing and Being with an infinity of such relations than there was with one."²

¹ Mr. Bradley would seem to think that discussion on this point is a matter of terminology. For example, in *Appearance and Reality* he says that, if one chooses, one may call that fuller experience, which is an adequate synthesis of the real, thought. "But," he adds, "if anyone else prefers another term, such as feeling or will, he would be equally justified. For the result is a whole state which both includes and goes beyond each element; and to speak of it as simply one of them seems playing with phrases" (p. 171). I am persuaded, however, that the point is more fundamental than such an attitude indicates. And I am also persuaded that he who would escape the conclusion that the abstract particular has a part in ultimate reality must ultimately concede Hegel's contention, — always provided we are in earnest about equating reality with experience.

² *Hegelianism and Personality*, pp. 133-134. I quote from the second edition. Cf. also McTaggart, *op. cit.*, §§ 194 ff. To mediate the 'this,' he asserts, would be to destroy it.

Now this idea that Hegel tried to reduce things to pure thought about things, or that he for a moment maintained that thought could possibly *be* the existent thing, seems to me a monstrous misinterpretation of his real meaning. It is inconsistent with the presupposition of his whole philosophy, that reality is essentially a subject-object relation. It is also inconsistent with the explicit statements quoted above concerning the universality of the notion, which always involves particularity. And he emphatically repudiates such a view in his account of mediation and the function of the negative in thought. But, apart from these facts, it seems that we might credit Hegel with sufficient acumen to see the inherent absurdity of such a position. Surely he saw the contradiction involved in an attempt to attain by thought an ideal which would result in the annihilation of thought itself. Indeed, was it not Hegel who first impressed upon us the fact that knowledge always requires an object, and that, if that object be taken away, knowledge itself ceases to be? As Professor Jones has said: "It is inconsistent with the possibility of knowledge that it should *be* the reality it represents: knowledge is incompatible alike with sinking the real in the ideal, and the ideal in the real."¹ And I think we are safe in saying that Hegel was well aware of this truth; his essential disagreement with Spinoza is that in the Spinozistic philosophy object is reduced to and identified with subject.

Hegel seems to have taken special pains that he should not be misunderstood on this point. The passages already quoted might be paralleled with others just as positive. I shall content myself, however, with adding only two which show, as plainly as words can show, that the author was not an advocate of the theory of abstract identity. The first of these is to be found in the eighty-second section of the smaller *Logic*: "If we say that the absolute is the unity of subjective and objective, we are undoubtedly in the right, but so far one-sided, as we enunciate the unity only and lay the accent upon it, forgetting that in re-

¹ *Philosophy of Lotze*, p. 273. Cf. Bosanquet, *Logic*, Vol. II, p. 207: "In an absolute tautology which excludes or omits difference, identity itself disappears and the judgment vanishes with it."

ality the subjective and objective are not merely identical but also distinct." In the *Philosophy of Mind* is found the other passage, which so well forestalls the above criticism and so forcefully emphasizes the necessity of distinguishing between merely formal identity and concrete unity that I may be pardoned for quoting it at length: "The close of philosophy is not the place, even in a general exoteric discussion, to waste a word on what a 'notion' means. But as the view taken of this relation is closely connected with the view taken of philosophy generally and with all imputations against it, we may still add the remark that, though philosophy certainly has to do with unity in general, it is not however with abstract unity, mere identity, and the empty absolute, but with concrete unity (the notion), and that in its whole course it has to do with nothing else,—that each step in its advance is a peculiar term or phase of this concrete unity, and that the deepest and last expression of unity is the unity of absolute mind itself. Would-be judges and critics of philosophy might be recommended to familiarize themselves with these phases of unity and to take the trouble to get acquainted with them. . . . But they show so little acquaintance with them . . . that, when they hear of unity,—and relation *ipso facto* implies unity,—they rather stick fast at quite abstract indeterminate unity, and lose sight of the chief point of interest,—the special mode in which the unity is qualified. Hence all they can say about philosophy is that dry identity is its principle and result, and that it is the system of identity. Sticking fast to the undigested thought of identity, they have laid hands on, not the concrete unity, the notion and content of philosophy, but rather its reverse."¹ If in these passages Hegel does not deny any attempt to arrive at the blank identification of thought and being, of subject and object, and if in them he does not criticise such a goal as an essentially mistaken ideal of philosophical inquiry, then so far as I am concerned the import of the passages is lost. Surely by concrete unity he means something quite different from abstract identity,—and concrete unity is that with which philosophy, as he conceives it, has to do.

¹ § 573.

It seems only fair to insist that such considerations as the preceding be taken into account before Hegel is accused of attempting that which is at once impossible and absurd. He never had any idea of reducing the 'choir of heaven' and the multifarious passions of the human soul to a 'ballet of bloodless categories.' Such an attempt would have seemed to Hegel as nonsensical as it seems to his critics. When he speaks of the unity of thought and being, he always means identity in difference, and never the undifferentiated identity of Schelling's system. And when he asserts that subject comprehends object, he does not mean to reduce experience to abstract subject, as did Spinoza. He does indeed insist upon unity, but it is always upon concrete unity, the unity of the 'notion'; and this unity does not annihilate or even harm its differences. In a word, Hegel transcends dualism, and yet, at the same time, does justice to the duality within and essential to experience. He neither denies nor attempts to explain away the factual side of experience; he simply denies that an inexplicable datum has any part or lot within experience. Not immediacy, but abstract immediacy, immediacy apart from interpretation, is unreal.

This paper may be brought to an end by an attempt to state in one paragraph its essential points. Hegel's doctrine of thought, philosophic thought, is given in the category of absolute knowledge, which is arrived at through the procedure of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The conception is thus based directly upon our actual knowing experience, and claims to give us an account of thought as it essentially is. Thought, as here defined, is genuinely objective, transcending the relativity of individual experiences and being the determination of things as they are in themselves. But this is not to say that reality is identical with abstract cognition. For thought finds its capacity to express the real in the fact that its universals are always the syntheses of differences, and not the blank universals of purely formal logic. Actual living thought includes within itself the data of so-called intuitive perception, of feeling, of volition, of cognition, and it is adequately conceived of only as this unifying principle of experience; it is the living unity of mind, the one reason which appears in every mental activity.

Therefore, when Hegel teaches that thought is conterminous with the real, he is simply stating the doctrine that experience and reality are one.

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REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

Fries und Kant: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte und zur systematischen Grundlegung der Erkenntnistheorie. Von THEODOR EISENHANS. Giessen, Alfred Töpelmann, 1906. — Vol. I, pp. xxviii, 347; Vol. II, pp. xv, 223.

The work before us is divided into two parts. The first and longer, contained in Volume I, is the "Historischer Teil," entitled "Jakob Friedrich Fries als Erkenntniskritiker und sein Verhältnis zu Kant." The second, contained in Volume II, is the "Kritisch-Systematischer Teil" and bears the title, "Grundlegung der Erkenntnistheorie als Ergebnis einer Auseinandersetzung mit Kant vom Standpunkte der Friesischen Problemstellung." The exposition, in Part I, of the Friesian *Erkenntnistheorie* and its relation to the Critical Philosophy bears the marks of prolonged and thorough study both of Kant and of Fries. So far as I am able to judge, without first-hand acquaintance with the writings of Fries, the account of his doctrine is excellent. In some respects, as the author recognizes, it departs from the prevailing interpretations. As to its correctness in these cases, I am not qualified to judge, but apparently Dr. Elsenhans has made out a good case for his interpretation. Be this as it may, we are certainly indebted to him for his thorough study and his illuminating exposition.

The first part of the work contains six chapters. Chapter I discusses Fries's "Critique of Reason as Philosophical Anthropology"; Chapter II, "The Fundamental Psychological Concepts of the Friesian Philosophy"; Chapter III, "The Sense Perceptions (*Sinnesanschauungen*)"; Chapter IV, "The Imagination"; Chapter V, "Reflection"; and Chapter VI, "The Immediate Knowledge of Reason." The usual interpretations of Fries tell us that he tried to reduce philosophy to empirical psychology. This, Dr. Elsenhans maintains in Chapter I, is a serious misunderstanding of the nature of his *philosophischer Anthropologismus*. For Fries's philosophical anthropology is not identical either with philosophy or with empirical psychology. As to the first point, philosophical anthropology is not philosophy, but the propædeutic to it. Its fundamental problem is to determine how we come into possession of our philosophical knowledge. Fries believed that the great defect of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* is that it fails to show how we become conscious of our *a priori* knowledge. With Kant, he holds that space and time, sub-

stance and causality, are *a priori*, that nothing in the matter furnished by the senses suffices to account for them. But our awareness of them, he maintains, is not an *a priori* consciousness. 'Transcendental knowledge' is knowledge of the *a priori* factors in cognition. But this transcendental knowledge is not itself, as Kant thought, *a priori*; it is gained through inner experience. If, now, this transcendental knowledge is empirical, it is obvious that philosophical anthropology is closely related to empirical psychology. Nevertheless, the two sciences are not identical. Philosophical anthropology is a part of empirical psychology (called by Fries 'psychological anthropology'); but it is distinguished from it as involving a higher method, in that it is concerned with describing, not all aspects of consciousness, but only our consciousness of the *a priori* factors in knowledge. Its task is to give a description of reason, in its normal forms, in order to attain to a theory of it.

The succeeding chapters of Part I give an exposition of the Friesian psychology and epistemology in such detail that it is difficult to select points for comment. Of especial interest are the discussion of proof, demonstration, and deduction in Fries and Kant, the exposition of Fries's conception of *Theorie*, and the final chapter on "The Immediate Knowledge of Reason." In this final chapter, are an interesting discussion of Fries's *Wahrheitsgefühl*, a comparison of his theory of apperception with Kant's, and a detailed exposition of his doctrine of Ideas. Some of the points taken up in the chapter will be touched upon in our consideration of Volume II. Here, we may look for a moment at the account of Fries's deduction of the categories and the Ideas. Fries makes a praiseworthy attempt, Dr. Elsenhans thinks, to justify the deduction of the categories from the logical forms of judgment. Kant derives the categories from the forms of judgment, but he furnishes no justification of his procedure. According to the Friesian doctrine, reflection is *Wiederbewusstsein*; thought brings mediately to clear consciousness what is already immediately present in the reason. "The logical forms of analytical unity . . . are the aids of the thinking understanding, 'through which it becomes conscious of the *metaphysical forms that are present in the immediate cognition of reason*'" (p. 235). From this it follows that the categories, the "metaphysische Grundbegriffe," must be revealed in the forms of the judgment.

This is what Fries offers as the deduction of the categories. The Ideas are also capable of being deduced. The reason why Kant failed to see this is that he supposed that philosophical truth can be

established only by means of proof. The Ideas cannot, indeed, be proved, but neither, it should be remarked, can the categories. They can, however, be deduced; *i. e.*, it can be shown that every human reason inevitably believes in them. Human reason has the form of universality and necessity, and hence it must relate every reality which it recognizes to the complete unity and necessity. Thus, for every given, sensuous, limited consciousness, there is built up in the reason the form of an unconditioned reality, so that the given must be considered as the appearance of an absolute reality. The law of the unity of consciousness, which is also the law of completeness, compels us to negate the limitations of the given. Thus, the supreme form of all transcendental Ideas is the Idea of the negation of limits or the Idea of the Absolute. From it, arise the other Ideas,—of unlimited reality, the world-whole, eternity, and freedom.

In Volume II, we have an interesting discussion of epistemological problems from the point of view gained by the author's study of Fries and Kant. The greatest value of Fries's work, Dr. Elsenhans thinks, consists in the stating of problems. The three most characteristic features of his system, all of which grow out of his relation to Kant, raise three questions which are of great importance in modern epistemological thought. The first of these characteristic features is the distinction between immediate knowledge and reflection. Reflection, which is the task of the understanding, brings mediately to consciousness what already exists as immediate knowledge. This doctrine assumes immediate knowledge, universal and necessary, as the starting-point of the investigation of the knowing faculty, and thus raises the question of the indispensable presuppositions of a theory of knowledge. The second great characteristic of the Friesian doctrine is its use of the anthropological method. A consideration of it brings us to the present-day controversy as to the relation between psychology and epistemology. The third characteristic of his philosophy is its subjective form, particularly in its connection with the doctrine of Ideas. This suggests the question whether our knowledge has any other significance than that of a subjective process, and thus leads us to the problem of the limits of knowledge.

The volume contains three chapters, in each of which one of these problems is considered, with constant reference to Fries and Kant. Chapter I discusses "The Presuppositions of Epistemology"; Chapter II, "The Method of Epistemology"; and Chapter III, "The Problem of the Boundaries of Knowing." Presuppositions, we are told in Chapter I, are necessary for every science; and epistemology,

though relatively free from them, cannot be absolutely so. What are the presuppositions which are indispensable for it? The author groups them under three heads: (1) psychological presuppositions, (2) logical, and (3) epistemological. (1) In all epistemological discussion, we are obliged to use terms, such as 'sensation,' 'conception,' 'reasoning,' the signification of which is primarily psychological. Fries pointed out that the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* contains many psychological presuppositions. Avenarius furnishes another example of the futility of the attempt to work out an epistemology without presuppositions of a psychological nature. But has epistemology any right thus to lean upon psychology? Since it professes to furnish the basis for all other sciences, psychology included, ought it to borrow from psychology? To this it may be replied that what epistemology gives to psychology is not what it has previously borrowed from it. What it borrows from psychology is the set of meanings which are expressed in the various technical terms of psychology. These meanings psychology did not get from epistemology, but from its own observation of experience. (2) We cannot say that epistemology presupposes logic as it does psychology; for logic is only a part of epistemology, isolated for special purposes. (3) The epistemological presuppositions of epistemology are discussed by the author in much detail. The chief ones are: (a) the reality of knowing, not merely as a fact, but as something which has universality and necessity; and (b) the objective validity of the principles of thought that we are obliged to use in our epistemological investigations. Our conviction of the universality and necessity of knowing is not derived from experience; rather, must these characteristics of the knowing process be taken for granted at the beginning of any epistemological investigation. Similarly, every theory of knowledge must assume the validity of the fundamental principles of thought. Here we seem to be involved in a circle, for one might suppose that the chief task of epistemology is to prove the objective validity of these very principles. Various attempts have been made to avoid this circle, but the only real way of escape is to point out that we have no right to ask for *proof* of the validity of these fundamental laws.

In Chapter II, on "The Method of Epistemology," the chief points discussed are the criterion of objective validity and the method of investigating the principles of cognition. Before taking up the first of these points, it may be well to note that the question, 'What is the criterion of objective validity?' is capable of two interpretations. It may mean, 'What is it which is *felt* as a token of objective validity and which thus leads us to make judgments having reference beyond

our own conscious states?' in other words, 'What is the subjective criterion of objective validity?' Or it may mean, 'What is the objective criterion? What is it that justifies me in affirming propositions which have reference outside the field of my own consciousness?' A reading of the author's discussion inclines one to ask whether he has clearly distinguished these two questions. The criterion of objective validity, he maintains in general agreement with Fries, is an 'immediate feeling of evidence,' called by Fries 'feeling of truth.' Now if we interpret the question psychologically, *i. e.*, if we ask what it is that leads us to assert the objective validity of a proposition, Dr. Elsenhans is doubtless right in replying, 'The feeling of evidence.' If, however, we interpret the question epistemologically, if we mean to ask what justifies us in thus asserting objective validity, his answer is far from satisfactory. As a whole, the discussion is open to criticism in that it fails to make clear which of these two meanings the author has in mind. Sometimes (*e. g.*, pp. 96, 105) he seems to take the question psychologically; and at other times (*e. g.*, pp. 98, 102) he seems to take it epistemologically. On the whole, it is probable that he means to discuss the epistemological question. If so, it is interesting to note that, whereas he follows Fries in holding that the sign of objective validity is an immediate feeling, he yet admits, what Fries would hardly grant, that it is possible for this feeling to mislead us (pp. 101, f.), that there is therefore no infallible criterion. He points out, however, that we never suspect that the *Evidenzgeföhle* has led us into error until it attaches itself to a content which is incompatible with the one to which it was at first attached. Thus feeling of evidence can be corrected only by feeling of evidence. There is no reason why we may not assume feelings of evidence of higher and lower rank, the highest of all being those connected with the fundamental principles of knowledge. How we are to recognize the *Evidenzgeföhle* of the higher orders the author does not tell us.

The second part of the chapter discusses the method of investigating the principles of knowledge. This investigation includes (1) the discovery and (2) the establishment of the principles. (1) Kant maintained that the *a priori* principles are not discovered by psychological investigation; the process of finding them is not an empirical one. In opposition to this doctrine, Fries held that, although the first principles of knowledge are *a priori*, they are nevertheless discovered *a posteriori*. With this view, Dr. Elsenhans agrees in the main. The method by which we discover the first principles is empirical. "Just as the categorical imperative is

only a scientific formulation of what is already contained in the common practical reason, so the *a priori* forms of theoretical knowledge can be found only if we start from the 'most common use of the understanding' (pp. 121, f.). But to say that we get our knowledge of these *a priori* principles empirically is not to say that we get it from psychology. What is empirically given is consciousness as relation to an object. Now psychology abstracts from this relation and deals merely with the subjective aspect of consciousness. The task of discovering the *a priori* principles is, then, an epistemological one; 'the reference to the object' prevents us from regarding it as psychological.

(2) As to the establishment of the principles, we saw in the preceding chapter that we have no right to demand their proof, because their objective validity must be assumed before we can prove anything whatever. All that we have to do, then, is "to point out those fundamental forms of all cognition which are accompanied" by "a feeling of evidence of the highest order." One must "rely upon *one's own feeling of evidence* and presuppose that, by virtue of the common nature of 'rational beings,' this feeling of evidence will also arise for others under the same conditions" (p. 131). The discovery and establishment of the principles will thus go hand in hand. And it will also now be readily seen that there is no special epistemological method, as distinguished from other scientific methods. The forms which we have to seek "must somehow admit of being found in the *actuality* which is accessible to us,"—in our own cognition and in the history of thought. And "the process of finding and establishing" them "will not be fundamentally different from other processes by which science works over given actuality" (p. 138). The attempts of Cohen, Scheler, and others to show that there is a special epistemological method end in failure.

Having determined the character of epistemological method, the author proceeds to illustrate its application in a search for the principles of cognition. Our knowing of an object involves three things: we arrange the given material in space and time; we classify it under concepts; and we seek to explain it by the help of laws. We can thus briefly describe the knowing process as mathematization (*Mathematisierung*), classification, and causal explanation. The fundamental principles of the mathematizing are space and time; the principle of classification is the concept of substance; and that of explanation, the law of causality. On the basis of these distinctions, the author offers a classification of the material sciences (p. 159).

Chapter III is an interesting discussion of the boundaries of knowledge. The first point considered is Fries's doctrine that qualities do not admit of explanation. According to his view, explanation is possible only when we are dealing with quantitative relations; from this it would follow that all explanation is mathematical in character. Dr. Elsenhans points out, however, that there is explanation which is not mathematical. "The purpose of explanation is to make the given actuality intelligible. We do this when we *arrange* things and processes *in space and time, when we classify them, and when we deduce them from laws*" (pp. 175, f.). But while we must dissent from Fries's limitation of explanation to the mathematical form, we have to admit an element of truth in his doctrine of the inexplicability of qualities. There is always something in the object which cannot be resolved by any one or by all of these three methods of explanation. In this inexplicable remainder, knowledge seems to find its limit.

But can we thus identify knowing with explanation? The chief objection to doing so would seem to be found in the nature of historical reality. The historical event, it is maintained, cannot be reduced to general laws and universal concepts, and is thus incapable of such explanation as natural science seeks for its phenomena. Dr. Elsenhans points out, however, that the difference between historical actuality and the actuality with which natural science deals is one of degree rather than of kind. All actuality is individual, and is therefore incapable of being completely expressed through one general concept or one law. In so far as history *explains*, it must use the same method which natural science employs, must reduce historical personalities to complexes of characteristics and historical events to complexes of laws. But do we not thus lose all contact with living reality? No; the forms and linguistic symbols with which any science clothes its ideas are only forms and symbols, which must be filled with a content that experience alone can give. But they will continue to be serviceable, provided we remember that they are only devices which we employ for scientific purposes.

When all is said, however, we must still admit that there is in actuality always an aspect of givenness and that the given constitutes a boundary for the cognitive activity. But though the knowing process cannot resolve its object without remainder, may it not attain to valid affirmations about this 'given'? In connection with this question, we have an interesting discussion of the doctrine of the Ideas in Kant and Fries. Kant admits only the practical validity of the Ideas of reason; Fries attributes to them speculative validity as

well. In a measure, Dr. Elsenhans agrees with Fries. In our search for truth, the only way open to us is "to regard as true *das Denknwendige, which announces itself to us through a feeling of immediate evidence.*" But when we have once accepted this proposition, "we have, properly speaking, no right to set a limit to the . . . domain of knowledge simply because, beyond a certain point, the objects are only *thought of* and not perceived" (pp. 193, f.). Kant has gone too far in his denial of the speculative validity of the transcendental Ideas. They are useful, not only as regulative principles, but also as scientific hypotheses. (The author is not pleading the cause of any particular transcendental Idea, but is simply considering the general question.) Kant declares that the Ideas cannot be hypotheses, but his arguments do not shake the fact that, when used as regulative principles, they assist in making our explanation of actuality complete and thus serve the purpose of hypotheses. Even natural science makes hypotheses with reference to objects which cannot be matters of sense-experience, *e. g.*, the luminiferous ether. Our hypotheses, then, are not bound down to *Anschauungsmaterial*. Those which go beyond the realm of perceptual possibilities are justified in proportion as they prove serviceable for purposes of explanation. In no case, however, can knowledge of transcendent objects get beyond the stage of hypothesis.

This ends our survey of an interesting and valuable book. As a whole, the work is characterized by thoroughness, detailed exposition, and great clearness of expression. The interpretation of Fries is sympathetic and intelligent. Many interesting comparisons are drawn between him and Kant, and there are suggestive comments upon various points in the Kantian doctrine. The book has a very full analytical table of contents and an index of names. One great lack is the almost complete absence of summarizing paragraphs. In a work of this character, a brief summary at the end of a long and involved discussion may be of great assistance to the reader, not by way of sparing him the study of the discussion itself, but as a means to the full comprehension of it. The value of this excellent book would have been greatly enhanced, if the author had more frequently summarized his results for us.

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Attention. By W. B. PILLSBURY. (Library of Philosophy.) London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York, The Macmillan Co., 1908. — pp. xi, 346.

The book presents a minute analysis of all the conscious processes to which the concept of attention can be applied. The author has covered in twenty chapters all of the topics which are usually discussed in the text-books on psychology. Sensations, perceptions, associations, the higher processes of judgment and reasoning, as well as volition, feeling, and emotion, are all treated at length in order to show whether their conditions and characteristics justify the analyst in his general position that attention is one of the universal phases of all consciousness.

The book is a very pronounced example of the structural type of psychology. To sift out the elements of a conscious situation, to define processes in terms of these elements, seems to satisfy the author in every case. Indeed, he repeatedly makes it clear that this is to his mind the only possible form of true empiricism in psychology. To define, to describe, and then to restate in a general form the facts treated in the descriptive definitions, — this is the goal of his science.

So far as physiological processes are concerned, the book takes very explicitly the position of psycho-physical parallelism. Here, again, it is held that the business of psychology, in dealing with the physiological concomitants of mental processes, is to offer descriptions; no explanation which uses in any way the causal principle can be permitted. The seat of physiological processes paralleling attention is held by the author to be the frontal association areas. These act as avenues for associative reinforcement and inhibition of nervous processes in the other cerebral centres, and thus, without making any spontaneous contribution to the sum total of such processes, the frontal areas exercise an influence upon all cerebral activities.

Coming to somewhat closer quarters with the conclusion of the whole matter, we find that the definition of attention becomes very comprehensive. All the past experiences of the individual and his present tendencies as determined by the social pressure which is put upon him, must be included in a full account of attention. Thus, when two sensations are presented to an individual, one gets the advantage because of the past history of that individual. This advantage is described by the concept of attention. So also with the personal tendencies which grow out of social pressure. Furthermore, it is not only the tendencies which grow out of the two causes cited, but the tendencies which result from the intensity and recency of present or

past impressions, the general emotional mood, and any other considerations which must be taken into account when consciousness moves in a given direction ; all these belong under the concept of attention. Attention is involved in all consciousness ; its degrees are the same as those of consciousness in general. It is worth while to keep the concept attention separate from the general concept consciousness, because, as the author puts it on page 292 : "There are peculiar concomitant phenomena of the attention process, strain sensations, feeling of interest, etc., which are definitely marked off from the other conscious process and are bound to receive a distinctive name."

Some of the definite minor conclusions which may be referred to in summarizing the author's examination of experimental results are as follows. The motor processes, which have often been described in discussions of attention, are subsequent to the essential conscious activity and can therefore not be treated as causes of attention. The number of objects to which attention can be given is small. Probably experimental results, as ordinarily reported, should be discounted to allow for immediate memory, which makes it possible for the observer who is being tested to add to the number of impressions which can be included in a single act of attention. Fluctuations of attention are probably due to fatigue of cortical cells and inhibitions exercised by the vaso-motor centres. The period when attention may be said to arise in the individual or the race is that at which a body of past experiences appears which can act in determining the selection of present impressions. Finally, the practical training of attention consists in giving emphasis to the demands which society would impose on the individual of selecting his conscious factors, not in the light of personal tendencies, but rather in the light of larger demands which include the experiences of others as well as himself.

To the reader who is interested in general theory rather than the special experimental discussions, the author addresses a chapter on "Attention and the Self." Here he criticises sharply any doctrine which would attribute the unity of experience to a metaphysical self back of the stream of consciousness. He says, rather : "We have unity in mind, because all experiences, past and present, interact in the control and constitution of every apparently discrete act" (p. 203). This continuance of past elements must not be taken as a figure of speech. The author commits himself repeatedly to the doctrine that elements of consciousness drawn from past experience are, in constitution and influence, exactly like those which come through present impression. There is, therefore, a self including all

personal experiences, because these experiences accumulate and build up a mass of interconnected processes.

Thus far the task of the reviewer is a very simple one. Professor Pillsbury has put his discussions so clearly that it is easy to summarize them. Indeed, he has made his own summaries at the end of each chapter with admirable lucidity. When one turns from summary to the effort at evaluation, the task becomes very much involved. Author and reader, to use Professor Pillsbury's own teaching, are likely to have such totally different backgrounds in their individual experiences that their selection of materials, and especially their selection of conclusions, will be the natural expressions of two totally different selves. It is certainly so in the case of the present author and the reviewer. A treatment of attention which is of the purely structural type, is, from the point of view of the present reviewer, sure to be inadequate. By recording this general disagreement with the method of Professor Pillsbury, I trust that the subsequent critical remarks will be put in their right light. The appearance of so elaborate and scholarly a work, representing a definite type of thinking, is always a stimulus to other types of thought. Professor Pillsbury's service to functional psychology is second only to his service to structural psychology, for those who would formulate functional accounts of attention now have a definite starting-point in Professor Pillsbury's work.

There is one criticism sufficiently objective, I believe, to be presented before opening the more general matter. Professor Pillsbury has given very scanty accounts of a body of recent treatments of attention, all of which tend in the direction of so-called motor and functional explanations. One of the most obvious omissions of this sort is in the case of Breese's paper on Inhibition. The results of Breese are referred to time and time again, and used in support of many of the author's own positions, but a clearly stated theory of motor conditions of consciousness presented by Breese in this monograph is nowhere discussed. Again, MacDougall, who certainly has as much right to an exhaustive treatment as any recent writer on attention, gets in the whole book one short paragraph and this refers to a special point, rather than to the general doctrine which MacDougall has elaborated and defended. Münsterberg is turned off with little consideration and a final verdict borrowed from his own earlier conclusion against innervation-sensations. One would think that, if Münsterberg has come back to innervation processes after discarding them in earlier writings, the evidence which brought him back ought to be worth at least a critical discussion in a volume devoted to the subject which Münster-

berg discusses. There are other recent discussions of the functional type, but they all fell on Professor Pillsbury's blind spot.

The more general criticisms can be briefly expressed under three heads. First, Professor Pillsbury's general position allows of little or no transformation of the elements of experience. Again and again he reiterates the statement that the impressions once received are repeated in the same form later. The real reason for this position seems to be that every state of consciousness has certain characteristics which are derived from earlier impressions. How can these characteristics be explained without assuming the presence of the earlier impression? For the mere analyst there is no escape. All characteristics of mental life are due to elements. The elements must be found even if introspection is overlooked. That introspection is overlooked seems clear the moment one tries to make the theoretical statements about the presence of earlier elements in present experience tally with the facts. The fact is that remembered redness is not like the sensation red. The fact is that one does not recall all the impressions which give meaning to words. Why not give up the dogma? Impressions give rise to new forms of conscious functioning. They pass out of existence under the organizing influence of experience and leave behind, not pale after-effects, but functional influences which are not factors in the original meaning of the term at all. Until structure is supplemented by some definite reference to dynamic processes in consciousness, the structures will have to carry an artificial burden of elaborate characteristics which cannot be verified by introspection.

Second, according to Professor Pillsbury's own account, the same factor or element of consciousness may have totally different values for mental life and development according to the relations into which it enters. How, then, can any consistent scheme of psychological explanation fail to treat the different relational possibilities as of equal importance with the factors themselves? The issue here raised cannot be met by saying that a complete analysis of the elements will give also all the different kinds of relations. The relations have a right to an independent classification. They are not factors nor merely the aggregations of factors. They are functional links which effect the significance of the factors. As functional links, they tend to disappear under the dissecting process of analysis. To classify these relational phases of consciousness along with the content phases confuses the whole science. Witness Professor Pillsbury's effort to dispose of attention. What is it? Is it a factor? Is it an aspect? Is it synonymous with consciousness as a whole? Is it identical with volition, or

association, or reason? Things get curiously mixed when one has only one basket in which to put his findings. Professor Pillsbury has great difficulty in telling us how this attention phase of consciousness differs from other phases. The book comes to be ultimately a description of all the processes of mental life. How attention differs from anything else is not clear, and thus one of the chief purposes of structural psychology seems to be unattained.

Finally, Professor Pillsbury points out repeatedly that motor processes always accompany attention. He might have gone further and have shown that the direction of these motor processes and the ends at which they are aimed are always related to the objects of attention. He holds it to be fundamental, however, that nervous processes cannot be used for the explanation of mental processes; and, when he comes to details, he puts motor processes out of court very easily by stating that action is always subsequent to the conscious process of attention. No one who has recently attempted to use the motor processes for purposes of psychological discussion has referred to peripheral motor processes. It is the central motor processes which are under discussion, and these are not different in essential character from the central association processes with which Professor Pillsbury deals so freely. How can the central motor organizations be treated by any writer on attention as insignificant? One has only to observe an animal intent on food, or a child trying to grasp an object which it desires, to realize that the ends and purposes of mental processes are no within themselves. The analyst moves within a circle, when he defines his task as the mere discovery of constituent elements. Is it not a legitimate inquiry to ask what the aggregate of elements is for? Why are past experiences combined with present experiences? In order that there may be a new recombination tomorrow? The organization of the nervous system makes the end of nervous organizations very clear. Sooner or later even the extreme psychophysical parallelism will discover the parallelism between the ends of nervous processes and the ends of conscious processes, and wake up to the fact that his account of conscious processes cannot be made complete without quite as much reference to the motor end of the nervous arc as to the sensory end with which he is now on speaking terms.

These general criticisms serve to outline a position which Professor Pillsbury has evidently set aside as not worthy of serious consideration. It may be true that the functional view is not adequately worked out, but it has been expressed a sufficient number of times to deserve, some of us believe, a respectful hearing. As an example of

structural psychology, Professor Pillsbury's work will command instant recognition. He will probably be satisfied to answer that this was all he intended. Criticism for not doing something other than he intended may be beside the mark, but it will at least serve to exhibit one of the various lines of thought which the book stimulates.

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Morale des idées-forces. Par ALFRED FOUILLÉE. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1908. — pp. lxiv, 384.

With commendable courage M. Fouillée has added another large volume to his already long list of philosophical writings. The purpose of the present work is to give a systematic and detailed exposition of ethical theory from the point of view of his philosophy of the *idées-forces*. If, after a careful reading, the student of ethics lays aside the book with the feeling that condensation at numerous points would have been a distinct gain to the influence of the work, he can hardly fail to retain the conviction that, within its chosen field, the discussion is a significant one.

While the conception of the *idées-forces* is doubtless familiar, at least in general outline, to readers of M. Fouillée, a fresh statement of the doctrine may not be superfluous. Such a statement the author gives in the clear-cut formula of Guyau. An *idée-force* is defined as "that surplus of impulsive activity which is added to an idea by the simple fact of consciousness, especially of reflective consciousness, and which has as a correlative, physically, a surplus of motor force established by experience" (p. 54). It can hardly fail to be noted by any one who reflects upon this definition that it inevitably assigns an important rôle in human action to the idea of possibility. And later we are told that "the possible, in fact, as soon as it is conceived, as soon as it is truly possible, tends to its own realization" (p. 59). A psychological corollary of the doctrine of the *idées-forces* is that the intensity of a mental state at once constitutes and determines its force in action.

I suspect that the reader, familiar with contemporary philosophical literature in England and America, will at once discover in this brief statement grounds for assuming an important relationship of the theory to pragmatism. This relationship has not entirely escaped the attention of M. Fouillée himself. In a brief passage he pays his respects to pragmatism, although the pragmatists among us would doubtless object to his interpretation of their doctrine. That I may not be a party to any questionable interpretation, or change, even by a jot or tittle, the

spirit of the passage in rendering it into English, I quote the text: "Nous avons montré aussi, dans la *Psychologie des idées-forces*, que l'action détermine pour sa part le champ de la pensée, ses lois mêmes et ses formes. La sélection fait le triage des idées utiles à l'espèce, des idées pratiques et praticables : nous sentons pour agir, nous pensons pour réaliser, nous nous représentons le monde actuel pour en créer un nouveau. Voilà diverses vérités que le "pragmatisme" contemporain a gonflées jusqu'à en faire des erreurs, comme si l'utilité de l'espèce humaine, en déterminant pour cette espèce la part qu'elle peut s'approprier dans le champ infini de la vérité, déterminait la vérité même et rendait vrai ce qui nous est commode ou nécessaire ! Telle que nous l'avons toujours soutenue, la philosophie de l'action n'est pas le culte de l'arbitraire ; elle est un effort perpétuel pour en sortir, pour saisir les lois du réel et les tourner au profit de l'idéal" (pp. xxii-xxiii).

Throughout the entire work the author endeavors to hold to the conception of a science of conduct, as against a metaphysic of morals, on the one side, and a purely empirical account of the phenomena of conduct, on the other. The basis of such a science cannot be, as Kant would have it, "a law, ready-made, which would say to us: *sic volo*;" as little could it be founded, as the positivists assume, upon particular facts analogous to those studied by the special sciences, *i. e.*, objects of sensation or of external experience. Nor is M. Fouillée satisfied with Guyau's notion of pure hypotheses, similar to the contingent hypotheses of science. In addition to other defects these hypotheses, if applied to the data of ethics, would be impossible of empirical verification or of rational evaluation.

In opposition to all these views, the author holds that there are certain immanent, incarnated laws of experience, at once individual and social, which can be shown to determine human conduct. These laws may also be regarded as the immanent ends or ideals of human nature, and, thus viewed, they contribute the psychological foundation of the science of ethics. Within the field of ethics, so conceived, there exists the possibility of reasonable proof, a demonstration of moral principles. M. Fouillée is not so hopeless as Janet, when the latter exclaims: "To one who should ask me to prove to him that thought is worth more than digestion, a tree than a heap of stones, freedom than slavery, maternal love than luxury, I could no more give an answer than to one who should demand that I prove to him that a whole is greater than its parts" (p. 127). The proof, M. Fouillée would insist, is to be found in the part played functionally by these different elements in experience.

Our author refuses to be drawn into a discussion of the origin of moral ideas. While declaring himself not hostile to inquiries as to the origin of morality, he holds that the problem cannot be completely solved, and passes directly to the assertion that moral ideas are themselves "the origin of a totality of effects which constitute the true domain of morality." One may freely admit that the historical genesis of morality cannot be known with the same completeness as those phenomena of conduct which lie in the full light of observation, and one may also grant that the more important problems of ethics are concerned with the common characters of moral experience through the ages, and with the possible effects that morality may yet bring about in the future; but there still remains for ethical reflection a legitimate and interesting inquiry into the question of origin. This inquiry is rendered more hopeful by the fact that we still have before us for ever repeated observation the beginnings of moral experience in the unfolding life of every individual. And further, should not the very principles by which we seek to explain the historical and contemporary development of moral ideas, furnish us, if not with a perfect key, yet at least with a guiding clue, to the solution of the problem of origin? One such principle M. Fouillée seems to have in his hands, — that of the social nature of human consciousness. Indeed, it should not be forgotten that by means of this principle, and the correlated principle of sympathy, a number of writers have made real contributions to our understanding of the origin of moral ideas. At this point it is perhaps unfortunate that M. Fouillée has not shown himself more friendly to the evolutionists. There are, to be sure, evolutionists and evolutionists. And the reason for this attitude may be found in the fact that, when he speaks of the school, he clearly always has the radical wing in mind.

As regards the principle just referred to, the social character of self-consciousness, the emphasis of the volume is unmistakable. The *alter*, we are told, is given with the *ego*. The very *cogito*, which, rightly interpreted, yields the consciousness of self, gives us also the assurance of other selves. "*Cogito, ergo sumus*," is the accepted formula. This principle of "intellectual altruism," as M. Fouillée calls it, underlies all moral altruism. It is not surprising, therefore, that the general agreement of individual and social well-being is later vigorously defended. If the harmony is not yet complete, a complete and voluntary identification of the individual with a universal society is at least a true statement of the moral end. Such a theory of society, far from being atomistic, is not even organic, but "hyper-or-

ganic," in the sense that each organ of the whole is itself an organism, whose essential good is constituted by the good of all. In such a moral order "personality would be completely social and society completely personal."

M. Fouillée's treatment of the idea of obligation is important as showing his system to be genuinely teleological. He rejects the theory of obligation as an ultimate and irreducible category, and relegates it to a place of second rank. For the idea of obligation, considered by itself, not only fails to define morality objectively, to explain the conditions of its existence outside of ourselves, but it is also equally powerless to reveal the conditions of its existence within us. He substitutes for the categorical imperative a "*persuasif suprême*," which is found in the direct satisfaction of the moral act and in the attraction exercised by the contemplation of the moral ideal. There are, of course, imperatives of restraint found in the fear of public opinion and of social penalty; but these constantly diminish in force in the course of moral development. With elevated minds morality offers less and less an obligatory character, and there appears what Guyau has called "an equivalent of obligation," found in the attractive power of the Good.

Obligation is thus rightly, as it seems to me, made subordinate, in logical relation, to the concept of worth, or value. M. Fouillée even calls his philosophy a philosophy of evaluation, like those of Guyau and Nietzsche. He wholly rejects the idea of absolute values for ethics. The ethics that assumes such values is always involved in a vicious circle, pretending to measure our human values by the scale of the absolute, but in reality compelled to construct the absolute values by reference to our human and relative standards. M. Fouillée has not subjected the concept of value to close criticism, but has employed it as a convenient expression for the Good. We are bound therefore to accept his description of the Good as his actual account of value. His own definition of value is as follows: "We shall understand solely by value the 'good in itself,' the agreeable, the useful, or the morally good, in a word all that which possesses, by whatever title, a superiority over its opposite" (p. 66). In accordance with his doctrine of the *idées-forces*, he points out that there are values "which are created and multiplied by being conceived and desired." The question naturally arises whether a more exact idea of value for ethical purposes is not obtainable; whether it cannot be defined, on the one hand, psychologically in terms of subjective appreciation, and, on the other, objectively in terms of the activities and relations by which the subjective appreciation is constituted. A distinct advantage in

holding to the term 'value' is found in the important relations which moral values sustain to other values such as economic and æsthetic. M. Fouillée's system would readily crystallize about the concept of value, and I simply raise a query as to whether it might not gain in clearness and unity, if the principle were made more explicit throughout the entire work.

As regards hedonism, two theses are strongly defended. These may be stated as follows: Pleasure, considered abstractly and in isolation from its source, cannot give us the principle of its own valuation; but no system of ethics can be brought to completion which fails to introduce, outside of other elements, the element of pleasure, without which, in the last analysis, there would be no such relation as that of good and evil. While every critic is inclined to be wedded to his own particular form of statement concerning the truth and error of hedonism, the unprejudiced reader will, I think, find M. Fouillée's discussion of the problem sane and illuminating.

As we have already indicated, the present volume seeks to keep within the limits of a scientific ethical procedure. It always recognizes, however, that morality is an element in a larger whole and must ultimately find its setting in the cosmic order. What is the author's view of the relation of morality to the cosmic process? His philosophical faith is that morality is not in opposition to, but is rather a continuation of, the cosmic process. Moral sentiment is driven by a deep impulse to objectify itself, and thus wins a speculative as well as practical interest. "Conceiving the universe and seeking its higher laws, we try, under the sway of these *idées-forces* to mark out for the evolution of the world a universal end which is *our* end" (p. 188). But this faith never becomes a dogmatism. Replying to Carlyle's statement that "the soul of the world is just," M. Fouillée declares that "Carlyle knows nothing about it." "We do not *know* whether, in spite of appearances to the contrary, the world is really just; we do not know, in particular, whether the world will be just to the virtuous man who shall sacrifice himself for the good of all." But the disinterestedness of morality is able to rise superior to this doubt, and dictates the following rule of conduct: "To act as if we considered the triumph of moral goodness in the universe not impossible, and as if, on this earth, it was in our own hands" (p. 368).

The chapters dealing with freedom and responsibility are in harmony with the teaching of the author's work, *La liberté et le déterminisme*. They offer admirable reflections on this problem. No one has suc-

ceeded better in showing the unique character of the determinism which holds for the higher life of man and in differentiating it from that which is exhibited in the lower orders of nature. M. Fouillée's mode of treatment has, it seems to me, the greater value in view of the fact that most contemporary philosophy fails so signally in dealing with the problems offered by the different grades of being.

A chapter of considerable length treats of the æsthetic element in morality, and the concluding sections of the work are devoted to an exposition of disinterestedness in the ethics of the *idées-forces*. These subjects cannot be presented within the limits of the present review, and must be left, like many others, to the detailed examination of ethical students, in whose behalf one may bespeak for the work a cordial reception in this country.

W. G. EVERETT.

BROWN UNIVERSITY.

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

Modern Classical Philosophers: Selections Illustrating Modern Philosophy from Bruno to Spencer. Compiled by BENJAMIN RAND. Boston and New York, Houghton, Mifflin, and Company, 1908. — pp. xii, 740.

Experienced teachers of the history of philosophy are in substantial agreement as to the importance of getting the student to read the great masters of philosophy themselves. No amount of brilliant exposition and criticism by the teacher can ever adequately replace such first-hand contact with the classical texts themselves. This holds true even in the case of elementary and general culture courses in the subject. Opinions will differ considerably as to the best way of attaining this desired result. Some teachers will content themselves with having their students read or study at first hand one or two, or at best a very few, masterpieces; others may prefer short representative extracts from many authors. Twenty years' experience in lecturing on the history of modern philosophy to introductory classes confirms the opinion, long ago formed by the writer and put into practice at Yale, that the list of masterpieces read by the students in such classes may advantageously be greatly extended. In the Yale catalogue of 1889 the writer announced that the reading of the following philosophical masterpieces would be required of the students taking his elementary course in the development of speculative thought from Descartes to Kant: Descartes's *Method* and *Principles of Philosophy*, Pt. I; Bacon's *Novum Organum*; Spinoza's *Ethics* (selections); Locke's *Essay concerning Human Understanding* (selections); Leibniz's *Monadology* and Philosophical Opuscles; Berkeley's *Principles of Human Knowledge*; Hume's *Inquiry concerning Human Knowledge*; Kant's *Prolegomena*. Naturally the principal difficulties, and serious ones, in the way of this were found to be the expense involved in the purchase of so many books and the fact that some of them were not readily accessible.

Since that date three attempts have been made to supply teachers and students of modern philosophy with the literature needed. The first of these was made by Professor E. H. Sneath in his "Modern Philosophers" series (1891 f.). Modeled somewhat on Fraser's admirable volume of *Selections from Berkeley*, the substance of each philosophical system was given in a volume of extracts from the philosopher's own writings, a separate volume being devoted to each philosopher, — Descartes, Locke, Spinoza, Reid, Hume, Kant, etc. The volumes of that series were of unequal size and merit, and the serious mistake was made of placing the price at too high a figure, so high, indeed, that in most cases one could purchase at about the same cost the unabridged works themselves. A second, and far more successful, attempt was made by the Open Court Publishing Com-

pany in its "Philosophical Classics" series, now numbering a dozen volumes. The editor and publishers of that series have done a real service to teachers and students of modern philosophy, and to the reading public. They have issued, in excellent form, inexpensive editions, with two exceptions unabridged, of the modern philosophical classics. It is much to be hoped that the series will be more rapidly extended to include post-Kantian writers (and ancient and medieval as well), and that an attempt will be made to reduce the price to the uniform charge of twenty-five cents per volume. A third attempt to supply the needed literature is now made by Dr. Rand in his *Modern Classical Philosophers*.

Dr. Rand aims to present, in a single volume, in a series of somewhat extended extracts from original texts and standard translations, the essential features, both as to content and method, of the chief philosophical systems "from Bruno to Spencer"; thus furnishing required reading to accompany courses of lectures on modern philosophy, and enabling the instructor to apply the case system, so successfully employed in legal instruction, to philosophical instruction. The philosophers represented in the volume are Bruno, Bacon, Hobbes, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Condillac, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Comte, Mill, and Spencer. Dr. Rand rightly observes that no two authorities will entirely agree as to the authors to be chosen; nor, he might have added, as to the relative amount of matter to be taken from each and the particular passages to be selected to represent them.

In Dr. Rand's volume, Bruno is represented by a translation, twenty-three pages, made by Mrs. Josiah Royce and Professor Royce, of the second of the dialogues *On Cause, Principle, and the One*, in which Bruno anticipates Spinoza in emphasizing the unity of all things and the divine immanence in all things. John Toland's English rendering of Bruno's introduction to *The Infinite Universe and the Worlds*, giving as it does a summary of that work, might advantageously have been added.

Bacon is represented by Spedding's rendering of aphorisms one to sixty-nine and ninety-two to one hundred and six of the First Part of the *Novum Organum*, thirty-eight pages in all. These give the general introduction (aphs. 1-37), the 'idols,' and the general description of induction. One greatly misses, however, aphorisms one to twenty of the Second Part, with the specific account of Bacon's new method there given. The essential portions of that account could have been quoted in a few pages.

Hobbes is represented by forty-six pages of selections from the *Leviathan*, much of which might easily have been spared.

Descartes is represented by part of the *Discourse on Method* and *Meditations* I, II, and a part of III. The addition of a few pages from the First Part of the *Principles* would have been an improvement.

Spinoza is represented by fifty-one pages of admirably chosen selections from Elwes's rendering of the *Ethics*, Parts I, II, and V, presenting Spinoza's doctrine of one eternal substance as the immanent cause of the

universe, the three kinds of knowledge, the nature of the mind, and intellectual love of God.

Leibniz is rather inadequately represented by Hedge's rendering of the *Monadology* only, sixteen pages in all. Hobbes was hardly deserving of three times as much space as Leibniz !

Locke is represented by selections from Books I, II, and IV of the *Essay*, forty-eight pages in all. Dr. Rand shows good judgment in including from Book I, unwisely wholly omitted in the Open Court edition of Locke's *Essay*, enough to give the gist of Locke's famous polemic. Dr. Rand has surely erred, however, in omitting the brief but important chapters i and ii of Book IV.

Berkeley is well and adequately represented by the greater part of the *Principles*, forty-four pages.

Hume is given forty pages taken from the *Inquiry*, Sections II to IV, VII, and XII. A few additional pages from the *Treatise*, on substance and the ego, would have been an improvement here.

Condillac is represented by twenty-nine pages of translation, made by Professor de Sumichrast, of Harvard, from the *Traité des Sensations*, giving the famous description of the endowment of the statue with the senses of man in succession. Neef's rendering of the brief chapters vii and viii of the *Logic*, on the "Analysis of the Mental Faculties," might well have been added. As it is, Dr. Rand and Professor de Sumichrast have done a real service in making accessible in English this extract from Condillac.

The first five chapters of Hibbert's rendering of Von Holbach's *Système de la Nature* might well have been inserted also, as representative of the materialism of the time.

Kant is represented by one hundred and ten pages, thirty from Watson's admirable condensed rendering, fifty from Müller's translation of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and the remaining thirty from Abbott's rendering of the *Critique of Practical Reason*. Good judgment has been shown in these selections, which give surprisingly well the contents of the two famous critiques. It would, nevertheless, not have been difficult, perhaps, without injustice to Kant's importance, to have saved nearly a fourth of the space given to him for other writers not represented in the volume.

Dr. Rand has been over generous, surely, in the space allowed to Fichte, forty-nine pages: a translation, by Dr. Rand, of about one half of the *First Introduction to the Science of Knowledge*, twenty pages of matter from Kroeger's rendering of the *Science of Knowledge*, and about an equal amount of matter from Smith's rendering of *The Vocation of Man*. Many would have been quite content with Kroeger's excellent rendering of the entire *First Introduction*.

Schelling is represented by thirty-four pages of matter, translations by Dr. Rand himself of the "Introduction" and of the "Erster Hauptschnitt" of the *System des transcendentalen Idealismus*. These are especially welcome, as, with the exception of the late Thomas Davidson's translations of

the former and of the *Outlines of a System of Natural Philosophy*, and Morgan's rendering of the lectures on the method of university study, practically none of Schelling's writings have ever been translated into English.

Hegel is represented by thirty-five pages of well chosen matter from Wallace's translation of the smaller *Logic*, to which is added fifteen pages of matter on "The Contrite Consciousness" from the *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, so admirably rendered by Professor Royce as to make the reader wish that Professor Royce would give us his promised rendering of that entire work.

Forty-two pages of well chosen selections from Haldane and Kemp's rendering of Schopenhauer's *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* close the German succession.

Comte is adequately represented by eighteen pages, Miss Martineau's condensed rendering of the Introduction to *The Positive Philosophy*; and the volume closes with Stuart Mill's famous chapter xi, of the *Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy*, on "The Psychological Theory of the Belief in an External World," and some thirty pages of well chosen matter from Spencer's *First Principles*, in which, however, the important brief "Postscript to Part I" of the last edition ought to have been found.

Seventy-five more pages, at least, could have been added to the volume without its becoming too bulky. In that way, and by making omissions in the matter from Hobbes, Kant, Fichte, and perhaps a few others, omissions which would not have been serious, enough space could have been gained to have included Reid, Herbart, Hamilton, Lotze, and Cousin, thus rendering the volume much more complete and representative. As it is, Dr. Rand has given us an admirable volume, which will prove a valuable addition to the working apparatus for the teaching and study of modern philosophy. It will be especially useful in connection with courses in the history of modern philosophy which for any reason must be relatively short, and as supplementary readings in connection with longer courses where the principal emphasis is laid on the detailed study of a very few masterpieces. The volume can also be strongly recommended to the general reader. Some of the selections, as already noted, those from Bruno, Condillac, and Schelling, especially, cannot be found elsewhere, and they greatly enhance the value of the book.

Such a book as this will best realize its final purpose, however, as indeed the compiler points out, if it serves as a stimulus to the student to turn to the unabridged writings themselves of the great thinkers. To that end the addition of a few bibliographical references would have been of real service in directing the uninitiated. Such references would not appreciably add to the size of the volume, and ought to be inserted in future editions. It ought to be added that the make-up of the book, including the type and the paper, are all that could be desired.

G. M. DUNCAN.

Social Psychology: An Outline and Source Book. By EDWARD ALSWORTH ROSS. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1908.— pp. xvi, 372.

It is hardly necessary to say that social psychology, as conceived by Professor Ross, is a branch of sociology rather than of psychology. Throughout his book the psychologist feels the lack of any true psychological analysis. Everywhere, as might be expected, there is a tendency to rest satisfied with showing the external causes of the psychic phenomena treated instead of dissecting the phenomena themselves. The scope of social psychology, also, seems unduly limited by the author, but indeed, considering the fact that "all consciousness is social," it is not easy to mark the boundaries of this branch of mental science. Professor Ross restricts it to the study of "those uniformities in feeling, belief, or volition,—and hence in action,—which are due to the interaction of human beings, *i. e.*, to social causes." This limitation to *uniformities* is responsible for such a position as the following: "A style is a uniformity of practice, but it may or may not imply a psychic uniformity, *i. e.*, an agreement of belief or feeling. So far as the hoop-skirt is believed to be the best possible garment, or is felt to be becoming and feminine, its vogue concerns social psychology. But so far as women without illusions about it wear the hideous thing to avoid being conspicuous, or to get the prestige of 'stylish,' the practice has no psychic plane behind it, and it does not interest the social psychologist" (p. 95).

As the book does not attempt to take up the principles involved in special uniformities like language or religion, it becomes virtually a treatise on the various aspects of imitation. Professor Ross makes full acknowledgment of his debt to Tarde, and indeed a portion of the book, at least, consists of Tarde's principles enriched with new illustrations and quotations from other sources. The topics discussed are suggestibility, of which the normal aspect only is considered, the crowd, the public, fashion, conventionality imitation, defined as "the deliberate, non-competitive, non-rational imitation of contemporaries," custom, rational imitation, and the interference of imitations. At the end of each chapter there is a summary and a set of 'exercises,' the latter very uneven in their degree of suggestiveness. Despite the fact, justified by the sub-title of 'source-book,' that a large part of the book consists of well-selected quotations, there are many striking passages in which the writer's own economic and sociological point of view is apparent.

MARGARET FLOY WASHBURN.

VASSAR COLLEGE.

Elementary Experiments in Psychology. By CARL E. SEASHORE. New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1908. — pp. vi, 218.

"This is not a laboratory manual," says the author in his preface. "It is a manual of experiments which the student should perform before he is admitted to the laboratory, or in case he does not intend to pursue the subject beyond one course." With this statement the reviewer, after carefully

examining the book, cannot wholly agree. A student who has properly performed the experiments prescribed here will be much more than merely prepared to enter a laboratory, at least for undergraduate work. Rather, the purpose for which the book will be found especially adapted is that of providing a thoroughly good short laboratory course in institutions which cannot afford laboratory equipment. As a means to this end, it deserves the most cordial praise. The following topics are taken up, almost no apparatus other than the diagrams and colored papers supplied with the book being required: visual after-images, visual contrast, peripheral vision, visual space, auditory space (treated with considerable thoroughness), tactual space, cutaneous sensations, Weber's Law for lifted weights, mental images (tested by introspective methods only), association, memory (tests of visual memory for nonsense figures), apperception, attention, normal illusions, affective tone (the method of paired comparison with colors, as given by Titchener), and reaction time, by the chain reaction method. Throughout, there is insistence on conscientious introspection, in accordance with the admirable motto of the preface: "Not psychology, but to psychologize."

Here and there points for criticism appear. It seems unfortunate, for instance, to say that the after-image "is a sort of echo." In experiment 10, where an observer working alone is required to record the latent time and duration of after-images under certain conditions, it is not clear how he is to measure the times. The statement that "the most striking illustrations of contrast are found in the lower senses, as in taste, smell, and temperature," is surely misleading. Somewhat more emphasis might have been laid on the influence of mental type in the only experiment on memory: a non-visual observer is almost hopelessly bad at memorizing nonsense figures by looking at them. There is no reference to the obvious disadvantage of the method of determining the order of comparisons in 'right and wrong cases' by 'flipping a coin'; namely, that it affords no opportunity of eliminating the error due to position in time by making the number of experiments in which the second weight is heavier equal to that of those in which it is lighter. The investigation of association by the method of requiring the observer to "speak as many disconnected words as he possibly can" in eight seconds, does not succeed as well for many observers as a test in which so much haste is not required: a person of the auditory-verbal type, like the present reviewer, utters under such circumstances a parrot-like collection of words in which it would take the genius of a Freud to trace associative connections. Finally, this manual, like all others, is too optimistic on the subject of the results to be obtained in tests of the bodily effects of pleasantness and unpleasantness.

It is easier, however, to mention these very trifling defects than to refer individually to the excellent and ingenious features of the book. The reviewer gratefully acknowledges many most helpful suggestions received from it, which will be put into effect in her own laboratory.

VASSAR COLLEGE.

MARGARET FLOY WASHBURN.

The Psychology and Pedagogy of Reading. With a Review of the History of Reading and Writing and of Methods, Texts, and Hygiene in Reading. By EDMUND BURKE HUEY. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1908.—pp. xvi, 469.

Professor Huey's book is interesting, well written, and useful. In its first part, which is the most valuable part to the psychologist, he has brought together the results of research on various psychological problems connected with the reading process, such as the question of vision during eye-movement, the amount seen during pauses, the factors that determine the recognition of a word, the function of inner speech during reading, and the rate of reading. The author's theory of the mental processes involved in the activity of reading is substantially as follows. Certain dominant letters condition the recognition of words, not, however, by being separately recognized as letters. Meanings are connected largely with the inner speech set off by the visual recognition of the words. Meanings are not to any great extent images, but 'feelings,' for the most part unanalyzable. "Each meaning-feeling is very much itself and unlike every other." The reviewer would prefer the term 'unanalyzed' to 'unanalyzable,' here; it would be a discouraging outlook for psychology if every meaning should turn out to be a wholly unique bit of experience. The eye, Professor Huey points out, runs ahead of the process of inner speech, and while the meaning is associated chiefly with the latter, some suggestion of it keeps pace with the eye.

Part II, which deals with the history of written language and of reading, is of interest chiefly to the general reader, and the remainder of the book concerns the student of pedagogical methods. It is comforting to find, amid accounts of the bewildering and cumbrous machinery for teaching the child to read, that the author in his chapter on "Learning to Read at Home" has still faith in the possibility of that natural method by which so many of us taught ourselves to read, with no realization whatever of the tremendous intellectual feat we were performing.

MARGARET FLOY WASHBURN.

VASSAR COLLEGE.

The Will to Doubt: An Essay in Philosophy for the General Thinker. By ALFRED H. LLOYD. London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1907.—pp. x, 285.

One of the most difficult of tasks is that of writing a book on philosophy which shall be at once comprehensible to the general reader and acceptable to the professional philosopher; for curiously enough, when the writer on philosophical subjects lays aside his technical language, he too often discards at the same time his regard for the ordinary rules of logic. It is not surprising, then, if Professor Lloyd has not wholly succeeded in his attempt, and if *The Will to Doubt*, though often interesting and sometimes suggestive, must nevertheless be characterized as lacking in clearness

of statement and in accuracy of reasoning. One great virtue, however, must be conceded to it ; it is not stereotyped, and even in its faults, which are great, it avoids the academic commonplaces.

The problem proposed is the investigation and evaluation of doubt, which is justly recognized as an important factor in the intellectual life of the present, and, indeed, of all times. As stated in the preface, the thesis of the book is that doubt is essential to real belief ; but in the following chapters the course of the argument tends to identify the two, and thus to make it possible to apply to doubt whatever assertions can be shown to hold of belief. Moreover, one has constantly to reckon with the assumptions that whatever is possible is real, and that every idea vouches for the existence of a corresponding reality, the nature of which is left in obscurity, but which is described as other than the conscious processes involved, and also as constituting the object of every doubter's implicit creed. The largest portion of the book is given up to an examination, first of the ordinary, then of the scientific views, and the usual confusions and contradictions inherent in experience are set forth. Especial emphasis is laid upon the paradoxes of science, which are to be regarded as a justification of the doubter's position, since they lead beyond the limitations which science would otherwise be unable to recognize, much less overcome. The same mode of treatment is applied to the contradictions between the individual and the social sides of human personality, and here too "doubt is found to make for belief." There follows a glorification of Descartes as a typical doubter, and the book ends with an account of the Doubter's World, in which contradiction is identified with the principle of activity and therefore made essential to all genuine knowledge and experience. The Hegelianism of the final chapters is extremely superficial in character, popular in the bad sense of the term, and filled with a sort of moral and religious unction, the nature of which may be gathered from a passage on page 205, in which the doctrine of continuous creation is said to represent God as "always up to date" in his relations with the world.

GRACE NEAL DOLSON.

WELLS COLLEGE.

Der Intellektualismus in der Griechischen Ethik. VON MAX WUNDT.
Leipzig, Wilhelm Engelmann, 1907. — pp. vi, 104.

This treatise is, as the author informs us, a preliminary study to a larger work on Greek ethics, which will aim to examine the relations of scientific ethics to the general ethical thought of the Greeks. Such an undertaking will make necessary a thorough treatment of the Pre-Socratic period, in which the most important ethical movements to be found in the later systems had already been developed or at least foreshadowed. Dr. Wundt's thesis is that Greek ethics is, in spite of occasional limitations, wholly intellectualistic, that the intellectualistic conception is deeply rooted in the moral consciousness of the Greeks. The Socratic principle that

virtue is knowledge is merely a pregnant expression of the point of view which is common to all their thinkers. For Plato wisdom is the supreme virtue ; even for Aristotle the dianoetical virtues are superior to the practical, and right reason ought to regulate conduct ; according to Epicurus knowledge teaches us how to realize the highest Good by the proper choice of pleasures and pains ; and also with the Stoics knowledge is indispensable to virtue, if not identical with it. We find the same intellectualistic tendencies in the precursors of Socrates, in the Sophists, in Democritus, in Heraclitus, yes, even in the Homeric poems.

This intellectualism seems strange to us to-day ; we are convinced that a man may know the right and yet follow his evil instincts, and that the simple-minded may instinctively hit upon the Good. We can understand this surprising bias of the Greeks when we trace their ethical intellectualism to its origins. We shall find that it has grown out of three entirely distinct tendencies of thought, which, however, are related to each other and have influenced each other in many ways : they are described as Homeric intellectualism, mystical intellectualism, and practical intellectualism.

Dr. Wundt shows how in the Homeric epics the man of prudence, calm deliberation, and wide experience comes to be set against the man of impulse and passion, how the former is always pointing out to the latter, whose vision is obscured by his emotions, the effects of his rash acts. Not only does the man of passion harm himself ; led by blind impulse he also violates his duties to the State, his fellows, his family, and the gods, and thus becomes unjust. The unjust comes to be looked upon as a fool, the calm and prudent as just. We discover similar traces of ethical intellectualism in Hesiod, in the elegiac poets, in the tragedies, and in Aristophanes. Like a red thread the old Homeric idea that passion is foolishness, that it leads to injustice, and that injustice and ignorance are therefore the same, runs through the Greek tragedies. We note, however, in the course of development a change of emphasis. In Homer the prudent and just man is the antithesis of the passionate man ; later on, in Democritus, the unjust man is conceived as the antithesis of the wise and prudent man : injustice is error. We get here a completion of the psychologically false intellectualism : emotions are transformed into more or less unconscious logical processes. The principle of the Democritean ethics is *λογισμός*, which consists in making a correct choice of pleasures (pp. 1-18).

But the Greek also believes in gods and demons whose will he must do in order to keep them well-disposed. But what is their will ? The seer knows that which is hidden from men, and which, nevertheless, has no inconsiderable influence upon the results of their actions. Here, again, knowledge is the source of right action. It is taken for granted that he who knows the rules for human conduct will follow them, since the motives of fear and reverence are regarded as strong enough to compel. This mystical intellectualism, which is found in Homer and Hesiod, receives a new impetus in the religious movement of the sixth century. Through the mys-

teries the participant hopes to escape Hades and to achieve a blessed fate after death. Those who know the secret doctrines will enter upon a happy life (Orphic mysteries and Pythagoreanism). We also find examples of this form of intellectualism in the early philosophers (Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Empedocles) as well as in the literature of the Greeks (pp. 18-33).

The author shows how these two forms of intellectualism gradually merge into and mutually influence each other in the tragic poets (pp. 33 ff.), and then discusses the third source of intellectualism, which he finds in the peculiar Greek notion of virtue (*ἀρετή*). Virtue is practical efficiency having a purpose, and as such can be taught and acquired. In Homer *ἀρετή* is almost wholly identical with efficiency, efficiency in the sense of outward skill, some dexterity which one has learned and which one understands. This notion of efficiency gradually passes over into our modern notion of virtue, but something of its original meaning perhaps still attaches to the word. The skilful man is one who knows his business; only in case he has learned the rules of his *métier* can he be regarded as efficient. So too the virtuous man must be efficient in something. The goal of this efficiency may be defined differently according to the moral ideals of different periods and movements of thought, but the conception that it is something that one must have learned, something that one must know, was, from the outset, so firmly fixed in the specific Greek notion of virtue that it could not easily be lost (pp. 37-40).

The question now arises, How came these ideals of the man of prudence, the mystical sage, and the skilful artisan, to be so fused that the later thinkers could look upon them as the goal of a unified endeavor? It is the feeling of worth, the esteem, the appreciation, which they all arouse, that finally unites these three groups of human beings with each other: they are the most worthy personalities and hence moral ideals. But from the very beginning the mystical sage occupies the most prominent place. And we find in nearly all the ethical systems that wisdom, which in time changes from mystical wisdom to scientific wisdom, takes the highest place. It is almost always assumed that he who possesses the greatest wisdom will best meet the demands of rational prudence and practical efficiency (pp. 40-42).

The second chapter gives a survey of the development of intellectualism in Greek ethics, taking up the Sophists and Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Epicureans, the Stoics, and Neo-Platonism. Dr. Wundt points out that the general character of the different ethical systems is determined by the different emphasis which is placed upon the three forms of intellectualism which have been mentioned, and by the various ways in which they influence each other. Practical intellectualism wholly controls the thinking of the Sophists and of Socrates in the beginnings of scientific ethics, but plays no great rôle afterward. The entire development of intellectualism is for the most part marked by the reciprocal influence of the mystical and Homeric forms. Plato transforms the practical notion of virtue into the scientific notion, and this he connects directly with the mystical point of

view by means of the ingenious conception of reminiscence. Scientific investigation becomes the bridge between mystical knowledge and prudence. In Aristotle, Homeric intellectualism prevails almost exclusively; theoretical wisdom, which is here identical with scientific knowledge, forming a separate element. This is still truer of the system of Epicurus, but in his portrayal of the wise man we discern faint traces of the mystical sage. These features are more and more emphasized from this time on; Homeric intellectualism becomes more and more completely absorbed into mystical intellectualism, the climax being reached in Neo-Platonism.

FRANK THILLY.

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Das Gesetz der Vernunft und die ethischen Strömungen der Gegenwart.

Von ERNST MARCUS. Herford, Menckhoff, 1907. — pp. iv, 284.

The object of this book is to show that the Kantian system of ethics is a pure science, that the moral laws and even the supreme legal principles can be deduced and established logically, with mathematical precision. We need no longer search for the science of ethics, the author declares; it is complete, though only in its principles. "All that is required is to show that Kant has enabled us to deduce ethical propositions and to discover moral errors 'with geometric accuracy,' that we are able to give exact ethical proofs" (p. 6).

The notion of law, which is the product of the intellect or of pure reason, is the basal concept of ethics. The important criterion of morality which Kant has discovered is: Thou shalt act according to a law which is logically suited to rational beings. To this law must be applied the universal and necessary characteristics of the concept of law, which are described as follows: (1) The law holds exclusively for the subjects to whom the law is addressed; (2) it holds absolutely, without exception, for all subjects of the law; (3) the third characteristic is the principle of the conservation of the substance of these subjects of the law (pp. 35 ff.). From the notion of the law and these fundamental characteristics of law all moral laws can be logically deduced, *e. g.*, the injunction against murder and suicide, the law of neutrality (impartiality) of the law, the basal law of morals (veracity), the command against injury, and the law of furtherance, etc.

We also have a second criterion of morality, the absence of which would not contradict the notion of law as such, but would contradict a law adapted to intelligent beings. For the law for intelligent beings must do justice to their necessary intellectual character, that is, it must recognize and demand their character as a unified teleological centre, since it has to regulate the matter of their purposes. Indeed, it presupposes this unity of person since its command of persistent obedience is addressed to this very unity. The consciousness of this unity (self-consciousness) reaches its full fruition only as there arises the consciousness of responsibility before the law, the consciousness of the unified causality of all acts, *i. e.*, the consciousness of free-

dom, 'which would not be found in us without the law (not even in idea).' To live ethically means to act in accordance with the natural character of man as the purposive being, as the lord of ends. Hence there results the relation of the pure formula of law to the teleological formula: a law which contradicts the former is under all circumstances contrary to morals. The pure formula of the law is therefore the primary criterion of the true moral law. But it does not suffice that a law be in accordance with this pure formula. Rather, the second question arises: Does it do justice to the qualified or teleological formula? The latter is therefore the secondary necessary criterion of the true moral law. The teleological law also makes clear to us whence we derive the concept of perfection. The law prescribes the pursuit of the totality of all conceivable, humanly possible moral ends, and it does this in such a way that the teleological subject is furthered thereby, *i. e.*, that his power of pursuing ends is intensified. (From a résumé of the author on p. 104.)

Mr. Marcus, who is himself a practical jurist, regards law as a part of ethics, ethics bearing the same relation to jurisprudence as mathematics to natural science. The jurist of the future must study ethics, but the practical jurist of to-day is better fitted to be an ethical investigator and teacher than the modern theologian (pp. ix, 128). The logical necessity of law and of the State is proved (pp. 122 ff.), and the basal principle of law deduced from the supreme moral principles. The author then proceeds to establish, on strict logical grounds, of course, the right of property, showing communism to be illogical and unethical; points out the ethical basis of the penal law; "deduces" the laws of sexual life; and proves the ethical necessity of the liberal party, the separation of church and state, and the unction of the state in education (pp. 132 ff.).

Mr. Marcus is a faithful follower of Kant. He has written a number of books in which he reproduces in clear and intelligible language, and with additional proofs and illustrations, the thoughts of his great master. He is vigorous, forceful, and direct; apt to be boastful and to speak with impatience and contempt of those who will not see the absolute cogency of his arguments: a temper not unusual with rationalistic thinkers. His habit of impugning the motives of those who do not see things as he does, of calling them hypocrites and deceived deceivers, is, to say the least, unfortunate.

FRANK THILLY.

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Die Naturgeschichte der Moral und die Physik des Denkens: Der Idealismus eines Materialisten. Von ALBERT KANN. Wien und Leipzig, Wilhelm Braumüller, 1907.—pp. xv, 243.

We have here a good illustration of the thinking of a man who has never, as he himself confesses, made a study of psychology and philosophy. It is quite natural, under the circumstances, that the author should have had misgivings at the end of the book as to whether his ideas were really

original, and that he should have regretted his inability to devote himself to the study of philosophy and psychology. We have no misgivings on this point, but we fully share his regrets. Dr. Kann consoles himself with the thought that he would never have reached his original and independent solutions of certain questions if he had first become acquainted with the problems and their answers through the works of others; but the reader will not find it so easy to console himself for this slight oversight on his part. There is a naive simplicity and a child-like confidence about the writer which is certainly original, and which a profounder knowledge of the history of thought would surely have destroyed. "Take my hand reader," he says, "and let me lead you, and I have one favor to ask of you: 'Do not struggle against facts.'" We take his hand and go with him to the end of the journey, viewing the 'facts' against which he asks us not to struggle, until he takes sorrowful leave of us in the following words: "Like flowers I gave thee my thoughts, forget-me-nots, that gaze at thee with true blue eyes. Like flowers, . . . and thou knewest not how the root struggled in the ground. Flowers they are: children of flowers and fathers in turn of flowers. . . . Giving too is a compulsion. . . . As a mother will always love her child though it has given her ever so much pain. . . . I have reached the end. Whether my ideas may not lie too far afield from the thoughts of the common man, . . . whether the book may not be too popular in style for the scholar, too physical for the psychologist, . . . too psychological for the chemist, . . . too philosophical for the scientist, . . . too materialistic for the philosopher . . . I know it not. But I am strong enough to tell myself my fable: the fable of the 'cherry-tree'" (p. 26).

Dr. Kann does not take kindly to metaphysical, supersensible thinking (p. 65), and yet his whole book is nothing but an attempt to construct a system of metaphysics. A theory, he tells us, has no claim to truth, that is, permanent truth. Nothing is permanently true, the truth of yesterday is a lie to-day. Externally true, . . . true forever, is nothing but the direction, the directive of truth, the striving after truth (p. 185). All hypotheses and explanations are only ideas, results of a conflict of ideas. There is no fixed law for the truth, except at most this: Truth is that upon which we can build further, with chances of agreement. No logic, that is the new logic. "*Bahnfrei! für das individuelle Denken*" (p. 215). Mankind will always have unsolved problems so long as they are able to ask new questions, and advance in their evolution. Unsolved problems are the necessary results of our laws of thought. "To explain by our own brain-psychology metaphysics, which is constantly forcing itself upon us, is perhaps the profoundest idea of my book" (p. 186).

The fundamental theses of the book, according to the author, are these: The world is such as it appears to my thinking ego, which is compelled to deliberate for the sake of further evolution. And my thinking ego is a part of the actually existing world in which there exist as actual laws: the law of evolution, the compulsion to deliberate for the sake of further evolu-

tion, the struggle of ideas, and the individualism of thought-atoms" (p. 204). This standpoint, the idea of the progress of humanity, Dr. Kann confesses, is an ancient fact; but he thinks it has never been applied so extensively in the explanation of the world, nor have such consequences been deduced from it as by him. "Where Anaximander has guessed, Spinoza laid the foundation, Darwin built," he modestly declares, "there I add another story and place a temporary roof over it."

These theories are grounded upon a naïve materialism. The materialistic, physical explanation of thought is said to be the only one destined to uncover the veils which still conceal our thought-processes from us. Thought is explained by the movement of atoms in the brain. Points of thought (*Gedankenpunkte*) are material points which can send out waves. Every such point also has the power to filter waves coming from another thought-point, to curl waves passing through it, to let them pass through unchanged, to deflect them, polarize them, absorb them, reflect them, etc. From these points of thought are derived the laws of thought: the conflict of ideas, the triumph of selection of the fittest idea, the continued evolution of thought as a whole, and of the particular points of thought, selection through the sum-total of thought-points which we call the apparatus of consciousness, the individualism of the particular thought-points, the hypothesis of a struggle for existence in the brain, the result of which is a certain state of equilibrium, which, however, is always destroyed by nature, making possible further development (p. 140).

Of course, these 'laws' do not follow from any knowledge we have of the brain; they are simply read into the brain. The fact is the author constructs a philosophy of history upon the theory of evolution, reads this into the brain, and then — simply reads it out again. He has never studied philosophy, but he can do a good old-fashioned philosophical trick. "Ach! das sind Taschenspiellersachen!"

FRANK THILLY.

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Précis raisonné de morale pratique, par questions et réponses. Par ANDRÉ LALANDE. Paris, F. Alcan, 1907. — pp. v, 70.

The French lay great stress on moral instruction in the schools, and have published many little books for service in this field. It is not often, however, that such a good one is offered as that prepared by Professor Lalande. His object in writing it was to place in the hands of the pupils in the *lycée*, and of their parents, a somewhat detailed account of the principles along which their education shall proceed. The little work does not aim to present the dogmas of a philosophical school or religion, but a table of practical truths, the generally accepted moral rules. Before publishing the *Précis*, the author consulted a number of his colleagues in France, and also submitted it to the *Société française de philosophie* for discussion.

In the Introduction the author takes up the subject of morality, morality

and conscience, and morality and happiness. This is followed by Part I, General Rights and Duties, under which head are discussed: Good Will and Courage, Personality, Intellectual Duty, Justice and Tolerance, Solidarity, Fraternity, The Moral Life. Part II bears the title, Particular Rights and Duties of Children, and treats of the following topics: Particular Morality, The Family, Discipline and Instruction, Companions, Initiative and the Choice of a Profession.

The manual is clear and sensible, but there will be some regret that the author did not abandon the catechetical method, which has become such a firmly established tradition with French writers of books on moral instruction. The demand for brevity, emphasis, and clearness, which is Professor Lalande's reason for using this method, might have been met without it.

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The following books also have been received:

Early Greek Philosophy. By JOHN BURNET. Second Edition. Adam and Charles Black, London, 1908. — pp. x, 433.

Realities and Ideals, Social, Political, Literary, and Artistic. By FREDERIC HARRISON. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1908. — pp. xiii, 462. \$1.75.

Lectures on the Elementary Psychology of Feeling and Attention. By EDWARD BRADFORD TITCHENER. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1908. — pp. ix, 404. 1.40.

The Soul of Progress. By J. EDWARD MERCER. Williams and Norgate, London, 1907. — pp. xvii, 296.

The Philosopher's Martyrdom: A Satire. By PAUL CARUS. The Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago, 1908. — pp. vi, 67. \$1.00.

The Age of Mental Virility. By W. A. NEWMAN DORLAND. The Century Co., New York, 1908. — pp. vii, 229. \$1.00.

Social Education. By COLIN A. SCOTT. Ginn and Company, Boston. — pp. xi, 300. \$1.25.

University of Iowa Studies in Psychology. Edited by CARL EMIL SEASHORE. (The Psychological Review, Monograph Supplements, Vol. IX, No. 2.) The Review Publishing Co., Lancaster, Pa., 1908. — pp. 148.

The Scope and Content of the Science of Anthropology. By JUUL DIESERUD. The Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago, 1908. — pp. 200.

Magic Squares and Cubes. By W. S. ANDREWS. With Chapters by PAUL CARUS, L. S. FRIERSON, C. A. BROWNE, JR., and an Introduction by PAUL CARUS. The Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago, 1908. — pp. 199.

Voraussetzungen und Ziele des Erkennens: Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen der Logik. Von JONAS COHN. Leipzig, Wilhelm Engelmann, 1908. — pp. viii, 526. M. 10.

- Das Seelenleben des Kindes : Ausgewählte Vorlesungen.* Von KARL GROOS. Zweite umgearbeitete und vermehrte Auflage. Berlin, Reuther und Reichard, 1908. — pp. 260. M. 3.60.
- Die philosophischen Lehren in Leibnizens Théodicée.* Von ADELHEID THÖNES. Halle, A. S., Max Niemeyer, 1908. — pp. 79.
- Materie und Organismus bei Leibniz.* Von HANS LUDWIG KOCH. Halle, A. S., Max Niemeyer, 1908. — pp. viii, 59.
- Über Christian Gabriel Fischers Vernünfftige Gedanken von der Natur.* Von AUGUST KURZ. Halle, A. S., Max Niemeyer, 1908. — pp. 55.
- La dynamis et les trois ames : Essai de psychologie Néo-Aristotélicienne.* Par J.-PAUL MILLIET. Paris, E. Sansot et Cie, 1908. — pp. 383.

SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mêt.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Rev. Nto-Sc.* = *Revue Nto-Scholastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I. Abtl.*: *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*. — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS.

Die angeblich falsche Wissenstheorie der Psychologie: Ein Protest.
RICHARD HERBERTZ. *Z. f. Psych.*, XLVI, 4, pp. 275-287.

This article is a refutation of H. A. Pritchard's "Criticism of the Psychologists' Treatment of Knowledge." Herbertz objects, in the first place, to Pritchard's use of the term 'known' as meaning indifferently both contents of consciousness and objects of knowledge. In the second place, Pritchard frankly assumes without proof that the contents of consciousness as such and the objects of knowledge as such coincide not only with each other, but also with the real objects of the external world. To the first coincidence Herbertz objects, because contents of consciousness form only a small part of all the possible objects of knowledge. Therefore psychology is justified in making them its peculiar subject-matter. The second case of assumed coincidence must stand or fall with Pritchard's own metaphysical point of view. Besides, it is based upon a wrong conception of the historical development of subjective idealism and a misunderstanding of English empiricism. Locke, Berkeley, and Hume do not deny extra-conscious objects of ideas nor maintain that our ideas have no relations to such objects. This kind of empiricism has nothing in the world to do with modern psychology. Again, it is also not at all relevant to the abstract point of view of the psychologist whether the metaphysician postulates an identity between the idea and the external object represented by the idea. Such or any other subject-object relation is not a psychological question at all. Finally, Pritchard objected to explaining complex mental phenomena by reducing them to simpler ones, yet he could not offer a better substitute than a return to the old faculty psychology, a proposition which needs no further comment.

L. R. GEISSLER.

Ueber die psychologischen und die logischen Grundlagen des Bewegungsbegriffes. MAX FRISCHEISEN-KÖHLER. *Z. f. Psych.*, XLVI, 5, pp. 334-344.

The writer's aim is to refute R. Hamann, who attempted to show, in agreement with Mach's purely phenomenological interpretation of physics and other natural sciences, how psychology differs from them only in method or in the attitude toward given conscious contents. A typical example is offered by the term 'motion,' which, according to Hamann, is based upon the perception of mutual change between the relations of an object to its background. The fact that the motion is predicated of the object rather than of the background is due, in his opinion, to a reference by analogy to our own haptic and motor experiences. In opposition to this, the writer holds that such a psychological analysis may perhaps explain the popular notions and even the Aristotelian view of physical motion; but for the understanding of the modern scientific concept of motion it is entirely inadequate, because it leaves out of account the logical motives that led to a revised formulation of the principles of mechanics. The purely mathematical description of change neither demands nor is capable of an interpretation which makes use of an analogy with conscious human experience. The dynamical description of motion introduces, besides the concepts of energy and mass, a constant reference to an arbitrary system of coördinates. The question whether the body or the background moves has no meaning to the mathematician or physicist, because he always assumes his system of coördinates to be at rest.

L. R. GEISSLER.

Knowledge and Imagination. J. MARK BALDWIN. *Psych. Rev.*, XV, 3, pp. 181-196.

The present article discusses the relation of the actual and the imaginative in the development of knowledge. Every cognitive content must have both renderings. The imaginative is the instrumental or dynamic factor; the actual is the truth-recognizing or static factor. No content is ever merely given; it is more or less the product of the selecting forces of consciousness. The imaginative is instrumental to the establishment of the actual. Not truth, however, but the imagination of that which may become truth, is instrumental. By the play of this imaginative construction, the factual passes into the instrumental image, which ultimately itself passes into the actual. The instrumental content, which can justly lay claim to truth, must be for common acceptance and must possess a generality by virtue of which its claims may be tested. But it never loses its personal aspect; it is always a reading which is the result of interest, and, because of this teleological nature, it possesses a degree of 'privacy.' It is only in the æsthetic experience that there is given us an inkling of how these two phases of the cognitive process come together. In cognitive experience dualism is emphasized; the factual and the teleological here tend to fall

apart. But in the over-logical and over-practical content, usually called æsthetic, we find a reunion of the separated phases. The æsthetic experience exhibits a degree of finality and absoluteness impossible to the development of experience as cognition. The object of contemplative interest is an object that embodies and fulfils the self. Having enumerated three ways in which the æsthetic experience may be considered absolute, the author concludes his article with a remark concerning idealism and realism. He urges that his comparative method offers the possibility of a satisfactory solution of the problem of the relativity of reals. The solution is found in the æsthetic mode of experience.

G. W. CUNNINGHAM.

Pragmatisme et intellectualisme. A. CHIDE. Rev. Ph., XXXIII, 4, pp. 367-388.

The dogmatism of theology, through Descartes's influence, is supposed to have given way to a different method, that of rationalism. In reality, however, rationalism is quite as dogmatic as theology. It uncritically assumes that there is a correspondence between the conceptions of reason and the nature of reality. This theory, however, refutes itself in that it gives rise to contradictory abstractions, all of which are assumed to be true. Out of this confusion, a new method is born, that of pragmatism. In opposition to rationalism, it denies that abstract logical categories are adequate to the nature of reality. It denies reality to anything but immediately given, concrete experience. But, in opposition to Descartes, it has tended to set a value on obscure thought, a tendency which would be fatal to intellectual life, if carried out. Manifestly, this extreme pragmatism is impossible. A reasonable pragmatism, which will be the metaphysics of the future, will mediate between the dogmatism and abstractions of rationalism and the obscure and unorganized thought of present-day pragmatism. Its line of advance is indicated by the study of the methodology of the sciences, which has made it possible to do equal justice to the concrete and immediate nature of reality and to the abstract constructions of science by showing that the latter have a necessary functional reality in organizing experience. Such a pragmatism would be rationalism made aware of its non-ontological character.

A. H. JONES.

The Thirteen Pragmatisms. A. O. LOVEJOY. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., V, 1, pp. 5-12; 2, pp. 29-39.

(1) Primarily, pragmatism maintained that the meaning of any proposition is reducible to the future consequences in experience to which that proposition points. The experience whose occurrence constitutes the meaning of the judgment may have one date; the apprehension of the judgment's validity may have quite another. The fullest knowledge of the belief's meaning, therefore, may throw no light on the question of its legiti-

macy. (2) The consequences of the *truth* of a proposition and the consequences of *belief* in a proposition have been habitually confused. Taken in the one sense, the theory is equivalent to the assertion that only definitely predictive propositions have real meaning. Taken in another sense, the theory does not require that propositions refer to the future at all. In the first sense, the formula has the effect of very narrowly limiting the range of significant judgments. In the second sense, it is the mildest of truisms. (3) But the pragmatic theory of meaning in its first sense leads to a theory about the meaning of truth. Judgments are true if their prediction is realized. But James makes an exception in favor of 'necessary truths,' which, since they coerce the mind as soon as they are clearly presented to it, are verified 'on the spot.' According to this phase of pragmatism, judgments are not true till they become true; and when they have become true, they have no importance, for their reference is to the dead past. (4) The notion of the *ex post facto* character of all truth is sometimes expressed by the observation that those propositions are true which 'will work' or which you can 'live by.' What is usually meant is, that those judgments are true which hitherto *have* worked. (5) But a belief may 'work' in two very different senses: either by having its actual prediction fulfilled, or by contributing to the energies, or efficiency, or chance of survival, of those who believe it. (6) This doctrine is a reflection of the doctrine of the real futurity or 'openness' of the future, and of the determinative or 'creative' efficacy of each 'present' moment in the ever-transient process of conscious judgment, choice, and action. (7) The criterion of the truth of knowledge, as formulated by Perry, is 'the satisfying character of the practical transition from cognitive expectation to fulfilment, or the resolution of doubt into practical immediacy.' (8) This is entirely different from the contention that to determine whether a proposition is true is to apply the test of 'satisfyingness' directly and *simpliciter*. (9) According to this view, satisfaction, as an essential mark of the apprehension of truth, can be had only upon condition that other satisfactions be ignored or flatly rejected. (10) Another pragmatism holds that 'axioms are postulates,' and that postulates are as valid as any human judgments can ever be, provided they be the expression of a genuine 'practical' need. (11) Kindred to this is the doctrine that axioms are necessities, and that the action of voluntary choice in belief is always limited by a permanent system of *a priori* principles of possibility and impossibility inhering in the nature of intellect. (12) A separable assertion is that of the equal legitimacy of those postulates which appear indispensable as presuppositions for effective dealing with the physical world, and of those which seem demanded in order to give meaning to men's moral and æsthetic natures. (13) Lastly, we find the doctrine that an essential part of our idea of an object or fact consists in an apprehension of its relation to some purpose or subjective interest on our part.

Are Mental Processes in Space? W. P. MONTAGUE. *The Monist*, XVIII, 1, pp. 21-30.

That the psychical exists in space is to be inferred from the fact that the ordinary man regards his mental states as located in his body. Further, it is a rule that every invisible thing is located in the same place as the visible thing which varies directly and immediately with it; *e. g.*, electricity or gravitative attraction. According to this rule, mental processes would be located in the central nervous system. To the objection that to locate consciousness in space is to make it mere appearance, we reply that the empirical consciousness to which we refer is generally considered as located in time without disrespect to the eternal consciousness. To the objection, that, if our sensations exist in space, they should appear as definitely extended, we answer that this is true of none of our experience admitted to exist in space, except the visual and tactual. The third objection, that, since consciousness in its very nature is incapable of being perceived externally, it cannot exist in space, would apply equally well to potential energy, which is admitted to exist in space. This suggests the hypothesis that consciousness is a form of potential energy. In the modes of potential energy into which nerve currents can pass, we have a system rich enough to express the manifoldness of psychic life. Besides, the determination of the intensity of a sensation according to the law of relativity parallels the determination of a mode of potential energy by the opposition of one mode of kinetic energy to another. The view outlined in this paper would have the advantage of reconciling interaction and parallelism.

C. H. WILLIAMS.

Consciousness and Reality. J. E. BOODIN. *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.*, V, 7, pp. 169-178; 9, pp. 225-234.

Consciousness cannot be a relation; for, since all relations are conscious relations, we cannot identify consciousness with the sum-total of its relations. The fact that consciousness appears under certain energetic conditions of structure and stimulus does not prove that it is nothing else than the interaction of structure and stimulus. For how can consciousness be produced out of non-conscious energies? Psychological processes may be regarded as energetic, but this does not mean that consciousness is energy. Conscious processes may be measured, not so consciousness. The interpretation of consciousness as a thing is unsatisfactory. The ego cannot be understood as a stream of conscious processes, for much of the associative mechanism is unconscious. The explanation of consciousness as an epiphenomenon is untenable; for how can material energetic processes produce something that is not energy? Parallelism is still more unintelligible. It only doubles the difficulty by leaving physiological and psychological processes suspended in the air. The interaction theory is just as unsatisfactory. For how can the consciousness of pain or blue interact

with the physiological processes of pain and blue. By regarding consciousness as an independent variable, we have the simplicity of materialism without the contradiction of trying to convert energy into non-energy. If you take away from the side of consciousness all that is energetic, is not consciousness reduced to an abstraction? Only in the same sense that space is an abstraction. Space has no causal relations to the energies in space, and yet it makes a decided difference to these energies that they must interact in space. Consciousness makes only one difference to reality, — the difference of awareness. It throws upon the energetic structure the responsibility for the diversity of facts and changes. Consciousness makes the difference between mere habit and instinct, on the one hand, and memory and apperception, on the other. It transforms the whole flow of change from mechanical to teleological causality, and thus makes possible an infinitely greater degree of individual adjustment. Consciousness is not a by-product of energy, but a new fact added. Pathological cases are due to physiological disorganization. Consciousness, as awareness, is a general precondition without which there could not be value at all, but consciousness does not explain any particular value or meaning. The distribution of consciousness, so far as psychology is concerned, is a question of evidence. But, for epistemological purposes, it is easier to assume that it is a constant, and that the difference in its effectiveness is due not to it but to the energetic conditions in the universe. This view of consciousness avoids the problem of origin. Consciousness is not private and subjective, but objective. Privacy is due to individual tendencies. This conception of consciousness does not solve the problem of knowledge, but it makes the problem less complicated. The problem of immortality remains the same on this as on any other theory. Individual immortality would depend upon the continuity of energetic conditions, not upon consciousness. This would fit in with the religious dogma of the resurrection of the body.

M. MOLLOY.

PSYCHOLOGY.

Gefühlssuggestion und Phantasiegefühl. ROBERT SAXINGER. Z. f. Psych., XLVI, 6, pp. 401-428.

The first half of this article deals with suggestion as a purely psychical event whose nature consists in the fact that something, because it is thought as real, is actually experienced as real. Its psychological basis is not merely a matter of ideas, but one of judgments or assumptions (*Annahmen*). The matter suggested is accepted as real or silently taken for granted. Of course the vividness of the images representing the suggested objects is also in many cases of great importance. Even feelings and emotional dispositions may be produced, changed, or destroyed, at least temporarily, through the influence of suggestion. In order that a suggested feeling may be experienced as real, it must be anticipated in the form of an imaginary, or better, fancied feeling (*Phantasiegefühl*), as Meinong has called

the qualitatively peculiar psychical process which stands midway between ideas and feelings, and which takes place whenever we try to recall a previously experienced feeling. The second half of the article refutes a number of objections by Dürr to a previous article by the author, "Über die Natur der Phantasiegefühle und Phantasiebegehungen." Saxinger reasserts that a feeling gradually fades away, not only under continuous affective excitation, but also by discontinuously repeated stimulation. However, fancied feelings are not subject to this process of dying away. Another mistake of Dürr seems to be his assumption that fancied feelings are simply emotional states of less intensity, while experience shows that they may have a very high intensity. Again, introspection and observation make it evident that fancied feelings are not changed in their quality or intensity by other previous or simultaneous feelings or emotions. Since, then, the fancied feelings behave in many respects so differently from other feelings, the conclusion seems to be justified that they must be different in kind.

L. R. GEISSLER.

Psychology: What Is It About? MARY WHITON CALKINS. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., IV, 25, pp. 673-683.

More adequate definition and classification are needed in psychology. Though sometimes abused, both are valuable, not only for introspective psychology, but for experimental and comparative psychology as well; for it is necessary to possess a preliminary knowledge of the object of study. (I) Psychology as the Science of the Idea: Whose Idea? Psychology is defined as (1) the science of the mental state, or idea; (2) the science of the mental function; and (3) the science of the conscious self. The writer is convinced that the third is the correct definition. The first is inadequate, for the question arises: Whose idea? It is experienced as the idea of a self; other idea-psychologists admit this. This self may be scientifically studied. (II) Psychology as Science of Mental Functions: Functions of What? Most functional psychologists regard consciousness as reaction to environment, and all are agreed that it is activity. The question arises: Activity of what? Psychology must then be the science of the functioner. Most functional psychologists tacitly accept this, though some may object that such a study is philosophical, not scientific, in character. If the functioner be conceived as the psycho-physical organism, it can certainly be studied scientifically.

C. H. WILLIAMS.

Sensory Affection and Emotions. H. T. WOOLLEY. Psych. Rev., XIV, 5, pp. 329-344.

After a general review of Stumpf's thesis that the sensory affections are themselves another class of sensations, coördinate with those already recognized, the author expresses his view that there is no sharp dividing line

between simple sensory affections and emotions. The simplest conceivable case of a sensory affection, in the usual acceptation of the term, is a pain sensation without organic or muscular accompaniments. It possesses but one quality, that of painfulness. The next simplest case is a state consisting of some other sensation, *e. g.*, temperature, accompanied by an algedonic sensation as secondary. Beyond this there seems to be an unbroken series of increasing complexity, occasioned by the addition of various organic and muscular sensations as secondary, and by increasing complexity in the central perceptual or ideational content, which ends only with the most complex emotion. If, then, we analyze any simple sensory affect or emotion, leaving aside those simplest cases, which exist rather as logical limits than as actual states, we find the same constituents, — a presentational or representational central content with an accompanying mass of sensations in which pleasantness or unpleasantness and muscular and organic sensations are prominent. When the central content is largely representational, and the accompanying mass of sensations is complex and intense, we call the experience an emotion; when the central content is presentational, and the mass of accompanying sensations not very complex, we call the experience a sensory affection. The decreased complexity is usually due to the lesser number of muscular and organic sensations. While the author agrees with Stumpf in regarding pleasure and pain in their simplest terms as themselves sensations, he disagrees with Stumpf in his theory that the emotions are a quite different type of experience from the simple sensory affections, and that a sharp line should be drawn between them.

TAIZO NAKASHIMA.

The Doctrine of Primary and Secondary Sensory Elements. B. SIDIS
Psych. Rev., XV, 1, pp. 44-68; 2, pp. 106-121.

When we take a mental cross-section of a moment of perceptual consciousness in the very act of the formation of a percept, we find sensory elements of a relatively intense character. The structure of the percept may be compared to that of the cell, a group of sensory elements constituting the nucleus, and a mass of other sensory elements forming the tissue. The nuclear elements may be regarded as the vital point of the perceptual system. When awakened by external excitation, they form the sensitive organization for the release of motor energy in definite directions. These sensory-motor reactions, with consequent kinæsthetic sensations, may be regarded as constituting the very essence of the world of external, material objects. The central nuclear elements are intense, distinct, and definite; the subordinate elements are of far less intensity. They form, nevertheless, the main content of the percept, giving it the fulness of reality. Yet a change of the subordinate elements does not matter so much as the slightest modification in the quality, or even in the intensity, of the nuclear elements. Regarded statically, the percept may be described figuratively as

a psychic compound. The percept forms a new compound, in which the component elements are disguised and transformed by the qualitative aspect of the central elements. The whole organism is invaded by the subtle influence of the nucleus, giving rise to definite sensori-motor reactions. The central nuclear elements thus come to present objective reality. In the course of evolution the sensory elements to which the organism is more sensitive, will be selected and become indicators of the total percept. The central elements forming the nucleus of the percept are given *directly* by the sense-organ stimulated by its appropriate sensory stimuli, while the subordinate sensory elements are given *indirectly*, — they cannot be traced to appropriate sensory stimuli. The indirect or secondary sensory elements are not images; they are essentially sensations. A sensation differs from an image, in that it possesses immediacy, intensity, externality, and cannot be called up at will. There are no memory images in a perceptual consciousness, although the latter may be closely associated with ideational processes. Such ideas, however, are on the fringe of the perceptual consciousness, and do not constitute the essence of the percept. Vivid images succeeding sensations are sometimes described as secondary sensations. Only such sensations are secondary, however, as follow in the domain of another sense-organ a sensation due to the stimulation of a peripheral sense-organ. Sensations are independent; images are interconnected. Yet sensations do call forth other sensations, secondary sensations which constitute the texture of the percept. When appearing isolated, secondary sensations are the simplest form of hallucinations. Hallucinations are systems of secondary sensations. Sensations can be ranged in a graduated series of *intensities*; images can be ranged in a graduated series of *vividness*. The image represents the sensation. The degree of vividness does not change the qualitative character of the representation. The slightest change in the intensity of the sensation, however, changes its qualitative character. The character of the representative element is its extraordinary plasticity and possibility of substitution. Under ordinary conditions of life, the gradated series of representative vividness runs parallel to the gradated series of sensory intensities. Strong stimulations may give rise to sensations of great intensity, but the vividness of the representative elements may fall so low as almost to reach the minimum. Dissociation results. Functional psychosis, with all its protean manifestations, may be reduced to variations of one fundamental attribute, vividness. A sensation, whether 'true' or 'false,' possesses rightfully the coefficient of reality as its necessary and inherent attribute. The percept, true or hallucinatory, consisting of sensory elements, has, therefore, the sensory coefficient of reality. Where the secondary sensory elements can be shifted and become primary, the percept is regarded as true; where the secondary sensory elements do not admit of being shifted, and thus of becoming primary, the percept is regarded as hallucinatory. Representative elements lack the sensory coefficient of reality. Nevertheless, the image is felt as

image because it possesses a character of its own. As an experience *sui generis* we claim for the representation an 'ideational' or 'representative' coefficient. The sensation has objective, the image subjective, reality. Writers on psychology often refer the coefficient of reality to the will. Baldwin holds that image a true memory which we are able to get again as a sensation by voluntarily repeating the series of muscular sensations which were associated with it in its first experience. The author believes, however, that we are just as sure of the external reality of a sensation referred to by the memory image, even if we cannot bring about the original experience. External reality is the *quale* of sensory experience; internal reality is the *quale* of the image. There is a view which finds the fundamental difference between percept and image in what is and what is not common to all selves. But a hallucination is as fully a percept though it may have no currency with my fellow men. And a percept possesses the coefficient of external reality. Psychologically regarded, moreover, the percept is as much a private experience as an image. External reality is given directly and immediately by the sensation or by the sensory compound, by the percept.

F. A. PEEK.

ETHICS.

La contradiction de l'homme. F. PAULHAN. Rev. Ph., XXXIII, 1, pp. 27-47; 2, pp. 145-168.

The author does not discuss morality in general, its reality, value, etc., but takes morality merely as a fact of human experience. As it applies to the particular nature of man, morality is a special study, but it may be seen that its range is universal. The duality of man's nature as a social animal and an egoistic individual is the most striking fact of man's life, and furnishes the reason for the existence of morality. The fact that there are two 'selves,' with the internal struggle arising from their incoherence, and the high intellectual development of man, make man the 'moral' animal. Man is neither exclusively individual nor exclusively social; he is in a sense a product of society, in that he represents his contemporaries, his ancestors, and also the race of the future, but he is none the less an individual. Each lives in and for others, but at the same time by others; and from this conflict in the struggle for existence arises morality. But morality, as applying only to the individual, would be nothing more than a body of rules of physiological and mental hygiene. As ordinarily understood, however, morality means action which conduces to the harmony of the social whole; and an individual is moral or criminal according as he contributes to, or detracts from, that harmony. The individual's interest in the whole is possible through the fact that a large number of his ideas are ideas of others, and, since these ideas of others form a part of the self, he can recognize their interests as identical with his own. Action upon these interests causes to be built up a group of sentiments which strengthen the social,

disinterested action of the individual ; in a word, there is developed a social instinct. While the social order shows many imperfections, these may be removed, in part at least, by believing in its solidarity. The individual must see that the unity of his personal life implies the unity of the life of society. Our egoistic and our social interests are so correlated that, when we act from egoistic desire, we persuade ourselves that we act according to moral laws. But the conflict remains, and is the condition of morality. Refusal to recognize imperfections in the social order does not contribute to its solidarity. Imperfections exist because of the conflict of individual and social instincts ; but the social instinct will prevail by means of the conceptions of the Divine will, the established laws, and promises of satisfactions in another life. Religious belief thus realizes harmony between the individual and the social instincts ; and, while this belief will in the future dissolve, its wreck will furnish new ideas to the social instinct. The conception of the 'ought' is the means by which harmony will be realized. The importance of the 'ought' has been over-estimated, the idea has been used to complicate what is simple. Examples of its proper use will show its meaning. A watch 'ought' to indicate time correctly ; and, if it does this, it is a good watch. An organ 'ought' to perform the function for which it is fitted ; its 'ought' and its 'rights' are determined by the needs of the organism. But there is in practice a difficulty here ; for the individual has a double function corresponding to his contradictory nature, and hence results the conflict. The triumph of the social instinct results in the tendency to obedience, which is thus a social reflex ; and through this conception of obedience the individual is flattered and intimidated to do the bidding of the social instinct. Even when the individual revolts against society, he imagines himself doing so in the interest of a better society. But, for the sake of clearness, we have here unduly simplified matters ; the idea of the 'ought' is obtained by analysis out of a whole mythology of illusions ; and, while its true source is in the social instinct, yet the social instinct is a complex of religious and æsthetic emotions, indeed, is a part of the complex of our whole life.

E. JORDAN.

Deux types d'immoralisme. GEORGES PALANTE. Rev. Ph., XXXIII, 3, pp. 274-285.

There are two points of view either of which the 'non-moralist' may assume, according to the influence he conceives morality to have on human conduct. The first consists in maintaining that that influence is very weak, the second in attributing to morality a strong hold upon the mind, but in regarding that influence as tyrannical. The first view regards morality as a negligible quantity ; the second regards it as a wicked demon which possesses and torments humanity. Bayle is the earliest of those who hold the first view. He is followed by Fourier, who holds that morality is a weak superfluity in the social mechanism. Stendhal follows with ridicule

of morality. Gobineau, de Gourmont, and Maurice Barrès, all agree that morality has little influence on human conduct. Maeterlinck, André Gide, Johan Bojer, and Georges Dumas, contend that morality is at present unsettled, or that it represents a pathological condition of society, that life surpasses in richness and variety what can be expressed in our moral codes. The second type of non-morality is represented by Stirner and Nietzsche. Stirner allows to morality a powerful but pernicious influence upon conduct. The rude hand of morality strikes mercilessly upon the noble manifestations of egoism. The attitude of Nietzsche is less clear. Instead of regarding morality as a force imposed upon life from without, he regards it as the servant of life, an illusion created by, and employed in the interests of life. But the servant has usurped authority and become tyrant. The first of these types of theory is merely psychological; the second is an ethical theory, but one working 'against the grain.' The first is perhaps exact and sufficient for unassuming natures; but, for vigorous and independent natures, the second is the proper attitude.

E. JORDAN.

The Struggle for Existence in Relation to Morals and Religion. MABEL ATKINSON. Int. J. E., XVIII, 3, pp. 291-311.

According to natural selection, the world order has evolved through what men call vices. Even Huxley, without offering a solution, asserts that social progress means a checking of the cosmic process at every step. Tolstoy, too, in emphasizing the renunciation of self, sets these tendencies against each other without explanation. Nietzsche declares that the cosmic process is the right one, all self-renunciation being 'slave morality.' He urges men to put aside sickly sympathy and advance toward the Superman. He does a service in dispelling cant and hypocrisy, but sympathy will remain. Schopenhauer owes much to biology. He starts by recognizing that all organisms are impelled by the will to live. Since, however, our desires can never be satisfied, our only hope lies in self-renunciation and negation of the will to live. Shaw's 'life force' is only another expression for the will to live. The same thought is to be found in recent discussions regarding the 'Immanent God.' This idea of an all-pervading force suggests the possibility of a reconciliation of religion and science. The new religion must improve society, be consistent with science, and provide for personal devotion. In animals and plants the will to live is purely selfish; in humanity it has come to recognize other individuals. In the family and community the struggle for existence is already in part suspended, and in time even war will cease. Man's capacity for social life is shown both in the subordination of the individual life to the life of others and in the strife against hereditary animal instincts. These teachings of biology were preceded by those of religion; love of humanity and even of animals was taught. Conversion is the final triumph of man over his animal ancestry. Thus, through the extension of the will to live, morality

can be reconciled with natural selection. Let us now estimate the worth of the systems mentioned above. Huxley's difficulty is overcome, for the moral process is but a higher form of the world process. Schopenhauer made a mistake in identifying the animal will to live with the human ; humanity finds happiness in love. Nietzsche is right in voicing the worth of physical life ; in the Super-man, too, he has furnished a new inspiration to man. Still, he fails by emphasizing intensity of life to the exclusion of extensity. The problem of the future is to unite the Christian with the pagan character.

C. H. WILLIAMS.

The Philosophical Basis of Ethics. GEORGE H. MEAD. Int. J. E., XVIII, 3, pp. 311-323.

An environment can exist for an organism only in so far as it corresponds to the receptivity of the organism. The organism thus determines its environment. The growth of the moral consciousness must correspond to that of the moral situation. Evolution has interpreted moral consciousness in terms of customs. Every phase of our experience comes within the sweep of conscience. It is but a step further to claim that the various intellectual, æsthetic, and perceptual processes exist only by reason of the act, and that the act alone is moral, not these functions. This would base metaphysics on ethics. The author does not enter on this discussion, but draws certain purposive implications within these lines. The first is that the motive is the recognition of the end as it arises in consciousness. We are familiar with three ethical standpoints : (1) that which holds that conscious control is only a higher stage of conduct unconsciously determined by ends ; (2) that which finds conduct only where reflective thought presents a transcendental end ; and (3) that which recognizes conduct only where the individual and the environment mutually determine each other. Moral necessity is assured only by the last, the inter-relation of self and situation. The necessity of uprightness in public affairs, for example, does not depend upon a transcendental ideal, but upon the commercial and social activities of those who make up the community. To push public reform is to emphasize these impulses in opposition to others. To correct an abuse, we must emphasize the interests it harms ; we cannot appeal to a power outside ourselves. Moral advances usually come through new interests which change the problem. The second implication is that the moral interpretation of experience must be found within experience. Explanation cannot be based on a moral order in the past or future. Moreover, a moral order cannot be built up suddenly in an emergency ; an individual either responds wholly according to habits or adopts habits. The control is the result of the mutual action of the individual and the environment ; where not completely modified, the process is intensely interesting, as is attested by the social sciences. The pulpit has not treated these problems scientifically and so has necessarily been silent in the re-

cent great moral issues of industry. The intellectual side of moral conduct will be eliminated as long as interpretation lies outside experience. Moreover, interpretation of evil with reference to an external ideal takes it away from the real situation by the reconstruction of which it must be remedied.

C. H. WILLIAMS.

The Ethics of Nietzsche. A. C. PIGOU. Int. J. E., XVIII, 3, pp. 343-355.

The poetical element in Nietzsche makes his work disjointed. The key here used is that of means and end. It is Nietzsche's view that certain things, good in themselves, are bad because of their effects, and that others, bad in themselves, are good because of their effects. Suffering, bad in itself, is good because of its results. Just so the bondage of spirit which Christianity produced has educated the spirit. Some people contribute more to the good of the whole by remaining bad. It is so with women, who should not be educated, and with all the common people. We now pass to cases of goodness which are bad because of their effects. Sympathy tends to the preservation of individuals who, for the good of the race, ought to perish. Accordingly, Nietzsche condemns sympathy, not in itself, but because of these effects. As regards the things which Nietzsche considers good in themselves, the ultimate good belongs to a particular kind of conscious beings, to Beyond-men. The conception of Beyond-man does not refer to a future life in another world, but to a state of heart possible on this earth both now and in the future. The first qualities of the Beyond-man are strength and energy. He must also be well-rounded; even evil qualities must be present. Finally, sympathy, which is usually supposed to be totally condemned, is given a place. In brief, there must be harmony of character. This harmony is to consist in the development of all the capacities in so far as they tend to life. That this view is inadequate needs hardly be said; we do not want mere quantity of life; we want to discover the nature of the good life.

C. H. WILLIAMS.

The Individualism of Value. J. ELLIS MCTAGGART. Int. J. E., XVIII, 4, pp. 433-445.

The author intends to show that the terms 'good' and 'bad' do not ultimately apply to the universe as a whole. It is generally admitted, and is here assumed, that nothing is good or bad except conscious beings and their conscious states, though neither the conscious being possessing them nor any other conscious being need recognize them as having value. Moreover, such states include not only those which give us direct perception of the external world but also those which give us knowledge of it in any way. Accordingly, the universe cannot be good or bad unless it is a conscious being. It can have value only as a means, not as an end;

though of course it would be legitimate to predicate value of it, referring to the average of the conscious beings in it, just as one would say, "This is a drunken town." The belief that the universe has value as a whole is thus excluded from all except certain pantheistic systems which hold that the universe is a conscious being. Even in them, judgments of value are more individualistic than other judgments. For, if there are x finite consciousnesses within God's consciousness, the whole number of consciousnesses is $x + one$. God may be righteous while an individual is unrighteous. Even materialists have sometimes failed to recognize the individualism of value, though it is chiefly the idealists who have erred here. Their mistake has been due in part to the fact that the good of an individual depends largely on his relations to others, but more especially to the fact that not only are these relations conditions of Good, but that it is the consciousness of them which is the Good. Idealism has gone too far in contending that the relation has value in itself. What is good is not the relation, but the state of the individual is being one of the terms of the relation, though, of course, there need not be any conscious recognition of this value. It follows that the value of the states of consciousness of several individuals taken together can be nothing but an aggregate. The individualism of Hedonism, therefore, need no longer be a reproach. It also follows that the individual is ultimately the end; society is but a means. Accordingly, it is foolish to talk of 'the religion of socialism,' for religion deals with ultimate values, not with means. Animal-worship is thus more reasonable than worship of the State.

C. H. WILLIAMS.

NOTES.

PROFESSOR FRIEDRICH PAULSEN.

Friedrich Paulsen, who died at his home in Steglitz on August 14, was born at Langenhorn, Holstein, July 16, 1846. He came from a hardy race of seamen and tillers of the soil, and as the only son of a thriving farmer was expected to follow in the footsteps of his fathers. But the desire for knowledge was so strong in the lad and his intellectual talents so marked that his parents reluctantly yielded to his wishes and permitted him to study at the higher schools. After the necessary preparation in the humanistic gymnasium, Paulsen entered the University of Erlangen in 1866, and received his doctorate from the University of Berlin in 1871. In 1875 he established himself at the last-named institution as a *Privatdocent* of Philosophy, and in 1878 was made an *extra-ordinarius*. The latter title he held until 1893, when he was promoted to the full Professorship of Philosophy and Pedagogy, an office in which he rendered faithful and distinguished service down to within a few weeks of his death.

As a lecturer Professor Paulsen exercised a wholesome influence upon a large circle of German students. His manner was simple and earnest, free from any rhetorical display, but appealing to the sober reason and common sense of his hearers. In a country in which many extravagant notions are presented, he never lost his intellectual balance, but endeavored to see things as they are and to describe them as he saw them. It was owing to his clear and healthy judgment that his opinions on questions of importance to the German people were so eagerly sought and so highly valued during the last ten years of his life. His heart was as sound as his brain; his emotions were deep, but they were quiet, and he impressed one as a man who had gained complete mastery over himself.

Professor Paulsen's success in arousing a living interest in the study of philosophy through the spoken and written word was great. Among his more popular books the *Einleitung in die Philosophie* passed through nineteen editions from 1892 to 1907, and his *System der Ethik* through eight editions since 1889. In the former work he presented his system of philosophy, which he characterized as idealistic monism and which shows the influence of Fechner's teachings. His ethical theory followed the lines marked out by such thinkers as Aristotle and Spinoza; it rejected the old intuitionism as well as hedonism, and called itself *teleological energism*, a term which has since become current in German thought. In his *Philosophia Militans*, first published in 1901, he entered the field of controversy and attacked clericalism and naturalism, both of which he regarded as the sworn enemies of philosophy.

Although some German writers were inclined to look upon Paulsen as a

Popularphilosoph rather than as a technical scholar, his work of investigation was generally recognized as highly meritorious. At any rate, it was constantly referred to and reckoned with by those working in the same fields. His *Versuch einer Entwicklungsgeschichte der Kantischen Erkenntnisstheorie*, Leipzig, 1875, his *Geschichte des gelehrten Unterrichts auf den deutschen Schulen und Universitäten*, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1885, second edition, 1896, and his *Immanuel Kant, sein Leben und seine Lehre*, Leipzig, 1898, fourth edition, 1903, are certainly among the best contributions that have been made to the history of philosophy and education during recent years. And it surely would not hurt the cause of education if a few more books like *Die deutschen Universitäten und das Universitätsstudium*, Berlin, 1902, and *Das deutsche Bildungswesen*, Leipzig, 1906, were published in Germany or any other country.

Personally, Professor Paulsen was a man of noble character and high ideals who won the respect and affection of all who came in contact with him, and his death will be deplored by a large number of American students of philosophy who enjoyed his instruction and friendship.

FRANK THILLY.

In the footnote on p. 407 of the July number of this REVIEW, Professor Titchener is made to suggest the word "enpathy" as an equivalent of *Einfühlung*. The word should have been printed "empathy."

Mr. T. W. Cole, recently Professor of Psychology at the University of Oklahoma, has accepted an appointment as Instructor of Experimental Psychology at Wellesley College.

Dr. J. W. Hudson, formerly Assistant at Harvard University, has been appointed Assistant Professor of Philosophy in the University of Missouri.

Professor G. A. Tawney, of the University of Illinois, has accepted a call to the chair of Philosophy at the University of Cincinnati.

Charles H. Judd, Professor of Psychology in Yale University, has been appointed Dean of the School of Education at the University of Chicago. Professor Judd will, however, remain at Yale during the present academic year.

Alfred H. Jones, formerly Assistant at Cornell University, has been appointed *locum tenens* in Philosophy at Dalhousie College.

We give below a list of the articles, etc., in the current philosophical periodicals :

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, XV, 5 : *H. Heath Bawden*, Studies in Æsthetic Value : (II) The Nature of Æsthetic Emotion ; *M. Meyer*, The Nervous Correlate of Pleasantness and Unpleasantness (II) ; *H. A. Peterson*, Correlation of Certain Mental Traits in Normal School Students.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, V, 8 : *Adolf Meyer*, The Problems of Mental Reaction-types, Mental Causes, and Diseases ; Literature ; Notes and News.

V, 9: *F. Kuhlmann*, The Present Status of Memory Investigation ; *J. W. Baird*, The Problems of Color-Blindness ; Literature ; Books Received ; Notes and News.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, V, 17: *Guglielmo Salvadori*, Positivism in Italy ; *George R. Dodson*, The Function of Philosophy as an Academic Discipline ; Discussion ; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature ; Journals and New Books ; Notes and News.

V, 18: *Henry Rutgers Marshall*, Subattentive Consciousness and Suggestion ; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature ; Journals and New Books ; Notes and News.

V, 19: *Frank Thilly*, Friedrich Paulsen ; *J. H. Farley*, Types of Unity ; *James H. Tufts*, Ethical Value ; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature ; Journals and New Books ; Notes and News.

ARCHIV FÜR SYSTEMATISCHE PHILOSOPHIE, XIV, 3: *Ludwig Stein*, Das Problem der Geschichte ; *Otto Janssen*, Gedanken über den empirischen Ursprung der Causalität ; *F. Lifschitz*, Zur Kritik des Relativismus ; *Albert Sichler*, Über falsche Interpretation des kritischen Realismus Wundt's (Fortsetzung.) ; *Kristian B. R. Aars*, Der Hass und die Liebe ; *N. Loskij*, Thesen zur "Grundlegung des Intuitivismus" ; *Georg Wendel*, Kritik einiger Grundbegriffe des transzendentalen Idealismus ; *A. Zielencyzk*, Ein Abschnitt aus der polnischen Philosophie der Gegenwart ; *Rudolf Schleiden-Stiftung*, Rechts- und staatswissenschaftliche Fakultät Freiburg i. Br. ; Die neuesten Erscheinungen auf dem Gebiete der systematischen Philosophie ; Systematische Abhandlungen in den Zeitschriften ; Eingegangene Bücher.

KANT-STUDIEN, XIII, 3: *Oskar Ewald*, Die deutsche Philosophie im Jahre 1907: *August Stadler*, Die Frage als Prinzip des Erkennens und die "Einleitung" der Kritik der reinen Vernunft ; *Richard v. Schubert-Soldern*, Die Grundfragen der Ästhetik unter kritischen Zugrundelegung von Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft ; *August Messer*, Heinrich Gomperz, Weltanschauungslehre ; *Paul Menzer*, Die neu aufgefundenen Kantbriefe ; *Heinrich Romundt*, Vorschlag zu einer Änderung des Textes von Kants Kritik der praktischen Vernunft ; Rezensionen ; Selbstanzeigen.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE, XLVIII, 3 u. 4: *Carl Friedrich Wie-gand*, Untersuchungen über die Bedeutung der Gestaltqualität für die Erkennung von Wörtern ; *Willy Hellpack*, Unbewusstes oder Wechselwirkung ; *Paul v. Liebermann* und *Géza Révész*, Über Orthosymphonie ; Literaturbericht.

XLVIII, 5 u. 6: *Willy Hellpack*, Unbewusstes oder Wechselwirkung (Schluss) ; *Sidney Atruts*, Die Function der Temperatursinne in warmen Bädern ; *T. J. de Boer*, Zur gegenseitigen Wortassoziation ; *Erich Becher*, Energieerhaltung und psychologische Wechselwirkung ; *Otto Lipmann*, Eine Methode zur Vergleichung von zwei Kollektivgegenständen ; Literaturbericht.

XLIX, 1 u. 2: *Richard Hennig*, Beiträge zur Psychologie des Doppel-Ichs; *E. v. Aster*, Die psychologische Beobachtung und experimentelle Untersuchung von Denkvorgängen; *Anathon Aall*, Über den Massstab beim Tiefsehen in Doppelbildern; Literaturbericht.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, XXXIII, 8: *A. Fouillée*, La volonté de conscience comme base philosophique de la morale; *M. Milloud*, La formation de l'idéal; *Ch. Richet*, La guerre et la paix au point de vue philosophique; Notes et discussions; Analyses et comptes rendus; Revue des périodiques étrangers.

XXXIII, 9: *A. Schinz*, Anti-pragmatisme: (1) Pragmatisme et modernisme; *Dr. Jankelevitch*, Du rôle des idées dans l'évolution des sociétés; *R. Cousinet*, La solidarité enfantine: étude de psychologie sociale; Notes et discussions; Analyses et comptes rendus; Revue des périodiques étrangers; Notices bibliographiques.

REVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE, VIII, 8: *A. Bouvyssonie*, De la réduction à l'unité des principes de la raison; *Abbé Gayraud*, Les vieilles preuves de l'existence de Dieu (fin); *P. Duhem*, Le mouvement absolu et le mouvement relatif; Enquête sur l'idée de démocratie; *Ch. Boucaud*, Une intéressante répercussion de la philosophie contemporaine dans la jurisprudence; Analyses et comptes rendus; L'enseignement philosophique.

VIII, 9: *Mgr. Le Roy*, Chez les primitifs africains (premier article); *Séraphin Belmont*, L'existence de Dieu d'après Duns Scot (premier article); *F. Chovet*, Les principes de la raison sont-ils réductibles à l'unité; *P. Duhem*, Le mouvement absolu et le mouvement relatif (dixième article); *P.-J. Cuche*, Les deux aspects de l'immanence et le problème religieux; Analyses et comptes rendus; Périodiques; L'enseignement philosophique.

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE, XVI, 4: *R. Berthelot*, Sur le pragmatisme de Nietzsche; *L. Vialleton*, La loi biogénétique fondamentale de Haeckel; *J. Dagnan-Bouveret*, L'aphasie et les localisations cérébrales; Discussions; Enseignement; Questions pratiques; Supplement.

XVI, 5: Études sur le mouvement philosophique contemporain à l'étranger: *J. Benrubi*, Allemagne; *J. S. Mackenzie*, Angleterre; *F. Thilly*, États Unis d'Amérique; *G. Amendola*, Italie; *H. Höffding*, Scandinavie; *F.-G. Calderon*, Sud-Amérique; Supplement.

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA E SCIENZE AFFINI, XIX, 1-3: *R. Ardigò*, A. Comte, H. Spencer e un positivista italiano; *E. Troilo*, Efficienza e forme del pensiero positivo nel medio evo e nella filosofia moderna (cont. e fine); *A. Renda*, I processi selettivi della coscienza; *R. Mondolfo*, La filosofia della proprietà alla "Costituente" e alla "Legislativa" nella Rivoluzione Francese; *G. Natali*, Che cos'è la storia? *Antonio Marchesini*, Vizi della parola nella scuola; *R. Ardigò*, Canti di Enrico Heine; Questioni universitarie; Per l' "anima della scuola"; Autorelazioni Analisi e Cenni.

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[N. B. —(a) stands for original articles, (b) for book notices, (d) for discussions, (n) for notes, (r) for reviews of books, and (s) for summaries.]

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
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




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